MARATHA-RAJPUT RELATIONS DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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BY

KALPANA SAHU

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
DELHI-110007

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ABSTRACT

The Maratha-Rajput relations is an issue which occupies considerable space in the Mughal chronicals of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and in the writings of early colonial administrators. Both, the Marathi as well as Rajasthani sources provide extensive and significant information relating to the changing contours in their relations.The Marathas self-perception and a set of social attributes ascribed to them by others are in sharp contrast. As the Marathas began to resist and later challenge Mughal empire, they were characterized as predatory elements by the historians of the empire. Since the Marathas were in the forefront to resist the expansion of the English East India Company in Central and Northern India, they began to be portrayed as 'robbers' etc. by early colonial administrators. These representations of the Marathas in Mughal and colonial sources still persist. However, one must take cognizance of the fact that the Maratha history to be found in most textbooks is still redolent with images of 'bandits'.

No wonder that the value judgements of Mughal historians and colonial administrators continue as axioms in historiography. However, there is need to re-look at these pronouncements upon the Marathas. It is also important to note that Mughal-centric accounts of the late eighteenth century offer a different perception of the Marathas. They are less virulent in their criticism. Some scholars have re-looked at the Marathas basing themselves on Marathi sources. Similarly we come across Rajput-centric accounts of the Maratha-Rajput relations. There is need to look at the Maratha-Rajput relations during the eighteenth century in the light of Rajasthani sources. The Maratha-Rajput relations have often been depicted as hostile. Was this hostility all pervasive or their relations were cordial at the social, cultural and political levels. Else conflict and cordiality co-existed. In the present work an attempt is being made to re-look at various facets of the Maratha-Rajput relations. While taking into consideration the Mughal, Maratha, Rajput and colonial approaches, our effort would be to focus on hitherto unused Rajasthani sources.

While reviewing the literature, we find that some of the Mughal court historians and colonial authorities perceptions of the Marathas still continue to find place in modern

historical writing. In Mughal chronicles, the Marathas are associated with raids and destruction. The biasness of the Mughal court historians and officials in the context of their dealings with the Marathas is obvious. As the Marathas successfully challenged the Mughal authority, the concern of the Mughal historians and officials indisputably influenced their perception of the Marathas. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Mughal accounts see the Marathas negatively. Khafi Khan's *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, an important contemporary Persian source, profiles Shivaji as, "the truculent rebel",[1]"the designing rascal",[2] "the treacherous foe",[3] and "the bloodthirsty assassin",[4] and the Marathas as a, "race of Robbers",[5] and as rapacious elements. In his work, *Nushka-i-Dilkusha*, Bhimsen calls the Marathas as 'malefactors'.[6]

European accounts related to this particular period are predominantly British who had their own political agenda. Adnre Wink says that the first generation of British administrators depicted the Maratha rule with more venom than even the Mughals. He says that the British officers views were based more on sanctimonious moralizing rather than dispassionate and objective assessments of economic or political processes.[7] In Tod's writings there is a monolithic representation of the Marathas[8]. We find a similar echo in the writings of V.A. Smith.[9]

However, recent researches based on the Maratha sources have challenged both the Mughal and British portrayal of the Marathas. They have been arguing that the Marathas were not a habitual destroyer of the economy, rather they provided an alternative administration to the Mughals in the territories conquered by them. Thus, Andre Wink[10] and Stewart Gordon[11] have portrayed the Marathas in a new light.

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1 Khafi Khan Muhammad Hashim, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab* in H.M. Elliot and J. Dowson ed., *The History of India as told by its own Historians*, Vol. VII, London, 1867-77, p. 258.
2 Ibid., p.259.
3 Ibid., p. 260.
4 Ibid., p.260.
5 Ibid., p. 464.
6 Bhimsen, Nushkha-i Dilkusha, tr. Jadunath Sarkar, ed. V. G. Khobrekar, Bombay, 1971, pp.138-140.
7 Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India: Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth-century Maratha Svarajya*, (hereafter, Land and Sovereignty in India), Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2009, p. 5.
8 James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, The Central and Western Rajpoot States of India,* Vol. I,II Indian Publication Society, Calcutta, 1898.
9 V.A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, OUP, 1920, P. 436.
10 Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India.*
11 Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1994.

There is a rich historiography related to the Maratha penetration in Rajasthan. As has been already discussed, James Tod's treatment of Maratha-Rajput relations is highly biased in favour of the Rajputs. J.N. Sarkar's work, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*[12] in four volumes is highly informative and comprehensive. But Sarkar is highly judgemental on each event and the persons involved. It covers all the major political events involving the Marathas and the Rajput States. Subsequent historical writings on Maratha penetration in the region and Maratha-Rajput relations during the eighteenth century have been largely Rajput-centric in approach. Except for Jaipur, Maratha relations with the major Rajput States which witnessed Maratha inroads are presented in the works of G.R. Parihar,[13] K.S. Gupta,[14] R.P. Shastri,[15] M.L. Sharma,[16] Beni Gupta[17] and R.K. Saxena.[18] While examining the relations of the Marathas with the States of Jaipur, Marwar, Kota and Bundi, they have focused more on political narrative about the Maratha-Rajput relations in their works.

G.R. Parihar's work, *Marwar and the Marathas (1724-1843)* throws light on various stages through which Maratha-Rajput relations passed up to 1818. The work shows clash of interest between the two in Gujarat and the attempt to curb the Maratha menace by Abhay Singh, the Jodhpur Raja. The events following Abhay Singh's death leading to Maratha penetration into Marwar and the history of Maratha-Rajput relations are dealt with by Parihar. K.S. Gupta's book, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations (1735-1818)* traces the relationship between the two from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century. He has shown how the history of Mewar during this period is a record of the tragic downturn. He treats the Maratha domination of Mewar as a great calamity. R.K. Saxena's work on '*Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*', is more comprehensive and covers the States of Jaipur, Marwar, Mewar, Kota and Bundi during the period 1761-

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12 J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vols. I-IV, Calcutta, 1932-50.
13 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas : 1724-1843 A.D.*, Hindi Sahitya Mandir, Jodhpur, 1968.
14 K.S. Gupta, *Mewar and Maratha Relations (1735-1818)*, S. Chand and Company Ltd., New Delhi, 1971.
15 R.P. Shastri, *Jhala Zalim Singh (1730-1823)*, Raj Printing Works, Jaipur, 1971.
16 M.L. Sharma, *History of the Jaipur State*, The Rajasthan Institute of Historical Research, Jaipur, 1969.
17 Beni Gupta, *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan Through the Mukandara Pass*, (hereafter *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan),* Research Publications, Delhi, 1979.
18 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana 1761-1818 A.D.*, S. Chand & Company (Pvt.) Ltd. New Delhi, 1973.

1818. He has shown how the Rajputs themselves created atmosphere which facilitated the Maratha control over Rajput States. J.N. Sarkar and Raghubir Sinh's '*A History of Jaipur*',[19] also touches Jaipur-Maratha relations in a broader context. V.S. Bhatnagar's work, '*Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh*',[20] provides useful information on Jaipur-Maratha relations during Sawai Jai Singh's reign.

The contribution of these scholars is tremendous, yet they have ignored to examine some very important Rajasthani sources for understanding the complex nature of their relationship in totality. They largely re-iterated Tod's approach. An indepth account of the nature of Maratha domination and their political, social and economic process of the State formation in the eighteenth century is long overdue.

The Maratha-Rajput relations need to be examined in the context of the emergence of the Marathas as the sole contestant for political supremacy in North India. What kind of change could be discerned once the encounter between the Marathas and other power located in North India began? Which factors enabled the Marathas to reach the pinnacle of power during the period from 1753 tp 1759 in North India? Yet the question arises that at the same time what led to the political isolation of the Marathas which found manifestation at the battle of Panipat in 1761 which proved disastrous for the Marathas. How did the Rajputs and Rajasthan figure in the period subsequent to the battle of Panipat? Did the Marathas ever visualize a well conceived Rajput policy in the context of their future plans to regain and retain political ascendency? Why was their handling of the Rajputs vastly different from the Mughals? Did the Marathas exercise paramount authority over the Rajput clan States in the same manner as did the Mughals ? The question arises did the indifferent attitude of the Rajputs towards the Marathas shape the Maratha policy in Rajasthan or they did not consider the co-operation of the Rajputs necessary in the pursuit of their ambitions in North Indian politics? The advancement of the Marathas in Rajasthan also raises the question of the perception of the Marathas and their representation in non-Marathi sources and the nature of their dealings with the local societies. Did the image of the

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[19] Jadunath Sarkar and Raghubir Sinh's, A History of Jaipur c..1503-1938, Revised and ed. by Raghubir Sinh, Orient Long man, Delhi 1984.

[20] V.S. Bhargava, '*Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh 1688-1743,* Imper India, Delhi, 1974.

Marathas change overtime in the context of historical situation of North India in general and of Rajasthan in particular.

In the wake of the declining Mughal authority during the eighteenth century the Rajputs were left to fend for themselves. The waning Mughal control encouraged the rulers of the principal Rajput States to pursue the policy of territorial expansion of their *watan* (dominion) areas at the expence of the Mughals. It also paved the way for the revival of the old Rajput polity. The Rajput States witnessed growing inter-state feuds and intra-clan rivalries. Succession disputes paved the way for the entry of the Marathas who were invited to intervene in the internal disputes by one of the contending parties. Did it amount to implicit recognition of the paramount authority of the Marathas by the Rajputs or the Marathas were desirous to replace the Mughals as the paramount power in Rajasthan?

Nature of Source Material

Since the Rajput States were the main target of the Maratha attacks in the eighteenth century, it is important to study the relations of the Marathas with the Rajputs as recorded in the Rajasthani sources, both primary as well as secondary. The nature of the present study necessitates the use of contemporary sources as far as possible. An attempt has been made to weave into the narrative ample citations from original documents. The Rajput States of Kota, Bundi, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur and Bikaner have rich Archival sources related to this period. The richest collection are the Jaipur records[21] which in turn are compiled under *kharitas, chitthiyats, dastur komwar – dikhni*, *Amber records*, *arzdashts*, etc.

The secondary sources used are the modern historical works. Kaviraj Shyamaldas's *Vir Vinod*[22] is one of the earliest Indian historical works written in Hindi. Though Mewar was the central concern of Shyamal Das, the work also focuses on the slow and gradual hold of

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21 Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, Amber/ Jaipur records, *Kharitas, Dastur Komwar - Dikhni,* Vols. IX and X, *Chitthis, Arzdashts, Yaddashti, Khatut Ahalkaran, Kapat-Dwara.*

22 Shyamal Das, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, (*Mahachampu)* ed., Chandra Prakash Dewal, Sahitya Akadami, New Delhi, 2007, Vols. IV, VI, VII.

the Marathas on the other States of Rajasthan. The other works used in the present work are the *Khyats* of Nainsi,[23,24] *Rathora ri Khyat*[25] and *Marwar ri Khyat*.[26]

Marathi letters dispatched from the offices of Peshwa *Daftar* and other Marathi sources cover a large number of issues concerning the Maratha-Rajput relations. Besides these sources, the early correspondence of the East India Company's officials also need to be looked into.

Chapterization

The present work is divided into five chapters. Each chapter covers a particular aspect or stage in Maratha presence in Rajasthan that emerges from the analysis of the primary and secondary sources. The emphasis is largely on the relations of the Marathas with the two major Rajput States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The study is limited to these two States in order to make it viable in terms of the handling of vast primary source material which is available in Rajasthani and Marathi.

The **first chapter** deals with '**Maratha Intervention in Rajasthan: 1730-1760 (Part-I)'.** The time frame taken into consideration is from 1730-1760. For the sake of a better understanding of their relations, this period takes into consideration the initial phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations first in the context of the Mughal-Maratha relations and thereafter in the context of the decline of Mughal central authority and its implications for Rajput States. There was a revival of the pre-Mughal inter and intra-clan rivalries in the Rajput States in the wake of the waning Mughal power which facilitated the entry of the Marathas into Rajasthan. Thus, the Marathas initially entered Rajasthan to settle the domestic feuds, for which they were hired. Later they became the masters who levied tribute and ravaged the land each successive year.

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[23] Muhnot Nainsi, *Marwar-ra-pargana-ri-Vigat,* ed. Narain Singh Bhati, Vol. I, Vol. II, Vol. III, Jodhpur, Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, 1968.

[24] Muhnot Nainsi, *Muhnot Nainsi ri Khyat,* ed. Badri Prasad Sakaria, Vol. I, 1960, Vol. II, 1962, Rajasthan Research Institute, Jodhpur.

[25] Aaidan Khidiya, *Rathora ri Khyat(Jodhpur Raya ka Iihas),* ed, Hukum Singh Bhati, Vols. II and III, Itihas Anusandhan Sansthan, Chupasani, Jodhpur and Rajasthani Granthagar, Jodhpur, 2007.

[26] Tilokchand Joshi, *Marwar ri khayat,* ed. Hukum Singh Bhati, Rajasthani Shodh Sansthan, Chaupasani, Jodhpur, 2000.

The chapter also discusses Jai Singh's governerships of Malwa, along with a brief discussion about the various Rajput States, with the main thrust being the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. While taking into consideration the two major sub-divisions of Rajasthan, viz., the north-western and south-eastern, an effort has been made to explore the levels of production – agricultural, mineral etc. This would help to determine the motivations that propelled the Marathas to deal with different states of Rajasthan.

The **second chapter** is entitled, **'Maratha Intervention in Rajasthan: 1761-1794 (Part-II)'**. The Maratha defeat in the third battle of Panipat emboldened the Rajputs to resist the Marathas. The Maratha defeat at Panipat in 1761 demonstrated their weakness which did not go unnoticed by the Rajputs. The present study explores whether there was a continuity or change in the Maratha-Rajput relations in the post-Panipat phase. The phase ends with the final subjugation of the Rajput states by Mahadaji Sindhia who later died when he was at the zenith of his power. The chapter also focuses on the local Rajput support availed of by the Marathas.

The **third chapter** focuses on the, **'Economic Impact of the Maratha Presence in Jaipur and Jodhpur States'.** The *kharitas, chitthis, yaddashti,* are the chief sources of information for this chapter. It was common knowledge that Maratha visitations in Rajasthan were not a happy experience both for the Rajput rulers and their subjects. The chapter focuses on the economic strain on the State exchequer and the hardships suffered by the local people. It also highlights the various means adopted by the State and the people to resist and mitigate the Marathas. This chapter also discusses the impact of the Maratha presence on the economy of the region. What measures were adopted by the State to overcome the financial crisis? How much and in what form were the payments made by the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur?

The **fourth chapter** deals with the, '**Diplomatic Ties and Socio-Cultural Co-operation between the Marathas and Rajputs',**The relationship between the Rajputs and the Marathas has been generally seen as permanent hostility and antagonism. The general perception is that the Marathas made armed incursions, plundered and devastated the Rajput States. Perhaps this is just one side of the picture. Our sources explores whether their relations were marked by the existence of

maintenance of social ties and areas of co-operation. *Dastur komwar – Dikhni* and the *kharitas* are the chief sources of information for this chapter. The other themes discussed in this chapter are diplomatic and trade relations, the nature of communication and how people from both sides interacted with each other. The Marathas engaged in different professions visiting Rajasthan are also discussed.

The **fifth chapter** focuses on **'Maratha Occupation of Rajasthan and Rajput Resistance'**.*Kharitas* are the chief source of information used in this chapter. An effort has been made to study the territorial arrangements made by the Marathas in the territories transferred to them by the Rajput rulers. It also attempts to study the nature of administrative control of the Marathas in these areas. An attempt has also been made to look at the forms of resistance of the Rajputs to the Maratha domination. How the Marathas responded to the resistance of the Rajputs and manifestation of the antipathy of the Rajputs towards the Marathas are also examined in this chapter.

At the end it may be concluded that the Maratha-Rajput relation is a field of study which despite being impregnated with daunting difficulties needs to be understood on the basis of contemporary documentation and not modern prejudices. In this work we have been able to explore, basing ourselves on a variety of sources, the nuanced and complex facets in the Maratha-Rajput relations during the eighteenth century.

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INTRODUCTION

The Maratha-Rajput relations is a subject which occupies considerable space in the Mughal chronicals of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and in the writings of early colonial administrators. Both, the Marathi as well as Rajasthani sources provide extensive and significant information relating to their relations.The Marathas self-perception and a set of social attributes ascribed to them by others are in sharp contrast. As the Marathas began to resist and later challenge Mughal empire, they were characterized as predatory elements by the historians of the empire. Since the Marathas were in the forefront to resist the expansion of the English East India Company in Central and Northern India, they began to be portrayed as 'robbers' etc. by early colonial administrators. These representations of the Marathas in Mughal and colonial sources still survive. However, one must take cognizance of the fact that the Maratha history found in most of the textbooks is still redolent with images of 'bandits'.

Thus, the value judgements of Mughal historians and colonial administrators continue as axioms in historiography. There is need to re-look at these pronouncements upon the Marathas. It is also important to note that Mughal-centric accounts of the late eighteenth century offer a different perception of the Marathas. Some scholars have re-looked at the Marathas basing themselves on village level Marathi sources. Similarly we come across Rajput-centric accounts of the Maratha-Rajput relations. There is need to look at the Maratha-Rajput relations during the eighteenth century in the light of Rajasthani sources. The Maratha-Rajput relations have often been depicted as hostile. Was this hostility all pervasive or their relations were cordial at the social, cultural and political levels. Else conflict and cordiality co-existed. In the present work an attempt is being made to re-look at various facets of the Maratha-Rajput relations. We will examine the Maratha-Rajput relations by focusing mainly on Rajput sources.

Here it is essential to briefly understand the nature of the Maratha movement that rose during the seventeenth century. It coincided with the emergence of the Marathas as the most potent political entity in India by the end of the first quarter of the

eighteenth century. Historians have different perceptions about the Maratha movement. To Jadunath Sarkar and G.S. Sardesai it was a 'Hindu reaction' against the communal policies of Aurangzeb.[1] M.G. Ranade calls it a movement of 'national independence against foreign rule.'[2]Historically though the rise of the Maratha movement was anterior to the communal policies of Aurangzeb, it cannot be explained in terms of the so-called religious reaction alone. An examination of the Maratha ruling elite would show that it retained its regional character to the end.[3] Shivaji did assume the title of *haindava-dharmoddharak* at the time of his coronation. But it can only be regarded as a general appellation common to many Rajput princes at that time.[4] Later when the Peshwas pursued their policy of Northward expansion, it did not deter them to demand *khandani* or *mamlat* (tribute) from their co-religionists, viz. the Rajputs.

James Grant Duff published the first history of the Marathas in three volumes way back in 1826.[5] Ever since then, a vast amount of original material unknown to him has come to light. V.K. Rajwade[6] collected the Marathi material and reconstructed Maratha history of all periods and in its various branches. V.V. Khare,[7] and D.B. Parasnis[8] made important contributions to the study of Maratha history. Initially, Maratha historians desisted from publishing the results of their investigations in English. Govind Sakharam Sardesai's *The Marathi Riyasat* [9]in nine volumes also suffered from the same lacuna and were beyond the comprehension of the non-Marathi speaking readers. Through his *New History of the Marathas*, Sardesai became the first Maratha historian to attempt presenting a fresh and full treatment of Maratha

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1 Jadunath Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*, 4th edition, M.C. Sarkar & Co., Calcutta, 1948, p. 372; Govind Sakharam Sardesai, *Main Currents of Maratha History*, third edition, Bombay, 1949, 57-83.

2 M.G. Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power and other Essays and Gleanings from Maratha Chronicles* by K.T. Telang, Published by T.V. Chidambara, (hereafter *Rise of the Maratha Power*), University of Bombay, Bombay, 1961, pp. 3,4.

3 Satish Chandra, "The Maratha Polity : Its Nature and Development," in *Medieval India : Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the Village*, Macmillan India Limited, Madras, Reprinted 1992, p.103.

4 Satish Chandra, "Social Background to the Rise of the Maratha Movement during the Seventeenth Century," in *Medieval India : Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the Village*, p. 140.

5 James Grant Duff, *A History of the Mahrattas*, Vols. I,II, III, Published by R. Cambray & Co., Law Booksellers & Publishers, Calcutta, 1912.

6 V.K. Rajwade ed., *Marathyancha Itihasachi Sadhane* (Sources of Maratha History) in XX Vols.

7 V.V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha* (Collection of Historical Documents).

8 D.B. Parasnis, *Brahmendra Swami Yanche Charitra*, Babaji Sakharam, Bombay, 1900.

9 G.S. Sardesai, *Marathi Riyasat*, Vols. I-VIII, ed., S.M. Garge, Popular Prakashan, Mumbai, 1988.

history in English, embodying the results of the latest research. Sardesai feels that the Marathas have long been misjudged by their rivals and adversaries and painted in blackest colours both during and after their period of rule, as if they did not have anything to be credited with.This attitude became confirmed in popular mind owing to the first flush and glow of the foreign conquest. With the passage of time the dust of passion has settled down. A sober and objective judgement about the Marathas is emerging.[10] The heaps of old Marathi and English records located in the Bombay Secretariat and at the Alienation Office in Poona contains the *Peshwa's Daftar*, from which selections were made with suitable brief notices in English at the bottom of each page. These are known as the *Peshwa's Diaries.*[11] The contribution of Jadunath Sarkar to Maratha history has been invaluable. The publication of his *Shivaji and His Times*[12] formally heralded Sarkar's entry into the labyrinth of the Maratha history.

Though it is difficult to ascertain whether the term "Maratha" in the seventeenth century denoted the Maratha community or the people of Maharashtra. It seems that the term "Maratha" is used in a comprehensive sense, including all the people in Maharashtra speaking the Marathi language. The early activities of Shahji and Shivaji indicate that it was not a chance circumstance but determined efforts that led to the rise of the Maratha power in the Deccan in the seventeenth century.[13] Grant Duff attributed the rise of the Maratha power solely to fortuitous circumstances, and compared it with the conflagration like those that occur in the forests of Sahyadri mountain.[14] Shivaji inherited the independent regions of Pune, Chakan, Supe and Indapur jagir from his father which proved to be a stepping stone for the rise of Maratha power under his leadership. These also formed the initial boundaries of Shivaji's *swarajya*,[15] (territory directly governed by him) and is credited to be his first achievement.[16]

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10 G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, *Shivaji & His Line [1600-1700]*, Vol. I, (hereafter *New History of the Marathas)*, Phoenix Publications, Bombay, Second Impression, 1957, p. 8.

11 *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, ed., G.S. Sardesai, Government Central Press, Mumbai.

12 Jadunath Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*.

13 A.R., Kulkarni, *The Marathas (1600-1848)*, Books & Books Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 6,7.

14 Ibid., p. 54.

15 A.R. Kulkarni, *Medieval Maratha Country*, Books & Books, New Delhi, 1996, p. 140.

16 Rajaram Vyankatesh Nadkarni, *The Rise and Fall of the Maratha Empire*, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1966, p. 101.

The Maratha Power had its rise in Western Maharashtra, and the sphere of its influence soon extended to the Central Deccan, Karnataka and Southern India as far south as Tanjore, including Mysore. On the North it embraced Gujarat including Kathiawad, Berars, Central Provinces upto Katak, Malwa in Central India, Bunbelkhand, Rajasthan, Northern India including Delhi, Agra, the Doab and Rohilkhand.[17] Before the rise of Shivaji, the Marathas were scattered throughout many Deccani states. Shivaji welded them together. This was not a small achievement as he accompolished this in the teeth of the opposition of mighty powers like the Mughal Empire, Bijapur, the Portuguese and the Abyssinians of Janjira. Before this the Marathas were mere military mercenaries. Though they were *zamindar*s but never rulers.[18]

Ranade credits Shivaji for organizing the Marathas into a force to reckon with by evolving order out of chaos. The factors that helped him to accompolish this included the nature and ancient history of the area, besides the disciplined army and the religious revival.[19] Modern historians like Andre Wink hold the view that it was due to the Mughal pressure on the Deccan kingdoms that propelled the rise of the Western Deccan.[20] In opposition to the historians who look upon Shivaji as the perfect Hindu king, Stewart Gordon holds that Shivaji learned and absorbed from the Muslim states around him and slowly and gradually formulated an idea of freedom and kingship that differed from the surrounding Muslim states.[21] Satish Chandra calls the rise of the Marathas as a regional as well as a class-cum-caste phenomenon.[22] Shivaji drew appreciation from Grant Duff who wrote:

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17 M.G. Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power*, p. 3.

18 Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb: based on Original Sources*, Vol. IV, Orient Longman, Bombay, 1973, p. 237.

19 M.G., Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power*, PP.20, 21.

20 Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignity in India* : *Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth-century Maratha Svarajya*, (hereafter, *Land and Sovereignity in India*), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 35.

21 Stewart Gordon, *The New Cambridge History of India The Marathas 1600-1818*, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2009, p. 66.

22 Satish Chanda, 'The Eighteenth Century in India : Its Economy and the Role of the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs and the Afghans', in *Essays on Medieval Indian History*, (hereafter, 'The Eighteenth Century in India') Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003, p. 92.

> "the territories and treasures which he acquired were not so formidable to the Mahomedans as the example he had set, the system and habits he introduced, and the spirit he had infused into a large proportion of the Mahratta people."[23]

Shivaji was the first Maratha leader to crown his achievement by giving it a halo of legitimacy. This also brought him politically at par with other Kings.[24] The Rajput princes respected the Bhatt family of Benaras so highly that no ceremony could be completed without some member of that learned family being present to officiate at the function.[25] Following this tradition Shivaji decided to invite Vishveshwar alias Gaga Bhatt for his coronation ceremony.

The claim of relationship with the house of Udaipur appears to have been accepted by contemporaries. Nainsi traces the descent of Shahji Bhonsle to the Sisodia chief of Mewar, Rana Khetsi. One of the son's of Khetsi, named Chacha was born out of a carpenter caste woman (*khatin*). Chacha's descendent later on migrated to the Deccan and Nainsi states that Shahji Bhonsle's descent was from this branch of the Sisodias.[26] The family name of Bhonsle is said to be derived from the fief of Bhosavat in Udaipur, where a prince named Sajan Singh fled after the conquest of Udaipur to seek fortune as a soldier in the South.[27] It is against this background that we should perceive the initial phase of cordiality between the Marathas and especially the Sisodias of Mewar and the Kachhwahas of Amber.

Before we discuss the actual Maratha intervention in Rajasthan the rise of the Peshwas and the subsequent Maratha policy needs to be understood. Though the Mughal Emperor, Aurangzeb had captured and executed the Maratha King Sambhaji in 1689, he could not completely crush them. With the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, Sambhaji's son Shahu who had been brought up in Mughal captivity, was released.

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23 James Grant Duff, *A History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, Published by R. Cambray & Co., Law Booksellers & Publishers, Calcutta, 1912, p. 242.

24 Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, 'Significance of Shivaji's Coronation', in *Shivaji Architect of Freedom*, ed. Narayan H.Kulkarni, A Coronation Tercentenary Volume, Chhatrapati Shivaji Smarak Samiti, Delhi, 1975, p. 215.

25 G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. I, p. 216.

26 Muhnot Nainsi, *Muhnot Nainsi ri Khyat*, Vol. I, ed., Badri Prasad Sakaria, Jodhpur, 1984, p. 15.

27 David Kincaied, *Shivaji The Founder of the Maratha Empire (The Grand Rebel)*, Discovery Publishing House, Delhi, 1984, pp. 25, 26 .

Shahu's return to Maharashtra and the discord it created between him and Tarabai (Rajaram's wife and Shahu's paternal aunt) is out of the scope of the present work. But at this juncture Balaji Vishwanath saved Shahu from an irretrievably dire situation and on the 17th November, 1713, Shahu appointed Balaji Vishwanath as his Peshwa. Originally, the Peshwa was only one of the members of Shivaji's *Ashta Pradhan* Council and was one of the eight *Pradhans* or ministers of State. In Shivaji's time the post was not hereditary. By his ability and astuteness, Balaji Vishwanath not only succeeded in making the Peshwaship hereditary in his family, but he and his famous son Baji Rao I made the Peshwa's position superior to the other seven. The Peshwa actually became the viceregent of the king.[28] According to S.N. Sen, the rise of the Peshwa destroyed the solidarity of the constitution which Shivaji's *Ashta Pradhan* Council was expected to maintain.[29]But the rise of the Peshwa was an inevitable outcome of the times.

The Peshwa's enunciated an age of conquest and expansion of the Maratha rule. Balaji's first concern was threefold; viz. to strengthen the cause of Shahu by bringing over to his side many powerful *sardars* and supporters of Tarabai as possible, to create order and peace in the few territories which Shahu then owned and to give suitable employment to the various turbulent Maratha bands who, flushed with their recent victory over the Imperial forces, could have ruined the Maratha power for want of a suitable occupation, by taking sides in the civil war which had not yet ended.[30]

After restoring order at home, Balaji directed his energies to establish the independence of Shahu.The time was most opportune. Following the death of Aurangzeb the Mughal throne came to be occupied by a series of puppet rulers. Farrukhsiyar's reign witnessed the rise of Saiyyad brothers – Hussain Ali Khan and Abdullah Khan who controlled all the sinews of power. When Hussain Ali became the Viceroy of the Deccan, he was defeated by the Maratha leader Khande Rao Dabhade. Balaji made the most of this opportunity. Under duress, Hussain Ali Khan concluded a treaty thereby agreeing that the Emperor should concede all the territories known as Shivaji's *swarajya* along with the

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28 Surendra Nath Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas*, K.P. Bagchi & Company, Calcutta, Third Edition, 1976, pp. 117,118.

29 Ibid., p. 121.

30 Govind Sakharam Sardesai, *The Main Currents of Maratha History*, pp. 92, 93.

forts therein. It was also agreed that the Maratha right to collect *chauth*[31] and *sardeshmukhi* [32]from the six provinces of Deccan and Mysore, Trichinopoly and Tanjore should be recognized. The territories in Shivaji's possession at the time of his death in 1681, were now confirmed to his grandson with certain modifications.[33] The treaty made Shahu the lawful ruler of these vast territories.

A little after the ratification of the treaty granting *chauth, sardeshmukhi* and *swarajya* to Shahu, Balaji Vishwanath died a sudden death on 2nd April, 1720. He was survived by his wife, Radha Bai, two sons – Visaji alias Baji Rao and Antaji alias Chimnaji Appa and two daughters. Both the brothers had the most perfect understanding in their plans and their execution.Balaji Vishwanath had laid the broad basis on which his son Baji Rao had to build the Maratha Empire. Shahu Maharaj invested Baji Rao with the robes of honour for the post of Peshwa on 17th April, 1720, at a place called Masur, thirty miles of Satara.[34] When the question of the future policy was considered in Shahu's presence, Shripat Rao gave vent to his feelings and observed that it was childish of Baji Rao to carry arms into the north leaving the homeland weak and insecure. In the end, however, it was Baji Rao who carried the day by asking Shahu to ponder over the Mughal weakness and the opportunity it provided to establish the Maratha rule in the rich provinces of Hindustan. Shahu ultimately agreed with the policy suggested by Baji Rao who was forcefully in favour of a northward expansion of the Maratha power.[35]

The twenty years of Baji Rao's Peshwaship saw the execution of a thoroughly chalked out strategy in making the Marathas a power to reckon with.[36] Baji Rao turned his attention towards the extention of the Maratha power in Malwa, Gujarat

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31 Surendra Nath Sen, *The Military System of the Marathas*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1958, P. 32, in Shivaji's time *chauth* was a military contribution paid by the defenceless subjects of enemy kingdoms and territories, for the protection of their life and property from the invading Maratha army.

32 Ibid., P. 41, *sardeshmukhi* widely differed in character from *chauth*. While the latter was based openly on might and could be extracted from any province of India, the former was based on a legal fiction and was expected to be limited in its application to the Deccan. Shivaji claimed to be the hereditary *sardeshmukh* of Maharashtra and *sardeshmukhi* was supposed to be his *watan.*

33 William Irvine, *Later Mughals*, ed., Jadunath Sarkar, Vol. I, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, Book Publishers, New Delhi, 1971, p. 407.

34 Surendra Nath Sen, *The Military System of the Marathas,* p. 26.

35 C.A. Kincaid and D.B. Parasnis, *A History of the Maratha People*, Vol. II, Humphrey Milford Oxford University Press, London, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, 1922, p. 184.

36 A.R., Kulkarni, 'Marathas in History', in *Professor S. Nurul Hasan Memorial Lecture*, Center of Advanced Study, Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 2001, p. 17.

and Bundelkhand. Following from this, he chose Malwa to secure a foothold for his policy of Northward expansion.The inevitable result of the decline of the Mughal Empire was the creation of a political vacuum that coincided with the appointment of Balaji Baji Rao – Balaji Vishwanath's son as the Peshwa in 1720. In Maratha history the leadership of Baji Rao was second only to Shivaji. For the purpose of the present work, we will be discussing the gradual Maratha hold on Malwa, the rise of Holkar and Sindhia under the Peshwas and the expansion of their power in Rajasthan in the subsequent chapter.

The political unification of the country under the Mughals initiated a phase of peace, security and stability which was conducive to economic expansion. Whenever this stability was disturbed, it's repercussions were felt by every strata of society. But the gradual decline of the Mughal power paved the way for regional assertions. While taking cognizance of the eighteenth century, Satish Chandra draws our attention to the situation which developed in the country following the weakening and collapse of the Mughal Empire. In the first instance we see the rise of a series of *nawabis* set up by the Mughal *subedars* or ambitious nobles, who after seizing control, exercised power as almost independent potentates. These were the *nawabi* of Bengal, Awadh and *nizamat* of Hyderabad. He further says that it is misleading to translate the word *'riyasat'* as 'state', for the *Nawabi riyasats* in India were not independent in theory, nor fully so in fact, because the Mughal Emperor was the sovereign. The heads of *riyasats* were, therefore, content to call themselves *'Nawabs.'* In general, the succession in each *riyasat* had to be approved by the Emperor, which implied fees, and some degree of political manipulation. A second rung of states were those which had come into existence in course of popular rebellions or movements against the Mughal State. These comprised of the Maratha state, the Jats, Afghans and later the Sikhs. The Rajput states formed a category of their own. They did not declare their independence from the Mughals, but Mughal authority and control slowly receded from the area, leaving the Rajputs to fend for themselves as best as they could. Their subsequent weakness opened the way for the entry of the Marathas, just as it had enabled the Mughals earlier to dominate the area.[37]

[37] Satish Chandra, 'Eighteenth Century in India', in *Essays on Medieval Indian History*, pp.74,75.

Here we will briefly discuss the emergence of these autonomous states. Abdul Samad Khan was appointed to the Punjab in 1713. Within a short span of time, his association with the Delhi court was limited to paying the annual tribute. In 1726, when his son succeeded, the Punjab was an independent tribute-paying state. Sadat Khan was appointed the governor of Awadh in 1722. By 1726, the outward allegiance of paying the tribute was maintained but internally, the state functioned independently. He proclaimed his *de-facto* independence when in 1726 he refused to be transferred to Malwa. A similar case is that of Bengal where Murshid Quli Khan was appointed as the governor. Efforts to remove him from Bengal had failed, and from 1710, he was in effective charge of Bengal and Orissa. Bihar was added to his charge later on. His son-in-law, Shujaat Khan succeeded him in 1727. When Nizam-ul-Mulk assumed the *wizarat*, he made an effort to put forward a scheme of reforms of the administration. But it is not clear how sincere he was in his scheme of reforms. However, his real interest was to hold on to the Deccan and if possible, to retain Malwa and Gujarat. Towards the end of 1723, he left for his jagir in Moradabad. In October, 1724, in a battle at Shakar Khera, Nizam-ul-Mulk defeated Mubariz Khan with the aid of Maratha troops led by Baji Rao. From this battle may be dated the *de-facto* independence of Hyderabad. The breakup of the Mughal empire had begun. The defenders of the Mughal dynasty and of the empire had turned around fully and become the instruments of its destruction. The Jats asserted themselves in the area between Delhi and Agra. In Malwa and Gujarat the Marathas disputed Mughal authority. For all practical purposes, after 1740, the Mughal Empire had shrunk to the *suba* of Delhi and parts of the Agra *suba* up to the river Chambal. Percival Spear designates this empire as 'The State of Delhi.'[38]

The Imperial decline has been viewed from different perspectives. The earliest interpretations regarded the Mughal decline and its aftermath, in terms of a degeneration in the caliber of the rulers.[39]In his monumental work, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*,[40] Jadunath Sarkar characterized the Jat, Satnami, Sikh and Maratha rebellions as a 'Hindu reaction' to Aurangzeb's religious orthodoxy. In the works of S.R.

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38 Satish Chandra, '*Eighteenth Century* in India', in *Essays on Medieval Indian History*, p.75.

39 William Irwin, *The Later Mughals* ,ed., Jadunath Sarkar ; Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, New Delhi (5 Vols.) and *Fall of the Mughal Empire* (4 Vols.), Hyderabad, Orient Longman Ltd., 1991.

40 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, 4 Vols., Calcutta, 1932-50. For the present work, Vols. I, II, III, has been used.

Sharma and Ishwari Prasad, *The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*[41] and *The Mughal Empire*[42] respectively, the religious policy of the Mughal Emperors constituted the chief explanatory point for the decline of the Mughal Empire. Subsequently these views have been comprehensively rejected. Now scholars study Mughal decline as a structural process and a systematic failure. Satish Chandra held the structural flaws in the working of the Mughal institution of jagir responsible for the fiscal crisis of the late seventeenth century. He argued that the efficient functioning of this institution depended on the availability of revenue and its collection and distribution. When the Mughal emperors could not ensure its smooth functioning, it heralded the process of Mughal decline[43] by fuellng factionalism within the Mughal nobility. Irfan Habib has attributed the decline of the Mughal empire to economic factors. He thinks that increasing exploitation of the peasantry led to agrarian revolts which weakened the empire[44]. M.N. Pearson and J.F. Richards view the imperial decline in the Mughal involvement in the Dakhin. M.N. Pearson[45] traces the decline to what he calls the 'Shivaji factor'. By 'Shivaji factor' he means the demoralization of Mughal armies as a result of Shivaji's successive victories over the Mughals. J.F. Richards[46] highlights the point that political mismanagement by Aurangzeb led to the squandering of available resources. While accepting Habib's model of a fiscally centralized state, M. Athar Ali attributed the Mughal decline to a shortage of jagir.[47] Later in the 1980's, Satish Chandra argued that as jagirs became few and relatively infertile, the discrepancy between the estimated revenue/*jama* and actual yields/*hasil* intensified. This had an adverse impact on the ability of the state functionaries to ensure the regularity of revenue collection. According to him, a jagirdari crisis with distinct economic undertones finally undid Mughal stability.

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41 S.R. Sharma, *Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1972.

42 Ishwari Prasad, *The Mughal Empire*, Chugh Publications, Allahabad, 1974.

43 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, 1707-1740, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1972.

44 Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, 1556-1707, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997.

45 M.N. Pearson, 'Shivaji and the Dec+line of the Mughal Empire', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXXV, 2, 1976, pp. 221-35.

46 J.F. Richards, 'The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan', *Journaal of Asian Stuidies,* Vol. XXXV, 2, 1976, pp., 237-56. Richards contention that there was no *jagirdari* crisis has been contested. See, for instance, S. M. Azizuddin Hussain, 'Scarcity of *pai baqi* Lands During Aurangzeb's Reign in the Light of Inayat Jung Collection Documents', *Proceedings of Indian History Congrees,* 39th session , 1978, pp.426-30; M. Athar Ali *The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb,* 2nd edn. 1997, xxi-xxii and Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court 1707-1740*, OUP, 2002, xii-xv.

47 M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, Revised edition, Asia Publishing House, Delhi, 1997.

However, historians are sharply polarized about the nature of the economy and polity of the eighteenth century. Eminent historians like Irfan Habib, Ashin Das Gupta[48] and M. Athar Ali consider the eighteenth century as a period of political chaos and economic decline. Thus, Satish Chandra considers the eighteenth century a period of uneven economic development. Scholars like C.A. Bayly[49]and Muzzaffar Alam[50] view the eighteenth century as a remarkable period in Indian history in terms of its economy. All these works have opened up new perspectives both on the decline of the Mughal empire and the nature of the eighteenth century economy.

With the declining Mughal power, the Maratha depredations in Malwa and Gujarat gained momentum. Since 1725, Sawai Jai Singh had been requesting the Mughal Emperor to come to terms with the Marathas thereby suggesting that the Marathas could not be beaten but they could be bought over. The Maratha raids in Rajasthan started from the second decade of the eighteenth century and after 1740, their raids became more frequent, organized and demanding of money. The fear of the Rajput kings become evident from a *kharita* written on 24th November, 1724, by Maharana Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh of Amber. He wrote that the Deccanies (read Marathas) always created disturbances in his territory and that the Maharana was of the opinion that the Deccanies were 'thieves' and they would not give up their habits unless they were properly chastised[51].Clearly, the Marathas were detested by the Rajputs. But historically, it were the rival Rajput contenders for the throne of Bundi, Jaipur, Jodhpur etc. who invited the Marathas to interfere in these States. In the beginning the Marathas did not come on their own. At one point of time, Sambhaji had tried to persuade Maharaja Ram Singh of Jaipur and through him, other rulers of Rajasthan, to make common cause with the Marathas to overthrow 'the tyrannical regime of Aurangzeb and re-establish Hindu supremacy', in the country. But subsequent developments clearly show that the Maratha slogan of '*Hindu Pad*

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48 Ashin Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat c. 1700-1750*, Manohar, Delhi, 1994.

49 C.A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

50 Muzaffar Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India : Awadh and Punjab 1707-1748*, Oxford University Press, 1986.

51 K.S. Gupta, 'Maratha Expansion and Rajput Resistance,' *Proceedings of Indian History Congress,* 32nd Session, Jodhpur, 1970, p. 32.

Padshahi', was merely a ploy to inveigle Hindu *zamindars* to join them. Those who refused to surrender were fiscally fleeced.

While reviewing the literature, we find that some of the Mughal court historians and colonial authorities perceptions of the Marathas still continue to find place in modern historical writing. In Mughal chronicles, the Marathas are associated with raids and destruction. The bias of the Mughal court historians and officials in the context of their dealings with the Marathas is obvious. As the Marathas successfully challenged the Mughal authority, the concern of the Mughal historians and officials indisputably influenced their perception of the Marathas. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Mughal accounts see only negative features of the Marathas. Khafi Khan's *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, an important contemporary Persian source, profiles Shivaji as, "the truculent rebel",[52] "the designing rascal",[53] "the treacherous foe"[54] and "the bloodthirsty assassin",[55] and the Marathas as a, "race of robbers",[56] and as rapacious elements.

The Marathas are called *'Dakhinis'* in Persian historiography. Writing about the period 1702-03, Khafi Khan writes that under Tara Bai, the power of the Marathas increased day by day and they penetrated into the old territories of the Imperial throne, plundering and destroying wherever they went. They divided all the districts (parganas) among themselves, and following the practice of the Imperial rule, they appointed their *subedars* (provincial governors), *kamavisdars* (revenue collectors) and *rahdars* (toll collectors).He further says that their principal *subedar* is commander of the army. Whenever he hears of a large caravan, he takes six or seven thousand horse and goes to plunder it. He appoints *kamavisdars* everywhere to collect the *chauth* and whenever due to the resistance of the *zamindars* and *faujdars*, the *kamavisdar* is unable to levy the *chauth*, he hastens to support him, and besieges and destroys his towns. The *rahdar* of these evil-doers takes from small parties of merchants, who are anxious to obtain security from plunder, a toll upon every cart and bullock, three or

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52 Khafi Khan Muhammad Hashim, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab* in H.M. Elliot and J. Dowson (tr. and ed.), *The History of India as told by its own Historians*, Vol. VII, London, 1867-77, p. 258.
53 Ibid., p. 259.
54 Ibid., p. 260.
55 Ibid., p. 260.
56 Ibid., p. 464.

four times greater than the amout imposed by the *faujdars* of the government. This excess he shares with the corrupt jagirdars and *faujdars*, and then leaves the road open. In every *suba* (province) he builds one or two forts, which he makes his strongholds, and ravages the country round. The *mukaddams*, or headmen of the villages, with the countenance and co-operation of the infidel *subedars*, have built forts, and with the aid and assistance of the Marathas they make terms with the royal officers as to the payment of their revenues. They attack and destroy the country as far as the borders of Ahmadabad and the districts of Malwa, and spread their devastations through the provinces of the *Dakhin* to the environs of Ujjain. They fall upon and plunder large caravans within ten or twelve *kos* of the Imperial camp, and have even had the hardihood to attack the royal treasure.[57]

Writing about the year 1718, he further says that Aurangzeb had spent a long time and great treasure in reducing the fortresses of the *Dakhin* and deprived the Marathas of their home. Now when they realized that the Emperor was far away, they showed greater boldness than in former years. With large armies they invaded the *subas* of the *Dakhin*, Ahmadabad and Malwa, for the purpose of collecting *chauth*, and they plundered and ravaged wherever they went. He goes on to say that to cities and large towns, they sent messengers and letters, demanding payment of the *chauth* from the governor or *zamindar*. The *mukkadams* and *zamindars* of the towns and villages hastened out to meet the Maratha army, undertaking to pay the *chauth* and begged for protection. Taking back with them a messenger (*harkara*) and a horseman, to protect the village and the cultivation…. But whatever sum was settled, they promised payment, and gave sureties, called *ol*. They thus saved themselves from violence and plunder.[58]

When the *faujdars* or *zamindars* of a place refused to pay the *chauth*, and made no propositions, the Marathas attacked the place and thoroughly ravaged it. If after investing a place for some days, they found themselves unable to take it, they moved away. The Marathas treated caravans just in the same way, and many were plundered. The commanders of their bands did their best to settle the amount of *chauth* to be paid and were not willing to pillage. Their men on the contrary, strove to prevent any

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57 Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab,* pp. 374, 375.
58 Ibid., pp. 464, 465.

arrangement of the *chauth*, so that they might be free to plunder. For if an agreement was arrived at, and the *chauth* was settled without plundering, it belonged to the chiefs, and the men got nothing. But if it came to plundering, each man kept what he could lay hands upon, and the chiefs did not gain so much.[59] Their attack brought a panic even upon the Imperial army. In his work, *Nushka-i-Dilkusha*, Bhimsen calls the Marathas as 'malefactors'.[60]

European accounts related to this particular period are predominantly British who had their own political agenda. For instance, Andre Wink cites the views of James Grant Duff – the political Agent of the Satara Court:

> "Perfidy and want of principle are the strongest features in their character, and their success have perhaps been less owing to their activity and courage than to their artifice and treachery. Their presence of mind, patience and intrepidity are truly surprising since they appear to have no point of honour to fight for, few feelings of generosity or gratitude, and little *expert de corps*."[61]

Wink further says that the first generation of British administrators depicted the Maratha rule with more venom than even the Mughals. He says that the British officers views were based more on sanctimonious moralizing rather than dispassionate and objective assessments of economic or political processes.[62] Thomas Broughton, who was the camp follower of Sindhia, wrote the following summary description of Maratha character for his brother in England:

> "They are deceitful, treacherous, narrow-minded, rapacious, and notorious liars; the only quality they are endowed with which could, according to our system of ethics, be placed… to the credit side of the account… and to all accusations of falsehood, treachery extortion…he has one common answer: *Mahratta durbar hue* ('tis a Maratha court)!"[63]

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59 Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab,* p. 465.

60 Bhimsen, *Nushkha-I Dilkusha*, tr. Jadunath Sarkar, ed., V.G. Khobrekar, Bombay, 1971, pp. 138-140.

61 Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India*, p. 5.

62 Ibid., p. 5.

63 Thomas Duer Broughton, *Letters From a Mahratta Camp During the Year 1809 : Descriptive of the Characters Manners Domestic Habits and Religious Ceremonies of the Mahrattas*, Calcutta, Published by K.P. Bagchi & Company, Reprint Indian Council of Historical Research, Delhi University Press, 1977, p. 72.

In Tod's writings there is a monolithic representation of the Marathas. We find a similar echo in the writings of V.A. Smith who held that, "Shivaji was a robber chieftain who inflicted untold misery on hundreds of thousands of innocent people, Hindus and Mahomedans alike", and that "the Maratha independent rule in all its varieties until 1818 was the rule of professed robbers."[64] But it has been rightly observed by Ranade, "Freebooters and adventurers, never succeed in building up empires which last for generations and permanently alter the political map of a great continent."[65]

However, recent researches based on the Maratha sources have challenged both the Mughal and British portrayal of the Marathas. They have been arguing that the Marathas were not a habitual destroyer of the economy, rather they provided an alternative administration to the Mughals in the territories conquered by them. Thus, Andre Wink[66] and Stewart Gordon[67] have portrayed the Marathas in a new light. Wink argues that there was agricultural expansion and prosperity in the districts under Maratha rule. Andre Wink calls all this as the 'mentalistic jargon' of the British officers.[68] His views appear in a sharp conflict with the conventional image of the Marathas as a predatory, rapacious horde. He further points out that the Marathas left their territories in flourishing condition. Moreover, they left a most detailed and complete administrative record, the largest single body of indigenous material which has been preserved in their Archives.[69]

Stewart Gordon also says that though the Marathas in the eighteenth century were mostly known for turbulent warfare and long-distance raids, what did not fit with this image was the huge Archive in Pune, filled with millions of documents of an enormously sophisticated revenue administration. The Archives had no evidence of 'chaos' or 'decay', but a vibrant administration on recording the minutest details of rural and urban life and committed to agricultural development. Unlike the Mughal system, in which *mansabdars* and officials were often transferred, the Maratha system promoted long, personal and family association with a single area.

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64 V.A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, OUP, 1920, P. 436.
65 M.G. Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power*, pp. 1, 2.
66 Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India,* 1986.
67 Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India*, (hereafter *Marathas, Marauders*), Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1994.
68 Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India* p. 6.
69 Ibid., p. 6.

Interestingly, both Khafi Khan, a Mughal historian and Tod, an administrator of the English East India Company, portrayed the Marathas similarly. Khafi Khan says that Shivaji assembled a large force of Maratha robbers and plunderers, and set about reducing fortresses.[70] In January 1660, when Aurangzeb marched to punish Shivaji, Khafi Khan describes:

> "how every day and in every march, Shivaji's *Dakhinis* swarmed round the baggage, and falling suddenly upon it like Cossacks, they carried off horses, camels, men and whatever they could secure, until they became aware of the approach of the troops."[71]

Since the Rajput states were the main target of the Maratha attacks in the eighteenth century, it is important to study the relations of the Marathas with the Rajputs as recorded in the Rajasthani sources, both primary as well as secondary. The primary sources used for the present work are in the form of Archival sources, the richest collection being the Jaipur records which in turn are compiled under various categories, such as, *kharitas, dastur komwar–dikhni, chitthis, arzdashts, yaddashti, khatut ahalkaran.*

The secondary sources used are the modern historical works. Kaviraj Shyamaldas's *Vir Vinod* is one of the earliest Indian historical works written in Hindi. About *Vir Vinod*, historian P. Saran writes:

> "After Tod, the pioneer work in this field was done by Kaviraj Shyamaldas, court poet of Maharana Sajjan Singh (1874-1884) of Mewar. Kaviraj Shyamaldas in his monumental history entitled *Vir Vinod* which runs to nearly 2800 pages, has covered a very wide field of the history and geography of the whole of Rajasthan. The author has also brought together a large amount of statistical material on the political, economic, and administrative aspects of Rajasthan. He has also given copies of many inscriptions as well as *farmans* etc. of the Mughal emperors. Thus this great work will ever remain a standard work of reference on the political history of Rajasthan."[72]

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70 Khafi Khan, *Muntakhal-ul Lubab*, p. 257.

71 Ibid., p. 261.

72 P. Saran, " A Survey and General Estimation of the Importance of Historical Sources in Regional Languages with Reference to Rajasthan and Gujarat", in Mohibbul Hassan's, *Historians of Medieval India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1968, p. 200.

Though Mewar was the central concern of Shyamal Das, the work also focuses on the slow and gradual hold of the Marathas on the States of Rajasthan. The other works are the *Khyats* of Nainsi, *Rathora ri Kyhat* and *Marwar ri Khyat*. Detail information about them are given in the subsequent pages.

There is a rich historiography related to the Maratha penetration in Rajasthan. As has been already discussed, James Tod's treatment of Maratha-Rajput relations is highly biased in favour of the Rajputs. Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, was first published in 1829 and 1832. In conventional historiography, Tod's views on the Marathas have been treated as the views of all Rajputs. Tod's perception of the Marathas was that they became distinguished for mean parsimony, low, cunning and dastardly depredation.[73] The Marathas were like locusts, who crossed the Narbada in swarms.[74] The Holkars, the Sindhias, the Pawars and other less familiar names, emerged from obscurity. Tod characterized the Marathas as low caste shepherds and peasants, with pretensions of a warrior. Tod holds the Marathas responsible for devastating and then settling upon the lands of the Rajputs.[75] For him the Marathas are 'avaricious'[76] and 'insolent', and their 'desultory armies'[77] were a curse on Rajasthan.

In his opinion the Marathas were worse than the Mughals, the latter at least observed the forms of government and justice.[78] But the Marathas were "associations of vampires, who drained the very life-blood wherever the scent of spoil attracted them."[79] The British officer had his sympathy with the Rajputs because the Maratha raids were followed by, "deserted towns, roofless houses and uncultured plains."[80] He further elaborates that, "wherever the Marathas encamped, annihilation was ensured, it was a habit; and twenty-four hours sufficed to give to the most flourishing spot the aspect of a desert. The march of destruction was always to be traced for days

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73 James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, Or The Central and Western Rajpoot States of India,* (Hereafter *Annals and Antiquities*) Vol. I, Indian Publication Society, Calcutta, 1898, p. 322.
74 Ibid., p. 331.
75 Ibid., p. 331.
76 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. II, Indian Publication Society, Calcutta, 1898, p. 122.
77 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. I, p. 361.
78 Ibid., p. 348.
79 Ibid., p. 348.
80 Ibid., p. 372.

afterwards by burning villages and destroyed cultivation"[81] All this paralyzed the socio-economic life.

Jadunath Sarkar's work, *Fall of the Mughal Empire* in four volumes is highly informative and comprehensive. It covers all the major political events involving the Marathas and the Rajput States. Subsequent historical writings on Maratha penetration in the region and Maratha-Rajput relations during the eighteenth century have been largely Rajput-centric in approach. Except for Jaipur, Maratha relations with the major Rajput States which witnessed Maratha inroads are presented in the works of G.R. Parihar,[82] K.S. Gupta,[83] R.P. Shastri,[84] M.L. Sharma,[85] Beni Gupta[86] and R.K. Saxena.[87] While examining the relations of the Marathas with the States of Jaipur, Marwar, Kota and Bundi, they have focused more on political narrative about the Maratha-Rajput relations in their works. G.R. Parihar's work, *Marwar and the Marathas (1724-1843)* throws light on various stages through which Maratha-Rajput relations passed up to 1818. The work shows clash of interest between the two in Gujarat and the attempt to curb the Maratha menace by Abhay Singh. The events following Abhay Singh's death leading to Maratha penetration into Marwar and the history of Maratha-Rajput relations are dealt with by Parihar. K.S. Gupta's book, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations (1735-1818)* traces the relationship between the two from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century. He has shown how the history of Mewar during this period is a record of the tragic defeat and humialiation. He treats the Maratha domination of Mewar as a great calamity and a grim story of plunder, rapine and hunger. R.K. Saxena's work on *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, is more comprehensive and covers the States of Jaipur, Marwar, Mewar, Kota and Bundi during the period 1761-1818. He has shown how the Rajputs themselves created atmosphere which facilitated

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81 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. I, p. 372.

82 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas : 1724-1843 A.D.*, Hindi Sahitya Mandir, Jodhpur, 1968.

83 K.S. Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations (1735-1818)*, S. Chand and Company Ltd., New Delhi, 1971.

84 R.P. Shastri, *Jhala Zalim Singh (1730-1823)*, Raj Printing Works, Jaipur, 1971.

85 M.L. Sharma, *History of the Jaipur State*, The Rajasthan Institute of Historical Research, Jaipur, 1969.

86 Beni Gupta, *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan Through the Mukandara Pass*, (hereafter *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan),* Research Publications, Delhi, 1979.

87 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana 1761-1818 A.D.*, S. Chand & Company (Pvt.) Ltd. New Delhi, 1973.

the Maratha control over Rajput States. Jadunath Sarkar and Raghubir Sinh's, *A History of Jaipur*, also touches Jaipur-Maratha relations in a broader context. V.S. Bhatnagar's work, *Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh*,[88] provides useful information on Jaipur-Maratha relations during Sawai Jai Singh's reign.

The contribution of these scholars is tremendous, yet they have ignored to examine significant Rajasthani sources for understanding the complex nature of their relationship in totality. They merely re-iterated Tod's approach. An indepth account of the nature of Maratha domination and their political, social and economic process of the state formation in the eighteenth century is long overdue.The Rajput States of Kota, Bundi, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur and Bikaner have rich Archival Sources related to this period. These sources are in the form of *kharita, chitthiyats, dastur komwar – dikhni*, *Amber records*, *arzdashts*, etc. Marathi letters dispatched from the offices of Peshwa Daftar and other Marathi sources cover a large number of issues concerning the Maratha-Rajput relations. Besides these sources, the early correspondence of the East India Company's officials also need to be looked at.

The Maratha-Rajput relations need to be examined in the context of the emergence of the Marathas as the sole contestant for political supremacy in North India. What kind of change could be discerned once the encounter between the Marathas and other powers located in North India began? What was the nature of the period from 1753 to 1759, that witnessed the peak of Maratha power in North India. Yet the question arises that what at the same time led to the political isolation of the Marathas which found manifestation at the battle of Panipat in 1761 which proved disastrous for the Marathas. How did the Rajputs and Rajasthan figure in the period subsequent to the battle of Panipat? Did the Marathas ever visualize a well conceived Rajput policy in the context of their future plans to regain and retain political ascendency? Why was their handling of the Rajputs vastly different from the Mughals? Did the Marathas exercise paramount authority over the Rajput clan states in the same manner as did the Mughals? The question arises did the indifferent attitude of the Rajputs towards the Marathas shape the Maratha policy in Rajasthan or why they did not consider the co-

[88] V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh 1688-1743*, Imper India, Delhi, 1974.

operation of the Rajputs necessary in the pursuit of their ambitions in North Indian politics? The advancement of the Marathas in Rajasthan also raises the question of the perception of the Marathas and their representation in non-Marathi sources and the nature of their dealings with the local societies. Did the image of the Marathas change overtime in the context of historical situation of North India in general and of Rajasthan in particular.

The earlier phase of the Maratha presence in Rajasthan needs to be seen first in the context of Mughal-Rajput relations. The Mughal policy towards the Rajputs initiated by Akbar was influenced by geo-political, strategic and economic considerations rather than the productive resources of Rajasthan itself. Because of its peculiar geographical features Rajasthan was much less economically developed as compared to its neighbouring Malwa, Gujarat and the Doab. On account of its crucial geographical location, control over Rajasthan was a pre-requisite for the Mughal controlling authority for defensive purposes as well as to secure the trade route which connected North India with Gujarat as it passed through Rajasthan. The Mughal Emperors used the services of the Rajput rulers positively and in the greater interest of the empire.In return of their meritorious military and civil services the Mughals offered them lucrative jagirs and important positions which greatly enhanced the prestige, power and resources of the Rajput chieftains who had joined the Mughal Imperial service.

In the wake of the declining Mughal authority during the eighteenth century the Rajputs were left to fend for themselves. The waning Mughal control encouraged the rulers of the principal Rajput States to pursue the policy of territorial expansion of their *watan* areas at the expence of the Mughals. It also paved the way for the revival of the old Rajput polity. The Rajput States witnessed growing inter-state feuds and intra-clan rivalries. Succession disputes paved the way for the entry of the Marathas who were invited to intervene in the internal disputes by one of the contending parties. Did it amount to an implicit recognition of the paramount authority of the Marathas by the Rajputs or the Marathas were desirous to replace the Mughals as the paramount power in Rajasthan?

The initial phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations must also be viewed in the context of the Mughal-Maratha conflict in Malwa. Sawai Jai Singh of Amber, who was appointed as the Mughal governor of Malwa thrice, failed to meet the Maratha challenge and once Malwa was placed under the firm control of the Marathas, it would not have been possible to check the Maratha advancement in the regions bordering Malwa. Rajasthan was situated in the North and West of the Maratha frontier at the edge of Malwa plateau. In 1732-33 the Marathas reached Dungarpur and Banswara. In 1735, the Maratha forces for the first time penetrated areas far deeper within the territory of Jaipur State as they were merely twenty miles away from Jaipur. This happened only one year after the Hurda Conference (1734) called to form a united front of major Rajput States to resist the Maratha entry in Rajasthan. The Maratha presence on the border of Rajasthan had become a political reality by 1730's although it was limited to the extent that they attacked Bundi in 1734 on the invitation of its ruler Pratap Singh Hada and the Maratha attack on Kota in 1738 to punish its ruler Durjansal Hada who had helped the Nizam. However, it is not clear as to how Rajasthan figured in the future plans of the Marathas after the acquisition of Malwa.

The formal entry of the Marathas in Rajasthan needs to be seen in the context of the functioning of the kinship based Rajput polity during the later part of the eighteenth century. Inter-state disputes and struggles for succession once again reappeared on surface after the decline of the Mughal paramount authority which regulated and arbitrated in such conflicts. As the Mughal intervention in the internal matters of the Rajputs was no longer effective, the Rajputs turned to the Marathas for the settlement of their succession disputes. There is rich historiography on how both, Sindhia and Holkar were enticed by rival Rajput princes to support their cause and how the inability of the Rajputs to meet the promises made to the Marathas to gain their support complicated the relations between the two sides and served as the pretext for continued Maratha pressure. All details of major political events involving the Marathas and Rajputs are well documented. However, the complexities that arose in the relationship between the two sides and the nature and background of the continued

Maratha intervention need to be further explored. What led to the growing popular exasperation and resentment against the Marathas. Is it so that the Marathas could not understand the local sentiments and financial limitations of the Rajputs or they deliberately ignored these realities for short termed gains? What methods were adopted by the Rajputs to counter the Maratha pressure for tribute? To what extent were the Marathas able to convert their demands into actual gains and fulfill their aims and objectives in Rajasthan? How the local people viewed the presence of the Marathas and their response to it?

Nature of Source Material

The nature of the present study necessitates the use of contemporary sources. An attempt has been made to weave into the narrative relevant citations from original documents. As the Archival sources on Maratha-Rajput relations are voluminous, the method of examination of the sources itself involves contextualization of the sources. A re-appraisal of available historical writings or generalization essentially demands reading the same type of source material with a measure of mistrust and / or make use of the source which has not been used or inadequately used in the past. What emerges from a careful survey of these records is that the activities of the Marathas must be seen in a larger context to comprehend historical implication of an event or development in a particular area even though it had no direct relevance to other areas. For instance Aurangzeb's relations with the house of Amber from 1667 onwards are largely influenced by the Maratha factor in the Deccan. Similarly Rajasthani documents pertaining to Sawai Jai Singh's Governorship of Malwa are important for a better understanding of subsequent historical development that concerns the Maratha State formation in central India. The expansion of Maratha power in Malwa cannot be seen in isolation from Rajasthan as it opened the gates for Maratha entry into Rajasthan which greatly influenced inter-state relations in Rajasthan. The Rajasthani documents also throw light on the perception of the Marathas and the nature of their interaction with the social groups outside Maharashtra.

Rajasthani Sources

The primary sources used for this study are largely in the form of correspondence in Rajasthani and Marathi between the Rajput and Maratha rulers, between the Rajput rulers, letters and dispatches from the Maratha officials and representatives posted in Rajasthan and reports of the *vakils* of the Maratha rulers posted at the courts of the Rajput rulers. A large mass of Archival records written both in Persain and Rajasthani are preserved at the Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.[89]The most important series of these records pertain to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the richest collection is preserved in the Jaipur Historical Section. The significance of Amber/Jaipur records lies in the fact that they are useful not only for constituting local and regional histories, but also have a bearing on other regions such as Malwa, Deccan and the Punjab. These records commence from the later part of Akbar's reign and the series go on till the end of the eighteenth century. However, the richness of the Amber/Jaipur records both in terms of variety and volume becomes visible from the middle of the seventeenth century and the collection is more voluminous for the eighteenth century. The Amber/Jaipur records are classified into several categories, many of which furnish valuable information on the Marathas and Rajputs in varying context over time. The eighteenth century records shed considerable light on the activities of the Marathas in Rajasthan and their dealings with the Rajput kings. The Jaipur records are sub-divided into several sections according to the nature of records. However, from the point of view of Maratha-Rajput relations, documents housed in the historical section of the Jaipur State are of immense value. Many of these documents cover the entire span of the eighteenth century. The following categories of records issued by the Amber/Jaipur chancery consulted are *kharitas, dastur komwar–dikhini*, *chitthis*, *arzdashts*, *yaddashti*, *khatut ahalkaran*, *kapat-dwara* etc.

Kharitas are the official letters exchanged between the Rajput rulers among themselves and with the Marathas. The *kharitas* exchanged between the rulers of Rajasthan also offer valuable information on Maratha-Rajput relations and how the

[89] Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, Amber/Jaipur records, *Kharitas, Dastur Komwar – Dikhni*, Vols. IX & X, *Chitthis*, *Arzdashts*, *Yaddashti*, *Khatut Ahalkaran*, *Kapat-Dwara*.

activities of the Marathas were viewed by the Rajput kings. The *kharitas*[90] used for this study are Jaipur-Jodhpur *kharita*, Bikaner-Jaipur *kharita*, Jaipur-Karauli *kharita*, Indore-Jaipur *kharita*, Gwalior-Jaipur *kharita*, Indore-Jodhpur *kharita*, Gwalior-Jodhpur *kharita*.

The *kharitas* sent by the Peshwa, Mahadaji Shinde and Malhar Rao Holkar to Jaipur rulers are available for the larger part of the eighteenth century. They are very comprehensive and contain specific messages from the Marathas to the Jaipur rulers about their relations and dealings. The *kharitas* exchanged between the Rajput rulers and the Marathas bear testimony to the fact that co-operation of the Rajput rulers was sought by the Marathas on sundry issues. They also furnish information on social and economic ties between Jaipur rulers and the Marathas. In the present study there has been an extensive use of *kharitas* sent especially from Indore, Gwalior, to Jaipur and Jodhpur. The *kharitas* were also exchanged between Jaipur, Jodhpur and Mewar. Overt manifestation of hostility between the Rajputs and the Marathas is quite evident from the *kharitas*. Mahadaji expressed solidarity with Sawai Madho Singh against the Jats of Bharatpur. Holkar wrote to Sawai Prithvi Singh that since long time Najib ud-daula, Jaipur and the house of Holkar were united. Mahadaji also sought military help of Jaipur in 1783 against Mohammad Beg Hamdani, the Mughal commander.

In 1770's numerous *kharitas* of invitation were dispatched to the Jaipur ruler and his family on occasions of marriage and other social functions in the Holkar family. Holkar dispatched horses, elephants and other gifts to Jaipur ruler at the time of his coronation ceremony. Clothes were sent on the occasion of the marriage in Jaipur royal family too. There are references from the Maratha ruled areas at various places in Rajasthan as soldiers, traders, officilials in revenue administration and pilgrims who frequented Pushkar. Mahadaji wrote to Sawai Pratap Singh to organize Pushkar fair as per past practice and ask all traders to attend the fair. All these aspects of the Maratha presence in Rajasthan can be better understood from the *kharitas*.

The other aspects of Rajput-Maratha relations covered in the *kharitas* concern the amount of tribute to be paid to the Marathas and the nature of control of the Marathas

[90] All these *Kharitas* are available at Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

over the territories that were handed over to them as per the agreement. The Peshwa's *vakil* in 1765 wrote to Madho Singh, "this court moves very slowly and protracts business." Khande Rao Holkar wrote to the *diwan* of Jaipur asking him to issue only valid *hundis* in future. The *kharitas* regularly raise the issue of tribute payment with the successive Rajput rulers. Territorial disputes also figure in the *kharitas*. For example, dispute between Jaipur and Holkar persisted over the transfer of parganas Tonk, Toda, Malpura, Fagi and Niwai. Ahilyabai Holkar wrote in 1770 that in pargana Tonk and Rampura, Rajput *bhomias* are harassing the Maratha *kamavisdars*. Mahadaji Shinde wrote to Sawai Pratap Singh, "Your State has given us pargana Sambhar but till today *amil* of the area has not vacated local *thanas* and trouble over men posted there." On the basis of the *kharitas* and other documents it is possible to highlight as to how the Marathas were seen in relation to local society, particularly in social and cultural spheres.

Dastur komwar – dikhni is available in two bulki volumes which contain important information dealing with Maratha-Rajput relations. *Dastur komwar – dikhni* gives ample information regarding daily court reports, regarding the honours, receptions, promotions or other incidents of the court of the Maharaja of Jaipur and are classified into caste-wise dealings of the Maharaja and have been named *dastur* (dealings) *komwar* (caste-wise). These documents record the *dastur* or protocol observed in respect of many Maratha dignitaries. They form an imporant category of official documents available in the Archives. The *dastur komwar* volumes have been numbered and volumes 9-10 are called *dastur komwar – dikhni*.[91] A major part of these documents cover the eighteenth century. The entries being dated, they are helpful in giving a detailed account in chronological order of the courtesy visits of the Maratha dignitaries to the court of the Jaipur ruler. These accounts offer valuable information regarding the status of the Marathas who visited the Jaipur court, purpose of the visit, duration of stay and the nature of treatment meted out to the visitor from the side of the host. Therefore, these *dasturs* constitute an important category of records and provide varied information on social, cultural, economic and political aspects of the relations between the Jaipur rulers and their Maratha counterparts.

[91] *Dastur Komwar – Dikhni*, Vols. IX & X, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

An important category of documents termed *chitthis*[92] are available in the *Diwan-Daftar-Huzuri* (*DDH*) section of the Jaipur records. *Chitthis* are loose papers arranged chronologically and were written by the *diwan* of Amber mainly to correspond with the *amils* and other officials under the control of the Jaipur Raja. The *chitthis* cover the entire eighteenth century. The substance of the specific information and complaints received by the *diwan* as contained in the *chitthis* are also followed by the instructions on the matters raised in the *chitthis*. This gives us an insight into the nature of grievances faced by the peasants and the attitude of the state towards different social groups in adjudicating the disputes. Thus, the *chitthis* depict the prevailing socio-economic conditions at the grass root level and the working of the administrative institutions. The *chitthis* pertaining to the later half of the eighteenth century refer to the Maratha inroads and their implications for the state as well as the rural society.

Arzdashts[93] were the petitions written by the *amils, faujdar* or other *pargana* officials to the Jaipur ruler. These officials regularly reported, to the ruling authorities, about various revenue and administrative details of the areas under their control. These documents were written in response to the problems faced by concerned officials and therefore, provide useful insights into the various concerns of state and commom man. At the same time, these also give us the responses and remedies evolved to solve the problem. The *arzdashts* have been a very important source for us, as they bring to the fore the problems faced at the most basic unit of administration, the village. From the year 1702 onwards, a good number of *arzdashts* refer to the Maratha activities in the Deccan and Malwa. They also furnish details about the actual working of the administration in Malwa before the Maratha control, the laxity of local officials which enabled the Marathas to make inroads into Malwa and attempts of the Mughal officials to block the entry of the Marathas. In one of the *arzdashts*, Chhatrasal Bundela informs the Jaipur Raja that he has received orders from the Mughal emperor to march against the Marathas. He suggested that combined forces of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bundela could prevent the Marathas from crossing over the river Narmada.

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92 *Chitthi*, *Diwan-Daftar-Huzuri Section*, Jaipur Records, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

93 *Arzdashts*, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

Despite nagging gaps in the availability of this genre of source, the *arzdashts* are useful for a variety of reasons stated above.

Yaddashti[94] or memoranda are the official recordings of various census data, crop production, agrarian settlement, migration, details concerning revenue demands and payments, jagir assignments, *ijara* grants and so on. *Yaddashti* of actual payment made to the Marathas by the Jaipur ruler over the years was also prepared in the eighteenth century. This *yaddashti* offers valuable information regarding the burden of Maratha demand for tribute and the extent to which the Jaipur rulers were able to meet it.

Khatut ahalkaran[95] are letters written by one official of the Jaipur State to another. Some of these letters give an account of the Maratha activities. For example, Deep Singh's letter to Bakshi Hem Raj giving an account of his visit to Raja Sahu and Hem Raj's letter to Jaswant Singh giving details of negotiation between Sindhia and Holkar on the one side and Jaswant Singh on the other.

Jodhpur Records

Among the Jodhpur records, the most important for Maratha-Rajput relations during the period of study are *kharitas* in portfolio, *hakikat-bahi, hath-bahi, khas-rukka bahi, dholian-ka-kothar records, bastas* and letters of Abhay Singh to Bhandari Amar Singh also throw light on Maratha-Rajput relations but are not relevant for the period under study. *Kharitas* in Portfolio are thirty one in number, addressed to the rulers and administrators of Jodhpur by the rulers, chiefs and administrators of different States, both of Rajasthan and outside. For instance a letter from Malhar Rao Holkar to Bijay Singh dated 12th day of the bright half of *Ashwin, V.S.,* 1809, preserved in portfolio No. 2, B. file No. 1, informs that Holkar had accepted the accession of Bijay Singh on the throne of Marwar, an interesting change in the policy of Holkar, who by family relations should have put forward the case of Ram Singh.

The fact that Mahadaji Sindhia gave the responsibility of safeguarding his interests in Marwar to Bijay Singh is revealed in a letter written by Mahadaji on 2nd day of the dark-

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94 *Yaddashti Dikhniya ne rupiya pahunchaya*, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.
95 *Khatut Ahalkaran*, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

half of *Ashadha V.S.*, 1828 (portfolio No. 6 letter No. 13). Letters from Ambaji Ingle on 6th day of bright-half of *Kartik*, *V.S.*,1856, refer to the receipt of valuable jewels and rupees 8000/ - sent with the letter by Abhay Raj (portfolio No. 2 B., file No. 2, letter No. 2 and 6).

Hakikat bahis record the daily routine of the rulers of Jodhpur, their movement and places of visit. They also furnish the information regarding the visit of political personalities, including the Maratha dignitaries, who waited on the Maharajas. The *bahis* begin from the *Vikram Samvat* 1821 and each *bahi* cover a period from five to ten years of the ruler's reign. *Hakikat bahi* No. 6 furnishes information regarding the stay of Holkar's family at Jodhpur from 1805 to 1809. *Jama kharch bahi* No. 44 contains a record of the details of payments of tribute, arrears of the tribute and war indemnity to Sindhia as agreed by the ruler of Jodhpur at Sambhar in 1790.

Non Archival Sources (Rajasthani)

For the study of the social and cultural history of medieval Rajasthan (c. 1500-1800) the most important primary sources are the traditions, clan histories and genealogies of the Rajputs.[96] Among the non-archival sources, *Khyats* written in Rajasthani language are the most important source of information. To study the history of medieval Rajasthan, *Khyat granth* occupy an important place. In fact, *Khyat* is the best form of Rajasthani prose that incorporates *Baat, Vigat, Vanshavali, hakikat* etc. that deal with history. They are written predominantly in *Dimgal bhasa* or Western Rajasthani.[97] The origin of the word *Khyat* is from the Sanskrit word *khyati*. In Rajasthan, the term *Khyat* is used as synonymous with history. The *Khyat* literature is available in abundance in the form of manuscripts and only a fraction of the voluminous *Khyat* collection has been published so far.

The most important and widely known *Khyat* is *Muhnot Nainsi ri Khyat*,[98] written by Muhta Nainsi who was the *diwan* of Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur. He has been called 'The Abu'l Fazl of Rajasthan' by Kalika Ranjan Qanungo in his book, *Studies*

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96 Norman p. Ziegler, 'Marwari Historical Chronicles : Sources for the Social and Cultural History of Rajasthan,' *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 1976, p. 219.

97 Ibid., The term *Dimgal* designates the Marwari or western Rajasthani dialect of the late medieval period in Rajasthan (c. 1500-1800), p. 220.

98 Muhnot Nainsi, *Muhnot Nainsi ri Khyat*, ed., Badri Prasad Sakaria, Vols. I (1960) & II, (1962), Rajasthan Research Institute, Jodhpur.

in Rajput History.[99] His *Khyat* is most exhaustive and to some extent reliable in comparison to other *Khyats*.It also provides the dynastic history. Nainsi's *Khyat* covers a span of 600 years and depicts the rule and rulers of Rajput clans belonging to Rajasthan, Gujarat and Central India. In his description of the Sisodias, Nainsi states that Shahji Bhonsle was the descendent of Sisodia chief of Mewar Rana Khetsi. One of the son's of Khetsi, Chacha was born out of a carpenter caste woman (*khatin*). Chacha's descendent later on migrated to the Deccan and Nainsi traces Shahji Bhonsle's descendent to this branch of the Sisodias. Nainsi held the office of *diwan* from 1654 to 1666 and died in 1670. He also visited Aurangabad along with Jaswant Singh where he was imprisoned and remained so till his death. He wrote his *Khyats* before visiting Aurangabad. Hence, it is very unlikely that the link between Bhonsle and the Sisodias as suggested by him is based on any information that he might have derived during his stay at Aurangabad.Nainsi's information is based on one of the several genealogical accounts of the Sisodias. Tod, who also used bardic accounts for writing his Annals of Mewar refers to the migration of Sujan Singh, son of Rana Ajai Singh to the Deccan and Shahji was eleventh in the line of succession. There is some factual discrepancy between these two narratives; however, the major fact that the Bhonsle's were originally Sisodia Rajputs is common in both accounts.

Muhnot *Nainsi-ri-Vigat* is a manuscript of Nainsi, which he wrote during the time of Raja Jaswant Singh. Nainsi, in his *Vigat*[100]has given a complete survey of seven *parganas* of that period – their historical background, areas, villages, roads, income, castes of people living there, kinds of lands, minerals etc. This reveals a valuable information concerning administrative and cultural history of the period.

The importance of the *Rathoran ri Khyat* [101]lies in the fact that it commences from Siha, the earliest traceable ancestor to Maharaja Man Singh and gives all the information chronologically. It was written by Aaidan Khidiya Charan after studying 21,000 *granths*

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99 Kalika Ranjan Qanungo, *Studies in Rajput History*, S. Chand, Delhi, 1960.

100 Muhnot Nainsi, *Marwar ra Pargana ri Vigat*, ed., Narain Singh Bhati, VOL. I (1968), Vol. II (1969), Vol. III (1974), Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur.

101 Aaidan Khidiya, *Rathora ri Khyat (Jodhpur Rajya ka Itihas)*, (henceforth *Rathora ri Khyat*), Vols. I, II & III, ed., Hukum Singh Bhati Itihas Anusandhan Sansthan, Chaupasani, Jodhpur and Rajasthani Granthagar, Jodhpur, 2007.

and was completed at Jodhpur. We do not get much information about Aaidan. He wrote the *Khyat* at the instance of Maharaja Man Singh. Joshi Sahibram besides making a copy of the *Rathora ri Khyat*, also added some more information after editing the original *Khyat*. This edited work became available to Gaurishankar Hirachand Ojha in four volumes and he named it as *Jodhpur Rajya ki Khyat*. Later *Rathora ri Khyat* became the source of many new *Khyats* such as *Rao Maldev ri Khyat, Rao Chandrasen ri Khyat, Motaraja Udai Singh ri Khyat, Maharaja Jaswant Singh ri Khyat, Maharaja Ajit Singh ri Khyat, Maharaja Abhay Singh ri Khyat, Maharaja Vijay Singh ri Khyat, Man Singh ri Khyat* etc. Along with the rulers of Jodhpur, the *Khyat* also take into account the *thikanedars*, the role played by the *mutasaddis*, relations with the Imperial government and the neighbouring states, administration, armed expeditions, Maratha arrival in Marwar and the wars as well as the creative works undertaken by the Jodhpur Maharajas. For the present work, *Rathora ri Khyat* is a very important primary source and sheds a lot of light on the relations between Marwar and the Marathas. We get to know how their intervention increased especially during the reign of Maharaja Bijay Singh. The importance of the *Rathora ri Khyat* lies in the fact that the author gives an objective account of the contemporary events. Though Ojha and Reu, both have used the *Rathora ri Khyat* as a source, at many places they do not give the detailed information as it is given in the *Khyat*.

During Maharaja Bijay Singh's reign (1752-1793), along with *roznamcha, patta, bahis and ohda bahiyats*, the trend of writing *Khyats* also started. Tilokchand Joshi, then composed *Marwar ri Khyat*.[102] It was written by him in 1814. His account is based on authentic record made available to him by Maharaja Man Singh in 1803. The time-span covered by the *Khyat* writer is from 1749 to 1813, which coincides with the peak period of the Maratha presence in Rajasthan in a big way. It takes into account the reigns of Maharaja Ram Singh, Maharaja Bakht Singh, Maharaja Bijay Singh, Maharaja Bhim Singh and the first ten years of Maharaja Man Singh. It commences from the reign of the founder of Jodhpur, Rao Jodha and narrates the achievements, armed expeditions, relations with the other states and the struggle with the Marathas along with the role played by the *mutasaddis*. This *Khyat* offers valuable

[102] Tilokchand Joshi, *Marwar ri Khyat*, ed., Hukum Singh Bhati Rajasthani Shodh Sansthan, Chaupasani, Jodhpur, 2000.

information on the Maratha inroads in the context of inter and intra-clan relations among the Rajputs as also in the light of political developments elsewhere. The *Khyat* also furnishes information about the form of resistance to Marathas and the impact of the Maratha presence on the economy of Marwar. The *Khyat* provides an insight into the perception of the Marathas in Rajasthan. It assumes importance as it depicts the events as they occurred. The entire narration is true to life.

Marathi Sources

Marathi correspondence dealing with the Peshwa, Holkar and Sindhia cover the entire period of our study. As the period progresses these correspondence not only become more voluminous but are also richer in context. In addition to offering detail account of the military movements of the Marathas in various areas they also contain details of administrative arrangements made in the newly conquered areas, outstanding arrears of demand imposed on the Rajput rulers and so on. Holkar's official correspondences were compiled by V.V. Thakur and it is entitled as, *Holkarshahicha Itihas*.[103] Part of Shinde's official records have been printed under the title, *Shindeshahi Itihasanche Sadhnen*,[104] edited by Anandrao Bhau Phalke. The Peshwa's Government had two sets of agents at the Court of the Delhi emperor. The first was the regular ambassador (v*akil*) belonging to the Hingane family, whose despatches – all written in the Marathi language, so far as preserved by Nana Fadnis in his home at Menavali, have been printed by D.B. Paranis of Satara, in two volumes and a supplement under the title of *Dilli Yethil Marathanchen Rajkarnen*, and two smaller and useful volumes of gleanings from their family papers have been published by the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal of Poona, under the tiltle of *Hingane Daftar*.[105]For the present work, information from *Hingane Daftar* has been used.

Selections from Peshwa Daftar,[106] series compiled by G.S. Sardesai is another important source for the activities of the Maratha s*ardars* under the Peshwas. These

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[103] *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, A.D. 1693-1797, Vol. I, V.V. Thakur ed., Holkar Government Press, Indore, 1944.

[104] *Shindeshahi Itihasanche Sadhanen*, Vol. I, Anandrao Bhau Phalke, Alijah Darbar Press, Gwalior, 1929.

[105] *Hingane Daftar*, Vol. I, ed., Ganesh Hari Khare, Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Published by Sardar Gangadharrao Mujumdar, C.G. Karve and R.V. Oturkar, Pune, 1867.

[106] *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, ed., Govind Sakharam Sardesai, Vols. II, XIII, XIV, XXI, XXVII, XXIX, Government Central Press, Mumbai, Published between 1930 to 1933.

records were selected from the vast mass of Marathi records written in Modi script preserved at Peshwa Daftar, Pune and published in several volumes. For the present study Volumes II, XIII, XIV, XXI, XXVII and XXIX have been used. During the reign of Jodhpur Maharaja, Bijay Singh, the Marathas were at the zenith of their power. At this time, the Peshwa's *sanrakshak* (regent) Nana Fadnavis had appointed Krishnaji Jagannath as the Maratha *vakil* at Jodhpur. From time to time, he wrote letters to his master, informing in detail about the political situation of that time. These letters assume great significance as these were written in the time period between 1785 to 1794. These original letters were preserved and kept by Shri Dattatreya Balwant, belonging to his family. He got these published in 1914-15 in a magazine entitled *Itihas Sangrah* and were compiled by D.B.Parasnis. The original letters were written in Marathi. Therefore, an effort was made to translate them in Hindi. In *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*,[107]28 contemporary letters written in Marathi have been translated and published. These letters cover the last few years of Maharaja Bijay Singh's reign and the initial years of Maharaja Bhim Singh's reign. These letters enlighten us not only on the internal and external politics of the contemporary period but they also help us to understand the social, economic and cultural activities of the period concerned.

Historical Papers Related to Mahadaji Sindhia,[108] edited by G.S. Sardesai has also been consulted for the present study.While Marathi sources of the period by and large focus more on political developments, it is Rajasthani sources that reveal the true nature of the Maratha domination in Rajasthan.

The Persian Records of Maratha History, consist of two volumes, entitled, *Delhi Affairs (1761-1788)*[109]and *Sindhia as Regent of Delhi : 1787 & 1789-91*.[110] Jadunath Sarkar translated a volume of Persian *Akhbarats* (newsletters) and correspondence, whose manuscript is preserved at the Salar Jang Library Hyderabad. The first

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107 Krishnaji Jagannath, *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, tr. Dr. D. B. Kshir Sagar, ed., Hukum Singh Bhati Rajasthani Shodh Sansthan, Chaupasani, Jodhpur, 1990.

108 *Historical Papers Relating to Mahadaji Sindhia*, ed., G.S. Sardesai, (henceforth, *Historical Papers*), Alijah Darbar Press, Gwalior, 1937.

109 *Delhi Affairs (1761-1788)*, Vol. I, General Editor P.M. Joshi, (News-letters from Parasnis Collection), tr. into English with notes by Jadunath Sarkar, Published by the Director of Archives, Government of Bombay, 1953.

110 *Sindhia as Regent of Delhi : 1787 & 1789-91*, Vol. II, General Editor P.M. Joshi, translated from the Persian with notes by Jadunath Sarkar, Published by the Director of Archives, Govt. of Bombay, 1954.

volume, *Delhi Affairs* covers the time span from 1761-1788 and provides useful information on Maratha campaigns against the rulers of Rajasthan and how the latter united to resist the former.The second volume, *Sindhia As Regent* covers the period from 1787 & 1789-91 and contains the letters related to the Lalsot campaign and are very important as they covered the entire five months of this campaign, with two reports for each day, one from Mahadaji's camp and the other from the Delhi Emperor's court, the latter being one day subsequent to the sheet for the corresponding incident in the former and reporting the reaction of the Emperor's court to that incident. We get an insight into how Sindhia subordinated the greater interests of Delhi Empire and the Maratha domination of Hindustan to a personal vendetta against the Kachhawahas and the Rathors.

English Records

Jadunath Sarkar edited, *English Records of Maratha History: Poona Residency Correspondence*, in totality consists of five volumes. The Handbook to the Residency Records in the Alienation Office, Poona, published by the Government of Bombay, gives in detail the nature and contents of what are known as the Residency Records which number about a hundred files and cover the last thirty two years of Maratha history (1786-1818). During this period four British Officials, Malet, Palmer, Close and Elphinston mainly held the post of the Resident British Ambassador at the Peshwa's court; and these files pertain to their official transactions and contain both their outward and inward correspondence. For the present work, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs 1785-1794, Volume I*,[111] has been consulted.

The present work is divided into **five chapters**. Each chapter covers a particular aspect or stage in Maratha presence in Rajasthan that emerges from the analysis of the primary and secondary sources. The emphasis is largely on the relations of the Marathas with the two major Rajput States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The study is

[111] *English Records of Maratha History : Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. I, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs 1785-1794*, ed., Jadunath Sarkar, Printed at the Government Central Press, Bombay, 1936.

limited to these two States in order to make it viable in terms of the handling of vast primary source material which is available in Rajasthani and Marathi.

The **first chapter** is **'Maratha Intervention in Rajasthan : 1730-1760 (Part I).'** For the sake of a better understanding of their relations, this period takes into consideration the initial phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations first in the context of the Mughal-Maratha relations and thereafter in the context of the decline of Mughal central authority and its implications for Rajput States. There was a revival of the pre-Mughal inter and intra-clan rivalries in the Rajput States in the wake of the declining Mughal power which facilitated the entry of the Marathas into Rajasthan. Having established themselves in Malwa, the Marathas made their early forays in the bordering States of Rajasthan. The chapter also discusses Jai Singh's governerships of Malwa, along with a brief discussion about the various Rajput States, with the main thrust being the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. An attempt has been made to study the role played by the Marathas in the inter and intra-clan feuds which facilitated their formal entry into Rajasthan at the behest of the Rajput States themselves. While taking into consideration of the two major sub-divisions of Rajasthan viz. – the north-western and south-eastern, an effort has been made to explore the possibilities of production – agricultural, mineral etc. This would help to determine the motivations that propelled the Marathas to Rajasthan. An attempt has also been made to map geographical and other forces that played a crucial role in establishing the Maratha domination in Rajasthan and how did they manage to gain access to the interiors of Rajasthan will also be discussed in this chapter.

The **second chapter** is entitled **'Maratha Intervention in Rajasthan : 1761-1794 (Part II),'** when the Maratha defeat in the third battle of Panipat emboldened the Rajputs into resisting the Marathas. The Rajputs unleashed their pent-up hatred towards the Marathas and made one last effort which proved to be the last show of strength to extricate themselves from the Maratha clutches. The phase ends with the final subjugation of the Rajputs at the hands of Mahadaji Sindhia, who later dies at a time when he was at the zenith of his power. The chapter also focuses on the local

Rajput support availed of by the Marathas along with the support of influential court officials, village level aristocracy and even *Banjaras*.

The **third chapter** focuses on the, **'Economic Impact of the Maratha presence in Jaipur and Jodhpur States.'** The ***kharitas*** are the chief source of information for this chapter. It was common knowledge that Maratha visitations in Rajasthan were not a happy experience. The chapter focuses on the economic strain on the state exchequer, experiences of the local people and the hardships they suffered. It also highlights the various means adopted by the state and the people to resist and mitigate the Marathas. The focus is also on the response of the Rajput rulers to Maratha attempts to extract economic resources of the region and how it led to numerous armed conflicts. This chapter tries to seek answers as to how the presence of Marathas impacted the economy of the region? What measures were adopted by the State to meet the financial crisis? How much and in what form were the payments made by the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur? The chapter concludes with the way in which the Marathas were perceived by the Rajputs. The other aspects covered in this chapter are perception of the Marathas in Rajasthani sources and how the Maratha raids are viewed and what was the nature of Maratha intervention.

The **fourth chapter** deals with the **'Diplomatic ties and Socio-Cultural Co-operation between the Marathas and the Rajputs.'** The relationship between the Rajputs and the Marathas has been generally seen as hostile and antagonistic. The general perception is that the Marathas made armed incursions, plundered and devastated the Rajput States. The Rajputs are depicted as wriggling under the financial strain in the form of tribute and war expenses demanded by the Marathas. Perhaps this is just one side of the picture as our sources reveal that the other side was marked by the existence of the maintenance of social ties and areas of co-operation. Diplomatic relations were maintained through a regular exchange of letters between the Rajputs and the Marathas. The trade relations between the Maratha ruled areas and Rajasthan, the nature of communication channel between the Marathas and Rajputs and how people from both sides interacted with each other are the other aspects discussed in this chapter. The movement of Maratha officials, soldiers, traders, religious dignitaries and pilgrims who visited Rajasthan are also discussed.

The **fifth chapter** focuses on **'Maratha Occupation of Rajasthan and Forms of Rajput Resistance.'** In this chapter an effort has been made to study the territorial arrangements made by the Marathas in the territories transferred to them by the Rajputs. It also attempts to study the nature of administrative control of the Marathas in these areas and the difference between the administrative arrangements made by them in Malwa and Rajasthan. An attempt has also been made to look at the forms of resistance of the Rajputs to the Maratha domination and how they resorted to passive as well as armed resistance to ward off the Maratha pressure. What was the nature of negotiations between the two sides to lessen hostility regarding two persistent problems concerning the payment of tribute and transfer of the territory promised to the Marathas by the Rajputs. How the Marathas responded to the overt and covert resistance of the Rajputs and manifestation of the antipathy of the Rajputs towards the Marathas are also examined in this chapter. We end by drawing some conclusions from this study.

CHAPTER I

MARATHA INTERVENTION IN RAJASTHAN: 1730-1760 (PART I)

In order to understand the Rajput-Maratha relations in the eighteenth century, it is pertinent that we consider the circumstances that brought the Marathas into Rajasthan. For the sake of convenience the period from 1730 to 1794 is divided into two phases. The first phase covers the period from 1730-1760. The second phase covers the span from 1761-1794 and will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. The period covering the first phase was the span within which they made their early forays into Rajasthan via the Mukandara Pass. The excuse for their official entry into the area was provided by the Rajputs themselves when they were invited by the Rajput States of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bundi to help them in their succession disputes. Though the disputes were settled, the Rajput Rajas found it difficult to extricate themselves from the hold that was exercised by the Marathas in these States. The Maratha-Rajput relations need to be seen first in the context of the Mughal-Maratha relations. It was while serving the Mughal Emperors that Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Raja Jaswant Singh had the first contact with the Marathas.

It is clear that the Rajputs first came into contact with the Marathas while serving as the *mansabdars* of the Mughal emperors. Both the Rajput Rajas, Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Raja Jaswant Singh had tried to subdue the Marathas under the leadership of Shivaji but were unsuccessful. This failure did not go down well with Aurangzeb and he did not hide his displeasure. The Emperor suspected that Shivaji had fled from Agra with the connivance of Sawai Jai Singh's son, Ram Singh. The Rajput prince was punished, first by being forbidden the court and then by being deprived of his rank and pay.[1]

Establishment of the Maratha power in Malwa

The initial phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations must be seen as a part of Mughal-Maratha conflict in Malwa. The province of Malwa was a part of the Mughal Empire. Sawai Jai Singh, who represented the Mughal power failed to meet the Maratha

[1] Jadunath Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzib*, Orient Blackswan, 2009, Delhi, p. 171.

challenge, and once Malwa came under Maratha domination, it was not possible for Sawai Jai Singh to control Peshwa's territorial ambitions further North. This will be discussed in the subsequent pages but let us first take into account the rise of Maratha power in Malwa.

The strategic importance of Malwa lay in the fact that it was the link which joined North India with South India. All the military and trade routes passed through it. Aurangzeb's Deccan wars increased the importance of Malwa and the Emperor set the precedent of appointing a prince of the royal blood or some most trusted officer as it's governor.On the basis of the contemporary Marathi records, Raghubir Sinh says that during the period 1698-1707 the Marathas fought against Aurangzeb for their existence. At this time the main purpose of the Maratha bands was to roam anywhere and everywhere, plundering the Imperial treasury and territory and harass the enemy in all possible ways. Initially their motive to invade Malwa was just to divert the attention of the Emperor, but after 1707, it was the prosperity of Malwa and Gujarat that lured them to invade these areas. The new Peshwa Baji Rao further encouraged them to conquer new lands. He gave a systematic form and political content to the sporadic raids by the Maratha *sardars* for he perceived the political, economic and strategic value of these provinces.[2] Baji Rao decided to overrun and bring under control the rich and flourishing provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. "Thus the establishment of a Maratha domination in Malwa and Gujarat was the first step to the establishment of a large and powerful Maratha empire."[3]

After securing themselves in Malwa they turned their gaze on Rajasthan. The political situation in northern India also proved helpful to the Marathas in fulfilling their ambition of expanding their power base.They followed the route from the Mukandara Pass and across the Chambal from Malwa via Harauti, and from Gujarat via Idar and Jalore. In both the cases the Maratha entry was facilitated by the internal disputes among the Rajputs. In the case of Kota and Bundi the Marathas hovered on the outskirts since 1725 but could make an entry only in 1732.

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2 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p. 191.
3 Ibid., P.192.

In the beginning the sporadic Maratha forays into the Mewar territory resulted in the annoyance expressed by the Mewar Maharana in the *kharitas* addressed to the Maratha king Shahu. The latter also took cognizance of the situation and rebuked his officials in consideration of the old ties that they had with the house of Mewar. Raja Shahu exhibited his earnestness and sincereity towards the Maharana when in 1726, he issued a permanent *ajna-patra* (written order) under his own as well as the seals of the Peshwa and the Pratinidhi, in favour of Rawat Bagh Singh Shaktawat, son of Hathi Singh Shaktawat of Piplia, a noble of Mewar. He instructed his military commanders and all officers not to disturb the land and the people of the Piplia village (situated within the Mewar State territories adjoining the Malwa *suba*.[4] During the reign of Sawai Jai Singh also the cordiality enjoyed by the Marathas with the house of Jaipur was invoked on many occasions. But the Maratha king could not check the ambitions of the *sardars*. After establishing their power in Malwa, Gujarat and Bundelkhand, the Marathas advanced into Rajasthan. They turned their gaze towards Rajasthan where in the words of Manucci: "The most powerful Rajahs are three in number : The first is the rajah Rana …the second is called Rathor…the third is called Chaque (? Kachhwaha)…"[5]

Objectives of the Marathas in Malwa and Rajasthan

In the 1730's, Malwa served as the frontier for the Marathas in their movement towards the North and West of it was Rajasthan.There are various reasons ascribed to the Maratha invasions in Malwa and the spread of their power subsequently in Rajasthan and North India. The Marathi writers generally believe that the Peshwa wanted to establish the ideal of *Hindu-pad-Padshahi* (Hindu paramountcy over the whole of India).The Maratha advance into the province of Malwa served as a "convenient starting point for raids into Rajputana."[6] In the Maratha plan of action the policy of north-ward expansion could be materialized only when they had a strong base in Malwa. Sir John Malcolm writes :

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4 Raghubir Sinh, *Studies on Maratha & Rajput History*, Shri Natnagar Shodh-Sansthan, Sitamau, Research Publishers, Jodhpur, 1989, p. 141.

5 Niccolao Manucci, *Storia Do Mogor Or Mughal India 1653-1708*, (henceforth *Storio Do Mogor*), Vol. II, tr. William Irvine, Editions Indian, Calcutta, Reprinted 1966, p. 407.

6 Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition Or A Century of Anarchy The First Phase 1698-1765*, D.B. Taraporewala, Sons & Co., Bombay, 1936, p.186.

> "Thus invited, by weakness and provoked by injury, we are not surprised to find that the Rajput princes and chiefs of Jeypoor, Marwar, Mewar and Malwa, so far from continuing to be that defense they had before proved themselves of the Empire, were either secretly or openly the supporters of the Maratha invaders, to whose first invasion of Malwa, we are told by every Persian or Hindu writer that notices the subjects, hardly any opposition was given; and we possess many testimonies to show that they chiefly attributed their success on this occasion to the action of religious feelings."[7]

This seems to be partly true.Having gained their right to levy dues on all the area south of the Narmada, the invasion of Malwa fitted very well in the ambitious northward scheme of Peshwa, Baji Rao. Another cause that led the Marathas to spread their authority all over India, was that the Peshwa was unable to check the ambition of the Maratha *sardars*. The Peshwa feared them lest they disturb the peace of their native country. Hence they were constantly employed in outward expeditions.[8]

Raghubir Sinh assigns economic cause as an important factor for the Maratha invasions in Malwa and later North India. He reasons that the Peshwa and Shahu were in deep debt and that he wanted money to pay it off. Gujarat and Malwa were the nearest to the Deccan but Gujarat had already been under the domination of the Maratha leader Dabhade that only left Malwa for the Peshwa.[9] Even though the Peshwas were credited with having turned the Maratha State into an Empire, the Marathi documents in the form of correspondence and account sheets confirm that the Peshwas were heavily in debt. In a letter to his guru Brahmendra Swami, Baji Rao described his pathetic indebtedness in the following words:

> "Our *sardars* (Dabhade, Gaikwad, Bande and others) are masters of crores, while I, who am devoted to you and to Chhatrapati Shahu, find it difficult to eke out a bare maintenance. I have been suffering humiliation at the hands of the money-lenders, and my forehead has suffered a lot by making apologies to the men of my army [due to my inability to pay them regularly]."[10]

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7 John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*, *Including Malwa, and Adjacent Provinces*, (henceforth, *A Memoir of Central India*), Vol. I, Sagar Publications, New Delhi, 1970, pp. 53,54,67.

8 Ibid., p.75.

9 Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition*, pp. 188,189.

10 G.H. Khare, 'The Marathas as Freebooters', in *Maratha History Seminar Papers*, (May 28-31, 1970), ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, Shivaji University Press, Kolhapur, 1971. pp. 213, 214.

> The economic motive further becomes clear when after Chimnaji defeated Girdhar Bahadur, the Peshwa ordered his brother that he should make heavy exactions from the city of Ujjain. He further instructed that once the affairs of the province were settled, Chimnaji should immediately hasten to a rich country to collect money and to refurbish the army. The Peshwa aimed at defeating the enemy in order to clear the debts.[11] Baji Rao wrote to his brother that he could roam about anywhere he liked but that he should bring back money somehow or the other.[12]

Rajasthan: Ecology and its Economic Resources

The nature of the present work requires that we take into account the geographical and topographical features of Rajasthan. This will help us to understand the socio-economic conditions of the area. It will also enable us to know the objectives of the Marathas in the region. Rajasthan is broadly divided into two natural divisions, namely, the North-western and South-eastern. This division is on account of the Aravali range of hills that run diagonally from South-west to North-east. In the North-west lie the arid plains and shifting sand hills of Marwar, Jaisalmer, Bikaner and Shekhawati region of Jaipur, collectively termed *Marusthali*. This region is characterized by low ridges and sand dunes. South-east has low-lying plains with narrow escarpments as the land rises towards the Harauti plateau. The Banas and the Chambal rivers irrigate this region. The well watered alluvial low lands of the latter forming one of the more productive parts of Rajasthan.The seasonal temperature variations of the weather of Rajasthan was recorded by Abul Fazl [13]and Jahangir.[14] In Marwar the climate is extremely dry. The days are intensely hot in summers.[15] In the North, especially on the Bikaner border there is sometimes hard frost at night, and it is much colder than in the Southern states.[16]

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11 *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, (henceforth *S.P.D.*), ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. XIII, *Marathyacha Malvyant Pravesh*, Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1931, No. 15.

12 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XIII, No. 29.

13 Abu'l Fazl, *The Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, tr. Col. H.S. Jarrett, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, Third edition, 1978, p. 273.

14 Nur-ud-din Muhammad Jahangir, *The Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri or Memoirs of Jahangir*, Vol. I, tr. Alexander Rogers, ed. Henry Beveridge, Delhi, 1968, pp. 340-41.

15 Lt. Col. Archibald Adams, *A Medico-Topographical & General Account of Marwar, Sirohi and Jaisalmer*, London, 1990, p. 351.

16 *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XXI, London, 1908, p. 91.

The North and North-west division covers nearly three-fifth of Rajasthan and is characterized by the presence of low ridges and sand dunes. The sandy tract extended in the West from Runn of Kutch to the border of Sindh and formed a part of the Thar Desert. The climate is characterized by extremes of temperatures and by a marked degree of aridity. The soils are classified as light textured, grey-brown desert soils, which are alkaline and saline. Rivers play only a very subordinate role in moulding the surface features of this area. The only river of any importance is Looni or Salt River. It flows though the Marwar desert. The region falls outside the regular course of both South-western and North-eastern monsoons and according to T.H. Hendley the maximum rainfall is between July and September. [17] Almost the entire region is sandy waste, ill watered and unproductive, except in the neighbourhood of the Aravalis. Water is brackish and found at the depth of 200 feet to 300 feet below the surface. The oasis alone, which are highly scattered supports vegetation and human clusters with their artificial tanks or natural hollows or pools that collect water during the rainy season and therefore, are able to retain the same for a few months.

The South-eastern part has a very diversified character. Although this part of Rajasthan[18] is considerably smaller in extent, it consists of the higher and more fertile land behind the Aravalis. The location of Mewar is towards the South, along the loftiest and most clearly defined section of the Aravalis. The South-eastern region contains extensive hill ranges and long stretches of rocky mould and woodland. Many rivers flow in this part of Rajasthan, the primary being the Banas and the Chambal. In many parts there are fertile table lands and stretches of excellent soils. The region is characterized by a diverse variety of alluvial soil, varying both in texture, from clayey loam (*chikni*) to sandy (*bhur*) and in the tints from pale brown, yellowish brown to dark brown. Towards South and West in the Harauti region, one comes across black soil. The region receives between 50 to 100 cms. of rainfall annually.Agriculture was practiced in the semi-arid part of Rajasthan and in the arid parts, pastoral activities

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17 Thomas Holbein Hendley, *General Medical History of Rajputana*, Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing , 1900.

18 Satya Prakash Gupta, *The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan (c. 1650-1750)*, Centre for Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University, Manohar, Delhi, 1986. Gupta's work is on Eastern Rajasthan and he has mainly scrutinized the records of six contiguous *parganas*, which were under the authority of the Amber/Jaipur rulers most consistently. These *parganas* were: Amber (later Jaipur) Bahatri (Basawa), Chatsu, Dausa, Lalsot and Malarana.

dominated. Variety of crops were grown in the agriculturally conducive areas. Though many different political and social factors have affected the development of the regional economy over centuries, the basic facets of physical environment – land, soil, rainfall and natural vegetation, have remained the same.

The most western part broadly corresponds to Jaisalmer. The soil all along the Western boundary is for the most part light and sandy.[19] In this region, agriculture was possible during the rainy season, as the rain would sink in and not flow off the surface. Hence, little rainfall would suffice for the crops. Except for some places where water could be stored, only rain crops such as *bajra, jowar*, *moong, moth and till* were grown.[20] The North-western region shelters a characterstic sub-division; the South-western region comprising broadly of Marwar.[21] It is generally a sandy tract, though the terrain gradually changes as we move eastwards; from a mere desert in the West to comparatively fertile lands along the eastern borders**.** Bikaner region formed the North-eastern section of this broad division. It formed a plain of the lightest class of sandy soil, broken at short intervals by ridges of almost pure sand.[22] In the eastern side, the soil was sandy loam, for the most part well adapted to the conditions of local rainfall, while in the South-east it was less loamy, and sand hills were most frequently met with.

Though land was available in abundance, the climatic conditionss were a major limiting factor. Even in semi-arid region, cultivation required capital investment. For this the poorer sections solicited loans, which were required to procure means of cultivation: seeds, manure, plough and bullocks:

> "… in many cases the peasant indebtedness was collective and we find the entire *ryots* of villages borrowing money from the *bohra* to purchase seeds, manure, ploughs and bullocks so that they could cultivate the fallow lands of the village, construct ponds and dig wells. … The *ryots* had to pay the debt with interest at the time of next harvest usually through their traditional representatives, the *zamindars* or the *patels*.[23]

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19 Muhnot Nainsi, *Khyat*, Vol. II, p. 31.

20 Lakhmi Chand, *Tawarikh-i-Jaisalmer*, Jodhpur, 1999, pp. 211-212.

21 Masanori Sato and B.L. Bhadani, *Economy and Polity of Rajasthan : Study of Kota and Marwar (17th-19th centuries)*, (henceforth *Economy and Polity of Rajasthan*) Publication Scheme, 1997. Sato has done extensive research encompassing south-eastern Rajasthan (Kota) while Bhadani concentrates on western Rajasthan (Marwar).

22 Muhnot Nainsi, *Khyat*, Vol. II, P. 116.

23 Dilbagh Singh, 'The Role of the Mahajans in the Rural Economy in Eastern Rajasthan during the 18th Century', *Social Scientist*, Vol. 2, No. 10, 1974, p. 22.

The physiographic features of North-western desert region did not always play a negative role. The ground water in this region being brackish/saline, prohibited artificial irrigation on a large scale. But the same was turned into a productive resource. The eastern fringe of the Rajasthan desert, from Didwana through the Sambhar Lake and the Pachbhadra salt basin to the Great Rann of Kutch, forms one of the important salt producing zones of India. Nainsi gives us village wise details of the salt pits.[24] Salt was extracted by a particular caste known as Kharwal.[25]

In the South-west Marwar, the principal mineral found was salt. It was manufactured extensively at Sambhar Lake, Didwana Lake[26] and Pachbhadra Lake.[27]Marble was mostly obtained from Makrana near Sambhar Lake. In terms of mineral resources, the North-western region was not very rich. It was mainly desert. Scanty rainfalls, non-perennial streams, low water level, that too brackish.[28] These conditions posed severe limitations on agricultural production. Agriculture could not become profitable and dependable. However, natural vegetation was conducive for pastoralism. The hoards of camels, cattle, sheep and goats constituted the wealth of the rural population.[29] Leather industry comprised an important component of pastoral sector. In Marwar, there is a reference of tax on the caste of *bhanbhi* (leather workers) in pargana Sojat.[30] It must have been a tax on tanning. It shows that cattle wealth constituted an important aspect of the socio-economic life of the region. This is corroborated from the nature of prevalent non-commercial taxes such as '*pan charai, ghas charai, korad and jakhira* (fodder tax).[31] The inability of the Rajputs to pay regularly can be seen in these environmental features. Maratha penetration was more severe in agriculturally rich parts of Rajasthan. Sambhar salt trade was an important source of income.

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[24] Muhnot Nainsi, *Vigat*, Vol. III, is full of such references where the number of salt pits in the villages are recorded.
[25] Ibid., p. 130.
[26] Muhnot Nainsi, *Vigat*, Vol. I, p. 43 & *Vigat*, Vol. II, p. 54.
[27] Muhnot Nainsi, *Vigat*, Vol. II, p. 36.
[28] Muhnot Nainsi, *Vigat*, Vol. I, p. 19.
[29] There are numerous references of fight/war over cattle, camels etc. in the Nainsi's *Khyat*.
[30] Nainsi, *Vigat* Vol. I, p. 398.
[31] G.S.L. Devra, *Rajasthan ki Prashasnik Vyavastha : 1514 se 1818,* Tharati Prakashan, Bikaner, 1981, pp. 178-182.

Strategic Importance of Rajasthan

Rajasthan fitted very well in the Maratha policy of Northward expansion. They had already become a power to reckon with in Malwa and Gujarat. As both these areas shared their border with Rajasthan, it served as a convenient foot-hold from where the Marathas could strike targeted places. The State of Kota lay on the North of Malwa where the Marathas had already obtained a firm footing. They entered Kota by the Eastern route, and crossed the ford of the Parbati near Atru.[32] Kota suffered from their incursions and had to spend a lot of money to avoid their destructive raids. The State of Bundi could be reached only after crossing the river Chambal, which was just below the State of Kota and then a large portion of the Kota State. Therefore, Bundi was not directly exposed to the Maratha raid. Jaipur could be reached only after crossing Kota and Bundi. Mewar was exposed to the Marathas from the East and the South-east. The State of Marwar was harassed by the Marathas from the Gujarat side.[33]

Therefore, they made Kota as their tributary State which easily succumbed to their pressure. With Kota as their base, the Maratha movement in the various States of Rajasthan became easy. Ajmer was another area coveted by the Marathas. It is centrally located in Rajasthan. From the early times, we find that in order to establish their hold over Rajasthan, possession of Ajmer was considered to be of strategic importance for dynasties of the Delhi Sultanate, or the Mughals followed by the Marathas and the British. In the context of the Marathas, the unfolding of events at Jodhpur is self explanatory. In 1756, the war between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh was brought to an end after an agreement was signed. According to the agreement, Marwar was divided into two halves between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh and Ajmer was given to the Marathas, as they had rendered help to Ram Singh. The long campaign of the Marathas in Marwar ended by making it as their tributory. Ajmer was given to the Marathas in *moondkati* (compensation for the blood) of Jayappa. The possession of this stronghold, perpetuated Maratha influence over Rajasthan.[34]

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32 Beni Gupta, *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan*, p. 6.
33 Ibid., p. 15.
34 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. II, p. 96.

However, the Rajput Rajas did not digest the loss of Ajmer. When the Marathas were defeated in the third battle of Panipat, the Rajput Rajas took advantage of the disturbed political situation in North India and tried to recover Ajmer from the Marathas. With the consent of Bijay Singh, Ballu Joshi attacked Ajmer and occupied the city. At this, the Maratha *patel* appointed at Ajmer asked Mahadaji Sindhia to save Ajmer quickly, otherwise Garh Bithli would be lost to them. This would adversely affect their prospects in the three States of Rajasthan as Mewar, Dhundhar (Jaipur) and Marwar could be controlled from Ajmer only. If Ajmer was lost to them then their control over the three States would also be lost :

> *"garh vitli chhoot jasi ne tinoo hee mulak su amal uuth jasi. Mewar, Dhundhar, Marwar ae sara hee Ajmer su dabel chhai."*[35]

Rampura and Gagron were the other strategic areas which were under the control of the Marathas. Both were their important outposts that lay on the bordering areas of Malwa and Rajasthan. Rampura was a fertile plain of Mewar which had been given to Sawai Madho Singh by the Mewar Maharana. Later, in 1752, Sawai Madho Singh gave this stronghold to Malhar Rao Holkar. Its importance cannot be denied as the Mewar nobles seized it from the Maratha control after the 1761 debacle. The seizure of Rampura from the Marathas added powerful sources to the already depleted treasury of the Jaipur State. For the Marathas it was a revolt against their domination. Soon the Marathas recaptured Rampura after killing four hundred Chundawats.[36]

The geographic location of Rajasthan boosted trading activities, as it is situated on the path of major land and sea trade routes. Undoubtedly, this trade sustained the economy of North-western Rajasthan. Salt called Sambhar *loon*, or salt of Sambhar was exported over the greater part of Hindustan from the Indus to the Ganges.[37] The *banjaras* transported salt to different places as the factors of the *banias*.[38]

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35 *Rathora ri Khyat* Vol. III, p. 572.
36 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 60.
37 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. II, PP. 126-133.
38 Masanori Sato and B.L. Bhadani, *Economy and Polity of Rajasthan*, p. 104.

Rajasthan assumed importance due to the presence of the following trade routes :

- The route between Agra and Ahmadabad passed through this region in two principal branches, one of them passed through Ajmer and the other one reached Ahmadabad via Chittor,[39] Chatsu, Merta and Jalore.[40]
- Several routes connected Agra and Delhi with lower Sindh via Ajmer and Hindaun.[41]
- One trade route passed from Jodhpur to Peshawar.[42]
- From Agra to Ajmer via Hindaun, Lalsot and Mauzabad.[43]
- From Delhi to Ahmadabad through Churu, Nagore, Jodhpur, Jalore, Sirohi.[44]
- From Rajgarh to Khairpur (Sindh) through Churu and Bikaner.[45]
- From Agra to Khairpur through Bikaner and Jaisalmer.[46]
- From Multan to Jaipur through Bahawalpur, Pugal, Bikaner, Churu, Sikar and Jodhpur.[47]
- From Delhi to Khorasar via Nagaur, Jodhpur and Udaipur.
- Trade route connecting Jaipur-Karauli-Gwalior.[48]

These routes assumed greater importance in the eighteenth century for the Marathas. They facilitated their movement in Rajasthan and other parts of North India. The route generally followed by them was from the eastern side of Kota from where they moved on to Bundi, and various territories of Jaipur like Tonk, Shahpura etc. Traders from Gwalior and Indore who settled in Rajasthan engaged in the profession of money-lending and trade actively.[49]

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39 H.C. Verma, *Medieval Routes to India : Baghdad to Delhi, a study of trade and military routes*, (henceforth *Medieval Routes to India*) Naya Prakash, Calcutta, 1978, p. 113.
40 De J. Laet, *The Empire of the Great Mughals*, tr., J.S. Hoyland, Bombay, 1928, pp. 64-66.
41 H.C. Verma, *Medieval Routes to India*, 113.
42 Ibid.
43 De J. Laet, *The Empire of the Great Mughals*, pp. 64-66.
44 P.W. Powlett, *Gazetteer of Bikaner*, Calcutta, 1868, Appendix, p. 251.
45 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. II, pp. 523-525.
46 Ibid., pp. 603-608.
47 G.N. Sharma, *Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan [1500-1800] : with special reference to the impact of Mughal influence*, Lakshmi Narayan Agarwal, Agra, 1968, pp. 323-325.
48 B.L. Gupta, *Trade and Commerce in Rajasthan during the 18th Century*, Jaipur Publishing House, Jaipur, 1987, p. 135.
49 Ibid.

The Marathas procured many items from the markets of Rajasthan. The old records of Marwar and Bikaner show that the fairs also promoted local and long distance trade. The traders participated in the fairs either to sell their merchandise or to procure the goods. For the royal exchequer, fairs constituted an important source of revenue. The importance of these can be realized from the fact that the rulers considered it their duty to organize them. The *hakim* of the pargana in which the fair was to be held, was expected to personally supervise the arrangements. The safety and security of the merchants and their merchandise also had to be ensured by him. Besides all this, the *hakim* had to arrange provisions of water for the merchants and fodder for their animals. A police station or *kotwali chabutara* was also established in the fairs where armed personnel were kept ready to provide necessary protection to traders and merchandise.[50] Important cattle fairs were the Gogameri held in August-September at Gogano, near Nohar in the East, and the other at Kolayat. Tilwara near Balotra was the venue for the principal horse and cattle fair.[51] In Marwar, the fairs were held for the sale and purchase of cattle such as bullocks, camels, horses and other goods such as hides, tanned leather, brass and tin utensils wearing apparels and blankets.[52]

Agriculture was the basic means of subsistence in many parts of Rajasthan. In the North-western region, it was mainly dependent on rains, therefore, production was very precarious and usually low value cereals could be cultivated. The following description by Manucci is worth noting:

> "The land of the Rathor, who rules nine districts, are for the most part all sand; they have little or no water…. The cereals grown in this country come up by help of rain only." [53]

This was the reason that the State of Marwar paid the installments to the Marathas generally in the form of miscellaneous goods.The South-eastern region had a more diversified character and most of the region supported two crops a year. Not only the cultivation was intensive, the area also had a variability of lucrative crops. The Eastern and South-eastern part also had a land surplus situation, the possibilities of

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50 Gian Chand Sharma, *Administrative System of the Rajputs*, Rajesh Publications, New Delhi, 1979, p. 155.
51 *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XVI, London, 1908, p. 521.
52 Gian Chand Sharma, *Administrative System of the Rajputs*, pp. 155,156.
53 Manucci, *Storia Do Mogor,* Vol. II, p. 406.

production with the human intervention were immense. But availability of necessary capital was a major handicap.

It has been emphasized by Dilbagh Singh that *raiyatis* were heavily dependent on the superior sections of the society, i.e., the *zamindars*, *patels, mahajan* and other rich *riyayatis* for resources needed for cultivation. They were frequently in debt and were obliged to mortagage their lands to the *riyayatis.* Often the *raiyatis* collectively fell into debt in order to purchase seed, ploughs and bullocks needed for cultivating their lands. In the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century, there was an extention of cultivation.[54] Revenue collection from the crops production yielded good income to the State.South-eastern Rajasthan enjoyed a fairly brisk agrarian commerce. Since western Rajasthan had been agriculturally poor, and eastern Rajasthan was food surplus area it can be safely assumed that the eastern area must have been more coveted by the Marathas. As compared to the North-western Rajasthan, the Eastern and South-eastern Rajasthan had an edge not only in respect of agriculture, it was also rich in mineral resources. Salt was largely manufactured at the Sambhar lake,[55] and Khetri had a copper mine. The hills of Ajmer-Merwara were well endowed in mineral wealth. Marbles of various colours were quarried in the vicinity of Ajmer.[56] Most of the areas which were transferred to the Marathas had intensive cultivation and supported two crops a year. Besides being rich in agriculture, it also had an edge in the mineral resources.

Impact of Mughal Empire's Decline on the States of Rajasthan

The Rajput Rajas played an important role in consolidating the Empire politically. They served the Mughal emperors as their military and civil officers in the outlying *subas* and during the campaigns on the Mughal frontier. In essence, the policy consisted of treating the Rajput rulers as Mughal nobles at par with others, obliged to render military services while receiving jagirs in lieu of salary. The Rajput policy of Akbar was in fact initiated with the agreement he made with Raja Bharmal of Amber. In the words of Abu'l Fazl:

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54 S.P. Gupta, *The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan*, p. 143; Dilbagh Singh, *State, Landlords and Peasants : Rajasthan in the 18th Century*, (henceforth *State, Landlords and Peasants*), Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1990, p. 23.

55 *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. II, London, 1908, p. 266.

56 *Gazetteer of the Ajmer-Merwara in Rajputana*, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1875, pp. 18,19.

> "Rajah Bihari Mal Kacwaha, who by the favourable grace of the Shahinshah, became one of the officers of the Sultanate, and rose to a rank superior to that of all the Rajahs and Raises in India, and whose sons and grandsons and whole clan rose to high rank and great office."[57]

The Kachhwahas were accorded a special recognition by Jahangir, when he designated them as Mirza Rajas.[58] In Rajasthan, the Mughals were the paramount power without annexing the territories of the Rajput kings. The Mughal supremacy and assertion of their paramountcy over Rajput principalities was well established. The rulers of the Rajput States were in the Imperial service and they held high *mansabs*. The Mughals levied no tribute, but they expected substantial *peshkash* or offering at the time of a ruler's accession or at the time of grant of a jagir. The Mughals had maintained a truce in Rajasthan, preventing the Rajputs from encroaching on areas outside Rajasthan, and also placing a check upon the ambitions of the stronger Rajput States. Satish Chandra calls this as the imposition of a kind of a *pax Mughalica* which was a precondition.[59]This implied control of inter-state disputes, and also, on occasions, disputes between a ruler and his *sardars*. The ruler was the final court of appeal in his State.

But in the parganas received by a ruler as *tankhwah, inam* or on *ijara*, the Emperor was the final court of appeal. In matters of succession, the Emperor could interfere. The *tika* sent by the Emperor was significant for succession.In order to maintain a direct contact with the Mughal court, the rulers appointed their *vakils* there.[60]

If we compare the relationship of the Mughal-Rajput vis-à-vis the Maratha-Rajput, we find that the former was much more stable and only occasionally disturbed by the personal whims of the Emperor as in the case of Aurangzeb. There was an atmosphere of peace and security, and a feeling of mutual trust. The Rajas knew that in case of any external threat, the Imperial power was there to safeguard their interests. They did not find the payment of the *peshkash* burdensome as they were rewarded with important assignments. It was only during the reign of Aurangzeb and his successors, that the Rajputs relations with the Mughal Emperors became sour.

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57 Abu'l Fazl, *The Akbarnama*, Translated, H. Beveridge, Vol. II, Bibliotheca Indica, Published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Rare Books, Delhi, 1972, p. 36.

58 The Tuzuk, Vol. I, p. 266.

59 Satish Chandra, *Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs & the Deccan*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1993, p. 39.

60 V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh*, pp. 279-281.

Sardesai opines that Shahu, while in Mughal captivity had gauged the depth of this Rajput feeling. He had even gained the sympathies of some of them and was given a cordial send-off on his release in Malwa. He further says that Sawai Jai Singh continued to be friendly to the Maratha overtures even upto the time of his death in 1743. However, later events brought about a complete estrangement between the Marathas and the Rajputs. But we must particularly bear in mind that during Shahu's life-time, there was an entire agreement and cordiality between the two sides. Therefore, when Shahu and his first Peshwa began to shape the future destinies of the rising Maratha power, there existed respectful amity between the Marathas and the Rajputs.[61]

With the decline in Mughal power and prestige, the leading Rajput States felt free to resume the old process of conquest and territorial expansion. Jaipur was the foremost to acquire the position as a major State in the first half of the eighteenth century. Sawai Jai Singh cherished the ambition of establishing a hegemony from the Sambhar Lake in the West to Agra and Mathura in the East, and extending upto the Narmada in the South. By grants from the Emperor and *ijara* he expanded considerably the dominion inherited by him.[62] As the Mughal empire weakened, the Jaipur rulers absorbed these territories into their hereditary State.[63] This should become amply clear from the way the Kachhwaha State prospered. Initially Amber was a single pargana state of the *sarkar* of Ajmer having 11,35,095 *bighas* of measured land and an assessed revenue of 1,22,56,297 *dams.*[64] By the year 1650, Mirza Raja Jai Singh held a jagir worth 820 lakh *dams* in the parganas of Amber, Chatsu, Fagi, Mauzabad, Jhag, Baharana, Pachwara, Khori, Deoli, Sanchari, Bharkol, Jalapur, Umran, Sakras, Bawal and Jat Kalyewa.[65] The area got further extended under Sawai Jai Singh. He was able to obtain jagirs in *tankha, ijara* and *inam*. Shah Jahan gave Kama to Mirza Raja Jai Singh's son Kirat Singh. Later, Mirza Raja Jai Singh acquired Chalkaliana and Tonk as the reward of his subjugation of Shivaji in 1665.

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61 G.S. Sardesai, *Main Currents of Maratha History*, p. 96.
62 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics,* P.186.
63 S.P. Gupta, *The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan*, p. 17.
64 Abu'l Fazl, *The Ain*, Vol. II, p. 278.
65 S.P. Gupta, *The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan*, p. 178.

Later, Shah Jahan bestowed the parganas of Toda and Tonk on Maharana Rai Singh of Udaipur. This was given as a gesture of the acknowledgement of the help rendered by Rai Singh's father Maharana Bhim Singh to Shah Jahan against his father, Emperor Jahangir. But Rai Singh's successors were weak and could not retain the parganas. Aurangzeb brought the two parganas under *khalisa*.[66] When Sawai Madho Singh ascended the Jaipur throne, he transferred the territories of Tonk and Rampura to Malhar Rao Holkar in 1750. There was always a friction between Sawai Madho Singh and Holkar regarding the possession of Tonk located hundred kilometers South-west of Jaipur. Sawai Jai Singh extended his possessions which included the parganas Bhangarh, Malarana and rupees 80,000 in pargana Amarsar, the areas of Jhilai, Uniara and Barwara.[67] In 1748, Sawai Jai Singh's son Ishwari Singh obtained a *farman* from the Mughal Court allowing all the territories which had been in the possession of Jaipur State to continue in his control.[68]

The Maharajas of Jodhpur seized several areas belonging to the Mughal province of Gujarat, and dreamt of a hegemony from Sambhar Lake to Ahmadabad and the sea.[69] In 1657, the jagirs held by Maharaja Jaswant Singh included Jodhpur, Pokaran, Merta, Sojat, Jaitaran, Siwana, Jalore, Phalodi and Gajsinghpura.[70] In 1770, there arose a dispute between the nobles of the Mewar Maharana Ari Singh and his nephew Ratan Singh. On this occasion, the Maharana had requested Bijay Singh for help. The

latter immediately sent his troops and settled the dispute.[71] Bagh Singh, after removing the control of Ratan Singh from Godwad, requested the Maharana that in order to have a firm control over Godwad, it was necessary that they station their army there. If this was not done Ratan Singh would re-establish his control over the area and this would enhance

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66 Hanuman Singhal, *Tonk ka Itiha [History of Tonk (Rajasthan)]*, Sahitya Kala Sangam, Jaipur, 1992, p. 9.

67 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur c. 1503-1938*, Revised and edited by Raghubir Sinh, Orient Longman, Delhi, 1984, pp. 219, 220.

68 Satya Prakash Gupta, "Expansion of the territory of the Kachhwahas in Mughal times," *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 27th Session, 1965, Allahabad, p. 179.

69 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p.187.

70 G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity: A Study of Politics and Administration of the State of Marwar*, (henceforth *Rajput Polity*), Published by Ramesh C. Jain for Manohar Book Sevice, New Delhi, 1977 , p. 50.

71 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas : Prarambh se Maharaja Bhim Singhji V.S. 1860 (1803 A.D.) tak*, (henceforth *Marwar ka Itihas*) Vol. I, Maharaja Mansingh Pustak Prakash, Jodhpur, Revised reprinted 1999, Delhi, p. 382.

his military might. The Maharana then conveyed to the Jodhpur Raja, Bijay Singh asking him to maintain 3,ooo soldiers to suppress Ratan Singh. As long as the army would be stationed there, the revenue of Godwad could be used for its expenses but the *sardars* of Godwad would be under the control of the Mewar Maharana.Bijay Singh then responded that under normal circumstances 200 cavalry and 300 infantry would be stationed there but in case of a battle, an army of 3,000 would be made available. The day the Maharana would send back his army, his control over the pargana of Godwad would be re-established.[72] In 1772, Maharaja Bijay Singh went to Nathdwara where he was joined by the Bikaner ruler, Gaj Singhji and Kishangarh ruler, Bahadur Singhji. Considering it to be a good opportunity, Maharana Ari Singh also went there and requested Bijay Singh to return Godwad but the latter refused.[73]

Resurgence of Mutual Rivalries among the Rajputs

Kolff emphasizes that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the top layer of Rajputs tended to close ranks and articulate new norms of Rajput behavior. Earlier bards had always encouraged their Rajput employers to assume aristocratic self-images closely linked with myths of origin that established their status as *khsatriyas* and traced back their genealogies to the great dynasties of ancient Indian history. Later the political power and social status of the more successful lineages tended to be legitimised exclusively in the language of descent and kinship. From the sixteenth century onwards, the political opportunities provided by the Mughals and the importance attached to the Mughals themselves gave a new vigour and largely pushed into the background the more ancient character of the Rajputs as an open status group.[74] Kolff suggests that since the late sixteenth century a new Rajput Great Tradition emerged which recognized little else than unilineal kin bodies as the elements of which genuine Rajput history ought to be made up. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Rajasthan and particularly Mewar had become the seat of this new Rajput genealogical orthodoxy.[75]

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72 Gaurishankar Hirachand Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya ka Itihas*, Vol. II, Rajasthani Granthagar, Jodhpur, Second Edition, 1999, pp. 659, 660.

73 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 383.

74 Dirk H. A. Kolff, *Naukar Rajput and Sepoy: the ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan, 1450-1850*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 72.

75 Ibid.

Thus, every Rajput State was, generally speaking, one clan politically organized into one unit under the pressure of historical circumstances and political conditions. During the formative period, the polities of each Rajput State was largely organized around the principle of *bhai-banth*, i.e., brotherhood.[76] As expressed in a modern work:

> 'the ruling class belongs to one particular clan …. The humblest members of the clan considered themselves along with the ruler as the sons of the same father enjoying their patrimony by the same right as the ruler himself. The latter was thus nothing but *primus inter pares*…. The State in fact did not belong to the ruler – it belonged to the clan as whole.'

This identification of the clan with the State was the most characterstic feature of medieval Rajput polity. The clan system not only affected the internal administration of the State; it stood in the way of centralization of political power. Submission to a common superior was basically inconsistent with the traditions of the clan system.[77] The struggle between the Chundwats and Shaktawats in Mewar in the last quarter of the eighteenth century is one of the worst examples of clan feuds which increased the vulnerability of the Rajput States to Maratha aggressions during this period.[78] The rise of Rajput States as centralized polities was possible due to a complete subversion of the system of *bhai-banth*. This concept made the Rajput king master of the clan by relegating other lineage members to the level of *chakars* (servants). As an organizing principle *chakri* was antithetical to the idea of *bhai-banth*. The former emerged out of the debris of the latter. The relations between the Narukas of Alwar and their clan-chief, the Jaipur Raja (both Kachhwahas) is a classic example of the changing contours of *chakari*.[79] Those traditions crystallized themselves into clan feuds which constitute one of the most salient features of Rajput history dicussed in our work.

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76 G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, pp. 5-10 and 118.

77 Norman P. Ziegler, 'Marwari Historical Chronicles : Sources for the Social and Cultural History of Rajasthan,' *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 1976, sheds light on the traditions, clan histories and genealogies of the Rajputs, p. 219-245; A.C. Banerjee, *Aspects of Rajput State and Society*, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 99-101.

78 A.C. Banerjee, *Lectures on Rajput History*, Raghunath Prasad Nopani Lectures, Farma K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1962, p. 150.

79 R.P. Rana, 'Chakar to Raja: The Emergence of Naruka State of Alwar (c. 1660-1790),' *Social Science Probings*, June, 2006, p. 60.

Richard Fox has explained the political change among the Rajput clans on the basis of the organizing principles of relationships between the Rajput Raja and his kinsmen. According to Fox when the expansion of the lineage tends to slow down because of non-availability of land in home territory, the clan comes into conflict with adjoining groups. This leads to intensification of inter lineage and intra lineage conflict for control over land – both at home and in the neighbouring areas.[80]In Sarkar's opinion, war was the only occupation of the Rajputs.[81]

As in the case of Jodhpur, in the process of the expansion of the territory, the sons and brothers of the ruler were allowed to occupy the various terrirories conquered by them. These holdings were recognized as their *thikanas*. This practice was called *bhai-bant*, because, being members of the same clan, they believed that it was their share in a co-operative effort of the clan. Though accepting the sovereignty of the chief of the ruling clan the *sardars* treated him just as *primus-inter-pares*. Following *bhai-bant*, Rao Jodha had assigned the conquered territories to his sons and brothers.[82] But the concept of *bhai-bant* weakened the central authority. Later rulers, therefore, had to resort to *pattadari* system.

The reign of Muhammad Shah (1719-1748) witnessed a complete breakdown of Imperial authority in Rajasthan.[83] In the course of the eighteenth century the Rajput chiefs motivated by personal ambition became aggressive against one another. All these factors revived the pre-Mughal polity in Rajasthan. The Rajputs spent themselves in clan rivalries and civil wars. Jadunath Sarkar observed :

> "The imperial Government of Delhi had held together and protected all the feudatory States of India. But when the Emperor became lifeless shadow confined within the *harem*, when the *wazir's* role was pursuit of pleasure varied only by contests of his Court rivals, this unifying bond and common controlling authority was dissolved. No superior power was left to enforce

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80 Richard G. Fox, *Kin, Clan, Raja and Rule: State Hinterland Relations in Pre-Industrial India*, University of Carlifornia Press, California, 1971.

81 Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. V, Orient Longman Limited, Second Edition, 1952, New Delhi, P. 348.

82 G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity,* p. 5.

83 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, 1739-1754, M.C. Sarkar & Sons Ltd., Calcutta, Second edition, 1949, p. 156.

> lawful rights and prevent ambitious conflicts between one vassal State and another, or between one prince and another of the same royal house. All the pent-up personal ambitions and inter-State rivalries (hitherto checked) now burst forth without fear or check, and Rajputana became a zoological garden with the barrier of the cages thrown down and the keepers removed. The fiercest animal passions raged throughout the land, redeemed only now and then by individual instances of devotion and chivalry which had not yet totally disappeared from the human bosom."[84]

Under Akbar and his successors, Rajput soldiers had carried the Mughal banner far and wide. But Aurangzeb's attempt to annex Jodhpur after Jaswant Singh's death and his invasion of Mewar alienated the Rajputs. This was the opportunity of the Marathas. By appealing to this feeling, Baji Rao I, easily entered Malwa and then made his hold upon that province good.[85] The last vestige of Imperial suzerainty disappeared from Rajasthan completely when Ranthambhor was gained by the Jaipur Raja in October 1753 and Ajmer by the Jodhpur Raja in 1752.[86] Thus, it can be concluded that the Mughal authority in Rajasthan waned on its own. The Rajput States were left to fend for themselves. It is against this background that the Rajputs came into direct contact with the Marathas.

The chief storm centres in Rajasthan during the second quarter of the eighteenth century were Bundi, Jaipur and Marwar. These centres became an arena of inter and intra clan quarrels. Sarkar has commented that:

> " Each of these three dynastic quarrels drew into its vortex the neighbours of the two main contestants, and in time all three became merged into one, with a clear cut array of allies facing opponents similarly confederated. The Marathas were called in to decide the issue, and that by every party and almost in every year. In the end the Rajput kingdoms were ruined, leaving the Marathas in supreme command over a divided and impoverished Rajasthan which was subjected to annual exactions."[87]

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84 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, P.131.

85 William Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. II, ed. by Jadunath Sarkar, Oriental Books reprint Corporation, Book Publishers, New Delhi, 1971, p. 309.

86 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 199.

87 Ibid., P. 134.

Maratha Presence in Dungarpur, Banswara, Rampura, Kota and Bundi

An amiable cord was struck between the Marathas and the House of Mewar when in 1673, at the time of Shivaji's coronation it was finally asserted that the Bhonsle house had descended from Sajjan, the son of Rana Hamir of Chittaur's uncle and predecessor in the Sisodia House. However, the Maratha presence in Mewar can be traced as early as 1724. On 24thNovember, 1724, Sawai Jai Singh received a *kharita* from Maharana Sangram Singh in which the latter expressed his concern about the Deccanies creating disturbances in his territory. The Maharana was of the opinion that the Deccanies were thieves and would not give up their habits unless they were properly chastised.[88] On 14th March, 1726, another *kharita* was sent by the Maharana to Sawai Jai Singh informing him about the Maratha ravages. He wrote :

> "Deccanies came this side and created great trouble, details of which will be known through Maya Ram. The trouble has been particularly severe, the account of which as sent to you in my previous letter… the Maratha trouble has been so (severe) that if they were not checked, in a year or six months, it would spread far and wide."[89]

The Maharana suggested that the Rajput Rajas ought to collaborate to check the Maratha menace.

The territories of Dungarpur and Banswara had acknowledged the suzerainty of Mewar. In 1726, Baji Bhivrao Retrakar, a Maratha commander, visited Mewar and realized *chauth* from a Mewar district. In 1728 Rawal Ram Singh of Dungarpur received a letter of demand from Baji Rao instructing him to pay *khiraj* (land revenue)to Udaji Pawar. Another letter of demand was issued on 26th May,1728 to pay half of the '*khiraj*' to Malhar Rao Holkar and other half to Udaji Pawar. In order to protect themselves from Maratha aggression, the Rawal of Banswara and Dungarpur agreed to pay *khiraj* to the Marathas.

Despite this, the Marathas committed aggression when Raghoji Kadam Rao and Sawai Kat Singh Kadam Rao ravaged Banswara and Dungarpur and realized rupees

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88 K.S. Gupta, 'Maratha Expansion and Rajput Resistance', *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 32nd Session, Jodhpur, 1970, p. 32.

89 *Kharita* from Maharana Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, *Baisakh Badi* 9, *V.S.*1781/1724.

50,000 and rupees 1,13,000 from them respectively. When this was brought into the notice of the Satara government they were rebuked for this trespass as the province was the sphere of influence of Baji Rao. They were directed to transfer all the booty to Baji Rao and warned them sternly against plundering the area in future. Towards the end of 1732, Holkar and Sindhia went to Banswara and Dungarpur to settle the payment of their dues. Maharana Sangram Singh died on 11th January, 1734. Soon his successor was subjected to demands by the Marathas.[90]

The small State of Rampura was located on the North-western border of Malwa. It lay between the States of Kota and Deolia (Partapgarh).It was ruled by the Chandawat offshoot of Sisodia Rajputs. Prior to its being made an independent principality by Akbar, it was a part of Mewar territory. Now it became a buffer State between Mewar and Malwa. Gopal Singh succeeded to his ancestral domain in 1689. Late in the seventeenth century while he was serving under Prince Bidar Bakht in the Deccan, he sent his son, Ratan Singh, to Rampura to manage the affairs of the State. Ratan Singh dispossessed his father Rao Gopal Singh, himself became a Muslim assuming the name of Islam Khan. He became successful in being recognized as the new ruler. In his despair Gopal Singh joined the Marathas in their Gujarat raids in 1705. Later when Ratan Singh got killed in a battle in 1712, Gopal Singh reoccupied Rampura in 1714 with the help of the Maharana's forces. The latter, however, gave only a portion of the whole district to the former and annexed the rest to Mewar. In August, 1717, Gopal Singh and his grandson Sangram Singh entered into an agreement by which they became tribute paying *zamindars* under the Maharana and renounced their independent status till it was granted to *bhanej* (nephew) Madho Singh.[91]

In December, 1728, a son was born to Sawai Jai Singh by his Udaipuri queen and the Maharana was induced by Jai Singh to grant Rampura to this infant, Madho Singh, who was to remain loyal to Mewar. The Jaipur agents ousted Sangram Singh and took charge of Rampura. When Sawai Madho Singh succeeded to the Jaipur throne in 1750, he attached Rampura to the Kachhwaha dominions. Later Rampura passed on to

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[90] Raghubir Sinh, 'Rajput-Maratha Relations', in *Maratha History Seminar Papers*, (May 28-31, 1970), ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, Shivaji University Press, Kolhapur, 1971. p. 263.

[91] Ram Vallabh Somani, *History of Mewar [From earliest times to 1751 A.D.]*, C.L. Ranka & Company, Kitab Mahal, Jaipur, 1976, pp. 327, 328.

Holkar in 1750. The period between 1761-82 in Mewar was marked by internal strifes. The State of Mewar witnessed a civil war between Maharana Ari Singh and Ratan Singh. Ratan Singh claimed to be the posthumous son of Rana Raj Singh II. The Marathas were invited on several occasions to help the rivals. When this phase passed, the state was destined to be governed by minor rulers that further precipitated the conflict between the Chundawats and the Shaktawats.

In 1726, an unauthorized raid was made in Hadauti by three Maratha leaders – Krishnaji Pant, Baji Pant and Ambaji Pant. They entered the States of Kota and Bundi with light cavalry through the Mukandara Pass with the object of plundering the remote parts of the region, but they were not successful and returned as quickly as they had come.[92] As the Maharao had friendly relations with the Maratha chiefs they did not think it wise to fight with the Kota forces, and left the territory as soon as the Maharao and his ministers had received information of their operations.The Marathas entered the territory of Kota again in 1733, under Pilaji Jadhav. This was the time when Holkar and Sindhia marched towards Malwa.The Marathas entered Kota by the eastern route, and crossed the ford of the river Parbati near Atru where Asuji Maratha held a jagir.They raided and ravaged many villages and operated in the territory for about a month. It was for the first time that the villagers suffered such extensive devastations and ravages. To save his people from further plunder the Malhar Rao bribed them heavily and asked to invest the fort of Nahargarh and oust it's ruler, Nahar Khan. Maharao Durjan Sal utilized Pilaji's services in repressing the recalcitrant chief Nahar Khan. The Maratha chief was to besiege Nahargarh and expel him from there. In return he received rupees one lakh and fifty thousand.[93] This was the first monetary bribe the Marathas received from Hadauti for abstaining from plundering a portion of it. Countless bribes like this were offered and accepted throughout the troubled period of the eighteenth century. Kota was subjected to much degradation at the hands of the Marathas as it lay in their march towards the North.[94]

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92 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 7 & 8.
93 Beni Gupta, *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan*, p.6.
94 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 23.

The Maharana of Udaipur was the hereditary overlord of the Hara clan of Bundi. In 1569 the chief of Bundi, Rao Surjan sapped his relations with the Maharana of Udaipur, gave the fort of Ranthambhor to the Mughal Emperor Akbar and accepted him as the overlord. In 1623, the Mughal Emperor Jahangir bestowed Kota on the second son of Rao Ratan. The clan of Haras now lived divided between the two States of Kota and Bundi. In 1707, following the death of Aurangzeb, in the war of succession to the throne, Budh Singh of Bundi fought on the side of Bahadur Shah at the battle of Jaju. As fate would have it, Ram Singh of Kota sided with the defeated rival Prince Azam Shah. The new Emperor Bahadur Shah was grateful to Budh Singh and, therefore, rewarded him with the title of Rao Raja, along with 54 forts of Harauti, including Kota, which had been confiscated due to the treason of it's ruler. But the city actually remained in the hands of Ram Singh's son Bhim Singh. The latter secured the patronage of the Sayyid brothers. With Bhim Singh begins the title of Maha Rao, borne by his family, as a fruit of his adhesion to the Sayyid brothers. Bhim Singh was succeeded by his youngest son Durjan Sal in 1724 and reigned till 1756.

Budh Singh had three queens, the chief queen being Jai Singh's step-sister, Amar Kunwar. His second wife, a Chudawat of Begun, in Mewar, was more dear to him. In 1720, the chief queen, who was till then childless, smuggled an infant into the palace and declared him to be her son by Budh Singh. The boy was named Bhawani Singh. All was well till the queen expressed her desire to marry her son, Bhawani Singh to a daughter of the Maharana. Budh Singh opposed the match on the ground that the boy was an imposter and not his son. Sawai Jai Singh accused Budh Singh that he was repudiating the paternity of Bhawani Singh as he wanted to keep the succession open for a son of his favourite Chudawat queen. At this Budh Singh gave a written undertaking that if Bhawani Singh was done away with, he would not install any of his sons born by his other two wives. He also gave the authority to Sawai Jai Singh to choose a successor for the Bundi throne.[95] Budh Singh got the document attested by his nobles. The matter was also brought to the notice of the Udaipur Maharana. Sawai Jai Singh requested the Maharana to be a witness to the agreement. The Maharana put his signature on the document signed by Budh Singh in which the latter had declared

[95] V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh*, pp. 213, 214.

Bhawani Singh to be an illegitimate child, and got it attested by his sixteen Umraos.[96] On the basis of the agreement, Bhawani Singh was put to death.[97]

Sawai Jai Singh made the best use of this opportunity. Through his efforts, Muhammad Shah granted the State to Dalel Singh, the second son of Salim Singh Hada of Karwar. The strained relations between Sawai Jai Singh and Budh Singh are also mentioned in the *Khyats*. After Bundi being given to Dalel Singh, Budh Singh went and stayed at Jodhpur for sometime.[98]In the meantime a son was born to Budh Singh by his Chudawat queen, the heroic Ummed Singh Hada. On the basis of Budh Singh's written undertaking, Sawai Jai Singh demanded the surrender of this infant. Budh Singh rolled back on his word and tried to recover Bundi. A fierce battle was fought at Pancholas on 6th April, 1730 in which all the Jaipur nobles lost their lives. Among those who fell on Jai Singh's side were the five great chieftains Fathmal (of Sarsop), Kojuram (of Isarda), Shyamaldas (of Suhad), Bahadur Singh (of Buddhani), Ghasi Ram (of Rasor), besides many others, including Khande Rao, the regent of Narwar.[99] According to the poet Suraj Mal, the Hada casualities were 1200 slain and 1000 wounded.[100] The Hadas were defeated and Budh Singh took refuge in Mewar, where he died a broken heart.

At the time of the battle being fought, Sawai Jai Singh was in Malwa. He returned from there and halted at the border of Kota, where he was received by Maharao Durjansal, on 11th May, 1730. Sawai Jai Singh's first task was to bring about a reconciliation between Durjansal and Salim Singh, then took Dalel Singh to meet the Maharao. Sawai Jai Singh then placed the document before Durjansal, containing the terms of the agreement made by Budh Singh and testified by the Maharana. He then asked the Maharao to put his seal also on the document, which the Kota ruler did. On 19th May, 1730, on the bank of the Kusak, Sawai Jai Singh crowned Dalel Singh, the Kota ruler first applying the *tika* on Dalel Singh's brow, followed by Sawai Jai Singh,

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96 Suryamal Misra, *Vamsha Bhaskar (Mahachampu)*, ed., Chandra Prakash Dewal, Vol. VI, Sahitya Akadami, New Delhi, 2007, P. 4605.
97 V.S., Bhatnagar, *Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh*, p. 216.
98 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 334.
99 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p. 193.
100 Suryamal, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, Vol.VI, P. 4714.

who, waving *chamvar* on the head of the young Hada, proclaimed him as the new Rao Raja of Bundi.[101]

The contest for the throne of Bundi invited the Marathas into the land of the Hada Rajputs. Budh Singh's queen sent Pratap Singh Hada to seek help from Malhar Rao Holkar. Accordingly on 22nd April, 1734, the Marathas attacked the fort of Bundi and carried it after a severe fight. The Marathas received rupees six lakhs for their assistance.[102]This was just the beginning of one of the most traumatic phases that was to be witnessed by Rajasthan and it continued for almost a century. After the death of Budh Singh, the struggle was carried on by his son, Ummed Singh. Towards the end of January, 1745, Jayappa Sindhia and Ishwari Singh attacked Kota and looted it, as Maharao Durjan Sal had been one of the chief supporters of Ummed Singh. In the encounter, Jayappa lost one of his arms which was blown off by a cannon ball. He imposed a heavy fine on Kota. Maharao Durjan Sal held that as Kota had been paying tribute to Sindhia, Holkar and Panwar, they should not have attacked Kota and that the damages for the loss of his hand should be paid either by Ishawari Singh or Dalel Singh and not by Kota. Accordingly, Ishwari Singh asked Dalel Singh to give four villages along with Raprane and Kesho-Rai-Patan with 42 villages to the Marathas. Kota also promised to pay rupees four lakhs.[103]

In 1748, he finally succeeded to the throne with the help of Holkar. As a price for Malhar Rao Holkar's help, Ummed Singh awarded the town and district of Patan to him. It remained under the Maratha control and continued to be so till the Hara States came under the East India Company.[104] Besides this, Ummed Singh promised to give him ten lakh rupees. Out of this two lakhs were paid in 1749 and another three lakhs were given by the Raja in 1751 to Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia equally.

The balance of five lakhs was to be paid to the Satara treasury along with the *chauth* from Bundi and Nenwa.[105] Though the verdict of the battle of Bagru proved final and

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101 V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh*, p. 219.
102 V.G. Dighe, *Peshwa Baji Rao I & Maratha Expansion*, Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay 2, 1944, p. 116.
103 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 27.
104 N.L. Mishra, *Geography Behind Political History*, R.B.S.A. Publishers, Jaipur, 1987, p. 59.
105 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XIV, No. 23.

irrevocable but it made Ummed Singh the feudatory of the Marathas.[106] As a price for Malhar Rao Holkar's help, Ummed Singh awarded the town and district of Patan to him. It remained under the Maratha control and continued to be so till the Hara states came under the East India Company.The bitterness that had developed in the Jaipur-Bundi relations persisted for a long time to come. Probably this was the reason that the *Vamsha Bhaskar* which was written in 1840 by Surya Mal Mishran, the court historian of Bundi tried to be critical of Sawai Jai Singh. Bundi was recovered by Ummed Singh, son of Budh Singh in 1748 and he naturally had a bitter memory of Sawai Jai Singh who had deprived him of his patrimony. It is, therefore,quite likely that Surya Mal derived some malicious pleasure in describing that Jai Singh had died of a horrible disease.[107]

Sawai Jai Singh and the Marathas

Interaction between Malwa and Rajasthan began with the appointment of Sawai Jai Singh of Amber/Jaipur as the Mughal *subedar* of Malwa thrice. Sawai Jai Singh has been charged with contributing to the Maratha conquest of Malwa and indeed, of Hindustan. Let us take into account the correspondence between Sawai Jai Singh and Baji Rao I that according to Sir John Malcolm, commenced on a characterstic note. Baji Rao is said to have sent a verse of the *Puran* to Sawai Jai Singh, which when literally translated reads:

> "Thou art like the cloud which drinketh the waters of the sea, and returneth them with thunder to fertilize the earth. The mountains, in dread of Indra, fly to thee for protection. Thou art the tree of desires. Thou art the sea whence springeth the tree of desires, who can tell thy depth! I have no power to describe the depth of the ocean; but in all thy actions remember Agastya *Moonee*."

According to Hindu mythology, the sage Agastya *muni* drank up the sea. Though flattering, Baji Rao communicated metaphorically a distinct warning of what might happen if Sawai Jai Singh opposed the Brahmin sway. Sawai Jai Singh retorted as mentioned under:

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[106] Beni Gupta, *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan*, p. 42.

[107] R.K. Gupta, & S.R. Bakshi ed., *Studies in Indian History Rajasthan Through the Ages : Jaipur Rulers and Administration*, Vol. 4, Sarup & Sons, New Delhi 2008, p. 105.

> "If the offspring of Brahma sin with me, I forgive them. This pledge I hold sacred. It was of no consequence that Agastya *Moonee* drank up the sea; but if God should doom the walls that retain the ocean to be thrown down, then the world would be destroyed, and what would become of Agastya *Moonee*?"

The Hindus believe the sea to be walled in; and the allusion to the consequences of that element being let loose upon the earth, is considered, as addressed to one of the sacred offspring of Brahma, whose duty it was to preserve, instead of destroying, the general order, to be peculiarly opposite. This correspondence, however, highlights that it was the object of the proud Rajput, while he gave encouragement and accepted the proffered friendship, to retort the threat by warning Baji Rao of the consequences that would ensue from breaking down long-established authority.[108] This indicates that Baji Rao had met his match in Sawai Jai Singh who refused to be cowed down.

Sawai Jai Singh's First Governorship of Malwa (February, 1713 - November, 1717)

As the governor of Malwa Sawai Jai Singh had won a great victory against the Maratha invaders in 1715. He drove them across the river Narmada with heavy losses. The impact of this crushing defeat was so strong that the Marathas did not meddle in the affairs of Malwa for the next two years. After 1715 Sawai Jai Singh was absent from Malwa as half of the Kachhwaha contingent was busy with the Jat campaign. His deputy was not as vigilant and Maratha raids got revived in the province. In November, 1717, Sawai Jai Singh was replaced by Muhammad Amin Khan.

Here it should be remembered that the favour shown to Sawai Jai Singh by granting the *subedari* of Malwa led to his disassociation from Ajit Singh. Jai Singh had succeeded in getting the *subedari* on the recommendation of Khan-i-Dauran and had direct access to the Emperor Farrukh Siyar. The growing animosity between Sawai Jai Singh and Ajit Singh was because both of them wanted to extend their influence over

[108] John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 54, 55.

Rajasthan. Ajit Singh felt that he had been deprived of Sambhar and Didwana due to Sawai Jai Singh. On the other hand, the appointment of Ajit Singh to the *subedari* of Gujarat on the recommendation of the Saiyyad brothers brought him closer to them. Besides the *subedari* of Gujarat, Ajit Singh also held the parganas of Sojat, Jaitaran, Phalodi, Siwana, Merta and Gajsinghpura. He also took advantage of the situation prevailing at the Mughal Court in expanding his territorial control around Marwar. While proceeding to Gujarat in A.D. 1715, he occupied Bhinmal and Jalor which had been in the Rathor domain during the time of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. After the assassination of Farrukh Siyar, in February 1719, Ajit Singh gained the most advantageous position. He was granted the *subedari* of both Ajmer and Gujarat.[109]

This clearly exhibits that though Sawai Jai Singh and Ajit Singh had collaborated when their respective *watan jagirs* were taken away from them. Internally in order to augment their own prospects they could leave each other in a lurch as and when the situation demanded. The same was true in the case of their respective successors also.

Sawai Jai Singh's Second Governorship of Malwa (November 1729-September 19, 1730)

Raja Sawai Jai Singh's second governorship lasted barey for ten months. Prior to the second governorship, Sawai Jai Singh was repeatedly urged by the Emporer to go to the aid of Raja Girdhar Bahadur, the governor of Malwa, to check the Maratha depredations but Sawai Jai Singh did not pay any heed to this. Sarkar ascribes this indifference to Sawai Jai Singh's disgust with court politics and Raghubir Sinh attributes it to the Raja's collusion with the Marathas. Raghubir Sinh held the view that religion did not play a role in guiding Sawai Jai Singh's policy of favouring the Marathas rather he was motivated by a feeling of self-interest and personal gain. He wanted to become the governor of Malwa and extend his dominion from the Jamuna to the Narmada. He hoped that he could keep the Marathas out of the province by paying them their dues regularly and in this way he would perpetuate his hold on the province. But he could hope to become the governor of Malwa only if the Marathas

[109] G. D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, pp. 233, 234.

made the position of every other governor untenable there.[110] Satish Chandra, however, does not accept either of the two arguments. Malcolm opines that during his governorship, Sawai Jai Singh either conceived opposition hopeless or entertained a secret friendship and understanding with the Marathas.[111] In 1725 Sawai Jai Singh had proposed to the Emperor that a policy of judicious compromise should be followed with the Marathas. He suggested that Shahu and four of his principle men should be taken into Imperial service, and Shahu be granted jagir worth ten lakhs in each of the two provinces of Malwa and Gujarat.[112]

During his second governorship Sawai Jai Singh got the opportunity to follow his policy. This is evident through a document in which he pointed out that :

> "The Marathas had tasted Malwa for a long time past. If this year, by reason of our heavy concentration of troops, they were unable to enter the *suba* or chastised (after they have entered) you know what heavy expenditure would be necessary for this object every year in the future. I therefore suggest that as Raja Shahu has been ranked as an Imperial *mansabdar* since the days of Aurangzeb, your Majesty should give him a jagir worth ten lakh of rupees in the name of his (adopted) son, Khushal Singh, on condition that he prevented any future disturbance in Malwa and an auxiliary contingent of his troops should attend the *subedar* of that province. This will give peace to the land and save us from the expense of campaigning (every year)."[113]

Shahu's agent, Dado Bhimsen, gave written undertakings to this effect, on behalf of his master (26th February and 27th September, 1730).[114] Sawai Jai Singh's policy was at first approved by the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah and he wrote 'Agreed' on Jai Singh's letter. But within a short span of a few months the Emperor not only reversed Sawai Jai Singh's policy but also charged him with slothfulness and treachery and soon replaced him as governor with Muhammad Khan Bangash whose utter failure in two years proved how correct Sawai Jai Singh's assessment was.

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110 Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa inTransition*, p.194.
111 John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*, p. 80.
112 Satish Chandra, "Raja Jai Singh Sawai's Contribution to Imperial politics", *Proceedings of History Congrees*, 11th Session, Delhi, 1948, p. 183.
113 Ibid., p. 184.
114 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p.177.

According to Satish Chandra, Sawai Jai Singh's policy was clearly aimed at keeping the Marathas out of Malwa. But after 1725, he considered that possible only by a settlement with the Marathas through a judicious compromise and war should be seen as the last resort. The policy suggested by Sawai Jai Singh had been successfully followed by Nizam ul-Mulk. He strengthened his alliance with the Marathas. He had also agreed for their right of levying *chauth* of the revenue of the Deccan. In the words of one of Nizam-ul-Mulk's biographers, Muhammad Qasim, who penned his biography in Persian, *Ahwal-i-Khawaqin*,

> "At this time the Marathas are so strong that only a person with the luck of Alexander can deal with them effectively. The work is not easy. All this is due to our own folly and dissensions. It is due to this that things have come to this pass. It is to be seen what God has in store for us."[115]

On being conferred the governorship for the second time Sawai Jai Singh arrived at the provincial capital Ujjain in December. A few weeks earlier the fortress of Mandu had been taken by the Marathas. To recover it, Sawai Jai Singh appealed to the Maratha king Shahu in the name of the old friendship that existed between their royal ancestors. The Maratha king relented and ordered Mandu to be restored to the Imperialists. Early in May, Sawai Jai Singh was recalled to Jaipur by more pressing business there.

Sawai Jai Singh's Third Governorship in Malwa (1732-1737)

The Mughal Emperor made Sawai Jai Singh the *subedar* of Malwa for the third time on 6th September, 1732. He was asked to maintain an army of 30,000 horse and foot in equal numbers for which he was granted rupees 13 lakhs and 7 lakhs as loan from the Emperor on the condition that he would raise an army and drive the Marathas out of Malwa. Sawai Jai Singh was also assigned two-third of the total revenues of Malwa to meet the expenses. Thus, unprecedented resources were placed at Sawai Jai Singh's disposal.[116] In 1732, after the rainy season was over, the Marathas became

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[115] Setu Madhavrao Pagadi, *Studies in Maratha History*, Vol. II, Shivaji University Publication, Kolhapur, 1971, p. 107.

[116] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p.218

active once again. Sawai Jai Singh reached Ujjain in December, 1732. When Sawai Jai Singh was at Mandsaur in February, 1733, Holkar and Sindhia after leaving their heavy baggage near the Mahi, hemmed Sawai Jai Singh round and put his troops to great privations, by cutting off their grain and water supplies.[117] Under duress Sawai Jai Singh had to sue for peace and he offered six lakhs of rupees, Holkar expected more.[118] Though charged with playing double game,[119] he had to extricate himself from this difficult situation on his own.[120]

This was also the time when Sawai Jai Singh was involved in the disputed succession to the throne of Bundi. Therefore, he tried to avoid an open conflict with the Marathas. As one of the claimants implored the Maratha king, Shahu for help against Sawai Jai Singh, the Marathas found this opportunity to intrude into Rajasthan. Budh Singh's wife, the Kachhwaha queen had invited the Marathas to restore Bundi to her husband on payment of six lakhs of rupees as their expences.[121] Ranoji Sindhia and Malhar Rao Holkar were deputed to help her. The two *sardars* took over Bundi in their possession on 12th April, 1734. However, Sawai Jai Singh again brought Bundi under his control.

Probably this act of the Marathas made Sawai Jai Singh realize that if not resisted, the Marathas would thwart his own ambitions. He therefore, entreated the Emperor to send him additional troops with funds and supplies. Sawai Jai Singh further strengthened his efforts by forming a strong league of the Rajput Rajas in 1734.

Hurda Conference

Sawai Jai Singh convened a conference of all the rulers of the various States of Rajasthan in July, 1734, at Hurda to devise ways to resist the Marathas.[122] Among those who attended the conference were the Maharana of Udaipur, Jagat Singh II, Abhay Singh of Jodhpur, Bakht Singh of Nagore, Dalel Singh of Bundi, Gopal Pal of

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117 *Holkarshahiche Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 42, :*"Holkarankdeel maansaani Sawai Jaisinghas bahut tang kele. Dana pani bund jhale."*
118 Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition*, p. 223.
119 William Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. II, p. 278.
120 G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, Bombay, 1958, P.145.
121 Suryamal, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, Vol. VI, P. 4789.
122 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, pp. 347,348.

Bikaner and the the Rajas of Kishangarh and Karauli.[123] Accordingly, an agreement with following terms was concluded among them:

1. To remain united in all circumstances, good or bad, with a pledge to abide by the terms.
2. No one shall countenance the traitor of another.
3. After the rains, to re-assemble at Rampura. In his absence the head of a State shall send his heir or some person of standing.
4. In case an heir commits any error, the Rana alone shall mediate to correct it.
5. In every enterprise all shall unite to execute the agreement.[124]

Soon the agreement fell flat due to the 'non-agreement' (*naittifaqi*) between Bikaner and Nagore, the 'deception' (*daghabazi*) of Sawai Jai Singh leading to the 'ruin' (*tabahi*) of Kota and Bundi and Maharana Jagat Singh's attempts to exhibit his own greatness in making Madho Singh as the rightful claimant to the Jaipur throne. Each one's eagerness to secure Maratha help further enabled the Marathas to intrude into Rajasthan. In the end the Marathas emerged as the victors and dictated terms to the Rajputs: "*jisse dakhini ghalib hokar inpar hukumat ka danka bajate the.*"[125] Thus, the terms of the agreement could not be executed, as they could not follow a unified policy. Outwardly Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh put up a joint front but in reality they followed divergent paths.

With the waning authority of the Mughal emperor and the division of the Imperial Court into two almost equally balanced groups among the nobles. One of these groups was led by the *wazir* Qamar-ud-din Khan and the other by the chief *bakshi*, Khan-i-Dauran.The *wazir* had the ability to perceive the dangers facing the Empire better than any of his contemporaries and was an enemy of oppression and promoted the war party. The chief *bakshi* was a learned man and his character in personal life was above reproach but he was not a strong military commander. This made him shrink from war

123 Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod Mewar ka Itihas*, Vol. II, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, Reprinted 1986, p. 1220.
124 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 50.
125 Shyamal Das, *Vir. Vinod.,* Vol. II, p. 1224.

and therefore, he relied on diplomacy and promoted the peace party. He believed in the balance of power and was loosely allied with Sawai Jai Singh.[126]Abhay Singh had got so disgusted with the Marathas that he was not in favour of the appeasement policy followed by Sawai Jai Singh towards them. Therefore, he joined hands with the party led by Qamar-ud-din Khan in the Mughal Court that followed the policy of resistance towards the Marathas. In pursuance of the hard line, Sawai Jai Singh was also compelled to join the plan of action. Accordingly, the *wazir*, Abhay Singh and Sadat Khan were to march by way of Gwalior while Sawai Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran were to be sent by way of Jaipur.

With these grand preparations, two divisions marched from Delhi in the winter of 1734-35, one under the *wazir*, Qamar-ud-din Khan by the eastern route into Bundelkhand and the second under the *mir bakshi*, Khan-i-Dauran by the western route into Rajasthan. The first army under the *wazir* totally failed against Pilaji Jadhav and returned to Delhi in May, 1735. The second army under Khan-i-Dauran was joined on the way to Ajmer by Sawai Jai Singh, Abhay Singh and Durjansal of Kota. This army crossed the Mukandara pass and reached Rampura territory.The Marathas gave a stiff fight to the the Mughal army: *"Mukandara utarun Rampura prante Marathyanchya rokhane Monglache kuch jhale*.[127]

The Imperial army was doomed to failure due to lack of direction. For eight days the Marathas surrounded the Imperial army, absolutely immobilizing it and depriving it of food and fodder: *"tyapramaane aath roj laskarche chaugird kahikabad danaghas bund kela*."[128] Thus, an army of twenty thousand Marathas proved superior to the Mughal army of two lakh.[129]

Having attained a lightning victory the Marathas crossed the Mukundara pass and entered the defenceless Jaipur and Jodhpur kingdoms. Malhar Rao Holkar, who had no more than 7,000 to 8,000 men, awaited the arrival of Pratap Singh Hada of Bundi.

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126 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 209-214.
127 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 42.
128 Ibid., p. 42.
129 Govind Sakharam Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, Second Impression 1958, Phoenix Publications, Bombay, p. 159.

Pratap Singh Hada had put his well-equipped army at the disposal of the Marathas.[130] The Imperialists were completely outwitted by the Maratha strategy. Malhar Rao at the head of a much smaller force was plundering areas around Ajmer. Sambhar also suffered from his marauding.[131] Malhar Rao further raided many places in both regions. The loot of the rich city of Sambhar on 28th February, 1735, yielded him rich dividends. The Imperial *faujdar* of the city was robbed of everything. By early March, Khan-i-Dauran was at Kota and Sawai Jai Singh was near his own capital. Ranoji and Malhar Rao were some twenty miles from Jaipur. Circumstances compelled Khan-i-Dauran to listen to Sawai Jai Singh's advice. Accordingly, the Marathas were persuaded to retire beyond the Narmada. On behalf of the Emperor twenty two lakhs of rupees as *chauth* from Malwa was promised. On 22nd March, 1735, this understanding was effected at a meeting between the two sides arranged by Sawai Jai Singh near Kota. [132] After this Sawai Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran returned to Delhi only to be charged with treason.[133] The war party at the Mughal court became more vociferous, thereby ignoring Sawai Jai Singh's sober reasoning : "*bakshi va Jaisingh yanjvirudh Turani pakshane Badshahkade takrar keli*."[134]

He had suggested that the way to restore peace in Malwa was to win over the Peshwa by friendly negotiations. The Peshwa was to be converted into an Imperial officer by granting a jagir and inducing him to visit the Emperor. As the agreement of 22nd March, 1735 was not ratified by the Emperor, Sawai Jai Singh got enraged and he decided to invite the Peshwa to Northern India.He called the Maratha envoy to his court and told him : "I …cannot trust the Turks. If the latter triumph over the Deccani forces, they will disregard us. Therefore in every matter I shall follow the behest of the Peshwa."[135]

In a letter dated August 1735, the Peshwa's agent posted with Sawai Jai Singh wrote to him the details of the negotiations which the writer was conducting with the Raja in

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130 Irvine, *Later Mughals*. Vol. II, p. 283.
131 Ibid., p. 280.
132 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, "*Jaisinghachya madhyasthine Holkar va Mirbaksh hanchya tarikh 22-3-1735 la bheti houun taha tharla",* p. 43.
133 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p. 181.
134 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 43.
135 Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition*, p. 235.

order to prevent the Marathas from entering Malwa.[136] Accordingly, he sent a proposal to Baji Rao to come to Jaipur at the head of only five thousand horse. Sawai Jai Singh promised to bear his daily expenses of rupees five thousand. Another important letter indicates Baji Rao's entrance into Imperial politics at Delhi. Baji Rao arranged terms with Sawai Jai Singh through Mahadev Bhatt Hingane, his agent at the Mughal Court.

One, Ram Chandra Baba is mentioned as being instrumental in arranging the accommodation. It seems that the Marathas Northward policy was arrived at by deliberations between eminent Maratha *sardars.*[137] In an interesting development Baji Rao's mother expressed her desire to go on a pilgrimage to North India.

Radhabai's pilgrimage

When Radhabai's intention of visiting the holy places of Northern India became known, both the Rajput Rajas and the Mughal officials, requested the revered lady to visit their States and shrines. Leaving Poona on the 14th February, 1735, Radhabai made a successful pilgrimage through Northern India. The Emperor himself ordered an escort of one thousand troops of his own body-guard to accompany her during the period of her stay beyond the river Narmada. Radhabai received an honourable and warm welcome from the Maharana of Udaipur. When she arrived near Jaipur in June 1735, Sawai Jai Singh personally came out of his capital to receive her. Arrangements were made for her to stay in the royal palace and during the seven days of her stay at Jaipur, Sawai Jai Singh came to see her several times and each time suitable gifts were given to her. Radhabai also reciprocated by giving suitable presents.[138] During Radhabai's stay, Sawai Jai Singh successfully sought her blessings for his daughter, Krishna Kunwari, who was married to Rao Raja Dalel Singh of Bundi.[139] There could be a probability that since Radhabai had blessed Krishna Kunwari, Dalel Singh was not disturbed by the Marathas till 1748. The Marathas highly appreciated the warm

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136 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XIV, No. 47.
137 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XIV, No. 50.
138 V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life And Times Of Sawai Jai Singh*, p. 231.
139 Suryamal Mishra, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, Vol. VI, ed. Chandra Prakash Dewal, Sahitya Akadami, New Delhi, 2007, p. 4773.

and respectful welcome accorded to Radhbai in Rajasthan. Her pilgrimage paved the way for Baji Rao's visit to Rajasthan.

Baji Rao's visit to Rajasthan

Baji Rao agreed to the proposal out of his regard for Sawai Jai Singh and also for a chance of winning over the Rajput princes through friendly discourses.[140] He left Puna on 9th October, 1735. To meet the Rana of Mewar, the Peshwa came via Lunawada, Banswara and Dungarpur.[141] He was given a grand reception at Udaipur and was accommodated at the *Champabagh* palace in January 1734. Moreover, the Maharana honoured him in an open *darbar*, where two gold embroidered seats were arranged for the guest and the host. When Baji Rao approached the seat which the Maharana pointed to him, he politely declined to accept the position of equality with the Maharana, and simply occupied a seat just below. For five days dresses and presents were offered and entertainments took place.[142] Baji Rao got a written promise of annual payment of rupees 1,60,000. The pargana of Banheda was ceded to the Marathas to cover this amount.

After his successful visit to Udaipur, Baji Rao proceeded via the holy city of Nathdwara towards Jaipur. Sawai Jai Singh moved South to welcome his guest and the two met at village Bhamola, thirty miles east of Ajmer. A pavilion had been erected at the meeting place, between the two camps, while the Rajput and Maratha escorts stood fully armed on the two sides. After descending from their respective elephants, both exchanged embraces and sat down on the same cushion. The visit having lasted for several days, Sawai Jai Singh and Baji Rao discussed the peace terms. They also had prolonged discussions regarding a lasting settlement between the Marathas and the Mughals. The visit was marked by the usual exchange of gifts.

In May, 1736, the Emperor agreed to appoint Baji Rao the deputy governor (*naib-subedar*) and *de facto* master of Malwa, while Sawai Jai Singh was to continue as the nominal *subedar.* As all the demands of the Marathas were not accepted, Baji Rao organized the

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140 G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, p. 162.
141 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 44.
142 G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, pp. 162, 163.

most spectacular campaign of his career. Leaving Poona on 12th November, 1736, he swept through Malwa, Bundelkhand and the Gangetic *doab* and reached the very gates of the Imperial capital. In 1737, Peshwa Baji Rao wrote to his brother:

> "Sawaiji has also sent us friendly letters requesting us to leave his territory undisturbed… we do not disturb his territory as we expect to get supplies of grain and fodder from Sawaiji on our way."[143]

With the accession of Balaji Baji Rao in 1740 upto the death of Sawai Jai Singh in1743, there was friendly interaction between the latter and the Marathas. According to Malcolm, Sawai Jai Singh's object was to keep the dialogue between the Marathas and the Emperor open. Clearly Sawai Jai Singh desired to combine his loyalty to the Emperor and friendship with the Marathas.[144]

Jodhpur and the Marathas

The Marathas featured in Marwar politics for the first time in 1724. After the deposition of Farrukhsiyar, Ajit Singh enjoyed an influential position at the royal court and was appointed as governor of Gujarat as well as of Ajmer, which had religious and strategical importance attached to it. Ajit Singh helped the Saiyyid brothers to stabilize their position at the imperial court. This was beneficial for Ajit Singh as his closeness to the Saiyyids helped him to safeguard his own interests. With the fall of the Saiyyid brothers, Ajit Singh also fell into disfavour at the imperial court. Imperial hostility drove Ajit Singh into an alliance with Churaman Jat. This alliance was not liked by Sawai Jai Singh and he contrived to weaken Ajit Singh's position.[145] Thus, the murder of Maharaja Ajit Singh was planned and executed as a result of an understanding between the Mughal Emperor, Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh, the son of Ajit Singh.[146]After the murder of Maharaja Ajit Singh by his son Bakht Singh on 23rd June 1724, Marwar plunged into a war of succession among Ajit Singh's sons. At the time of his father's murder, Abhay Singh was at Delhi. The

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143 William Irvine, *Later Mughals*, p. 248.
144 John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India,* p. 88.
145 R.S. Sangwan, *Jodhpur and the Later Mughals A.D. 1707-1752*, Pragati Publications, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 86, 87.
146 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. II, pp. 423, 424.

Mughal Emperor recognized Abhay Singh as the new ruler on 17th July, 1724 and he was coronated there only. The Emperor presented him a *khilat*, bestowed the title of '*Rajrajeshwar*' and also the area of Nagor on him[147]. The younger sons of Ajit Singh, Anand Singh and Rai Singh raised the standard of revolt. A civil war had started between the brothers. Abhay Singh was able to crush the revolt with the timely help advanced by the strong contingents of Jaipur and Mewar.

Anand Singh and Rai Singh fled to Gujarat where they seem to have even proposed a matrimonial alliance with the Marathas. They tried to secure the help of the Marathas to occupy Jodhpur. The two brothers tried to gain Idar for themselves with the help of their Maratha allies. Idar in Gujarat had been bestowed on Abhay Singh by the Emperor. It was attacked in the middle of 1725. Though the Marathas failed to dislodge the Rathor hold on the territory, their regular incursions ruined all sources of revenue from that area. In March 1726, the two brothers and their Maratha allies made preparation to march towards Jodhpur.

Meanwhile, Sawai Jai Singh made an attempt to reconcile the brothers by suggesting that Anand Singh and Rai Singh be allotted some *jagirs* in Abhay Singh's territory, but it did not succeed. Rather Abhay Singh agreed to hand over the *jagir* of Idar to the Maharana of Mewar on condition that he would get Anand Singh and Rai Singh murdered. Abhay Singh also assured the Maharana to make a common cause against the Marathas. The Maharana was successful in establishing his hold over Idar but both the brothers escaped and headed towards Marwar and devastated the Maharana's territory as well. Clearly, the internal feuds and their inter-state rivalries between Ajit Singh's sons gave an opportunity to the Marathas to gradually move towards Rajasthan.

Marathas inroads into Marwar dates from 1728, when Kanthaji Kadam and Pilaji Gaekwad invaded Jalore and fomented trouble at the request of Rai Singh and Anand Singh. Abhay Singh sent Bhandari Khivsi to make peace with the Maratha leaders and persuade them to withdraw. Bhandari Khivsi

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147 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, pp. 331,332.

succeeded in his mission and the Marathas withdrew. When Abhay Singh was the *subedar* of Gujarat he instigated the Mughals against the Marathas. This was rankling in the mind of Malhar Rao Holkar. Consequently in 1736, Malhar Rao Holkar advanced from Gujarat and invaded Marwar. He plundered Jalore, Sojat, Bilara, Merta and Jodhpur.[148] Meanwhile, the long struggle with his brothers came to an end as Abhay Singh gave Idar as a jagir to them in August 1728.[149] The death of Abhay Singh and the disputed throne of Marwar provided splendid opportunities to the Marathas to visit the State again and again.[150]

The interests of the Jodhpur Raja and the Marathas clashed in Gujarat. Its geographical location is in the South of Marwar across Palanpur and Sirohi, bordering on Jalore, Jaswantpura and Bhinmal *tehsils* of Jodhpur division. The traders of Marwar, carried their trade via the routes of Gujarat. As the State charged custom duty from these traders, the Rathor rulers had to provide security of the trade routes beyond their territory also. The first consideration of the Rathors in wishing for peaceful political conditions in Gujarat was the prosperity of their own trade. Secondly, the richness of the land was a compensation for their own territory's dry western part.Moreover, Gujarat's strategic location made them covet it as their own territory.

As Maharaja Jaswant Singh and Ajit Singh had been given jagirs in Gujarat followed by Abhay Singh's governorship of the same, the Rathors attempted to push Marwar frontier towards Gujarat. On the other hand, the Marathas treated Gujarat as a source of additional income since the days of Shivaji. The Marathas under the leadership of Pilaji, the deputy of Khande Rao Dabhade, established their control over Baroda, Dabhoi etc. and converted the province into a sort of marauding ground for themselves. These were the circumstances when Abhay Singh was entrusted the task

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148 Radhey Shyam, 'Marwar and the Marathas', in *Maratha History Seminar Papers* (May 28-31, 1970), ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, Shivaji University Press, Kolhapur, 1971. pp. 249, 250.

149 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 26-32; H.C. Tikkiwal, 'Sawai Jai Singh and the Marwar Affairs in the reign of Emperor Muhammad Shah', *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 31st Session, Varanasi, 1969, p. 207.

150 Radhey Shyam, 'Marwar and the Marathas', in *Maratha History Seminar Papers (May 28-31, 1970)*, ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, p. 250.

of ridding Gujarat of the Maratha marauders.[151]But Baji Rao I came with an army from the Deccan to Ahmedabad and sent a message to Abhay Singh that Khande Rao had been taking *chauth* from Gujarat. Since Khande Rao was no more, therefore, *chauth* should now be given to him.[152]

On *Mah Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1787/1730 Baji Rao met Abhay Singh and cordialities were exchanged. He stayed there for a month and both met for a couple of times. When the Peshwa heard about the *Nizam's* arrival at Narmada, he had to leave, though the *chauth* was not finalized. Abhay Singh then presented a *siropav* to the Peshwa and deputed *bhandari* Vijay Raj and Rathor Amar Singh Kushlawat with a force to safely see off the Peshwa. They accompanied him to Baroda.[153] Afterwards Abhay Singh entered into an agreement with them, under the Ahmadabad Pact of 1731. He agreed to pay rupees 13 lakhs as *chauth* of Gujarat. In return, the Peshwa promised to help in expelling Pilaji Gaekwar and Kanthaji Bande from Gujarat. However, the pact was soon repudiated and Abhay Singh got Pilaji murdered. Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia occupied Champaner and Pavagarh in 1733. Abhay Singh had no choice but to agree to pay rupees 80,000 out of the revenues of Ahamdabad along with the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi.*

The animosity between the Kachhwahas and the Rathors stretched over generations and the Peshwa knew about it. Hence, he took advantage of it.[154] The relations between Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh were quite bitter. So much so that on the advice of Sawai Jai Singh, Baji Rao asked Malhar Rao and Ranoji Sindhia, Kanthaji and Anand Rao Panwar to invade Marwar and devastate it.[155]Abhay Singh had antangonized Baji Rao by not paying the amount promised in 1735. Earlier Naro Shankar had reported to the Peshwa that Abhay Singh promises to relieve the Peshwa of his debts.[156] The Peshwa dispatched a force under Shinde and Holkar towards Marwar.[157] Soon the two *sardars* besieged the fort of Merta. Malhar Rao Holkar and

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151 Bisheshwar Nath Reu, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, Archaeological Department, Jodhpur Government Press, Jodhpur, 1943, p. 166.

152 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. II, *"Mah ra maas mein Baji Rao fauj lene Dikhan su aayo ne Shri Maharaj ne kaivayo ke Gujarat ri chauth Khande Rao laito su to ramsaran huvo su hame monu devo ne Shri Maharaj su het iklas baandhan nu pin aayo* p. 454.

153 Ibid.

154 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 44.

155 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p.53.

156 *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. XXIX, Peshwa Madhavrao I – *Uttarhind* (1761-1772), Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1933, No. 39.

157 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, "*Shinde Holkaranche hatakhali ek fauj Marwarant ravana keli."* p. 44.

Ranoji Sindhia informed the Peshwa about the severe encounter at Merta.[158]Soon Abhay Singh's general, *bhandari* Bijay Raj surrendered and agreed to pay the ransom.

Bakht Singh was also forced to pay the tribute. But as per the Merta agreement, when Holkar and Sindhia came to collect the tribute in March, 1742, they experienced difficulty in raising money from the people of Sojat, Raipur and Jaitaran.[159] It may be noted here that Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh had divergent policies towards the Marathas. Almost a similar situation cropped up later during the reigns of Sawai Madho Singh and Bijay Singh. If Sawai Jai Singh had taken interest in the internal disturbance caused by the revolt of Bakht Singh at Nagor in October, 1740, Sawai Madho Singh also supported the cause of Ram Singh. The battle of Gangwana fought on 28th May, 1741, was the net outcome of these hostilities. Sawai Jai Singh joined Ratan Singh in the battle but ultimately peace was concluded. It was a decisive victory for Sawai Jai Singh as it humbled the pride of Maharaja Abhay Singh.Soon after the battle Sawai Jai Singh performed the *Ashvamedha Yajna*.[160]The Marathas were ever on the look out for such an opportunity. When hostility between Abhay Singh and Bakht Singh resumed, the former invited Malhar Rao Holkar on a daily payment of rupees 11,000. Abhay Singh's failing health and intensification of internal conflicts within Jodhpur led him to secure the support of the Marathas. Ironically, this was the policy that had all along been suggested by Jai Singh. Abhay Singh exchanged turbans with Holkar at Pushkar, dined on the same table and thus developed close relationship.

Marwar Civil War and Maratha Intervention

After the death of Abhay Singh, his son Ram Singh ascended the throne of Jodhpur on 13th July, 1749.[161] Malhar Rao recognized him as the rightful claimant for the leadership of the Rathors and sent a *tika* and an elephant at the time of his coronation. The message sent was loud and clear. Earlier the change in kingship was recognized and approved officially by the Mughal Emperors, now the same was done by the Marathas. It was a remarkable change in political equations in the politics of Rajasthan. As expected, Bakht Singh did not acknowledge the new Raja. The State

158 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XIV, No. 14.
159 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 57.
160 V.S. Bhargava, *Rise of the Kachhawas in Dhundhar (Jaipur) : From the earliest times to the death of Sawai Jai Singh (1743 A.D.*), Shabd Sanchar, Ajmer, 1979, p. 160.
161 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 359.

was to witness a civil war and the court got divided into two armed camps. There is a famous saying prevalent in Marwar: "*Rinmala thapiya teeke Raja*,"which means, one who gets support of the nobles becomes the ruler of Marwar.[162]

If one group of nobles supported Ram Singh, the other organized itself under the banner of his uncle Bakht Singh.Thakur Kesari Singh of Ras, Kalyan Singh of Nimaji, Prem Singh of Pali and Devi Singh of Pokaran received jagirs from Bakht Singh as they extended their support to him.[163]Ram Singh sought the political support of Kachhwaha ruler Sawai Ishwari Singh,[164] Bakht Singh secured the co-operation of Madho Singh. A Maratha report was sent to the Peshwa informing him about the war between Ram Singh and Sawai Ishwari Singh on the one side and Bakht Singh on the other.[165] Through Sawai Ishwari Singh, Ram Singh secured the Peshwa's support who sent a force of 1,500. Holkar also sent a force under his son. An armed conflict was imminent. The two sides reached Pipar but the scarcity of water and the scorching heat thwarted any active action. Ultimately a confrontation took place on 14thApril, 1750, without any conclusive results. At last a peace unfavourable to Bakht Singh was concluded.

With the death of his ally Sawai Ishwari Singh, Ram Singh lost one of his allies. Except the *sardars* of Merta, almost all the others had joined Bakht Singh. This particular situation popularized a *doha* (couplet) in Marwar implying that majority of the *Thakurs* were unhappy with Ram Singh and they invited his uncle, Bakht Singh to come to Jodhpur and enthrone himself : "*Ramai sun raji nahin, dino uttar desh, Jodhano jhala karai, aaw dhani Bakhtesh*."[166]Sawai Madho Singh was now the Raja of Jaipur through whose help, Bakht Singh prevailed upon Holkar to at least remain neutral. Holkar's neutrality sealed the fate of Ram Singh. Bakht Singh defeated Ram Singh at Merta and occupied Jodhpur on 21st June, 1751. After loosing Jodhpur, Ram Singh went to Maroth. He sent his agent *purohit* Jagan Nath to Jaipur to secure Sawai Madho Singh's aid. Since

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162 R.P. Vyas, *Role of Nobility in Marwar (1800-1873 A.D.)*, Jain Brothers Publishers, New Delhi, 1969, p. 9.

163 R.K. Saxena, *Rajput Nobility (A Study of 18th century Rajasthan)*, Publication Scheme, Jaipur, 1996, p. 209.

164 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 360.

165 *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. II, *Panipat Prakaran* (1747-61), Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1930, No. 16.

166 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 364.

the growing power of Bakht Singh could be a menace to Jaipur, Sawai Madho Singh decided to support Ram Singh. When the *purohit* went to seek Maratha help, Jayappa Sindhia agreed to help Ram Singh for which he was paid an advance amount of ten to twelve thousand.[167] At the end of May, 1752, he attacked and occupied Ajmer but soon had to leave for Poona. Therefore, he deputed his general, Sahiba Patel to take care of Ram Singh's affairs. Soon Bakht Singh attacked and defeated Ram Singh and the Maratha force on 28th July, 1752. After this success, Bakht Singh even tried to activate an anti-Maratha coalition of the Rajput rulers, the Jats and the Mughal *wazir*. However, these efforts could not materialize due to his death on 21st, September, 1752.[168] He died leaving a disputed succession and an impending civil strife for his son, Bijay Singh.

Accession of Bijay Singh and the Battle of Merta

With the open support of Malhar Rao Holkar, Bijay Singh was coronated on 31st January, 1753. Once again Ram Singh tried to secure Maratha help. At Raghunath Rao's instructions, Jayappa marched towards Jodhpur to reinstate Ram Singh on the throne. He was accompanied by his son, Jankoji and brother, Dattaji along with Raja Sawant Singh's son, Sardar Singh. They all came to Kishangarh. With 30,000 cavalry, the city was looted by them.[169] From Kishangarh, Jayappa's army marched to Pokharan and encamped there. From Pokharan they went to Alanias and looted the place. Afterwards they reached Gangarade, near Ajmer.[170]The news of the Maratha arrival led to hectic preparations by Bijay Singh. He was joined in his efforts by the Bikaner and Kishangarh rulers, Gaj Singh and Bhadar Singh respectively.[171] The forces of the *Dakhanis* numbered 60,000 while Marwar forces were 40,000.

On the first day, the Rathors were victorious while the *Dakhanis* suffered a defeat.[172] From here they marched to Merta. The next day being the *shradh* of Maharaja Bakht Singh, the Rathors felt it improper to fight the Marathas. When the Jodhpur Raja's supporters were not able to decide whether to fight or not, suddenly the *Dakhanis*

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167 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 71.
168 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 368.
169 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 524.
170 Ibid
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.

attacked them with a force of 5,000. The bullocks were taken away by them and the cannons were destroyed. Surano Devichand was killed. They started moving towards their cannons but the *Dakhanis* again attacked them from behind.[173] The encounter took place on 14th September, 1754 on the plains of Merta city. The Marathas attacked from all sides. Almost 10,000 Rathor soldiers were killed. Many of the *Dakhanis* also got killed.[174] The Rathor leaders could not stand the Maratha onslaught. All the three rulers of the Rathor clan, Bijay Singh, Gaj Singh and Bhadar Singh fled leaving Jayappa and Ram Singh to enter the city in triumph on 17th September.[175]When Bijay Singh reached Nagaur the nobles persisted that if he mounted the elephant, the people would be happy to pay their respects to him. Bijay Singh then mounted an elephant. In the meanwhile, at Merta, Jayappa had taken possession of the cannons.[176] At Nagaur, Bijay Singh asked the *hakim*, Pratapmal Fatehchand about the preparations. The latter replied that he had arranged for the supplies that would last for two years.

Maratha Attack on Nagaur and Jodhpur

Leaving their *hakim* at Merta, Jayappa Sindhia and Ram Singh marched to Nagaur. After encamping at Tausar, they besieged the fort. It turned out to be a thirteen month long siege during which Bijay Singh and his men suffered great hardships.[177] On 31st October, 1754, Thursday, *purohit* Jagoji and Jayappa Sindhia along with Ram Singh's nobles, marched to Jodhpur. There they encamped at Abhay Sagar and laid siege.[178] In the meanwhile, the fort of Jalore was captured by the Marathas. The fort of Phalodi was also laid under siege. Jodhpur, Nagaur, Jalore and Didwana were under the control of Bijay Singh while the other areas were under the hold of Ram Singh and Jayappa Sindhia. When the siege dragged on, Bijay Singh sent Bijay Ram Bharti to Udaipur to request the Maharana and send the Salumbar chief Rao Jait Singh to initiate a settlement with Jayappa Sindhia.

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173 *Marwar ri Khyat*, p. 32.
174 Ibid., p. 32.
175 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 79, 80.
176 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 532.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.

Accordingly, Raj Singh Chauhan was sent to convey to Jayappa that as he was supporting Ram Singh, so only Ram Singh had the ability to rule. At this Jayappa replied that he knew it that despite his efforts, it had not materialized. But as he had given his word, if he stayed alive, then at least once he would get Ram Singh enthroned : *"Vachan diyo hai, su jivto rai gayo to ekbar garh mein besan desu."*[179] In this way negotiations continued but without Bijay Singh's agreeing to surrender Jodhpur, the issue could not be resolved. The siege of Nagore was further intensified. It turned out to be a long siege.

Jayappa's Murder

It was evident that Ram Singh's strength lay in the Maratha support. Seeing no respite in sight, the Rathor's decided to murder Jayappa to conquer their own land. An important news letter was sent to report about the murder of Jayappa Sindhia.[180] In Sai Das Chauhan's contingent of the *silepos* (a categoty of soldiers) and belonging to his own clan, two soldiers, Khokhar Kesarkhan and Gehlot, felt that if they had to die it was better that they die after killing Jayappa. They requested Sain Das to convey their resolve to the Maharaja who approved of their stratagem. Saaindas then conveyed to the Maharaja. Bijay Singh called both of them and said, if they accomplished this task, he would give them *pattas* worth 10,000 each and a *patta* worth 20,000 to the *diwan* along with the *thikana* of Bhakhrod to live. Both were given money for their expenses along with a *peskabaj* (a dagger worn in front) each. Then they were made to accompany the negotiators and were facilitated to open a shop in the army camp of the *Dakhanis*.[181]

One day when Jayappa was sitting on a *bajot* (stool) in his tent, his attendants were giving him bath. They indulged in a mock fight and started moving towards Jayappa and said that they were partners in the shop. One of them said that he gave rupees 500 to the other to go to Merta to buy various things for the shop. But he seems to have hidden the money and is now telling a lie that someone has snatched the money from him on the route between

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179 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 533.
180 *S.P.D.*, Vol. II, No. 48.
181 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, the Marathas were addressed as '*Dikhni*', by the Rajputs, p. 534.

Khajwada and Deswal village. Having listened to their complaint, Jayappa asked them to sit down and wait for justice. Suddenly they held Jayappa's throat and struck him with the *peskabaj*. There was a great commotion in the camp. Chauhan Raj Singh and the Salumbar chief Rao Jait Singh,[182] along with some others were killed. Soon Chauhan Sain Das secretly informed Bijay Singh that Jayappa was killed and that the atmosphere was rife with fear : "*aaj Aape nu mariyo, tin ro vedo chhai*."[183]

Taking advantage of the confusion, the Rathor army came out from the Nagore fort and attacked the Marathas.[184] The Marathas immediately took stock of the situation and handed over the command to Jayappa's son, Jankoji, while Dattaji infused vigour among the Marathas and resolved to teach a lesson to the Rathors. As the Maratha prestige was at stake in Marwar, Antaji Mankeshwar was called from Bundelkhand by Dattaji. Antaji Mankeshwar wrote to his agent at Poona, that he was proceeding to Marwar to succour Sindhia's forces who had suffered from the murder of Jayappa.[185] The Maratha focus had now shifted from fighting for the cause of Ram Singh to avenging the murder of Jayappa.This fact is corroborated by an important news-letter dated 3rd September 1755, reporting that Bijay Singh had got Jayaji Shinde treacherously killed: "*Jayaji Shinde yaans Bijay Singhani daga karun maarile hai*," and that he was conspiring with Sawai Madho Singh, the Maharana, the Jats and other Rajput Rajas.[186] Another letter dated 29th September 1755, also mentions about Bijay Singh's efforts to garner the support of the above mentioned Rajas.[187] A Maratha letter dated 5th September 1755 informs about Sawai Madho Singh joining in this effort.[188]

He sent his general Anirudh Singh Khangarot along with the forces of Umed Singh of Shahpura, Bahadur Singh of Rupnagar, Gopal Singh of Karauli and the Hadas of Bundi. About 25,000 to 30,000 men and a strong artillery moved towards Ramgarh to join Bijay Singh. They were joined by the Bikaner contingent under *diwan* Bakhtawar Mal along with Bijay Singh's forces from Nagor. But the Marathas defeated the combined army. Jankoji

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182 Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, p. 853. According to the information given in *Vir Vinod* the Mewar Maharana had sent Jait Singh to assist Jayappa to kill Bijay Singh. *Rathora ri Khyat* says that he was invited by Bijay Singh through Bijay Ram Bharti so that he could mediate with the Marathas for a settlement. The latter information seems to be correct.

183 Ibid., p. 534.

184 Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 374.

185 *S.P.D.*, Vol. II, No. 52.

186 *Hingane Daftar*, No. 163.

187 Ibid., 171.

188 *Shindeshahi*, Vol. I, No. 143.

informed Bhau Saheb about the defeat at Didwana he inflicted on Anirudh Singh, sent by Madho Singh of Jaipur to help Bijay Singh against Jankoji.[189] Dattaji Sindhia in a letter to the Peshwa, described the details of the defeat inflicted by his forces on Bijay Singh.[190] As the prospects of success were grim, Sawai Madho Singh's general had already started negotiations for peace. As success was eluding, Bijay Singh thought it prudent to sue for peace. As a result, a treaty of peace was signed in February, 1756. An annual tribute of rupees 1,50,000 was fixed on Bijay Singh.

Jankoji Sindhia Invades Jodhpur

Jankoji Sindhia brought a huge army to Jodhpur and attacked the Siwanchi Gate. But despite great efforts loss of 500 soldiers success was not in sight. But the fact that the fort held out against the adversaries was on account of its good defence. The fort of Jodhpur is constructed on Jodhgiri hills. The rugged portions of the hill are scraped and in order to strengthen it, big bastions, 12 feet to 70 feet thick were built on the massive walls of the fort. The height of the walls of the fort range from 21-120 feet. It is situated about 400 feet above the surrounding plains and an area of about four miles was covered with defences when it was constructed.[191] Meanwhile the nobles helped Bijay Singh to secretly move out of the fort. He proceeded to Bikaner accompanied by many important nobles.[192]

Bijay Singh and Gaj Singh meet Sawai Madho Singh

After corresponding with the Jaipur ruler, both the Rajas reached Jaipur. Sawai Madho Singh personally received them and all the courtesies due to their stature were bestowed on them. After the formalities were completed, Sawai Madho Singh addressed them and said that they did not have cordial relations with Malhar Rao Holkar, while he himself had enemity with the sons and brothers of Jayappa Sindhia. Therefore, he suggested that they should unite. Udaipur, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Bikaner, Rupnagar, were already together. Efforts were made to unite Kota and Bundi with them. If all of them united, the *Dakhanis*

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189 *S.P.D.*, Vol. II, No. 50.
190 Ibid., No. 49.
191 L.P. Mathur, *Forts and Strongholds of Rajasthan*, Inter India Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p. 73.
192 *Rathoran ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 535.

would not dare to put their foot on Rajasthan. All of them could unite and compel them to raise their siege at Nagore. At the instance of Sawai Madho Singh, Anirudh Singh Khangarot with an army of 60,000, was instructed to inveiglethe *Dakhanis* into a fight. Anirudh Singh was joined by Udawat Dalkaran, the *Thakur* of Dera, Ratnot Jadho Jujhar Singh, *Thakur* of Dugoli. The 7,000 contingent of Bikaner also joined the Kachhwahas. The *Dakhanis* got the information about the move of the Kachhwahas and they covered the wells with dried *fog* plants.When the Kachhwaha and the Bikaner army arrived, the *Dakhanis* set the *fog* plants to fire. Their opponents could not even drink water from the affected wells. The *Dakhanis also* burnt the grass and the horses of the Kachhwahas died without fodder.[193] Soon the efforts of Ram Singh and Marathas started showing results as they captured the fort of Jalore in the beginning of 1755, where the treasures of the Jodhpur rulers had been kept for centuries. Ajmer capitulated on 21st February, 1755 paving the way for a compromise with the Marathas.

Compromise with the Marathas

At Nagore, Singhvi Fatehchand and Devi Singh Champavat Mahasinghot negotiated with the Marathas that they would :

1. Surrender half of the Marwar territory.
2. From among the 5,000 villages of Marwar, 2,500 villages were given to Ram Singh. These included Merta, Parbatsar, Maroth, Sojat, Jalore, Bhinai, Kekri, 16 villages of Dewalia, 27 villages of Masoda. Jodhpur, Nagore, Didwana, Phalodi, Jaitaran *parganas* were given to Bijay Singh.
3. Ajmer was given to the *Dakhanis*.
4. rupees 60 lakhs were to be given as cash, 32 elephants, one *bhawan* worth one lakh, two lakhs worth jewellery. Some people were kept as hostages (*ne baki rupiya mein ol dini*). These were Singhvi Budhmal, the brother of Fateh Chand, Singhvi Budhmal, Vijayraj's *Purohit* Jeevraj, Harnath's Aasopa Sadashiv and Jagneshwar Srimali, who later died at Ujjain.[194]

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193 *Rathoran ri Khyat*, Vol. III, 536, 537.
194 Ibid., p. 539.

Ever since 1756, Marwar had become the hunting-ground for the family of Sindhia.[195]From 1755 to 1759, Marwar faced severe famine conditions. The State was under the obligation of paying a huge amount to the Marathas and the economic conditions were not favourable.[196] There was scarce agricultural production. It became difficult to meet even the day to day expenses of the court. Even the lamps of the court could not be lighted and it became very difficult to carry out the court proceedings: "*Rusnai ra hi tel ra phora padai*." In order to save himself from embarrassment, Bijay Singh held the *darbar* only when the *khansama*, *bhandari* Narsinghdas came and saluted him. This was a secret way of communicating to the Maharaja symbolically that oil to light the lamps was available and hence, the Maharaja could conduct the court proceedings. The day when Narsinghdas did not come to salute, it indicated that oil could not be arranged. On that particular day, the court could not be held.[197]

However, it appears to be an exaggerated way of highlighting fiscal difficulties of the ruler. Due to the famine conditions, Ram Singh went to Jhilai and Dattaji Sindhia went towards the Narmada. Bijay Singh's nobles decided that as the Marathas were appointed on their *thanas*, this was a good opportunity to recover their parganas. Once Ram Singh returned and resided at Merta, then it would be very difficult to recover them. At this Devi Singh expressed his views that it was already decided that for a year the parganas would not be taken from Ram Singh. Hearing this, the meeting was dissolved for the time being . But after a few days, the nobles again complained of fiscal difficulties. Anyhow, they started from Jodhpur for Merta and soon established control over it. Jalore was also attacked. Similarly, the *Thakur* of Chandawal, Prithvi Singh and Jethawat Pand Singh, also recovered Sojat.[198]

Maratha Reaction

In the absence of Ram Singh and Dattaji Sindhia, when Bijay Singh's men established their control over Merta, Jalore and Sojat, letters were sent to the Maratha commanders. Jankoji and Dattaji Sindhia were encamping on the banks of the river

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195 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, P. 22.
196 *Marwar ri Khyat*, p. xix.
197 Ibid., p. 41.
198 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, pp. 541, 542.

Narmada. Bijay Singh was planning to capture Ajmer also. All this infuriated Jankoji and he decided to go back to Marwar. But his men refused to go to Marwar. At this Kanhoji Jadu offered himself to go to Marwar. Having decided thus, Kanhoji left for Marwar with 500 horsemen while Jankoji went towards the Deccan.[199]Kanhoji assembled an army of 4,000 and reached Ajmer. There he was joined by Ram Singh's army of 3,000 and together they left for Merta. Both the sides lay opposite each other and there was some fight. At this time Devi Singh, secretly wrote to the *Dakhanis* that they should persist in their claim for the *parganas* as these belonged to them. He also assured them that Bijay Singh's men would not fight. In this way, the *Dakhanis* lay their claim on the Lambia and Baluda *thikanas*.[200]

Soon the Marwar nobles got divided into two groups. Kesari Singh and Jait Singh were in favour of putting up a fight while Devi Singh and Kalyan Singh were reluctant. The nobles then wrote to the Maharaja that only his arrival could motivate the nobles to fight so that the *Dakhanis* could be thrown out of Marwar. Bijay Singh then marched from Jodhpur. When they camped at Lambia, the supporters of Bharat Singh Udawat fired at them from inside. The Marwar army left Lambia and stationed their canons at Siraicha and after taking a *chhadi fauj* (the advanced army), they went to Ladpura. There they fought with the *Dakhanis*. Kanhoji was reinforced by Ram Singh Panwar who brought 1200 men from the Deccan. The *sardars* immediately left for Ajmer to visit the camp of Bijay Singh at Pisangan. It was decided that Bijay Singh would pay rupees 20,000 for Pisangan.[201]

Once again, the differences in the approach of the nobles came to the fore. Kesari Singh suggested to recover Ajmer while Devi Singh suggested just to collect money from the Mertias. After all these deliberations, they first moved to Alaniawas, then to Bhairunda, Harsor and further towards Merta.[202] In the meanwhile, Kanhoji decided to enter Marwar with an army of 6,000 as suggested by Devi Singh. On the way he halted at Naand and later at Jhadau. Immediately Bijay Singh was informed by his

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199 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 542.
200 Ibid.
201 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 543.
202 Ibid.

messengers that Kanhoji was going to enter Marwar territory. Bijay Singh also followed him to Jhadau. In this way wherever Kanhoji marched, Bijay Singh also followed him on his heels. Finally Kesari Singh suggested that they should mount their horses to fight with the *Dakhanis* and bring all their woes to an end.[203] From Mokaale Kahoji marched on to Merta but he could not establish his control over Merta and Malkot. Then he moved on to Maandre and Bijay Singh camped at Gangaarne. Here *Thakur* Umar Singh's men got killed and the *Dakhanis* lost 70 soldiers. The Marathas then looted Kuchera. Bijay Singh then camped at Harsolav and Kanhoji conquered Kharnal. In this way, Bijay Singh continued to follow Kanhoji on his heels. Bijay Singh realized that the *sardars* were not fighting whole-heartedly. Therefore, he sent Raghunath Singh, Surtaan Singh, Karanidan Barath to Maandre (Mandore) where Kanhoji was encamping. They offered that the land which Jankoji and Dattaji Sindhia had acquired for Ram Singh would be returned to them. Soon the parganas were returned. The Rathors evacuated evacuated Merta and the fort of Jalore. The *Dakhanis* established their *thanas* over there and Kanhoji left for the Deccan.

Rathora ri Khyat reveals that in the Jodhpur and Jaipur courts there were some officials and nobles who had aligned themselves with the Marathas. In 1754, seeing the adverse circumstances, Singhvi Fatehchand and Pradhan Devi Singh Champawat decided to negotiate the terms for a settlement.[204]

Again we find Devi Singh showing his reluctance when the other *sardars* suggested to occupy Merta in 1756, when they were facing severe famine conditions. He tried to dissuade them saying that they had entered into an agreement with Ram Singh, and therefore, at least for a year, they shoud not flout that agreement.[205]It can be easily inferred from the sources that Devi Singh was secretely in league with the Marathas. for he knew that as soon as they would try to recover Merta and the other *parganas*, the Marathas were bound to return and disturb the peace of Marwar. The other *sardars* reacted saying that Devi Singh's children were safe in the palace of Pokaran

[203] *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 544.
[204] Ibid., p. 539.
[205] Ibid., p. 541.

but their children were dependent on others.[206] With reluctance, Devi Singh, along with the other *sardars* left to attack Merta. But even there he was in communication with the *Dakhanis* and conveyed to them that he did not want to oppose them. But despite all his efforts, the Marwar *sardars* had occupied the parganas. But they should stand firmly as he was not interested in fighting with them.[207] He wrote a letter to Kanhoji that the entire Marwar army was away and the path was open for them to enter Marwar.[208] Later, Jorawar Singh informed the Maharaja about the treachery of Champawat Devi Singh. As a proof, he also produced the letter written by Devi Singh to the *Dakhanis* and cautioned Bijay Singh that he was trusting the *sardar* who had aligned himself with the *Dakhanis :* "*Aap kinre bharose barai baitha ho aap raa umrawan ra to ai parnam chhai…*"

Jaipur

During the lifetime of Sawai Jai Singh, the Marathas did not disturb his territories, nor could they levy any tribute on Amber/Jaipur. Though the Marathas had become increasingly aggressive in Rajasthan right after the acquisition of Malwa, their presence there came to be felt only after the death of Sawai Jai Singh (1743).[209] As already mentioned, in 1708 Sawai Jai Singh had concluded a treaty (*ahadnamah*) with Amar Singh II, the Maharana of Udaipur. According to this commitment, the son of Udaipuri princess would succeed Sawai Jai Singh even if he was younger than the sons born of wedlock with other princesses.[210] The marriage treaty was especially unfortunate, since it opened the way for perpetual quarrels over the succession and gave the Marathas a pretext for interference.[211]The treaty sowed the seeds of dissension by disregarding the law of primogeniture. Princess Chandra Kunwar, the Udaipuri princess was first blessed with a daughter who was later married to

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206 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 541.
207 Ibid., p. 542.
208 Ibid., pp. 543, 544.
209 Raghubir Singh, 'Rajput-Maratha Relations', in *Maratha History Seminar Papers* (May 28-31, 1970), p. 265.
210 Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, P. 973.
211 Gabrielle Festng, *From the Land of Princes*, Smith Elder & Company, Waterloo Place, London, 1904, pp. 234, 235.

Maharaja Abhai Singh of Jodhpur.[212] Then for many years no child was born out of this wedlock. In December 1738, the Mewar princess was blessed with a son, named Madho Singh. But in the intervening period, Sawai Jai Singh's other queens were blessed with sons. His eldest son was Shiv Singh who had served as his father's deputy *faujdar* of Mathura but died suddenly in 1724. The second son Ishwari Singh was now the eldest surviving son and after his father's death assumed the crown. The succession was also recognized by the Mughal Emperor, Muhammad Shah.[213] But this succession was disputed. It ultimately paved way for the Marathas to intervene in the affairs of Jaipur.

After his accession, the new Raja went to Delhi to meet the Emperor and receive the *tika* for himself. The Maharana of Udaipur supported his nephew Madho Singh. In the eyes of the Maharana Sawai Ishwari Singh's succession to the throne was a repudiation of the 1708 agreement concluded between Sawai Jai Singh and Maharana Amar Singh. However, Sawai Ishwari Singh ruled for seven years. Both the brothers were supported by different *thikanedars* (chiefs). Ishwari Singh was joined by Rao Raja Sardar Singh (of Uniara), Rao Raja Shiv Singh (of Sikar), Jorawar Singh of Kalakh), Sheodan Singh (of Ugriawas), Jorawar Singh (of Khandela), Deep Singh, Megh Singh etc.[214]The *thikanedars* who supported Madho Singh were Mohan Singh (of Bhadwa), Anirudh Singh of (Gadra), Anoop Singh of (Pachewar), Budh Singh (of Bachusi) and Shyam Singh (of Sakhun). *Thakur* Jagat Singh , Gyan Singh (of Diggi) and Zalim Singh (of Tordi) joined Madho Singh with a contingent of 3000 cavalry. Besides these, Madho Singh also received the support of other chiefs including Shyam Singh Khangarot (of Dudu), Jodh Singh (of Chomu), Ram Singh (of Samod), Gulab Singh (of Bagru), Jaswant Singh (of Chir), Man Singh (of Bhadwa), Pem Singh (of Godawat) and Sakat Singh.[215]

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212 Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, p. 973.
213 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p. 229.
214 R.K. Saxena, *Rajput Nobility*, p. 208. The chiefs of Jaipur were known as *thikanedars*, not *pattayats* as has been assumed by Saxena.
215 Ibid., p. 208.

The Maharana also marched in support of Madho Singh and reached Jamoli, five miles west of Jahazpur where he halted for forty days on the banks of the river Banas.[216] The Jaipur army was facing him. As time was required for his return from Delhi, the Kachhwaha commander Hemraj Bakshi pretended to go over to the side of Madho Singh who paid him some money. On his return march to Jaipur from Delhi, Sawai Ishwari Singh secured Maratha aid on the way and agreed to pay rupees 20,000 to them. Due to the efforts of the officials on both the sides, a battle was averted. Sawai Ishwari Singh was asked to give Madho Singh an appanage of five lakhs a year that included the parganas of Tonk, Toda, three others,[217] and included the town of Tonk where Madho Singh must construct a home and live peacefully. This paper known as the Jamoli agreement, dated 19th December 1744, was signed by Baba Bakht Singh, Baba Nathji, Kaka Bhagat Singh and *Thakur* Sardar Singh.[218] Sawai Ishwari Singh paid the amount he had promised to the Marathas but the Maharana refused pay the war indemnity to them. In early 1745, the Maratha allies of Sawai Ishwari Singh attacked the Mewar camp at midnight and the Mewar troops fled from the camp. Sawai Ishwari Singh repudiated the Jamoli agreement.

The Battle of Rajmahal (March, 1747)

The repudiation of the Jamoli agreement infuriated Maharana Jagat Singh who redoubled his efforts for his nephew's rights. This time he was joined by the dispossessed heir of Bundi, Ummed Singh and the Rao Raja of Kota, Durjan Sal.[219] They met at Nathdwara to plan the future course of action. Khuman Singhji, the *vakil* of the Maharana and Pem Singhji Gogawat were sent to seek the help of the Marathas.[220] They offered rupees two lakhs to Malhar Rao Holkar for pressurising Sawai Ishwari Singh to cede four parganas to Madho Singh, restore Bundi to Ummed Singh and allow the three parganas of Nenwa, Samidhi and Karwar to be held by Rao Raja Durjan Sal of Kota and Pratap Singh of Karwar.

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216 Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, p.1231.
217 *Hingane Daftar*, No. 29.
218 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p. 230.
219 Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, p.1236.
220 Narendra Singh, *Thirty decisive battles of Jaipur*, J.E.P. Works, Jaipur, 1939, P. 121.

Malhar Rao Holkar sent his son Khande Rao ignoring the advice of his colleagues Ranoji Sindhia and Ramchandra Baba Shenvi.Khanderao crossed the southern frontier of Jaipur via Udaipur, and reached Rajmahal on the Banas river. The contingents of Udaipur and Kota joined him on the way. Sawai Ishwari Singh decided to face the situation boldly and transferred the command of his advanced division to Hargovind Natani. Sawai Ishwari Singh himself arrived with the reserve force. A battle was fought on 1st March, 1747. Though both the sides suffered heavily, the Jaipur army under the leadership of Hargovind Natani carried the day. The Jaipur troops captured Madho Singh's standard-bearing elephant and band, all his artillery etc. Durjan Sal fled to Kota and the Maharana, on hearing the debacle returned to his capital. Khanderao was repulsed and forced to retire to Bundelkhand.[221] This battle proved to be very expensive for the Maharana as Sawai Ishwari Singh got the rich trade centre at Bhilwara wherefrom a large ransom was exacted. Besides, he also compelled the Maharana to pay a war indemnity. Thus, the battle at Rajmahal turned out to be a clear victory for Sawai Ishwari Singh.

The Battle of Bagru (August, 1748)

The battle of Rajmahal proved that contest for the throne of Jaipur was not easy. Sawai Madho Singh realized that he could not succeed without the support of the Marathas. For this purpose he befriended Malhar Rao Holkar and even exchanged turbans with him and the two became *pagadi badal bhai.*[222] Despite the severe defeat at Rajmahal, Maharana Jagat Singh intensified his efforts and this time sent an envoy to Puna with an offer of ten lakhs to Raja Shahu. In return the Peshwa was to support Madho Singh and compel Sawai Ishwari Singh to give his brother an appanage worth twenty four lakhs a year or a fourth of the total revenue of his kingdom. Earlier the Peshwa had supported Sawai Ishwari Singh, on account of consideration for Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Sawai Jai Singh's cordial relations with Balaji Rao and Baji Rao himself. However, he was tempted to support Madho Singh in order to pay for his debts. In March, 1747, he instructed Ramchandra Baba to coerce Sawai Ishwari Singh to cede the concerned territory to Madho Singh. Sawai Ishwari Singh found it disgraceful to part with one-fourth of his territory and wrote in reply:

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221 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p. 232.
222 Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, p. 1239.

> "This question is one of inheritance of ancestral property. We are Rajahs and must follow our hereditary usage. The question relates to territory; how can I oblige the Peshwa in this matter? I had previously given Madho what Malhar had pressed me to grant on the ground of service to the state. He now asks for more. How can I give him that without fighting? How can I bring down upon myself the name of a coward and an unworthy son by dividing my entire kingdom with a younger brother?"[223]

Next year on fourth April, 1748, Peshwa Balaji Rao held a meeting with Madho Singh[224] and entered the Kachhwaha territory, Ishwari Singh fled from the field of Manupur. It was followed by the devastation of his territory and he was compelled to sue for peace. The Raja sent his minister Keshavdas to resolve the matter peacefully, but the Marathas made exhorbitant demands leading to the failure of negotiations.

Malhar Rao Holkar and Gangadhar Tatya with their army entered Jaipur territory near Uniara in July.[225] After wresting parganas Toda, Tonk and Malpura, they handed them over to Madho Singh. In their forward journey via Piplod, Fagi and Ladana, they were joined by many Rajput chiefs. They were joined by Durjan Sal and Ummed Singh also. This army reached Bagru, twenty three miles east of the Sambhar town. The battle that commenced on the first of August, continued for six days. In this battle, Sawai Ishwari Singh received the much needed support from the Jat Raja, Suraj Mal. With the efforts of Keshavdas, peace was concluded and the Maharana's demands were accepted. Sawai Ishwari Singh gave five parganas to his brother, Madho Singh, and Bundi was restored to Ummed Singh. Thus, with the help of the Marathas the Maharana was partially successful in safeguarding the rights of his nephew.

Ishwari Singh's suicide (1750)

Sawai Ishwari Singh was a weak administrator and his loyal and able ministers either died or were done away with. Raja Ayamal Khatri, the ablest of Jaipur *diwans* and administrators, died on 9th February, 1747. He was succeeded by his son Keshavdas, but Sawai Ishwari Singh got him poisoned on a false charge. It was due to

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223 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History Of Jaipur*, p. 237.
224 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 83.
225 Ibid.

Keshavdas's efforts that in the battle of Bagru peace was negotiated with the Marathas. But soon Hargovind Natani rose in Sawai Ishwari Singh's favour who wanted to oust Keshavdas. For this correspondence between Holkar and Keshavdas was forged saying that it was Keshavdas's connivance with Holkar that gave Bundi to Ummed Singh and the four parganas of Tonk to Madho Singh. Thus, Keshavdas was falsely implicated and forced to drink poison by Sawai Ishwari Singh. Keshavdas spoke of his innocence and even said to have exclaimed that natural justice would soon befall Jaipur.[226] It is said that while dying, he uttered the following words: *"Mujh bekusoor khairkhwah ko marne ka badla ishwar aapko jald hi dega".* A couplet relating this incident was composed by a poet in the Marwari language: "*Mantri moto mariyo, Khatri Keshavdas, Jad hi chhodi Isra, raj karan ri aas.*"[227]Natani secretly corresponded with Holkar to get rid of his master, Sawai Ishwari Singh. He kept the Maharaja in the dark about the military preparations in defence of Jaipur.[228]

Vidyadhar, another elder statesman, was bedridden. Shivnath Bhaya, the old chief of artillery was thrown into a prison with his entire family. The only people whom the Raja trusted were people from humble origin. One of them was a barber, Shambhu Bari and the other was an elephant-rider, Khanu *mahut*. Sawai Ishwari Singh had promised to pay hefty sums to the Marathas for their support against his brother and as war indemnity after the Battle of Bagru. The promised sum had fallen into arrears and the Peshwa being in great need of money directed Malhar Rao Holkar to take charge of the situation.

On hearing that Malhar Rao Holkar along with Gangadhar Tatya were heading towards Jaipur, Sawai Ishwari Singh tried to appease them by sending his envoys with two lakh rupees but it only infuriated Malhar Rao Holkar. But the Raja seems to have given up. He was filled with remorse for having poisoned his faithful noble under the influence of the self-serving Natani.[229] Narendra Singh is of the opinion that Sawai

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[226] Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod Mewar Ka Itihas*, Vol. II, p. 1239.
[227] Ibid., P. 1239.
[228] Ibid., p. 1240.
[229] Narendra Singh, *Shri Maharaj Sawai Ishwari Singhji ka Itihas*, Jaipur Printing Works, Jaipur, 1933, p. 135.

Ishwari Singh preferred to end his own life than to stake the honour of his state to the Marathas.[230] On 12th December, 1750, Sawai Ishwari Singh committed suicide. He got himself stung by a poisonous cobra. Three of his queens and one favourite concubine consumed poison along with him. This is corroborated by a news-letter addressed to Govind Pant Bundele by his accountant Baburao Visnu from the camp of Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Shinde camping near Jaipur. For eighteen hours the corpse lay unattended and unburnt. Tod aptly describes the situation:

> "a dose of poison gave Madho Singh the *gaddi*, Holkar his bribe, and the Mahrattas a firm hold upon Rajasthan".[231]

Madho Singh's Accession and the Marathas

With the accession of Sawai Madho Singh on the throne of Jaipur, the Maratha-Rajput relations entered a new phase. The temptation for inviting the Marathas was unending. Both, Sawai Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh had promised huge amounts to the Marathas for their assistance. Madho Singh had sought Maratha help to oust Sawai Ishwari Singh and ultimately emerged as a winner in the contest to the throne. The Marathas participated in this fratricidal war due to financial reasons. After Sawai Ishwari Singh committed suicide, at Holkar's invitation, Madho Singh came from Udaipur[232] and occupied the throne on 29th December, 1750. It was decided that Sawai Madho Singh would pay rupees ten lakhs to the Marathas. The pargana of Rampura which was given to Madho Singh by the Mewar Maharana was now transferred by Sawai Madho Singh to Malhar Rao Hokar.[233] But soon Jayappa Sindhia arrived on 6th January, 1751, and made new exorbitant demands on Jaipur. From this moment onwards Sawai Madho Singh stopped trusting the Marathas.

The pent-up hatred of the Rajputs due to the exhorbitant Maratha demands found expression in the form of a sudden and violent attack on the unsuspecting Marathas when four thousand of them entered the Jaipur city for sight seeing. Almost fifteen hundred Marathas were slain and many were wounded. There was a heavy loss of men and property. An important Maratha news-letter gives a vivid account of the murder of

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230 Narendra Singh, *Shri Maharaj Sawai Ishwari Singhji ka Itihas*, Jaipur Printing Works, Jaipur, 1933, p.138.
231 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. I, p. 338.
232 Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, P.1240.
233 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 83.

Marathas insides Jaipur.[234] In this letter can be traced the dormant enmity which the Marathas and Rajputs bore towards each other.The immediate impact of this was felt in the adjacent villages where Maratha couriers were killed and treated harshly. Sawai Madho Singh opened negotiations after eight days and tried to convince them that the unfortunate incident was the result of the spontaneous outburst which was not supported by him. The Marathas on their part agreed to forgive him on the condition that besides the ten lakhs subsidy, he would restore the looted property and pay two lakhs as compensation to the dead and wounded. Clearly, the Marathas could barter even their anger for money.

In October, 1753, when Sawai Madho Singh made a courtesy visit to the Emperor, the *wazir*, Safdar Jang was in open revolt against the young Emperor, Ahmad Shah**.** Sawai Madho Singh offered to mediate.He was well placed to intervene as he had some leverage over Suraj Mal, the Jat ruler of Bharatpur on whose forces Safdar Jang was banking. Sawai Madho Singh was rewarded with the imperial grant of Ranthambhor for dousing the rebellion. The fort was exceedingly strong and had plenty of water.[235] A contemporary historian Minhaz-us-`Siraz writes, "The fort was famous throughout Hindustan for its exceeding strength, soilidity and impregnability."[236]

Sawai Madho Singh also built Sawai Madhopur near Ranthambhor.[237] Due to its strategic location the Marathas had tried to gain control of the fort. Malhar Rao Holkar obtained *sanad* from the Mughal Emperor about the occupation of the fort but the keeper of the fort refused to hand it over to the Marathas. The fort was then besieged by the Marathas under Gangadhar Tantia only to be fired by the defenders. They forced the Marathas to retreat. The Marathas then shelled the defences of the fort from Shivpur. The importance of the fort can be gauged from the fact that the Marathas continued to besiege the fort for three years. The defenders decided to hand over the fort to Sawai Madho Singh. With the help of the Jaipur forces, the defenders forced the Marathas to withdraw from

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234 *S.P.D.*, Vol. II, No. 31.

235 Nur-ud-din Muhammad Jahangir's, The *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri Or Memoirs of Jahangir*, Vol. II, tr. Alexander Rogers, ed., Henry Beveridge, Munshiram Manoharlal, Oriental Publishers, Delhi, Second Edition, January, 1968.p. 58.

236 L.P. Mathur, *Forts and Strongholds of Rajasthan*, pp. 36,37.

237 Tod, *Annals and Antiquities*, Vol. II, P. 301.

Ranthambhor. Finally in 1759, Sawai Madho Singh occupied the fort. The nearby town of Sawai Madhopur was named after him.[238]

The Marathas again visited Jaipur under Raghunath Dada and Malhar Rao Holkar in 1753 to demand the tribute agreed in the past. On 30th October, 1753, they crossed the Mukandara Pass and by way of Kota-Bundi entered the Jaipur territory. However, direct conflict was averted. Rupees 1,25,000 were presented to Raghunath Dada and 15,25,000 were paid as outstanding tribute. Out of this sum, rupees 7,35,074 were paid in cash and three lakhs in orders on bankers, by Jago Pandit, the Jaipur minister to Jayappa Sindhia in April, 1755, leaving a balance of rupees 5,14,926 in arrears.[239]

In 1757, the Peshwa's brother, Raghunath Dada again visited Jaipur and exerted pressure on Sawai Madho Singh. This time he made exorbitant demands on the Jaipur Raja amounting to forty or fifty lakhs in cash and large secession of territory with an annual income of forty or fifty lakhs. Sawai Madho Singh agreed to pay the same amount as agreed in the past. Raghunath Rao agreed to be content with eleven lakhs, six of which were paid down and shared between him and Holkar in the proportion of two to one. In August, 1758, Sindhia and Holkar came to an understanding to share the Maratha acquisitions and claims in Rajasthan and Malwa. Accordingly, Jankoji Sindhia entered the Jaipur territory. Sawai Madho Singh was coerced to pay thirty six lakh rupees besides an additional three lakhs in the first year. Jaipur was a wealthy Rajput State. In 1759, the Peshwa ordered Malhar Rao Holkar to claim the amount promised by the Jaipur Raja. He was specifically ordered to recover rupees twelve lakhs for the year 1758 and rupees nine lakhs for the year 1759. The Rajputs decided to resist the Marathas.Forty thousand soldiers assembled for a fight. However, the Rajputs were completely crushed at Lakheri and twenty of their leaders were slayed. As Madho Singh was in regular communication with Ahmad Shah Durrani and Najib ud-daula, he knew that the Durrani was expected in India in November 1759 and the Maratha commander would have to retire immediately. Therefore, he held out

238 L.P. Mathur, *Forts and Strongholds of Rajasthan*, p. 40.
239 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History Of Jaipur*, p. 246.

bravely.[240]By middle of December, Holkar laid siege to Barwara. But had to give it up to reinforce Dattaji Sindhia at Delhi against Ahmad Shah Abdali's attack.

Jaipur was free from Maratha attacks during 1760 and for sometime after their debacle at Panipat. Interestingly, on the eve of the battle of Panipat, the seventeen Kachhwaha chiefs entered into an agreement with Sawai Madho Singh. They assured the Raja that they would neither help the Muslims nor the *Dakhanis*. Infact, they would have no correspondence with them. If they proved faithless to the *darbar* they would be liable to social boycot.[241]The changing contours of the Maratha-Rajput relations between 1761 and 1794 will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

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240 Hari Ram Gupta, *Marathas and Panipat*, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1961, p. 41.

241 *Kapat-Dwara,* Transcribed copy, Historical Section, available at Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, *Jaisath Badi 9*, 1816 *V.S.*, No. 776, the names of these *sardars* are as follows : Jaswant Singh Rajawat, Jodh Singh Nathawat Chomu, Gulab Singh Chatrabhugat Bagru, Jagat Singh, Nand Singh Rao, Bikramaditya Barwara, Dalel Singh Rajawat Dhula, Rao Sardar Singh Uniara, Jalim Singh Nathawat, Ratan Singh Nathawat, Sultan Singh Naruka, Salim Singh, Chhaju Ram Naruka, Chand Singh Kumbhani, Fateh Singh Kumbhani, Ajit Singh Sheobrahmpota, Dalel Singh.

CHAPTER 2

MARATHA INTERVENTION IN RAJASTHAN : 1761-1794 (PART II)

The second phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations covers the time period from 1761-1794, when the Rajputs tried to resist the Marathas only to be finally crushed by Mahadaji Sindhia. The Marathas had antongonized themselves to the Rajputs and their relations had soured to such an extent that none of them participated in the battle of Panipat to support them. The Maratha defeat in this battle had far reaching consequences. For the time being all their achievements were wiped off and taking advantage of the situation the Rajputs also tried to assert themselves. However, the Marathas soon recovered from this setback. Mahadaji Sindhia and Nana Phadnis who escaped the carnage of Panipat rose to be the saviours of the Maratha State.[1] Malhar Rao Holkar also played a significant role. In a letter addressed to Sawai Madho Singh, Abdali acknowledged the fact that the Marathas fought courageously but that they were doomed to suffer utter defeat.[2] From among the many causes of the Maratha defeat in the battle of Panipat, one was the injudicious Maratha dealings with the Rajputs. The friendship and good feeling sedulously cultivated by the first two Peshwas was destroyed by the personal rivalries between Sindhia and Holkar. They were posted in the North to act whenever occasion and emergency demanded.According to Sardesai, this alienation of Rajput sympathies by Sindhia and Holkar ultimately weakened the Maratha power.[3]

An outcome of the Maratha defeat was a generalized revolution against their domination in Hindustan – in the Gangetic Doab, Bundelkhand, Rajasthan and Malwa. The pathetic situation could be best described in the following words from *Hingane Daftar* : *"tyanchya najra firlya Hindustancha amal sarv uthla*,"[4](everyone

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1 Jadunath Sarkar, *Sindhia as Regent*, p. i.
2 V.G. Dighe, *Maratha supremacy*, p. 199 ; Kulkarni, *The Marathas*, p. 126 (This letter was published by J.N. Sarkar in the Modern Review, May, 1946.
3 G.S. Sardesai, *The Main Currents of Maratha History*, pp. 118,119.
4 *Hingane Daftar*, p. 119.

turned hostile and Maratha control in Hindustan ceased to be) and as per *Holkarshahicha Itihas* : "*Hindustancha amal sarv uthla,*"[5]Marathas lost their control everywhere in Hindustan. Everywhere suppressed chieftains, and petty landlords raised their heads against the Deccanies.[6] Badrinath Keshav also draws a graphic picture of the North after the Panipat disaster.[7]The Maratha defeat at Panipat emboldened the Mewar *sardars* who brought Rampura, a fertile plain of Mewar under their control.The seizure of Rampura from the Marathas added a powerful source to the already depleted treasury of Mewar. Having realized the grimness of the situation the Marathas reached Rampura, killed four hundred Chundawats and regained their lost post.[8]Malhar Rao Holkar reached Rampura three days later. As a result of the Maratha success, Holkar retained out of 519 villages of the pargana of Rampura, 488 villages yielding an annual revenue of 3,50,000 rupees.[9]

The task of resisting the Marathas in Rajasthan now fell upon the Kachhwahas of Jaipur and Rathors of Jodhpur. But Sawai Madho Singh of Jaipur revived the dormant Kachhwaha-Rathor rivalry. He backed the exiled Ram Singh for the throne of Jodhpur. This antogonised Bijay Singh of Jodhpur. The Marathas took full advantage of their rivalry and made them their easy prey. Balaji Gobind informs Dadasaheb that Bijay Singh proceeded to Merta from Jodhpur and that Sawai Madho Singh had espoused the cause of Ram Singh.[10]

Sawai Madho Singh, in order to oust the Marathas from Rajasthan invited the co-operation of Shah Alam II, Najib Khan and Yakub Ali, as is evident from the Maratha documents.[11] Sawai Madho Singh not only alienated Bijay Singh but also attacked Sardar Singh Naruka of Uniara. A battle was fought between the armies of Jaipur and Uniara. This is corroborated from a letter written by Malhar Tukdeo, the beginning and end of which are unfortunately missing. As per his report, there was

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5 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 119.
6 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire* (1754-1771), Vol. II, Orient Longman, Fourth Edition 1991, p. 300.
7 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No.23.
8 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 60.
9 S.K. Bhatt, 'Holkar-Rajput Relations,' in *Maratha History Seminar (May 28-31, 1970)Papers*, ed. A.G. Pawar, Shivaji University, Kolhapur, 1971, p. 198.
10 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 17.
11 Ibid., No. 19.

heavy fighting going on between Sawai Madho Singh and Sardar Singh of Uniara. At this time Malhar Rao Holkar was busy investing Kota.[12] The Rajput Chiefs of Kota, Bundi, Karauli, Khichi and Sopar promised to join him. Additionally, Sawai Madho Singh sent a vast army to besiege Nenwa, which was held by the Marathas under Sadashiv Gopal. Another army was directed towards Patan which is twelve miles North-east of city of Kota. Balaji Govind wrote to Dadasaheb, informing him that Sawai Madho Singh had deputed his *diwan* Nandlal to proceed with an army to Nenwa and capture it.[13] In a letter dated 26th September, 1761, the *kamavisdar* of Kota, Lalaji Ballal informed Jankoji Sindhia that besides trying to settle the matter with the Uniara *thikana* of Jaipur, a Maratha artillery and contingent assembled at Nenwa and that 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers were sent to Rampura where other forces would also join.[14] Trimbak Ram Phadnis reported to the Peshwa about Sawai Madho Singh's intrusions in the Maratha territory.[15] The Marathas had their outposts in the Hada State. This combined army was led by Raj Singh Ghorchara, *diwans* – Kaniram and Nandlal and Surat Singh Shiv brahmpota. At the sight of the imposing Jaipur army the Marathas evacuated their outposts.

When the movements of the Jaipur army were reported to Malhar Rao Holkar, he marched from Indore to the Mukandara Pass with an army of 6,000 soldiers. The *diwan* of Kota, Akheram Pancholi, Zalim Singh and the foster-brother of the Rao Raja along with 3,000 Rajput allies joined Malhar Rao Holkar at Bariya, in the Kota territory. A battle took place between Mangrol and Bhatwara resulting in the total destruction of the Jaipur army. The Peshwa was apprised of the destruction of the Jaipur army by Dhan Singh that Malhar Rao Holkar after combining his forces with those of the Chief of Kota has crushed the Jaipur army which had crossed the river Chambal.[16] Holkar pursued the Jaipur army upto Manoharpur, just forty miles North of Jaipur. Sawai Madho Singh, who was at Ranthambhor hurried back to his capital. Meanwhile Kaniram reopened negotiations with Malhar Rao Holkar to settle the dispute about the outstanding tribute. However, eruptions in Bundelkhand forced

12 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No 81.
13 Ibid., Vol. XXIX, No. 20.
14 *Shindeshahi*, Vol. I, No. 267.
15 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 22.
16 Ibid., No. 27.

Malhar Rao Holkar to leave Jaipur territory. Holkar left Jaipur territory about 10th February, 1762 and Jaipur had a respite for three years, from 1762 to 1765 from Maratha *vahada* (fear).[17]

Sawai Madho Singh not only considered the Marathas as his arch enemies but also tried to expel them from the Jaipur territory. However, circumstances compelled him to seek Maratha help as he was not ready to co-operate with Bijay Singh and the Jat Raja Jawahar Singh. On 20th February 1761, Bijay Singh received a letter from Ahmad Shah Abdali asking him to pay tribute and in return assured him of his co-operation against the Marathas. Meanwhile, the dispossessed ruler of Marwar, Ram Singh decided to take advantage of the situation and recover his throne. In this endeavour he received the support of Sawai Madho Singh. Together they attacked on Bijay Singh in May, 1761. They also received the co-operation of the Champawats, Kumpawats and Shekhawats.[18] The Marathas were keenly observing these developments. Dadasaheb received the information from Balaji Govind that Sawai Madho Singh was espousing the cause of Ram Singh and that Bijay Singh was proceeding to Merta from Jodhpur.[19] With the help of Malhar Rao Holkar, the renewed contest between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh ended once for all in favour of Bijay Singh. Ram Singh passed his remaining life at Jaipur, where he died in 1772.

The rivalry between Jawahar Singh and Nahar Singh also paved the way for Maratha intervention in the Jat affairs. From Mirza Raja Jai Singh (1621-1667) onwards successive Kachhwaha rulers played a pivotal role in the political management of the region. The Mughal emperors controlled and stabilized the area through the agency of the Amber house.[20]Therefore, when Jawahar Singh wrested Narnol district of Jaipur, Sawai Madho Singh became alarmed. He knew that on his own he could not face his powerful opponent. Hence, he approached both Holkar and Sindhia for help.[21] Keeping in mind the Maratha interest in North India, both the Maratha leaders

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17 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur State*, p. 251.
18 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 94, 95.
19 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 17.
20 R.P. Rana, *Rebels to Rulers : The Rise of Jat Power in Medieval India c. 1665-1735*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2006, p. 108.
21 *Kharita* from Madho Singh to Malhar Raoo Holkar, *Asoj Vadi* 2, *V.S.* 1822/1765 (Draft Kharita Section).

favourably responded to Sawai Madho Singh's appeal and sent their forces to Jaipur. The Maratha intervention in favour of Jaipur spoiled Jawahar Singh's plan as he could not afford to take on the Marathas. He was forced to make peace with Sawai Madho Singh. The timely help of the Marathas saved Jaipur from the Jat incursion. This development was a turning point in Jaipur-Maratha relations at least for the time being.

Sawai Madho Singh intrigued with every possible enemy of the Jat Raja. He even supported the cause of Nahar Singh – Suraj Mal's favourite son and Jawahar Singh's rival for the throne. Nahar Singh held Dholpur as his appanage. Meanwhile Jawahar Singh inflicted a severe blow to the Marathas.This is referred in a letter written by Ramchandra Tukdeo to Raghunathrao that verifies the defeat suffered by a contingent of the Maratha army at the hands of the Jat.[22] After having lost his own estate, Nahar Singh took refuge in Jaipur and died on 6th December, 1766. Consequently, Bijay Singh and Jawahar Singh joined hands against the Marathas. They decided to defeat the *Dakhanis* and then divide the area among themselves : (*aapan sara Hindustan ra raja ek huan to Dikhniya su jhagdo kar mulak baant lesan*.)[23]Accordingly, the Jat Raja welcomed the proposal and marched to Pushkar through Jaipur territory.

This further infuriated Sawai Madho Singh. Bijay Singh was more than willing and welcomed Jawahar Singh on the bank of the sacred lake, at Pushkar. Jawahar Singh conveyed to Bijay Singh that as he was in mourning of his father Surajmal, therefore, as per tradition, he would not be able to come and meet Bijay Singh first. Hearing this, Bijay Singh himself went and met Jawahar Singh in his camp.[24] We get the information from the *Rathora ri Khyat* that the two met and a lot of rejoicing took place. Bijay Singh presented two elephants, four horses and two guns to Jawahar Singh. The next day, Jawahar Singh visited Bijay Singh's camp and was again presented two horses.[25] On 6th November 1767 (*Kartik* fullmoon day), the two Rajas exchanged turbans and sat down side by side on the same carpet like brothers and sent an invitation to Sawai Madho Singh to come and join them. This provoked the proud

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22 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No.127.
23 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 584.
24 Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 584, 585.
25 Ibid., p. 585.

Kachhwaha Raja.[26] The *vakil* sent by Bijay Singh conveyed to Sawai Madho Singh that after getting rid of the *Dakhani* menace, they would divide their territory, out of which, Sawai Madho Singh would get Ujjain, he himself would take Gujarat and the eastern part would be given to Jawahar Singh :

> *"Pachhe Jaipur ukil meliya ne Madho Singhji ne kevayo ke the hee aaya ne samil huvo su Dikhiniyan ro machkur baandhan.Dikhiniyan ne Narbada paar utarandaa nahi. Uujin to thane desan ne Gujarat mein lesan, purab Jat ne desan*."[27]

But Sawai Madho Singh sharply reprimanded Bijay Singh. Thus, Jawahar Singh's pilgrimage to Pushkar without the prior permission of the Kachhwahas resulted in a battle between both the parties at Maonda on 14th December 1767. Jawahar Singh lost the battle but saved his life.A few months later, on 5th March 1768, Sawai Madho Singh breathed his last. After four months Jawahar Singh also died. With the deaths of Sawai Madho Singh and Jawahar Singh the last effort of resisting the Maratha dominance in North India also got lost. It is a matter of conjecture whether Sawai Madho Singh was at fault or Jawahar Singh.

After the death of Sawai Madho Singh, the Peshwa demanded the succession fee (*tika nazar*) from his heir Sawai Prithvi Singh.[28] The Marathas were conveying to the Rajputs that they were the paramount power. This also symbolized that the Mughal authority was being replaced by the Marathas. Similarly, the Marathas entered into an agreement with the Rao Raja of Bundi, Ummed Singh, in the year 1769-70, according to which he was required to pay his *khandani* (tribute or contribution) punctually to the Peshwa's agent and to refrain from allying himself with any enemy of the Maratha State. Though the Peshwa agreed to protect the Rao Raja if he behaved loyally to the Maratha State. However, the nature and extent of this protection is in no way indicated in the above mentioned agreement[29].

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26 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 162.
27 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 585.
28 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 248.
29 Surendra Nath Sen, *Military System of the Marathas*, p. 39.

Sawai Prithvi Singh, Madho Singh's elder son was merely five years when he ascended the throne. The queen mother became the regent but in reality power was wielded by the young Raja's maternal grandfather, Jaswant Singh Chundawat, of Deogarh in Mewar. During his reign (1768-1778), there was respite from Maratha incursions. Sawai Prithvi Singh had a son Man Singh, only six months old at the time of his death. The little orphan's rights were superceded by his uncle Pratap Singh, a boy of thirteen. He has been harshly profiled by Sarkar.[30]Successive minority rulers created lot of political instability in Jaipur.

Khushali Ram Bohra, a prominent banker was espousing the cause of Man Singh whereas, Roda Ram Khawas was the supporter of Pratap Singh. The Raja imposed a fine of rupees 15-20 lakhs on the Bohra, yet he did not hand over the child.[31]The nobles were mostly the Raja's clansmen and had served the state loyally.The Narukas, Khangarots and Shekhawats had served Sawai Jai Singh and Sawai Ishwari Singh loyally. Harnath Singh Naruka of Choru, Rao Raja Sardar Singh of Uniara, Rao Raja Shiv Singh of Sikar, Deep Singh of Kasli and Zorawar Singh of Kalakh fell into disfavour during the time of Sawai Madho Singh and now sided with the posthumous son of Maharaja Sawai Prithvi Singh.[32]However, they could not bear the disgrace of taking orders from Roda Ram, popularly called Rodoji, (a tailor). Due to the Raja's personal favour, he wielded supreme power over the government. The enemity between the old Brahman *diwan*, Khushali Ram Bohra and Daulat Ram Haldia ultimately proved disastrous for the Jaipur State. When the Raja made his life intolerable, Khushali Ram had no choice but to seek shelter in Sindhia's camp.

In the later part of the eighteenth century, Mahadaji Sindhia rose to prominence and began to dominate North Indian politics. It was Mahadaji Sindhia who restored Shah Alam to his capital of Delhi in 1772. Later when Mirza Najaf Khan died on 6th April, 1782, the Emperor deputed the Maratha ambassador at Delhi to proceed to Mahadaji's camp with full instructions for the future plans. Hingane wrote to Mahadaji, "this is an occasion for you to secure not only monetary gains, but many other solid advantages.

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30 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 337.
31 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 24.
32 Narendra Singh, *Thirty decisive battles of Jaipur*, p. 228.

Such an opportunity may not come again."[33]Sindhia accepted the Mughal Emperor's invitation to come to Delhi and administer his reduced Empire. On the 1st of December, 1784, at a public *darbar*, the Emperor appointed the Peshwa as his Deputy (*naib-i-munaib*) as well as Commander-in-Chief (*bakhshi-ul-mamalik*), subject to the written condition that Mahadaji Sindhia and none else should be the permanent agent of the Peshwa in discharging the actual functions of these exalted offices. The *khillats*[34] and rich presents bestowed by the Emperor on the Peshwa as the adjuncts of his new office, as well as complimentary robes for the Peshwa's regent Nana Fadnis, were made over to Sindhia for dispatch to Poona. Shah Alam conferred on Mahadaji Sindhia the title of Regent Plenipotentiary (*wakil-i-mutlaq*).[35] The appointment of Mahadaji Sindhia as *wakil-i-mutlaq* of Delhi created conditions for a possible evolution of a political arrangement legitimized by the Mughal monarch but actually dominated or governed by the Marathas.[36] For many years the Rajput rulers had not paid a penny to the Imperial treasury. Hence, they were asked to pay rupees three crores as the arrears of their tribute and of the Maratha *chauth*. There was a meeting between Sindhia, Najaf Quli and the Rao Raja Pratap Singh Naruka of Machheri and they were deputed to lead an expedition against Jaipur.[37] Sindhia began his march towards Jaipur on 3rd January, 1786, along with the Emperor. The mediation of Rao Pratap Singh and Khushali Ram Bohra was availed of to secure a peaceful payment.

After much deliberation Jaipur having agreed to pay rupees 63 lakhs (rupees 60 lakhs as *peshkash* and three lakhs as *darbar kharch*). It was further agreed that out of this amount rupees 11 lakhs were to be paid immediately (rupees 7 lakhs as cash, jewels worth rupees 3 lakhs, elephants and horses worth rupees one lakh). Rupees 10 lakhs were to be paid in six month's time and rupees twenty lakhs were to be provided by

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33 Govind Sakharam Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas : Sunset over Maharashtra [1772-1848]*, Vol. III, Phoenix Publications, p. 1948, p. 138.

34 Stewart Gordon, "Ibn Batuta and a Region of Robing", in *Robes of Honour : Khilat in Pre-Colonial and Colonial India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003. Stewart Gordon writes that the ceremony termed *khila* in Arabic and *khillat* or *sar u pa* in Persian is found in much of South Asia in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, p. 1.

35 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol.III, pp. 293, 294.

36 Z.U. Malik, "The Core and the Periphery : A Contribution to the Debate on the Eighteenth Century," *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 51st Sesszion, Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1990, p. 179.

37 G.S. Sardesai, ed., *Historical Papers,* No. 409.

the secession of land. The remaining twenty two lakhs were to be covered by assignments on the revenue on the *thikanedars*. Khushali Ram became the regent again and successfully discharged the payment of the first installment of rupees 11 lakhs by the end of May. On 4th June, 1786, Sindhia started on his return journey after deputing Rayaji Patil, Najaf Quli and the Machheri Raja to collect the amount of the second installment of ten lakhs and the assignment for rupees 22 lakhs from the *thikanedars*. Sadashiv Dinkar reported to Nana Saheb that Sindhia had stationed a large army to realize the stipulated amount.[38]

Here it is important to mention that the Jaipur State's policy towards the Marathas varied between overt resistance and covert friendly overtures. In a period of minority rule, *diwan* of the state largely determined the policy.Khushali Ram Bohra and Daulat Ram Haldia pursued conflicting policies towards the Marathas. Khushali Ram Bohra stood for friendly relations with the Marathas while his adversary Daulat Ram Haldia followed a vigorous policy of resistance. The terms agreed between the Jaipur State and Sindhia in 1786 were the result of the efforts of Khushali Ram Bohra. When Daulat Ram returned to Jaipur in the middle of January, 1787, Rao Pratap Singh Naruka once again made him the *diwan* and in that capacity he influenced the Raja to resist the Marathas. The pro-Maratha faction among the Raja's nobles was sidelined.[39] Khushali Ram had fallen out of favour, he along with his partisans fled to the camp of Sindhia to save their lives.

Daulat Ram Haldia made every possible effort to garner support against the Marathas. To begin with, a close defensive alliance was formed with the Jodhpur Raja. Sadahiv Dinkar reported to Nana Saheb about the Rajput coalition having sent agents to the English to secure their assistance in their war against Sindhia.[40] The next step was to instruct the Jaipur *thikanedars* everywhere not to make any payment to Sindhia as per the terms of agreement of 1786. In retaliation, Rayaji Patil at the head of a 5,000 force was deputed by Sindhia as his agent in Jaipur. The local chiefs started resisting the payment of revenue. Not only did Rayaji lost 700 men, the Jaipur government also

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38 G.S. Sardesai, ed., *Historical Papers,* No. 476.
39 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire (1771-1778)*, Vol. III, S. N. Sarkar, Calcutta, 1938, p.353.
40 G.S. Sardesai ed., *Historical Papers*, No. 415.

tried to lure the Mughals against Sindhia. In these circumstances Sindhia started peparations for an expedition against Jaipur.[41]

In the case of Jodhpur, Mahadaji Sindhia's *vakil* at Jodhpur asked the Maharaja to send the amount of the *khandani*. Bijay Singh then sent two *hundis* worth two lakhs and 350 elephants, eight pairs of oxen, six horses, jewellery worth 50,000, *Multani chheents* (cloth), *pashmina* and some weapons, that made up another one lakh. In the meanwhile, it was reported that Sindhia was going towards Agra. The Maharaja immediately sent orders to stop further movement of animals and items gifted to Sindhia. Soon Bijay Singh's *vakil* with Sindhia, Kriparam Joshi reported that he was being asked to get the *khandani* amount deposited, else he should go back to Jodhpur. Bijay Singh then sent fresh orders that the installments of *Magh* and *Falgun* should be sent.[42] Meanwhile, Khushali Ram Bohra and the Machheri Raja were pushing Man Singh as a Maratha protégée and rival to Sawai Pratap Singh. In a letter dated, 11th April 1787, the Resident informed the Governor General that Sindhia's success was partly due to his management but principally it was due to the disunity among the rival chiefs. But it was for the first time that an association had been formed against him. Sindhia soon marched towards Jaipur and reached Dausa which is 32 miles East of Jaipur. On his arrival, Mahadaji realized that the Rajputs not only broke off their conference with him but next day left the camp without taking leave.

Apprehending an attack from the Marathas, Bijay Singh got the Jodhpur fort strengthened and also invited the *sardars* and asked them to make preparations by assembling their army. He also told them that the Jodhpur State had to pay the *khandani* of the last seven years. The State had been suffering from a famine for the past three years, he asked the *sardars* to deposit the *rekh-bab* (tax on income) in the treasury. The *sardars* agreed to do so. They started depositing rupees fifty per thousand rupees. From the ordinary people, ten rupees per plough were collected. In this way, the *vakil* reported that about 12-14 lakh rupees were expected to be deposited in the treasury.[43] Due to Sindhia's threat, Bijay Singh sent his *chaubdar*

41 G.S. Sardesai ed., *Historical Papers*, No. 415.
42 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 21.
43 Ibid., pp. 21, 22.

(sceptreholder) to Nana Fadnavis's *vakil*, Krishnaji Jagannath and asked him to attend the court as per the protocol.[44] In a letter written on 30th August 1787, by the Maratha *vakil* at Jodhpur, Nana Fadnavis was informed that all the Raja-Maharajas of Northern India had united internally.[45]

The services of the Kachhwahas were held in high esteem even by the Mughal Emperor. When Mahadaji at the instigation of Rao Raja Pratap Singh, the challenger of Jaipur marched to conquer the Jaipur kingdom, despite the prohibition of the Emperor, the latter wrote to him :

> "The house of Jaipur is an old servant and strong pillar of this empire. It is not proper to destroy it. Don't mind the abatement of a few lakhs, but accept what tribute is paid by compromise."

But Sindhia would not listen. He camped at Balabas, ten *kos* from Jaipur and demanded rupees twenty five lakhs as the arrears and current tribute, and the fort of Ranthambhor. The Jaipur Raja offered 2 or 4 lakhs. The Rao Raja secretely assured Sindhia that he himself undertook the conquest of Jaipur for the Marathas.Thus, Mahadaji spent two months in these negotiations. We get this information from a Delhi letter addressed to Hari Pant Tatya, dated 29th-3rd August 1787.[46]

When Mahadaji Sindhia made preparations for an attack on Jaipur, the Jaipur Raja Sawai Pratap Singh wrote to the Jodhpur Maharaja Bijay Singh that the *Dakhanis* had become so strong by now that Jaipur alone could not resist them. If they destroy the Kachhwahas then next it would be the turn of the Rathors. Therefore, he requested him to send his forces and then together the Rathors and the Kachhwahas could repulse the *Dakhanis*.[47]He further said that then the *Dakhanis* would not venture to come back soon. A letter from Delhi to the Peshwa, dated 5th February 1787 provided the information that the Jaipur Raja had confined (Sindhia's ally) Khushhali Ram Bohra in the house of the Rajawats and summoned Daulat Ram Haldia to come and

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44 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 26.
45 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 153.
46 Ibid., p. 155.
47 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 604, *"Maansu ekla su ruke jisa een bakhat ra Dikhni hai nahi. Ne Maharaj mane Dikhniyan vigad diyo to maa vigadio pachhe aapne hee vari uuri aavsi. So maari madad kar aap fauj melavo to Rathor ne Kachhwavan bhela hui ne Dikhniyan ne pag pachha dirai deva.*"

accept the premiership. Daulat Ram in fear of Khushhali Ram had fled to Jawan Bakht and the *firingis*, and after a few months to Maharaja Bijay Singh; confirming his arrangements there (i.e. Jodhpur) by inducing him to assist Jaipur and that he was coming with a Marwari army to Jodhpur.[48] The Jodhpur Raja wrote to Sawai Pratap Singh to distribute among his troops the 4 or 5 lakhs of rupees that he had set aside for paying tribute to Sindhia.[49]

Bijay Singh then sent Singhvi Bhivraj with an army. When Mahadaji heard about this collaboration, he spoke to the Jodhpur *vakil*, *Purohit* Jeevraj, who was posted there. He said that a Jodhpur force was on its way to help Jaipur, but by helping Jaipur, why Bijay Singh was inviting animosity with Mahadaji:

> *"Jaipar ri madad saru Jodhpur su foj vida hui chhe so Jaipuriyan re vaaste Maharaj mansu kyu dusmani khadi karai hai."*[50]

The *vakil* then tried to reason with Mahadaji that the force had not been sent to help Jaipur, but in self defence.Mahadaji then told him not to worry and asked the *vakil* to write to the Kachhwahas. Bhivraj then encamped at Sambhar with an army of 20,000 men. Mahadaji once again called the Jodhpur *vakil* and said that the Rathor army had reached Sambhar which indicated that they were going towards Jaipur. The *vakil* then replied that the Jodhpur State was not on good terms with Kishangarh and the Maratha forces were also quite nearby and what if they damage the bordering villages. Keeping all this in mind approximately 3,000 men have reached Sambhar. Meanwhile, the Rajput Rajas had persuaded Muhammad Beg Hamdani to join them. Everyday he was to be given rupees 3,000 and if he was successful in defeating Mahadaji, then he would be rewarded with Agra and Deeg. Having secured these promises, Hamdani came to Jaipur and the Rathors also started from Sambhar and reached Jobner. Mahadaji realized the gravity of the situation and decided not to fight at that time. He then left for Mathura.[51]

The Rathors decided not to follow Mahadaji. However, Hamdani felt that if they pursued Mahadaji, they could compel the Marathas to go beyond the Narmada. Then

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48 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, pp. 153, 155.
49 Ibid., p. 155.
50 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, pp. 604, 605.
51 Ibid., pp. 605, 606.

they could get Agra evacuated from their control. Hence, all the three forces pursued Mahadaji. Though Rao Pratap Singh of Machheri asked Mahadaji Sindhia to fight back but Sindhia chose to mark his own time and come back after two months. The Rao Raja told Mahadaji that if he turned his back towards the Rajputs now, then his control over the other areas would also get affected: *"eeno aage pooth dikhavo chho su mulka maey su amal uth jasi*."[52] He further instigated Mahadaji saying that who would then allow you to retain your hold over Agra and Delhi. Rao Raja advised Sindhia to attack Jaipur immediately, whereas Rana Khan, who had from the first advised Sindhia to make peace with Jaipur and not to despise the Rajput power, now reminded Sindhia of this and added: "Do what you consider best."[53] A similar sentiment was expressed in a letter written by the British Resident with Mahadaji Sindhia, William Kirkpatrick to the Governor General, the former informs that Mahadaji did not yield to the pacific measures suggested warmly by Rana Khan and Rayaji Patel. He writes that: "the Rao Raja and two or three disaffected Rajput fugitives are the only persons whose councils are violent."[54] Mahadaji then marched to Lalsot, although Rayaji, Patel, Ambaji and Bhauji tried their best to dissuade him from taking such a decision. The messengers immediately informed the Rajputs. Sawai Pratap Singh and the Rathors then marched to Bhinai and encamped there. From there they marched to Madhogarh and finally reached at Tunga.

The Lalsot Campaign

The Rajputs were itching for a battle with Sindhia.The Lalsot campaign of 1787 exhibited the accumulated hatred of the Rajputs against the Marathas. It also proved that Sindhia made the blunder of underestimating Rajput power. Somehow Mahadaji saved his army from a complete disaster in the Lalsot campaign.[55] The invasion of Jaipur was undoubtedly a great error of diplomacy and strategy on the part of Sindhia. For this he had to pay a heavy price as he lost his patiently built power for full one year. The rebuff at Lalsot made Sindhia more revengeful towards the Kachhwahas and the Rathors.[56]

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52 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 606.
53 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 155.
54 Jadunath Sarkar ed., *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 167.
55 Jadunath Sarkar, *Sindhia as Regent*, p. 17.
56 Ibid., p. vii.

Towards the end of August, 1787, there was battle between Jaipur and Patil Bawa[57] : "*san 1787 che Aagastant Jaipurvale va Patilbuwanche yudh jhale.*"[58] The Lalsot campaign continued for a period of five months. Interestingly, a volume of Persian news-letters covering the events, rumours in Mahadaji's camp and also in the Jaipur court, give lot of details accurately.[59] We can also get a British perspective of the crucial years from 1785 to 1794 from the *English Records of Maratha History*[60]. Sarkar is of the opinion that the value of these letters get enhanced as their intelligence is far more accurate. The dispatches of the English Residents give a broader survey of Indian politics as compared to the terse matter-of-fact Marathi letters. The Resident's despatches give us the official or front window view of North Indian politics.[61] Among the Residents who were deputed at Sindhia's camp include the Anderson brothers, William Kirkpatrick and William Palmer, to name a few. They give minute information about Mahadaji's strategies in dealing with the Rajputs. William Francklin, a captain in the service of the East India Company, wrote a history of the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam few years later. Although Franklin did not witness the battle, he gathered from Mughal sources that the defections were crucial and were motivated by envy towards Sindhia on the part of his Mughal colleagues. Franklin's account suggests that Sindhia was set up to fail.[62]

Mahadaji advanced to Lalsot on 15th June, 1787, lackadaisically. In view of the famine he decided to wait for his trusted detachments to join him. On 23rd June Sindhia assumed the offensive. He was quite precautious and a well planned strategy was followed. Mahadaji himself with 7,000 and ten large guns proceeded with four or five miles ahead followed by Rana Khan Bhai. On 8th July, Rana Khan reported to Sindhia that "Through starvation every day 150 men are leaving me, and you are not attending to it!"[63] Mahadaji's army faced a severe crisis regarding the provisions: "*Lashkarant mahagai far. Rasad yet nahi. Sarwasi badmali keli*."[64] The result was

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57 Mahadaji Sindhia was addressed as '*Patilbawa*' by the Marathas.
58 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 326
59 Jadunath Sarkar, *Sindhia as Regent.*
60 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. i.
61 Ibid., pp. iv,v.
62 Giles Tillotson, *Jaipur Nama : Tales from the Pink City*, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2006, P. 51.
63 Ibid., p. 2.
64 Ibid.

that the cost of the consumer goods became very high. The *Rathora ri Khyat* informs us that the cost of food and fodder had risen very high.[65] The Rathors and the Kachhwahas were closely watching the situation and tried to add to Sindhia's problems. Besides these, Muhammad Beg Hamdani deserted Sindhia and joined the Jaipur Raja[66].

This fact can be corroborated by a Delhi letter dated 29th-3rd August, 1787 that informs about how Daulat Ram Haldia set about alluring Muhammad Beg Hamdani and the Hindustani troops with Sindhia, who were bitter as their salary remained unpaid. It further said that some Mughalia *sardars* – Mansur Khan etc. – went off to the side of Jaipur. Muhammad Beg Khan also defected.[67] He received a royal welcome, rupees 3,ooo a day and leadership of the Rajputs. The British Resident reported that the defection of Muhammad Beg Hamdani dispirited Sindhia, who now became suspicious of his Mughal and Hindustani troops.[68] In another letter he reported that the Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Muhammad Beg Hamdani had entered into a treaty to share land and resources in the event of Sindhia's expulsion from Hindustan. They agreed on the following points:

1. The Jaipur Raja would get the possession of all the territories that belonged to his family during the time of Sawai Madho Singh.
2. He is to divide equally with Bijay Singh, the Jodhpur Raja, the dominions of the Rao Raja.
3. Muhammad Beg was to enjoy whatever may remain of the country possessed by the late Najaf Khan, after restoring to the Raja of Jaipur such parts of it as originally appertained to his family.
4. Of whatever other districts they may subdue the Hamdani was to keep one moiety (half), and the Rajas were to divide equally the remaining one[69].

Tukoji Holkar's jealous attitude further aggravated the situation for Sindhia. Holkar instigated more defections from Sindhia's army. Dharam Rao, a Maratha commander

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65 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 607.
66 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 189.
67 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 155.
68 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 196.
69 Ibid., p. 202.

of a thousand horse, defected to the Jaipur ruler along with two battalions of sepoys and about 3,ooo horse.[70]As pressure mounted for a decisive trial of strength in both the camps a battle was fought on 28th July, in the plains between Tunga and Bidakha. Lalsot, after which this battle is named, stands fourteen miles away from the actual field of encounter.[71] Hamdani took charge of the cannons[72]. The *Dakhanis* also advanced in large numbers. There was a long and bloody struggle leading to large scale casualities on both sides.

But the greatest loss of the Rajputs was the death of Muhammmad Beg Hamdani**.** When the Jaipur Raja was informed about this calamity, he ordered Daulat Ram to call Hamdani's son to occupy the vacant seat of his father on the elephant.[73] Later Hamdani's coffin was sent to Jaipur where it was cremated at Ramjaani's *bagichi* and a *chabutara* was erected in his honour[74]. From a Delhi letter dated 29th-3rd August, 1787, we get to know that after the battle, the Raja of Jaipur paid a visit to the tents of Agha Najaf Ali, the son of the deceased Hamdani and Mirza Ismail Beg, his brother's son, and condoled with them.[75] In the same letter it is mentioned that when the Jaipur Raja visited the Rathor camp; they complained that while fighting desperately they had not been supported by the Kachhwaha Rajputs. The Raja of Jodhpur on hearing of this news, sent another contingent of 10,000 Rathors to aid Jaipur, also 20 pairs of gold bracelets, 20 pearl necklaces and 20 swords for his *sardars*. Nearly 1,000 Sindhi mercenaries of Multan and a corps from the Raja of Bikaner and the Daudputra (Bahawalpur) came to the assistance of the Raja of Jaipur.[76]

On being summoned by Mahadaji, the *daroga* replied that if Mahadaji could pay their arrears, they were ready to fight: *"Mari chadhi-chadhi kharchi chukai do to mein rad karaan."*[77]As per a letter addressed to Hari Pant Tatya, Mahadaji Sindhia offered them one month's pay then and the rest afterwards. But they demanded five month's pay later.

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70 S.C. Misra, *Sindhia-Holkar Rivalry in Rajasthan*, Sundeep Prakashan, Delhi, 1981, pp. 93, 94.
71 Ibid., p.ix; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 367.
72 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 211.
73 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, p. 679.
74 Ibid.
75 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 157.
76 Ibid., pp. 157, 158.
77 Ibid.

Sindhia then offered to pay three months arrears but the commandants did not relent. They returned the jewels sent by Sindhia, saying "Of what use would this be? Give us cash. The Jaipur Raja has sent rupees 50,000 to us". In anger, Sindhia ordered his Deccani *fauj* to plunder the commandants of the *paltan*. On hearing of it the latter scampered to the Jaipur camp and turning the muzzlels of their 100 guns began to fire on Sindhia's army.[78] The battalions who moved off to the Rajput camp carried with them a great park of artillery, about 80 pieces of cannon. They were chiefly led by their chiefs and *subedars*.[79] The battle ended in the evening without any decisive result. However, the support for Sindhia was depleting day by day. In panic the Marathas decided to retreat. Circumstances compelled Sindhia to beat a retreat on 31st July, 1787. The battle resulted in a resounding victory for the Rajputs. The newsreporter informed that the Patel had fled: *"Halkara aaye khabar divi ke Patel naas gayo*."[80]Bijay Singh was informed about their victory and the flight of Mahadaji Sindhia.[81]

Hearing this there was a lot of rejoicing, cannons were fired, trumpets were blown. Rathor Badar Singh Champawat, along with 500 horses, had followed the Marathas and after covering about ten *kos* recovered and brought back two carts loaded with cannons. However, *dastur komwar* informs that on hearing about Sindhia's flight, the Jaipur Raja ordered that the Patel should be looted. Accordingly, along with Hamdani's son and nephew, Raja Amar Singh and the others pursued Sindhia with an army of 20,000. Shriji, i.e., the Jaipur Raja on the other hand stayed at the Sonad village and later went to Bidakha, where a battle had been fought with Mahadaji Sindhia.[82] Thus, the battle of Tunga – miscalled that of Lalsot, "though sanguinary, had no decisive result."[83]But one can safely conclude that a united show of strength by the Rajputs compelled the Marathas to ponder that they had underestimated them.But the Lalsot campaign did not reduce the troubles of the Rajputs. They cound not deliver themselves from the Marathas. While retreating from Lalsot, Mahadaji had

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78 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 158.
79 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indain Affairs*, pp. 216,217.
80 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, P. 615, Mahadaji Sindhia was addressed as 'Sindhia Patel,' by the Rajputs.
81 Ibid., '*Bando naas gayo*.'
82 *Datur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, p. 681.
83 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 380.

resolved to make the Rajputs pay for their audacity. He had turned his face back to the country and sworn,"If I live, I shall reduce Jaipur and Jodhpur to dust."[84]

Bijay Singh asked the nobles to make arrangements to send funds for the army. For this purpose, Bijay Singh gave the *pattas* of rupees 10,000 each, of the two villages, Panchlo and Kakdai to Maheshdas. Rupees 20,000 from both the villages were collected. Similarly *baab* was collected from some other areas also.[85] This indicates the financial strain the State treasury had to bear on account of the war. The British Resident was of the opinion that the Jaipur Raja had great difficulty in keeping together the army. However Bijay Singh's support was encouraging to oppose Sindhia.[86] In a letter dated, 14th September, 1787,Kirkpatrick informed the Governor General, Cornwallis that Ajmer was seriously threatened by Bijay Singh. Kirkpatrick considered him to be, "the prime mover of the Rajput combination, and indeed as the author of it."[87] The *Rathora ri Khyat* corroborates it. Singhvi Dhanraj marched from Merta and came to Ajmer. The city was taken by him. The siege lasted for two months The Marathas conveyed to Mahadaji that either he should make an attack on the Rajputs or the fort would get out of their control.[88]The Marathas attacked Marwar in order to ease pressure from Ajmer. Rana Khan and Bapuji Vithal suggested that Sindhia should abandon Hindustan for the time being and that he should save Ajmer and all the old possessions which were slipping out of hands.[89] Accordingly, Ambaji was sent with 7,000 men. Dhanraj sent messengers to Jodhpur that the State of Kishangarh had brought the Marathas on them: *"Dikhniyan ri fauj mare upar Kisangarh vaala laaya hai*."[90] One day Ambaji and the Kishangarh army entered Ajmer city. Thrice the city was attacked and each time it was repulsed. The Maharaja then asked his *sardars* and other supports to march to Ajmer and fight the Marathas.

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84 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p.288.

85 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 616.

86 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 260.

87 Ibid., p. 255.

88 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 617,*"Tare Patel kanai kasid meliya ne likhiyo saamaan neeth gayo hai. Su ke to upar keejo nahi to garh chhoot jasi*."

89 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, letter dated 14th December, 1787.

90 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 617.

Ambaji and Kishangarh

Ambaji left Ajmer and camped at Kawad where a severe exchange of artillery took place between Ambaji and the Chandawats. The next day, Ambaji went to Kishangarh. The Kishangarh Raja told Ambaji that all the great warriors of Marwar were in Dhundhar, and the Rathors had just somehow assembled those men to fight the Marathas. He further suggested that if his own army joined Ambaji, together they could easily defeat and loot the Jodhpur force:

> *"Kisangarh Rajaji Ambaji ne kaho ke Marwar ro kaju lok to Dhundhar mein chhe ne athe bhagat bheli karne laya chhe su moro hi lok saath husi so chalo foj lutsa*."[91]

Bhadar Singh was declared as the Raja of Kishangarh by Maharaja Bakht Singh and they had affable relations. Maharaja Bijay Singh also gave his son, Pratap Singh due recognition. But Bhadar Singh's successor, Pratap Singh severed his relations with Jodhpur. The Jodhpur forces joined the Jalore forces and waited for the Marathas to arrive. The Marathas formed themselves into three units. Moreover, the Marathas tried to create disturbance in the Rajput camp. But the Rathors put up a stiff fight. Soon Ambaji and the Kishangarh force had to flee.[92] The Marathas lost 150 men and 120 were wounded. Ambaji accused Pratap Singh of misleading the Marathas.[93]Bijay Singh sent instructions to the *musayabs/musahabs* (the wealthy men) to get Roopnagar and Kishangarh free from Maratha control. The Rathor force soon established its control over Rupnagar. Kishangarh resolved the issue by offering a *peshkash* of rupees three lakhs. Out of this amount, two lakhs were paid in cash, 50,000 were given as *bharna* and two *khandi* worth one lakh rupees.[94]As the Jodhpur army was fighting on three fronts, it was facing fiscal strain. Therefore, the Jodhpur Raja asked Surat Singh, the ruler of Bikaner to send some money. The Jodhpur Raja applied *tika* to Surat Singh, who sent rupees three lakhs in return.

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91 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 617.
92 Ibid., p. 619.
93 Ibid., p. 620.
94 Ibid., p. 626.

Mahadaji Sindhia was camping at Alwar wherefrom he decided to sneak out of Alwar and go to Ujjain via Ajmer, Kota and Bundi. When Mahadaji was at Manoharpur, he found the Rathors confronting him. He then went towards Mewat and while passing through Deeg he went to Agra, where a battle was fought with Ismail Beg. In this battle, the Rajputs did not help Ismail Beg. Even then Mahadaji was defeated and Ismail Beg triumphed. Mahadaji went towards Gwalior while Ismail Beg occupied Dhaulpur.[95]

Abortive Rajput-Mughal Alliance

Nandram Haldia and Lalji were sent to Delhi to meet the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II. The Rajputs desired to present a *nazrana* to the Emperor. The Emperor agreed and came to Rewari with 7,000 force. Sawai Pratap Singh also reached Rewari along with 40,000 force and other Kachhwahas. The Rathor force numbering 15,000 also assembled. Najaf Quli's force of 10,000 also came. The Jaipur Raja presented 100 *mohars* (gold coins) to the Emperor. A total of 235 *mohars* were presented to the Mughal Emperor. The Emperor presented as *inam* a *siropav*, a sword and an elephant to Pratap Singh and gifts to all those who accompanied the Raja as per their status.[96]The Rajputs requested the Emperor to co-operate with them to send the Marathas beyond the Narmada."[97] The Emperor then replied that Mahadaji used to give rupees 5,000 as daily expenses that were used to take care of the day to day expenses of the Emperor. If Jaipur and Jodhpur would give rupees 5,000 as daily expenses then the Emperor would be ready to march on anyone. All conquered *parganas* would belong to them. Sawai Pratap Singh assembled all the *sardars* and asked their opinion. The *sardars* said that they could not afford to pay such a huge amount. After much deliberation, Daulatram Haldia requested the Emperor to go back to Delhi saying that both the Rajas would fight the Marathas. Daulatram gave two fake *hundis* to assuage the feelings of the Emperor. The Rathor *sardars* went to their respective places after fighting at Kishangarh. In order to celebrate the occasion of defeating Mahadaji, all the *mutasaddis* were given refreshment. Meanwhile

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95 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, pp. 621,622.
96 Ibid., p.623.
97 Ibid.,"*Paatsaji su araj kivi ke Hajrat kooch kije su Dikhniyan ne Narbada paar lopaey desaan*."

factionalism within the Rathor *sardars* resurfaced on the issue whether the Patel (Mahadaji Sindhia) should have been fought or not. Thus, the Maratha problem remained as it was. Khushaliram Bohra was with Mahadaji Sindhia at Gwalior. Chaudhary Bhera was sent to him for settlement. Mahadaji asked for the amount of *peshkash* that had accumulated for so many years. He assured not to insist on more *khirni*. He further demanded the surrender of Ajmer and the separation from Jaipur. Thus, *chaudhary* Bhera came back without accomplishing much. Clearly, the Maharaja as well as Mahadaji were adamant on their respective stand.

Despite the prevailing hostility, Bapuji Vithal wrote secretly to the Jaipur Raja to make peace with Sindhia, or else his realm would be devastated. This fact has been acknowledged even by a letter from Delhi dated 20th-27th September, 1787. The Jaipur Raja offered to make peace if Sindhia would surrender the Rao Raja Pratap Singh and remain within his own frontiers, he would only pay the tribute which was settled in the time of Mirza Najaf Khan. But Sindhia set aside their urge to make peace and said, "the Raja of Jaipur will know my capacity. When I have gained such a victory over him, I shall make peace."[98]

Ismail Beg Versus the Marathas

Mahadaji Sindhia soon started making preparations to avenge his defeat. He paid the arrears of his soldiers. He handed over the command of 12,000 men to De Boigne. All came to Dholpur with De Boigne. Hearing these developments, Ismail Beg wrote to the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas for funds and forces left with him, so he asked the Rajas to send a force of 10,000 each. The Jaipur Raja prevaricated and did nothing. Bijay Singh sent a *hundi* worth rupees 30,000 to Delhi to the Jodhpur *vakil*, Pancholi Rohila Ghulam Qadir came to Deeg with a 16,000 force. Mahadaji Sindhia marched from Dholpur and after reaching Agra, fought with Ismail Beg. The next day a severe fight took place. Having been repulsed, Ghulam Qadir went to Delhi and Ismail Beg fought for a while then ran for his life. But the Marathas pursued him. Many of the followers of Ismail Beg were killed.Mahadaji Sindhia emerged victorious.[99]

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98 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 163.
99 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, pp. 629, 630.

Both Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg came to Delhi. Ghulam Qadir inflicted unthinkable atrocities on the royal household and mercilessly blinded the Emperor Shah Alam II. These events forced Ismail Beg and Mahadaji to join. Accordingly, Rayaji Patel met Ismail Beg and gave him rupees 30,000. Ismail Beg stayed at Delhi only while Ghulam Qadir left Delhi and camped only after crossing the Yamuna. He had already sent the carts loaded with the wealth collected from the Red Fort. The Marathas pursued him. Later he was caught. His eyes were gauged out and his limbs were cut off.[100]

These happenings struck terror in the hearts of the Rajput Rajas. Bijay Singh immediately sent his *vakil*, Lalji Mehta to Jaipur and conveyed the news of Mahadaji's victory.Bijay Singh thought to invite Taimur Shah who was an enemy of the Marathas. Bakht Singh sent Miyan Shah Nawaz Khan's *vakil* and Lala Izzatram to the Shah of Persia. They were both given 1500 rupees as expenses along with *saranjam*. He also sent a letter to the Shah stating that the Marathas were the enemies not only of the Muslims but of the Rajas also. Bijay Singh assured the co-operation of Jaipur and Jodhpur against the Marathas. All this information was sent to Nana Fadnavis by the Peshwa's *vakil* at the Jodhpur court. He also mentioned that Bijay Singh was determined to destroy the Marathas, hence he invited the Shah.[101]Sawai Pratap Singh also tried to secure the armed services of Mirza Ismail Beg, the nephew and successor of the dead Muhammad Beg Hamdani who immediately joined hands with the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The envoys of the two Rajas reached the camp of the Mirza near Narnaul with one and a half lakhs in cash and promises of more money. The following terms were settled:

1. The Jodhpur and Jaipur governments would pay the Mirza seven and five lakhs respectively, namely two lakhs down and ten lakhs on the eve of the actual fighting;
2. The Mirza should leave his family in Jaipur as hostages for his good faith and

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[100] *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 630, *"Tare Dikhni pakad Patel kane le gaya. Pachhe Patel Ghulam Qadar ri aankhya kadhai, chorango karai ne marai nakhiyo*."

[101] *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, pp. 42, 43.

3. The Mirza should send away the *vakil* of Sindhia who had upto now been in attendance at his camp.[102]

In this fluid political situation and shifting loyalties, noboby was sure of anyone. For example, Ismail Beg was with the Marathas but secretely plotting to cross over to the Rajput Rajas. Jaipur nobles wanted their Raja to ditch the Jodhpur Raja. After much deliberations with their *sardars*, both the Rajas decided to join Ismail Beg but did not send sufficient forces as desired by the Nawab. All these developments were known to Mahadaji Sindhia: "*Patel nu khabar hui ke Nawab Ismal Beg Jepar Jodhpur ek hua*."[103] He immediately sent De Boigne to attack them. Lakhwa Dada was sent with 50,000 men. Mahadaji was also joined by Tukoji. Tukoji's son, Kashiram also joined them with 10,000 men.

They all marched from Mathura and reached Patan. From Jodhpur *bhandari* Gangaram, the Jodhas of Khari Dhava, the *sardars* of Chaurasi, Meratia Raghunath Singhot, Surtanot, the *asamies* (contingents) of Udawats, Bhawan Singh Lambia and the *Thakur* of Khejadala, Bhati Uranjot marched. But Jaipur did not show any enthusiasm in joining them.

Battle of Patan (1790)

Between 1787 to 1790, Rajasthan was free from Maratha ravages. This was the time utilized by Mahadaji to revive his lost power and prestige in North India. After having secured his position as the Regent of the Mughal Empire, he directed his attention towards Rajasthan to deal with the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur. To meet Mahadaji, both the Rajas had also made preparations and even secured the services of Mirza Ismail Beg.However, this time Sindhia appears to have made better preparations as reported in a letter dated 21st June, 1790, by W. Palmer to Cornwallis.[104]In another letter dated 26th June, 1790, W. Palmer informed Cornwallis that Sindhia was determined to crush the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur.[105]

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102 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, pp. 288, 289.
103 *Rathora ri Khyat,*Vol. III, p. 632.
104 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 367.
105 Ibid., p. 368.

A battle was fought at Patan which is situated between Ajmer and Gwalior. De Boigne played a decisive role in this battle. The Rajput Rajas were completely routed. Patan was taken by storm after three days and it was under Maratha control : "*Ya ladainantar teen divasani Patan shahar Marathyani kabij karun jamindost kele*."[106] During this campaign, the Patel himself was not present. He was at Mathura when he received the news of the success at Patan.[107]After the defeat of Patan, Ismail Beg marched towards Jodhpur along with a Jaipur force of 4,000 horse under the command of Daulatram Haldia. Interestingly, in this battle Holkar stood aloof which further strained the relations between Sindhia and Holkar. The Rajput Rajas tried to benefit from the rivalry between Mahadaji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar. This is evident from British sources.[108]

In 1788, Tukoji Holkar appointed Sardar Singh Mehta as his *vakil* to the Jodhpur court and conveyed to the Maharaja about brotherly relations between Maharaja Abhay Singh and Malhar Rao Holkar. Later Bijay Singh sent three *vakils*, Shrichand Shivchand Singhvi, Bishan Singh Purohit and Shivdas Chauhan to meet Holkar. Attempts began to be made to establish cordial relations between Bijay Singh, Holkar and Ali Bahadur (the grandson of Baji Rao and Mastani).[109]As there were dissensions between Sindhia, Holkar and Ali Bahadur, Holkar and Ali Bahadur withdrew from the campaign.[110]

Jodhpur's Resistance to the Marathas

Having settled his score with the Jaipur Raja, Sindhia directed his attention towards Jodhpur The Marathas tried to create dissensions within their opponents by bringing the *paltaniyas* (battalions) to their side. Accordingly, they met the *daroga* of the *paltan* and offered rupees three lakhs and promised to give more in future. As soon as Ismail Beg received this information, he became alert. But Ismail Beg was advised not to suspect

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106 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 342.
107 Henry George Keene, *Fall of the Mughal Empire ; An Historical Essay*, Oriental Publishers, Delhi-6, Reprint 1971, p. 215.
108 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 178; W. Kirkpatrick's letter dated 26th April, 1787, p. 201.
109 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawai*, p. 34.
110 G.S. Sardesai, *Historical Papers*, Nos. 580, 581.

the *paltaniyas*. The Marwar force numbered 9,000. The *Nawab*, Shahmal, Vanechand, Gangaram along with the Jaipur force and the *paltaniyas* got ready for the fight. As the *Nawab* did not trust the *paltaniyas*, he watched them with 300 cavalrymen. Despite his watchful eye the *paltaniyas* ultimately betrayed and helped the Marathas to win. The Marathas plundered the camps of the *Nawab* and the Rajputs. The cannons were also captured by the Marathas.However, the *Nawab* and Najaf Quli escaped from the battlefield. The Jaipur force also left the field. There followed acrimonious accusations among the Rajput *sardars*.Bhivraj said that the mutual rivalry of the *mutasaddis* had proved ruinous to the state.[111]

The Marathas took advantage of this pathetic situation of the Rajputs. All the property, guns and arms of the confederates left in the field or in their camps were captured. The spoils of victory amounted to 105 pieces of artillery, 21 elephants, 8,000 flintlocks, 1300 camels, 300 horses, besides many lakhs worth of other kinds of property. The casualities on the side of the vanquished were five battalions and 3,000 Rathor horsemen. Ismail Beg's army was practically annihilated. In fact it ceased to exist as a military unit due to loss of arms, equipments, tents, and other baggage.[112] The Jaipur Raja Sawai Pratap Singh was asked by the Marathas not to join the Rathors. Meanwhile, many skirmishes took place between the Marathas and the Rajputs. The Marathas were able to establish control on many towns. After controlling Parbatsar, the Marathas marched to Ajmer. Mahadaji Sindhia spent three lakh rupees and got some *jaap* (ritual) done in the name of Hanumanji.[113] The Marathas soon conquered Ajmer also. After that the Marathas went to Pushkar where they asked the *mahajans* to pay rupees one lakh as penalty : *"Ne baab ghale su to mulak suno padiyo tare manjana upar rupiya (10,0000) ek lak dand ra ghaliya*."[114]

Battle of Merta

Meanwhile, Raja Bijay Singh tried to win over De Boigne by bribing him. Anyhow he failed in his plan. The town of Ajay Meru, meaning invincible hill, also came to be

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111 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 635, *"So eena musdiyan re mavo-maav mei aapas ro dokh jin su raj re kaam ro kharabo huve*."

112 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p. 295.

113 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 636.

114 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 636.

known as Ajmer.[115]It was coveted by the Mughals, the Jodhpur Rajas and the Marathas as well. Keeping in mind its geographical location, let us understand the importance of the fort of this city. In order to secure the safety and security of the travellers and also for protecting his domains, Ajay Pal Singh, the Chauhan ruler of Sambhar, built a fort and a town in the early seventh century on a lofty hill named Bitlhi. In due course of time, the fort of Bithli came to be known as Ajaygarh or Taragarh also.[116]*Garh* Bithli is said to have been so called from the fact that the *garh* (fortress) was built on the Bithli hill.[117]

The fortress of Taragarh at Ajmer was considered as "the key to Rajasthan."The Rathors were encamped at Merta, seventy six miles north-east of Ajmer. Merta is called the "Gateway of Marwar." A decisive battle was fought here between the Marathas and the Rajputs. On 21st August, 1790, De Boigne entered the town of Ajmer.[118] When Taragarh capitulated, Mahadaji reported this achievement to Nana Saheb.[119] The successes of Mahadaji's arms over the Rajputs at Ajmer, Sambhar and Merta was reported by Appaji Ram to the Maratha authorities.[120] To avoid further conflict, Bijay Singh sent peace proposals with Vyas Nawal Rai to Mahadaji on 14th September, 1790. But Sindhia did not entertain him.

Treaty of Sambhar

After several efforts the treaty of Sambhar was concluded through the services of Aba Chitnis on 5th January, 1791. The treaty was a great humiliation for Bijay Singh. He lost his prestige and standing among the rulers of Rajasthan. He had to part with a portion of the fertile land of Marwar.[121] Bijay Singh had to pay a huge war indemnity, *nazrana*, court expenses, *khasa-sawari* (reserved conveyance), *bharna* (miscellaneous-cattle and jewels). As per the agreement, a *mamlat* of 60 lakhs was settled on Jodhpur. Out of this 20 lakhs were to be paid in cash, 20 lakhs worth elephants, horses, jewels etc. The

115 L.P. Mathur, *Forts and Strongholds*, p. 29.
116 Ibid., p. 29.
117 Har Bilas Sarda, *Ajmer : Historical and Descriptive*, (hereafter *Ajmer*), Fine Art Printing Press, Ajmer, 1941, p. 49.
118 H.G. Keene, *Rulers of India : Madhav Rao Sindhia and the Hindu Reconquest of India*, S. Chand & Company, New Delhi, 1968, p. 155.
119 G.S. Sardesai, *Historical Papers*, No. 582.
120 G.S. Sardesai, *Historical Papers*, No. 579.
121 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p.133.

remaining 20 lakhs were adjusted by transferring three and a half *mahals.*[122] Ajmer was to be restored to Sindhia along with Sambhar including its lake, Khairwa, Masuda and 29 villages of Bhinai. As if this was not enough, Bijay Singh was asked to send prominent officials of Jodhpur as hostages.[123]

After settling the affairs of Jodhpur, Mahadaji directed his attention towards Jaipur. Jaipur was directed to free Rampura from its hold.[124]From Jaipur Sawai Pratap Singh sent *Thakur* Pahar Singh and *Khawas* Roda Ram to negotiate the terms. They met Mahadaji at Phulia in pargana Shahpura. The arrears of the past tribute came upto rupees 63,00,001. This sum was to be paid in cash by Jaipur after deducting the amount already given to Sindhia. Besides this, an amount of 15 lakhs was to be paid as war indemnity. Out of this, 3 lakhs in cash and one lakh in kind were to be paid immediately. The remaining eleven lakhs were to be made good by assignments. A supplementary treaty was also signed according to which the Marathas agreed not to interfere in the administration of the Jaipur State. The Maratha officials were to assist in the work of collection from Shekhawati out of which 1/3rd was to be paid as *fauj-kharch*.[125]Sindhia spared the life of Daulat Ram Haldia.[126]The Jaipur Raja's worst enemies were his mutually jealous ministers and his disloyal chiefs even when they belonged to the Kachhawaha clan. The most horrible of the last group were Rao Raja Pratap Singh Naruka of Alwar, Bahadur Singh Rajawat of Jhilai and Pahar Singh Khangarot.[127]Thus, the battles of Patan and Merta, fought within a span of two-three months crushed the might of the Rajputs completely.[128]

Having humbled the pride of the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas, Sindhia turned his attention to the calls of the Maharana of Udaipur. Mahadaji asked the disaffected nobles to render obedience to the Maharana. A war indemnity of 12 lakhs was imposed on the Chundawats, half of which was to be paid by the Salumbar Chief in

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122 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 344.
123 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 130-132.
124 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 345.
125 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 128.
126 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 345.
127 Gupta & Bakshi, ed., *Studies in Indian History Rajasthan Through the Ages : Jaipur Rulers and Administration*, Vol. 4, p. 238.
128 *Holkarshahicha Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 345.

two installments. The other half of the due was to be paid by the rest of Chundawats. The Maratha dues from the State of Mewar were also settled. Mewar was to pay rupees 20 lakhs, in two equal installments, in the years 1791-92 and 1792-93 respectively. But reconciling the Chundawats to the Maharana was not an easy task. Therefore, Mahadaji appointed Ambaji Ingle as his representative to administer the country in the name of the Maharana and realize the Maratha dues as agreed upon. After deputing 10,000 Maratha soldiers under the command of Ambaji, Mahadaji left for Poona on 5th January, 1792.[129]

The Maratha presence in Rajasthan coincided with the expansion of the Maratha power in Malwa. Once the Marathas established their control over Malwa, they found themselves on the border of Rajasthan as Kota, Bundi and Udaipur were adjacent to Malwa. The gradual advancement of the Marathas into Rajasthan reached its climax in 1790-91, when Mahadaji Shinde decisively crushed the combined forces of Jaipur and Jodhpur at Patan and Merta. It also marked the end of Rajput resistance to the Marathas that had started from 1750 onwards and had found manifestation in the refusal to pay tribute and consistent opposition to the Maratha presence in the territories of Rajput States.

Rajput Allies of the Marathas

In Rajasthan, the Marathas emerged as a supreme power. The success of the Marathas was partly due to their understanding of the situation in Rajasthan and partly on account of their superior military power. They became a formidable military power, after they had organized their army on European pattern. Another factor behind Maratha triumph was the unending internal disputes in the Rajput States as well as inter-state disputes over various issues. During 1780's and 1790's, the chiefs of Machheri, Kishangarh, Salumbar were having territorial disputes with bigger States. They looked upto the Marathas for supporting them against Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur. The rulers of Kota and Bundi also depended upon the Marathas to sort out their internal and external problems. These forces proved to be useful allies to the Marathas. These chiefs not only provided active military

[129] R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 96.

assistance to the Marathas but also made available valuable support in the form of military and local intelligence, supply of provision and safe base for the army.

There were different considerations that motivated local Rajput chiefs to go over to the Maratha side. Let us take into consideration some of these. The chiefs of Kishangarh and Salumbar were having territorial disputes with their powerful neighbouring rulers of Jaipur and Udaipur. Others who joined hands with the Marathas were aspiring to expand their hereditary dominions at the expence of the parent state. Since they themselves could not afford to fulfill their aspirations, they looked up to the Marathas for support. Here a brief discussion about the role of some of these ambitious and disgruntled political persons would help us to better understand the ease with which the Marathas managed to subdue the premier Rajput States.

Rao Pratap Singh Naruka of Machheri

The case of Rao Pratap Singh Naruka of Machheri, is the best example of the rise of the local elites who befriended Shinde and helped him against Jaipur and Jodhpur. The title of Rao denoted a high status within the larger Kachhwaha clan.Usually this title was given in recognition of meritorious service and unflinching loyalty to the state.[130] Initially Pratap Singh just held two and a half villages as his jagir. As long as there was a powerful head of the Jaipur State, he refrained from adopting any adventurous policy. In fact, he rendered active support to Sawai Madho Singh in his fight against Jawahar Singh Jat of Bharatpur in 1767-68. However, during the reign of Sawai Prithvi Singh (1768-1778),a phase of internal weakness set paving the way for the rise of factions within the Jaipur nobility.

The emergence of powerful *sardars* belonging to the Nathawat and Khangarot offshoots of the Kachhwaha clan led to the marginalization of the Narukas who were also Kachhwahas. In due course of time, Rao Pratap Singh Naruka went personally to present his tribute to the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam. In return, he was suitably rewarded. He was given a *sanad* to hold Machheri as a jagir from Delhi. The Mughal Emperor also gave a title of 'Rao Raja' and other insignias of honour to Pratap Singh Naruka.[131]

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[130] R.P. Rana, 'Chakar to Raja : The Emergence of Naruka State of Alwar (c. 1660-1790),' p. 72.
[131] Ibid., p. 75.

Taking advantage of the situation, Pratap Singh usurped territory belonging to Jaipur and laid the foundation of the independent Naruka State of Alwar. This act of Pratap Singh Naruka spoiled his relations with Jaipur and brought him into direct conflict with Sawai Prithvi Singh and after him Sawai Pratap Singh. This conflict with Jaipur brought Pratap Singh closer to Mahadaji Shinde. Pratap Singh accompanied Shinde throughout the Lalsot campaign and the battles with Jaipur and Jodhpur.[132]

Prior to the battle of Merta, Bijay Singh called Nana Fadnavis's *vakil* to the court and told him that the Jodhpur State had sent the remaining *mamlat* dues to the Mahadaji Sindhia. Besides this, some two to four lakh rupees more had also been given, despite all this Mahadaji had brought destruction on Gohad (25th February, 1784) Khichivada (1786).[133] Apparently, Pratap Singh Naruka and Khushaliram Bohra had decided to invade Jaipur and Jodhpur. This further strengthens the point that Mahadaji made crucial moves on the promptings of Rao Pratap Singh.

The close ties between Shinde and the Naruka chief Pratap Singh further become evident from the manner in which he was consulted by Shinde before making any move during the Lalsot campaign. Even after the debacle of Lalsot when Shinde was preparing for another attack on Jaipur and Jodhpur, the Maratha *sardar* followed the advice of Pratap Singh and retreated from Lalsot. In this battle Jaipur had got an upper hand over Shinde due to the desertation of the latter's troops. The close relations between Sindhia and the Naruka chief can be corroborated by a letter from Delhi dated 27th September, 1787, when after the battle of Tunga, during the peace negotiations, the Jaipur Raja had offered to end the hostility with the Marathas if Sindhia surrendered the 'arch-mischief-maker Rao Raja Pratap Singh'. But Sindhia refused to surrender Rao Pratap Singh who had always sided with him.[134] The Rao was given so much importance by Sindhia that at times he overruled the suggestions offered by his wise and able generals like Rana Khan and Bapuji Vithal. This would become clear from the following description. The same letter informs that the Rao Pratap Singh invited Sindhia to Alwar fort, where he would have plenty of provisions

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132 *Marwara-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, pp. 24, 25.
133 Ibid., pp. 26, 27.
134 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 163.

and fodder etc. He said that this was a fort that could not be taken by less than one or two years of fightimg. Mahadaji could stay there till the reinforcements from the Deccan arrived and in the meantime they could plunder the Jaipur territory, so as to force the Raja to make peace. Therefore, Mahadaji wanted to march to Alwar. Rana Khan, Bapuji Vithal and the others opposed this idea saying that he should reject the counsel of the Rao and stay in Deeg for sometime, or else they would not march with him to Alwar. But Sindhia replied that he would march to Alwar alone, others might do as they liked. At this they all had to accompany him.[135] Later when Sindhia asked for financial aid from Pratap Singh, the latter gave him a sealed bag of jewels, saying that he had no cash.[136]

In 1789, when Shinde contemplated a second attack on Jaipur, he invited Pratap Singh for consultation. Pratap Singh was visited by Shinde's commander, Ambaji Ingle for consultation regarding the proposed attack on Jaipur. The Peshwa's *vakil* at Jodhpur, Krishnaji Jagannath mentioned in his letter dated 17th February, 1790, that with the help of the Bundi *diwan*, Dalel Singh Hada, Bijay Singh called the Machheri chief Pratap Singh's *vakil* at Bundi. He wrote to the *vakil* that by allying with the other people, he was causing the destructin of his own caste and *gotra*. The Naruka chief was promised a jagir worth one lakh rupees and the Jaipur territory that he had already occupied. But Rao Pratap Singh Naruka demanded (a) reinstatement of Khushaliram Bohra, (b) Daulatram Haldia's removal, (c) Pratap Singh would surrender the Jaipur territory provided four nobles from Jodhpur guarantee this and (d) The Naruka chief be given assurance that any understanding with the Marathas would be made as per the wishes of the Naruka chief.

As these demands were not acceptable to the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas, the *vakil* was sent away.[137] The effort made by Bijay Singh clearly shows that Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas wanted to dissuade Pratap Singh Naruka from joining Mahadaji Sindhia. In June 1790, in the battle of Patan, Pratap Singh offered valuable services to Shinde. This is acknowledged by the British Resident, William Palmer also in a letter dated,

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135 Jadunath Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, p. 164.
136 Ibid.
137 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 48.

23rd August, 1790[138]. Pratap Singh, along with his 15,000 strong cavalry, gave a stiff resistance to Ismail Beg and his forces who had joined Jaipur and Jodhpur. In the successive battle of Merta also Pratap Singh fought from Shinde's side. Pratap Singh wanted to reap the harvest of his friendship with the Marathas. It was his ambition that with the help of his new friends, the Marathas, he would acquire more territory. But Shinde's commander, Ambaji Ingle, thwarted his plans when after the battle of Patan, he made an attempt to take possession of Patan. Though the Machheri Rao kept on trying for Patan, all his attempts were turned futile by Ambaji.[139] In a letter dated 15th August, 1787, William Kirkpatrick informed the Governor General that:

> "The truth is that most of the Maratha *sardars* are exceedingly indispod towards the Row, some of them regarding him with jealously, and others considering him as the author of all the difficulties in which their Chief is at present involved…."[140]

Pratap Singh had tried to exploit his friendship with Shinde on earlier occasions also. He had tried to meddle in the affairs of the Jaipur court. He had proposed to Shinde that the *qiledars* of Ranthambhor were under his control. If Shinde helped Sawai Prithvi Singh's son Man Singh to acquire the throne of Jaipur, then the fort could be given to him. But it was not taken seriously by Shinde. In fact, as a proof of his loyality, Shinde asked him to surrender the fort of Alwar. In another letter dated, 14th September, 1787, Kirkpatrick wrote that the:

> "Row Raja's opinions and advice… prevailed over every other consideration, and betrayed him into difficulties of which he did not become sensible till he had advanced too far to retreat without sacrificing his military reputation and consequently without hazarding his political existence in this quarter of Hindostan."[141]

Due to his allegiance with Sindhia, the Rao Raja had to bear the brunt of Rajput hostility. This is testified from the letter of William Palmer, dated 21st February, 1790,

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138 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 367.
139 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, pp. 64, 65.
140 Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 228.
141 Ibid., p. 252.

in which he informs Cornwallis that on account of the confederacy of the Rajputs and Ismail Beg, they will not wait for Sindhia's attack and:

> "Ismail Beg has already invaded the country of the Row Raja, the firmest and most useful of Sindhia's allies and whom he must unavoidably assist."[142]

The fact that Pratap Singh continued his allegiance to Shinde is evident as we find Shinde and his officials seeking his co-operation in 1791 also.

The Karauli Raja

Karauli occupied a favourable position between Jaipur and Gwalior. Karauli's geographical location gave direct access to Shinde to enter Jaipur territory from Gwalior side. This motivated the Marathas to seek the co-operation of the ruler of Karauli State. The *kharitas* exchanged between them are an invaluable source of information in this regard. The *kharitas* from the Karauli rulers to their counterparts in Jaipur reveal that both the States were maintaining harmonious relations and co-operating with each other. Minor issues cropped up in between but these were amicably resolved. The *kharitas* of the Karauli rulers express their concern about the Maratha advancement in Rajasthan, particularly in the neighbouring territories of Bharatpur and Jaipur. In 1753, Sawai Madho Singh was informed about the movement of Maratha forces from the side of Kumher and the evacuation of people all around. The next year, in 1754, Gopal Singh Jadam, the Karauli ruler requested Sawai Madho Singh to acquaint him with the affairs of Delhi, Marathas and Marwar. In 1759, Tulsipal Jadam reminded Sawai Madho Singh of the traditional ties between the two houses and expressed regret over recent disruption in relations with Jaipur and assured him that all efforts would be made to clear misunderstanding. It seems that around 1784 the ruler of Karauli was feeling the heat of Maratha presence in their neighbourhood. This becomes evident when Manikpal Jadam conveyed his concern over the departure of the Maratha forces and requested Sawai Pratap Singh to find a way out to avert their visitation as it would be detrimental to the interests of Jaipur.

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[142] Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 364.

The Karauli ruler informed Sawai Pratap Singh of Jaipur that he had been paying tribute to the Marathas as per the agreement. When Shinde's commander Ambaji Ingle plundered Jaipur villages to collect money, the Karauli chief was informed by the Jaipur State through Shah Dulichand. The ruler acknowledged the receipt of this information. He was informed by the Jaipur Raja about his intention of paying the pending dues to the Marathas at the earliest. The year 1786 witnessed several letters being written by the Karauli ruler to Sawai Pratap Singh regarding the Maratha affairs in Jaipur. He asked the Jaipur ruler to send information regarding the terms of settlement with Shinde. He also expressed joy over Shinde's departure from Jaipur.

In 1787, Amolakpal, the new Karauli ruler expressed in his letter happinesss over the victory of Ismail Beg against the forces of Shinde. When Ismail Beg moved towards Agra to gain control of it, Sindhia dispatched a detachment under the command of the son of Apa Khande Rao for the relief of Agra. The British Resident expressed his anxiety that as it advanced from the Chambal its progress was likely to be checked by the insurrection of the intervening *zamindars* and the hostile conduct of the Karauli Raja as he had taken a decisive part against Sindhia[143]. In a letter dated, 31st December, 1787, W. Palmer informed Cornwallis that:

> "Sindhia marched this morning about seven *kos* to Southward, in order to overawe the Rajas of Narwar and Karauli, who have dispossessed him of some *mahals* which he had reduced in their respective countries, and to support the detachment under Rayaji Patel which he had sent into those districts. The rapid fall of Sindhia's power has excited an almost general defection among the Rajas who have been subjected to his authority from the Jamna to the Narbada."[144]

This proves that Sindhia's reverses at Lalsot had emboldened not only the Karauli Raja but even that of Narwar. In yet another letter dated 8th January, 1788, W. Palmer informed the Governor General that Sindhia had detached the greatest and best part of his troops under his best commanders, Rana Khan and Rayaji Patel, and Ambaji to:

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143 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 258.
144 Ibdi., p. 276.

> "reduce the Rajahs of Narwar and Kerauli, who have thrown off their subjection to him and have joined their forces to oppose him. These numbered to 15,000, which exceeded the number despatched against them by Sindhia. Should he fail to reduce these Rajas his retreat to Ujjain would be very difficult, and he would in all probability be obliged to take immediate shelter in Gwalior."[145]

The gravity of the situation for Sindhia can be just imagined when he requested the British Resident, W. Palmer to join him as he declared his intention to reduce the rule of Karauli. However, the Resident felt that such an enterprize was not only beyond his strength but also hazardous. He also informed Cornwallis in his letter dated 27th February, 1788, that the Karauli Raja had collected a considerable force and was in possession of forts which might be maintained until succoured by the Jaipur Raja and Ismail Beg. Therefore, the Resident felt that :"For these reasons I do not think Sindhia seriously designs to attack Kerowly, he probably expects to intimidate the Rajah by his preparation into a compliance with his demand of money."[146]

In 1790, the Karauli Raja conveyed to Sawai Pratap Singh that he is quite relieved to know about the progress of negotiation between the Jaipur State and Shinde. Amolakpal also informed the Jaipur Raja about Shinde's apprehension regarding the stand of Karauli in his conflict with Jaipur. He again wrote to Jaipur that he has decided to comply with Shinde's instruction for dispatching an authorized representative for talks.

In a letter dated 9th March, 1790, written by Krishnaji Jagannath, we get the information that a part of Mahadaji's army had crossed the Chambal river from Dhaulpur side and had reached Karauli. They not only looted but also caused a lot of destruction. The ruler of Karauli had reached an understanding by sending 75,000 rupees with his *vakil*. Out of this 25,000 were paid in cash while two *hundis* worth rupees 50,000 were given which could be encashed after two months.[147] In 1793, when negotiations between Shinde and Jaipur representative, Daulat Ram Haldia were

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145 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadaji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs*, p. 277, 278.
146 Ibid., p. 288.
147 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 55.

being held at Bhusawad, the Karauli chief requested Sawai Pratap Singh to ensure his uninterrupted possession over Karauli territory.

Interestingly the *kharitas* of the Karauli chief stress his friedship with Jaipur and reflect his sympathetic attitude over the Maratha affairs, at the same time he was loyal to Shinde and followed his instructions. In 1787, Shinde promised to restore Bijaygarh to Karauli. At the time of the Lalsot campaign, the Karauli chief supplied provisions to the Maratha camp and the Jaipur Raja had to request him to stop the same. But the Karauli chief could not afford to annoy the powerful Marathas. It was via Karauli that the supplies from Gwalior were sent to the Maratha camp. When Sawai Pratap Singh received this information, on 11th July 1787, he ordered five to six thousand troops to cut off the grain supply to Shinde. The order was promptly executed and on 30th July 1787, the Rajputs cut off a caravan of 6,000 oxen and 700 camels loaded with grain and other provisions which were badly needed by the starving Maratha army. Thus, less willingly and more unwillingly the Karauli chief was made to subserve the Maratha interest.

The State of Kishangarh

The Marathas also received active support from the Rathore State of Kishangarh which shared its border with the powerful State of Jodhpur. Kishangarh's territorial dispute with Jodhpur paved the way for Maratha intervention. The Kishangarh ruler turned to Shinde for support and the latter was also keen to seek the former's friendship. According to Nana Fadnavis's *vakil* in Jodhpur, Krishnaji Jagannath, Virdi Singh, the ruler of Kishangarh was unhappy with Bijay Singh as he had turned down his demand for the grant of pargana Parbatsar in lieu of serving in Mewar on behalf of Jodhpur.There was also a longstanding dispute between Kishangarh and Jodhpur over the possession of some frontier villages. These villages were occupied by the *bhomias* of Kishangarh. Frequently tempers flared up on both the sides, especially when Rajputs from Jodhpur plundered and destroyed some villages belonging to

Kishangarh. The Kishangarh ruler received the news of this encroachment upon his territory. This incident forced the Kishangarh ruler to to seek Shinde's support.[148]

Following the death of Sawai Prithvi Singh, Kishangarh also involved itself in the succession dispute of Jaipur. Sawai Prithvi Singh had married the daughter of Kishangarh ruler. From this wedlock Man Singh was born. After Sawai Prithvi Singh's death, the Kishangarh ruler supported the claim of his grandson against that of Sawai Pratap Singh. He appealed to Shinde against the succession of Pratap Singh.[149]When Kishangarh was surrounded and attacked by the Jodhpur forces, the Kishangarh *diwan*, Surat Singh paid rupees five lakhs to Tukoji Holkar and invited both Holkar and Shinde to rescue Kishangarh. Jodhpur's claim over Rupnagar was also contested by Kishangarh. In the battle of Merta, when Shinde's army defeated Jodhpur, Rupnagar was restored to Kishangarh. Friendship with the Kishangarh ruler was beneficial to the Marathas as Kishangarh served as a safe base for them in their fight against Jodhpur for regaining the possession of Ajmer. No wonder that in their attack on Ajmer, the Marathas were supported by Kishangarh forces.

The Chief of Salumbar and Zalim Singh of Kota

In Mewar, the Chundawat chief of Salumbar, Rawat Bhim Singh was opposed to the Rana of Udaipur. Shinde found a willing ally in him too. He became a handy tool in the hands of Shinde and acted as per his dictates *vis-à-vis* the Maharana. The regent of Kota, Jhala Zalim Singh was also an ally of Shinde. It was through his efforts that the settlement between Shinde and the Maharana was concluded regarding Mewar's obligation to pay the tribute. Evidently, through active collaboration of local Rajput chiefs, the Marathas were able to occupy large areas of some key Rajput States.

Collaborators in the Courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur

As a shrewd Maratha leader, Mahadaji Shinde successfully created a powerful and influential group of supporters in the courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The role played by some of these important courtiers in extending help to the Marathas is briefly

148 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, pp. 23, 24.
149 Ibid., p. 24.

analyzed here. Among these officials, the Jaipur *diwan*, Khushaliram Bohra was a leading light. On account of differences between the Jaipur ruler and the *diwan*, Bohra fell from grace, Khushaliram was suspected as a pro-Maratha element. On the basis of the report of Krisnaji Jagannath, Shinde asked Khushaliram Bohra to visit Jodhpur and gather military information. Shinde also required him to meet Govardhan Khichi of Khichiwada in Malwa to collect similar information. As Govardhan Khichi was opposed to Shinde, he used to advise the Jodhpur ruler on matters concerning the Marathas. To counter Govardhan Khichi, the services of Khushaliram Bohra were availed of. He was entrusted with the task of assessing the strength of Jodhpur army, their terms for settlement with the Marathas and other relevant information.[150]

Another interesting person who emerged as an important actor in the course of Maratha-Jodhpur tension was Gulabrai. She was a student of Chaupasani's Goswamiji. She later became a singer for the Maharaja who made her the *Paswan.*[151] It was a tradition among the Jodhpur Rajas that if a woman belonging to any caste could be made to wear a gold ornament on her feet and kept behind *parda* then she was designated as the *up-patni* or *Pardayat*. As a mark of honur to her the respectable epithet of '*Raiji'* was added to her name. Besides this, the *Pardayat* for whom the Raja developed greater fondness was addressed as the *'Paswan.'* Just as *Maharani* was a higher designation among the *ranis* similarly the *Paswan* enjoyed the higher designation among the *Paswans*.[152] Through her manipulations, Gulabrai managed to secure Bijay Singh's affirmation for enthroning her own son, Tej Singh. Unfortunately Tej Singh died. The *Paswan* then adopted the son of the Dewadi Rani, Sher Singh and decided to get him enthroned. Sher Singh was a very simple person by nature.[153] In a letter dated eighteenth January, 1791, the Maratha *vakil*, Krishnaji Jagannath informs Nana Fadnavis that Gokulasth Guru Gosain kept Raja Bijay Singh preoccupied with religious worship and the *Paswan* was controlling state affairs.[154] In another letter written by the *vakil* on 1st February, 1791, it was mentioned that Raja

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150 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 32.
151 Ibid., p. 22.
152 Jagdish Singh Gehlot, *Marwar Rajya ka Itihas*, Maharaja Mansingh Pustak Prakash, Durg, Jodhpur, 1991, p. 143.
153 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 80.
154 Ibid., p. 71.

Bijay Singh called Khubchand and confided in him that his own life was at her disposal. The *Paswan* along with the new *diwan*, Bhawaniram Bhandari, *Pradhan* Sawai Singh Champawat and her own *Mukhtiyar*, Bhairji Sarni, decided to imprison the Raja. Govardhan Khichi the ex-*diwan*, had been imprisoned by Sawai Singh. They had even plotted to kill the Peshwa's *vakil*. When the *vakil* came to know about this, he feigned madness and managed to escape from there.[155] The *Paswan* was at the helm of the political affairs. She sent some of the *mutasaddis* as guaranters to Mahadaji Sindhia. She needed the support of Mahadaji Sindhia in order to execute her plan. It is mentioned in the letter written by the Maratha *vakil o*n 1st February, 1791, that the claim of Bijay Singh's elder son, Zalim Singh who was the nephew of Maharana Ari Singh was sidelined.[156] He had been given a jagir worth one lakh rupees but it had been taken back from him. Even his name in the official papers (*sanad*) had been removed. The Maharana reproached Mahadaji for giving up Zalim Singh's claim, and sending *tika* for Sher Singh. Mahadaji then replied that the *Paswan* had taken up the responsibility of the payment of the *mamlat* which would fetch rupees two lakhs for the Marathas.[157] This further illustrates that money and not political probity was the primary concern for the Marathas.

Mahadaji sent Dhan Singh to collect the *mamlat*. Gulabrai tried to influence him also. She wanted that her adopted son Sher Singh should be made the new Raja so that she herself could control state affairs. Dhan Singh was sent to Patil Baba.[158] On meeting Mahadaji, Dhan Singh gave the assurance on behalf of the *Paswan* that she would pay rupees 1,50,000 for the *tika* and 50,000 cash. The total amount paid by her would be two lakh rupees. Mahadaji agreed and accordingly clothes, *sirpech*, a pearl necklace and *chaukara* (*karnabhushan*) and clothes for the *Paswan* were sent. Suitable gifts were also sent for *diwan* Bhawaniram Bhandari and Bhairji.[159] The *tika* was given in the *rajtilak* (coronation) ceremony to Sher Singh. Bijay Singh had not stepped down. Yet the *Paswan* ordered that as the *tika* ceremony had taken place, all the big *sardars* would present an elephant each while the small *sardars* would give a horse each as

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155 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, pp. 79, 80.
156 Ibid., p. 100.
157 Ibid., p. 83.
158 Mahadaji Sindhia was addressed as 'Patil' Baba by the Marathas.
159 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 85.

nazar. Her directives enraged all the *sardars*. The Raas *sardar*, Jawan Singh expressed his feelings that with the support of Patil Baba, the *Paswan* had given the state to the son of a *dasi*. The Jaipur and Mewar Rajas also expressed their displeasure over these developments.[160] The *Paswan* finally met a brutal end at the hands of the *sardars* of Jodhpur state.

Singhvi Fatehchand and *Pradhan* Devi Singh, Budh Singh and Sawai Singh Champawat, the officials and nobles in the Jodhpur court aligned themselves with the Marathas. In 1754, seeing the adverse circumstances, Singhvi Fatehchand and *Pradhan* Devi Singh Champawat decided to negotiate the terms for a settlement.[161] The treaty concluded on 2nd February, 1756, between Bijay and the Marathas materialized due to the efforts of Singhvi Fateh Chand and Devi Singh Champawat.[162] Again we find Devi Singh showing his reluctance when the other *sardars* suggested to occupy Merta in 1756, when they were facing severe famine conditions. He tried to dissuade them saying that they had entered into an agreement with Ram Singh, and therefore at least for a year, they shoud not flout it.[163] It can easily be surmised that Devi Singh did not want to antagonize the Marathas for he knew that as soon as they tried to recover Merta and the other parganas, the Marathas were bound to return and disturb the peace of Marwar. Though reluctant, Devi Singh, along with the other *sardars* left to attack Merta. But even there he was in communication with the *Dakhanis* and conveyed to them that he did not want to oppose the Marathas and that despite all his efforts, the Marwar *sardars* had occupied the parganas. But they should stand firmly as he was not interested in fighting with them.[164] Later, he wrote a letter to Kanhoji that the entire Marwar army was away and the path was open for them to enter Marwar.[165]

In 1760, Maharaja Bakht Singh had got Devi Singh Champawat, along with a few other *sardars*, treacherously murdered. Ever since then the Champawats kept

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160 *Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 86.
161 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 539.
162 Beni Gupta, *Rajasthan ka Itihas*, Bohra Prakashan, Jaipur, 1998, 122.
163 Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 541.
164 Ibid., p. 542.
165 Ibid., pp. 543, 544.

rebelling from time to time. This will become clear from the following incident. In 1785, when Mahadaji was expected to come towards Jaipur, Maharaja Bijay Singh's son, Zalim Singh sent Champawat Budh Singh and Hiranand Hazari to meet Mahadaji. The Jodhpur *vakil* at Mahadaji's camp wrote a letter to the Jodhpur ruler in which he mentioned that Budh Singh was very cunning. If he stayed there, he would create problem for the state. Therefore, he should be called back to Jodhpur. The *vakil* also suggested that he should be kept satisfied by giving him jagir. The Maharaja, in consultation with Govardhan Khichi, sent a *sanad* worth 15,000 jagir.[166] In this way, before more damage could be done, he was called back and pacified.

On the basis of a letter dated 28th May,1791, written by Krishnaji Jagannath we get the information that Sawai Singh Champawat was the *Pradhan* of Jodhpur. Earlier his grandfather, Devi Singh Champawat was the *Pradhan* of Jodhpur. Before the battle of Panipat in 1761, Bijay Singh invited Devi Singh Champawat along with some other *sardars* into the fort and later got them treacherously murdered. Sawai Singh secretly nursed the grudge of avenging his grandfather's murder. Therefore, without allowing anybody to sense his intentions, he tried to control the state affairs through Gulabrai *Paswan*. He provided opportunities for progress to his relatives.[167] He served as the *Mukhtiyar* for seven months. He indulged in double talk. He said one thing to the Maharaja and other to the *sardars*, the Raja was conveyed something else through the *Paswan* while Patil Baba was conveyed another thing. He was always plotting and scheming. But all this did not go unnoticed by the other *sardars* and they finally got together and met the Maharaja and the *Paswan* and said that Sawai Singh could not be trusted. His uncle Champawat Budh Singh was involved in the negotiations with Mahadaji.Patil Baba had not left the state boundary as yet. The possibility of Patil Baba's attack was lurking. All these factors worked against the imminent and removal of Sawai Singh.[168]

In Jodhpur, Bhawani Ram Bhandari, who later became the *diwan* after Bijay Singh's death, became a close confidante of Shinde. Along with the Jodhpur *vakil*, Kriparam

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166 *Maratha-Marwar Aitihasik Patrawali*, p. 25.
167 Ibid., p. 97.
168 *Maratha-Marwar Aitihasik Patrawali,* pp. 97-99.

Joshi, he was sent to the court of Shinde as a clerk. He rendered useful assistance to Gopal Raghunath Chitnis (Aba Chitnis) who was handling Jodhpur affairs on behalf of Shinde. Through him Bhawani Ram managed an amount of rupees three hundred for himself. When Bijay Singh came to know about this, he got angry and removed him from this post. Bhawani Ram was replaced by Lalji Mehta. Through Aba Chitnis, Bhawani Ram cautioned Mahadaji when he was going towards Jaipur that the Kachhwahas and the Rathors were cunning and treacherous, therefore he ought to be alert. When this information reached Mahadaji, he called the Jodhpur *vakil*, Kriparam Joshi. After scolding him, the *vakil* was asked to leave the army. The *vakil* then requested for a reprieve of fifteen days within which he would contact the Maharaja, ask him to pay the *khandani* amount and sort out the matter.When the *vakil* informed the Maharaja about these developments, the latter called the Sindhia *vakil*, Ramrao Sadashiv and told him that Bhawani Ram was no more in the service of the Jodhpur State. He had unnecessarily distorted the facts and had made Mahadaji unhappy. Bijay Singh also told the *vakil* that on behalf of the Jodhpur State, only Kriparam Joshi and Lalji Mehta would be the official representatives, so the Marathas should not listen to anyone else.[169]

In a letter dated eighteenth January, 1791, the Maratha *vakil* at Jodhpur, Krishnaji Jagannath informs Nana Fadnavis that five years back he had cautioned Bijay Singh that for creating enemity between Bijay Singh and Mahadaji Sindhia, Champawat Budh Singh and Bhawani Ram Bhandari were responsible. But the Maharaja did not give it any heed. Bhawani Ram Bhandari along with Champawat Budh Singh sidelined the Maratha *vakil* at Jodhpur. Both of them had gone to meet Mahadaji. It was decided that Jodhpur would pay forty lakhs as war expenses. For this the parganas of Sambhar, Didwana and Nawa were to be transferred to the Marathas. The remaining amount to be paid was decided as fifteen lakh rupees. Out of this amount seven lakhs were to be paid in cash and the remaining amount was to be given in installments. Ajmer and the fort would be surrendered. Mahadaji got these terms in writing from Budh Singh. Then they were sent back after giving them suitable

[169] *Maratha-Marwar Aitihasik Patrawali,* pp. 20, 21.

presents[170]. In the same letter, the *vakil* further says that generation after generation, Bhawani Ram Bhandari's family had served the Jodhpur ruler. He maintained his personal relations with Mahadaji Sindhia at the cost of being disloyal to his own master.[171] The *vakil* felt that if Bhawani Ram was brought to Jodhpur, he would be definitely killed.[172]

It was on account of his past services to Shinde that after the death of Bijay Singh, he was made the *diwan* of Jodhpur. In a letter dated 28th May, 1791, the Maratha *vakil*, Krishnaji Jaganath informed that Mahadaji Sindhia had informed the *subedar* (Holkar) that Maratha rule had been established beyond Delhi and both the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur had been suppressed. He also said that in Jodhpur pro-Maratha Bhawani Ram Bhandari had been made the *diwan* and he had been successful in bringing many *sardars* to his side.[173] It was with his help that the Marathas dominated the affairs of Jodhpur State. In the same letter, the *vakil* also mentioned that Bhawani Ram was not a stable man. He wanted to benefit from both the worlds. Bhawani Ram Bhandari's letters of conspiracy were interjected on the way and the *sardars* became unhappy with him. In case Patil Baba moved away then these *sardars* would take his life.[174]

The political elites were not the only allies of the Marathas. There is some evidence to suggest that the Marathas were also able to create support base at the level of village gentry. This is evident from the instance of Uda and other *patels* of the village Kahar in pargana Malarana. He became a supporter of the Marathas and used the military might of the Maratha contingent present in pargana Sherpur to fulfill his own ambitions. In fact, he even assisted the Marathas when they plundered the villages of pargana Malarana. In their petition to the Jaipur ruler, the *patel* and *paltis* (cultivators) of village Maroti reported the plunder and ruination of the village by the Marathas with the connivance and collaboration of Uda Patel.

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170 *Maratha-Marwar Aitihasik Patrawali,* pp. 74, 75.
171 Ibid., p. 76.
172 Ibid., p. 77.
173 Ibid., p. 96.
174 Ibid., p.101.

To escape the plundering raids of the Maratha invaders, sections of the society, took initiative on their own to placate the Marathas. For instance, *panch mahajan* of Sambhar town decided to extend financial support to the Marathas in order to protect their own interest. The *panch mahajans* ignored the state officials while approaching the Marathas. It appears that in the absence of state protection, some people were organizing local self defence in both the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur.

The campaigns against the Rajputs were meticulously planned by Shinde. This is evident from his attempt to lure the *Banjaras* to his side. The support of the *Banjaras* was necessary for maintaining the line of supply in Rajasthan during the Maratha campaigns. To keep the *Banjaras* in good humour, just before his Lalsot campaign, Mahadaji honoured the chief of the *Banjaras*. He was invited to the camp of Shinde and presented the robe of honour and turban. The co-operation of the *Banjaras* was required by Shinde not only to ensure an uninterrupted supply of food grains and other essential commodities but also to prevent the upward movement of food prices. From time to time the *Banjaras* were also given other incentives such as tax concessions. It was on account of Shinde's shrewdness that the *Banjaras* maintained a more or less regular supply of provisions that they brought from Gwalior and made available at Shinde's camp.

The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed regular military campaigns and warfare due to the presence of the Marathas in Rajasthan. As their presence was continuously resisted, the Marathas dealt the Rajputs with strong military campaigns. The Marathas under the command of Shinde and Holkar acquired military superiority by adopting European style of warfare and crucial help given by local collaborators. This shifted the balance of power in favour of the Marathas. Mahadaji Shinde won decisive victories over the combined forces of the Rajput rulers between 1780's and 1790's. Thus, Shinde overcame all resistance to the Maratha domination in Rajasthan by combining military superiority and diplomacy.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to find whether there was a continuity from the first phase or some changes were occurring in the Maratha-Rajput relations during post 1761 period. The Maratha defeat in the third battle of Panipat accelerated the

efforts of the Rajputs to unite against them. They tried to avail of this opportunity to extricate themselves from the clutches of the Marathas. It also proved to be their last united effort to oppose the Marathas. There is definitely a change in Maratha-Rajput relations in the post-Panipat phase. The Rajputs tried their best to unite in order to drive the Marathas out of Rajasthan. The bitterness between Mahadaji Sindhia and the Rajput Rajas had become too deep seated. When Mahadaji Sindhia became the Regent of the Mughal Emperor, the Rajas were asked to pay the arrears that had accumulated over the years. However, the success of the Rajputs in the battle of Tunga, emboldened the Rajas. But Mahadaji reorganized his forces and defeated the Rajput Rajas in the battles of Patan and Merta. In these victories, the help rendered by the Rao of Machheri, the Rajas of Karauli and Kishangarh was immense. The information provided by pro-Maratha faction at the courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur greatly facilitated the Maratha's success.

Moreover, the oscillations in the attitudes of the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur towards each other also proved to be helpful for the Marathas to further their agenda in Rajasthan. In the next chapter we discuss the economic impact of the Maratha presence in Rajasthan.

CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MARATHA PRESENCE IN JAIPUR AND JODHPUR STATES

The economic repercussions of the Maratha presence in Jaipur and Jodhpur can be fully assessed on the basis of the financial strain it brought about on the exchequer of these States. The Marathas made forceful collection from the residents of towns and villages. It also led to plunder of the countryside causing extensive damage to the standing crops. The Marathas were invited to help the contenders to the throne. In return they were to receive monetary benefit along with tribute. As the Jaipur and Jodhpur rulers could not make the payment on time, it gave sufficient reason to the Marathas to justify their military intervention to forcefully collect the tribute and other dues. The Maratha incursions into the territory of Jaipur and Jodhpur was not a happy experience for the local people as it affected almost all sections of the society. The economic strain which each of these incursions brought to the economy of the State is well documented. The Maratha *sardars* were not so vigilant about plunder and atrocities committed by the invading Maratha army. Damage was done not only to the standing crops but even to property in towns and villages.

Inability of the Rajput Rajas to make these payments gave the Marathas a pretext of further military intervention to enforce collection of tribute and other dues which often resulted in the devastation of the countryside and ruination of the *raiyat*. Sometimes when the Marathas were in dire straits due to the non payment or delayed payment of salaries to their troopers, there was forceful collection of money from the local people. All this in turn resulted in the devastation of the countryside and ruination of the *raiyat*. The financial crisis of the Rajput rulers was further confounded when they found that the agricultural production was declining leading to diminished revenue collection. The growing financial crisis compelled the rulers to seek the help of the bankers for loans and resort to the practice of *ijara* of the *khalisa* parganas to raise money and as a mode of repayment of loan to the bankers.[1] The

[1] Dilbagh Singh, *State, Landlords and Peasants*, p. 131.

Rajput rulers wrote letters of protest to the Peshwa objecting to the loot and plunder in their territory by the Maratha army. This is evident from the Peshwa's reply to Sawai Madho Singh's letter in 1758. Sawai Madho Singh expressed his annoyance at Maratha army's loot and plunder in Jaipur territory.[2]

The Rajput States found themselves in the midst of a vicious circle from which they could not extricate themselves. As there was always a gap between the Maratha demand and the actual payment made by the Rajputs, it is difficult to calculate the total burden of Maratha demand in terms of actual payments made to the Marathas by the Rajputs. However, it is significant that the Marathas demanded more from the State of Jaipur than Jodhpur. This variation was on account of Jaipur's resource position and paying capacity being stronger than Jodhpur. Jaipur had good revenue yielding pockets such as Shahpura, Malpura, Rampura, Tonk, Toda, etc. Since Marwar was agriculturally poor as compared to Jaipur, the Marathas never put up a stake for claiming territory, except for the control of Ajmer. It was after the battle of Merta in 1790 when Bijay Singh had to surrender Sambhar, Khairwa, Masunda and 29 villlages of pargana Bhinai to Mahadaji. These were comparatively better revenue yielding areas. Later when Bijay Singh acquired the fertile territory of Godwad from the Mewar Maharana, Mahadaji Sindhia made him to pay rupees 30,000 per annum as its tribute. In the light of the information available in the sources, an attempt has been made to make an estimate of the financial obligations that the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur owed to the Marathas. Fortunately a *yaddashti* document entitled, '*yaddashti dikhniya ne rupaiya pahunchaya*,'[3] has survived and it further gives details of the Maratha demands imposed upon Jaipur from 1750 to 1765.

The Marathas decided to support the cause of Sawai Madho Singh after he promised to pay a *nazar* of rupees 10 lakhs to the Peshwa and rupees 50 lakhs as *nazrana* for the entire state of Jaipur. Sawai Madho Singh also agreed to pay rupees 10 lakhs as surity to the Marathas on behalf of Raja Ram Singh of Jodhpur as the latter had sought help from the Marathas against Bijay Singh in the Jodhpur succession dispute. The other demands imposed

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2 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 165, *Magh Sudi*, *V.S.* 1815/1758.

3 *Yaddashti, Yaddashti Dikhniyan nai Rupiya pahunchaya* 1755-1765 (hereafter *Yaddashti*), preserved in the Jaipur Historical Section of the Rajasthan State Archives at Bikaner.

included rupees 5 lakhs (outstanding arrears out of the previous demand) and rupees 3.50 lakhs as official expenses incurred by the Marathas while supporting the cause of Sawai Madho Singh. In all, the Jaipur *diwan* Hargobind and Prem Singh committed to pay rupees 78.50 lakhs to the Marathas. This commitment was made to Malhar Rao Holkar who visited Jaipur following the death of Maharaja Sawai Ishwari Singh. However, the Jaipur ruler could manage to pay only rupees 34,55,590.62 to the Marathas.[4]

In 1751, the amount due to the Marathas was calculated at rupees 75 lakhs out of which the Jaipur *diwan* Kanhi Ram paid rupees 10.43 lakhs by way of *hundis* issued by the bankers.[5]A sum of rupees 14 lakhs was paid to the Marathas in 1752. The entire amount was remitted through *hundis* issued by bankers Lunkaran and Lakshman Das of various amounts ranging from rupees one lakh to 9 lakhs. Out of this amount rupees 3 lakhs were sent to Malhar Rao Holkar.[6] In 1753, as per the agreement between the two sides the Jaipur ruler was to pay rupees 25.90 lakhs to the Marathas and it was also agreed upon that rupees 13.50 will be paid up at once. Jaipur *diwan* Hargobind Natani paid rupees 7 lakhs in cash and rupees 6.5 lakhs as compensation for the slaughter of the Marathas in Jaipur city. In October 1753 the amount of outstanding dues stood at rupees 15.25 lakhs and rupees 1.25 lakh were to be paid to Raghunath Rao, raising the amount to rupees 16.50 lakhs. Out of this amount rupees 7.35 lakhs was paid in cash, rupees 3 lakhs in *hundis* issued by the *sahukars*, and rupees 5.15 lakhs was still left due to be paid.[7]

In 1754, rupees 15 lakhs were paid to the Marathas in the form of four *hundis*. Out of these, three *hundis* were of rupees 4 lakhs each and one was of rupees 3 lakhs. These were issued by the bankers Balkishan and Parasram.[8] In 1755, Sawai Madho Singh was to pay rupees 10.85 lakhs to Jankoji Shinde as *mamlat* (in addition to the outstanding dues) as per the agreement made through Anirudh Singh Khangrot, the Jaipur representative. But the actual payment could not be more than rupees 7.55 lakhs.[9]

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4 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1807/1750, p. 2.
5 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1808/1751, p. 4.
6 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1809/1752, p. 19.
7 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1810/1753, p. 6.
8 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1811/1754, p. 8.
9 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1812/1755, p. 10.

In 1757, the Marathas raised their demand to rupees 40 to 50 lakhs but finally settled for rupees 12 lakhs as *mamlat* due to Raghunath Rao.[10] It was through the Peshwa's *vakil*, Naro Shankar that the committed amount was paid.[11] In 1758, once again Sawai Madho Singh was coerced to pay rupees 36 lakhs over a period of four years. The current year's installment was enhanced by the addition of a *nazar* of rupees 3 lakhs. In 1759, the arrears due from Jaipur amounted to rupees 12 lakhs for the year 1758[12] and rupees 11 lakhs and 50,000 for the year 1759.[13] But the actual amount paid to the Marathas was rupees 4,67,500 out of which Malhar Rao Holkar received rupees 3 lakhs and 91,000 in 1758.[14] From the year 1759 to 1761, no payment was made.

In 1761, the Jaipur forces were convincingly defeated by Malhar Rao Holkar. Realizing that the Marathas were in total command of the situation, the Jaipur *diwan*, Kanhi Ram immediately opened negotiations with the Marathas to settle the dispute about the outstanding tribute. The Marathas were thus back in Rajasthan soon after their debacle in the battle of Panipat. The defeat of Sawai Madho Singh's forces once again established the supremacy of the Marathas in Rajasthan. Now they began pressurizing Jaipur for payment of outstanding tribute. Malhar Rao instructed Maratha representative at Kota, Lalji Gulgule to press *diwan* Kanhi Ram for immediate payment of the dues.[15] However, Jaipur ruler was rescued from imminent Maratha threat as the Marathas were compelled to leave Rajasthan to defend Bundelkhand from the invasion of Emperor Shah Alam and his *wazir*, Shuja-ud-daula, who had captured Kalpi and Jhansi.[16] Sawai Madho Singh's conflict with the Marathas at Mangrol in 1761 and the Maratha involvement in the Deccan where they were fighting with the Nizam delayed the resumption of normal communication channels between Holkar and Jaipur. However, diplomatic ties between the two sides were resumed in 1764 when Sawai Madho Singh sent his representatives, *diwan* Gur Sahai and Raj Singh Hamirdeka to Holkar's court at Indore.[17] This step was seen as an

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10 *Kharita* from Madho Singh to Malhar Rao Holkar, *Falgun Vadi* 7, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
11 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1814/1757, p. 13.
12 Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, pp. 236-38.
13 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1816/1759, p. 13.
14 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1815/1758, p. 14.
15 *Holkarshahiche Itihasanche Sadhane*, Vol. I, L. No. 161.
16 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 304.
17 *Indore Kharita* No. 83, *Jeth Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1821/1764.

attempt at normalization of relations. Holkar responded by sending his representatives to the Jaipur court.

The Maratha debacle in the battle of Panipat put them in urgent need of money and they were compelled to turn to the Jaipur ruler, demanding tribute which Sawai Madho Singh had stopped paying in the last few years, taking advantage of Ahmad Shah Abdali's presence in North India. Mahadaji and Kedarji Shinde wrote to Sawai Madho Singh, "we have no money even to take care of our daily requirements." They asked Sawai Madho Singh to pay rupees twelve lakhs of tribute without delay and hand the amount over to their representative *seth* Dhaneshwar and Parsuram. Both, Kedarji Shinde and Mahadaji Shinde were dealing with Jaipur. Initially they sent *kharitas* written jointly by them and later on both started addressing Sawai Madho Singh individually. It created the impression that there was a rift between the two over the question of leadership.[18] Taking advantage of the tension between Kedarji and Mahadaji Shinde, Sawai Madho Singh did not take their demand seriously.

The family of Shinde faced tough times for two years following the battle of Panipat. The Rajputs were challenging their authority and stopped payment of tribute, the only possible source of income for the Marathas at this critical juncture. Frequent reminders to Sawai Madho Singh for the payment of outstanding amount of tribute did not yield the desired result. Payments were not only much meagre than the demand but also irregular. Sawai Madho Singh resorted to paying little amount, made empty promises to pay the rest later. Unable to mobilize liquid money, the Shindes even tried to press Sawai Madho Singh to meet the day to day requirement of Maratha officials posted in Jaipur territory.[19] As there was acute shortage of cash in hand at Ujjain, Kedarji Shinde asked Sawai Madho Singh for immediate payment of the current installment of tribute.[20] By now Mahadaji Shinde was fed up with these delaying tactics of Sawai Madho Singh as he was badly hurt by non-payment of dues. In 1762, Kedarji and Mahadaji compelled Sawai Madho Singh to pay rupees

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18 *Gwalior Kharita*, Nos. 178, 185, 187, 191, 194, addressed jointly by Kedarji and Mahadaji Shinde; *Gwalior Kharita* Nos. 179, 183, 189, 192 from Kedarji Shinde; *Gwalior Kharita* Nos. 184, 186, 190 from Mahadaji Shinde.

19 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 180, Undated.

20 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 183, *Jeth Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1820/1763.

3,76,070[21] and in 1764 Malhar Rao Holkar extracted rupees 7,10,375. The amount was paid in the form of *hundis* which were issued by the bankers Kewal Ram, Surat Ram, Paras Ram and Balkishen.[22] From 1763 onwards, Mahadaji Shinde started adopting tough posture towards Jaipur which is evident from the offensive language of the *kharitas* that he addressed to Sawai Madho Singh.In July 1763, Mahadaji reprimanded Sawai Madho Singh for his failure to pay the installment in time. The wording of the letter clearly indicates Shinde's desperation for getting money as soon as possible. He wrote :

> "Your dues for the *mamlat* are pending since long, you have failed to pay installments on due date, this is unfair, upon receiving this letter, send all money."[23]

From 1765 onwards situation began to improve with the Shindes, as they recovered from the shock of Panipat. They now gained enough confidence to look beyond their holdings in Malwa. They began to follow their affairs in Rajasthan with a fresh vigour. However, in his *kharitas* even now Shinde expressed keenness to develop healthy relations with Jaipur.[24] In the month of March 1765, Shinde displayed the show of strength at Ujjain by way of heavy concentration of the combined army of the Shindes. Mahadaji Shinde proceeded to Kota and from there he dispatched a strong contingent consisting of about ten thousand Maratha soldiers to realize tribute from Marwar and Mewar.[25] In 1766, Mahadaji Shinde was able to gain control of all pockets of area that were under the control of Shindes before the battle of Panipat. He was involved in settling these areas and making fresh appointments to replace the old officials.[26] In order to improve the Maratha position in Rajasthan in view of the death of Malhar Rao Holkar, Shinde in his *kharita* tried to impress upon Sawai Madho Singh that Malhar Rao's grandson, Mal Rao Holkar and the Shindes are united.[27] By 1767, Mahadaji Shinde was able to raise a fresh contingent which gave him

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21 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1819/1762, p. 15.
22 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1821/1764, p. 17.
23 *Gwalior Kharita*, No, 183, *Bhadon Sudi* 9, *V.S.*/1763.
24 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 185, *Kartik Vadi* 4, *V.S.* 1822 /1765.
25 K.S.Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations*, p. 85.
26 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 186, *Jeth Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1823/1766.
27 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 187, *Sawan Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1823/1766.

confidence to put pressure on all those Rajput rulers who defaulted in paying tribute.[28] In 1768 Mahadaji's position further strengthened as he was now in total command of the house of Shinde. From Poona he dispatched Jaswant Rao Bable with a contingent of troops towards Jaipur to collect arrears of tribute. He wrote a terse letter to Sawai Madho Singh stating, "ask your officer to deposit the arrears with Jaswant Rao Bable. I will also be reaching Jaipur side soon."

In 1769, the Jaipur Raja had to pay rupees 10,000 as the *mamlat* of Borada, out of which it was decided that villages worth rupees 8,000 would be given for which a *sanad* was to be issued from the *diwan's* office and rupees 2,000 were to be given in cash which was to be drawn from the treasury. It was given to Borada's Dudha Pandit, who was serving Pandit Govind Rao.[29]

Mahadaji Shinde now entered into regular exchange of *kharitas* with the Jaipur ruler which among other things also reveals that now he was paying greater attention to the Maratha interests in Jaipur. Going beyond the Maratha concerns for the realization of tribute and territorial possessions, he became more demanding on Jaipur. We find Mahadaj Shinde asking Sawai Prithvi Singh to ensure safe passage of Shinde's men travelling from Jaipur to Ujjain by providing them with armed escort, protection for his own men living and holding property in Jaipur and traders from Ujjain who had shops in Jaipur. In one of the *kharitas* sent to Sawai Prithvi Singh in 1770 Shinde was addressed as *subedar* Madhav Raoji Shinde which indicates his superior position in the Maratha political set up.[30]

There was growing exchange of information between the two rulers as we find Sawai Prithvi Singh being kept informed about all important events involving Shinde. For example, he wrote to Sawai Prithvi Singh about his role in bringing Emperor Shah Alam back to Delhi from his exile in eastern India to occupy the throne of Delhi.[31] In 1774, Shinde appointed his *vakil* at the Delhi court. Again he shared this information with Sawai Prithvi Singh that a *vakil* from Ujjain had been sent at the court of the

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28 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 190, *Magh Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
29 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, p. 124.
30 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 10, *Falgun Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
31 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 22, *Posh Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1828/1771.

Mughal emperor.[32] The return of Shah Alam to Delhi to reoccupy his lost position with the help of Mahadaji Shinde clearly demonstrated that the Maratha leader had fully recovered from the shock of Panipat and he symbolized the revival of Maratha power in North India. Mahadaji Shinde requested Sawai Prithvi Singh to send a Jaipur contingent to be in attendance upon the emperor. Sawai Prithvi Singh readily agreed.[33] However, the bonhomie between the two through mutual acts of co-operation did not last long due to Sawai Prithvi Singh's inability to satisfy the Marathas with regard to the payment of tribute. The Peshwa Madhav Rao reminded Sawai Prithvi Singh about the accumulating arrears and demanded that the installment due must be paid forthwith to Bapuji Vaman.[34]

Soon he sent another reminder to Sawai Prithvi Singh asking him to pay current dues of tribute to Apaji Narain.[35] The Jaipur ruler tried to settle the issue of long standing arrears of tribute through the Peshwa's *vakil* who was in Jaipur. The Peshwa again complained that no payment had been received so far and asked Sawai Prithvi Singh to send money through the Maratha *vakil.*[36]Sawai Prithvi Singh promised to comply with the Peshwa's demands. However, some amount was paid to the Marathas when they invaded Jaipur and laid waste the countryside. Five lakh rupees were paid when the Maratha commander Ramchandra Ganesh attacked and devastated Jaipur territory. Only rupees one lakh could be realized from Jaipur when again Mahadaji's forces invaded Jaipur territory and demanded much more.[37] Visaji Krishna was also given a *hundi* of rupees 1.5 lakhs and presents worth rupees 50,000.[38]Sawai Prithvi Singh complained to Peshwa Narain Rao about the predatory activities of the Maratha commanders. Further he complained that he was unable to pay the dues of tribute due to the ruination of standing crops by the Marathas.[39] He requested the Peshwa to check these activities of his commanders.

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32 *Gwalior Kharita*, No. 25, *Magh Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
33 *Kharita* from Prithvi Singh to Mahadaji Shinde, Draft No. 149, *Falgun Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
34 *Kharita* from Peshwa Madhav Rao to Prithvi Singh, *Jeth Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
35 *Kharita* from Prithvi Singh to Mahadaji Shinde, *Kartik Vadi* 13, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
36 *Kharita* from Peshwa Madhav Rao to Prithvi Singh, *Maghishri Vadi* 7, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
37 *Kharita* from *bohra* Khushali Ram to Peshwa Narain Rao, Draft No. 189, *Asarh Vadi* 5, *V.S.* 1830/1773.
38 *Kharita* from Prithvi Singh to Peshwa Narain Rao, Draft No. 189, *Asarh Vadi* 5, *V.S.* 1830/1773.
39 *Kharitas* from *bohra* Khushali Ram to Peshwa Narain Rao, *Vaisakh Vadi* 4, *V.S.* 1830/1773.

The issue of pending tribute was raised by Holkar in his lenthy letter to Sawai Madho Singh in October 1764. This letter contains details of Holkar's demand for outstanding dues since 1761 which also included expenditure incurred on the upkeep of Ranthambhor fort.[40] Between 1762 and 1764, the Marathas kept on reminding Sawai Madho Singh for payment of tribute. When Holkar realized that the payment was not forthcoming he proceeded towards Rajasthan to force Sawai Madho Singh to pay up. Holkar encamped at Chatsu and demanded clearance of dues. Failing to get any response from Sawai Madho Singh, he proceeded to Jobner and began to plunder. Sawai Madho Singh was adviced by his nobles to save the State from devastation by agreeing to pay. Sawai Madho Singh deputed his representatives to settle the issue of dues. Holkar demanded rupees thirty-five lakhs, the demand also included expenditure incurred on the upkeep of the fort of Ranthambhor. Out of this rupees ten lakhs were to be paid within the year in four installments. First installment of rupees four lakhs was to be paid in cash immediately and the rest of the amount was to be paid within six months. Rupees twenty-five lakhs was to be paid between 1765 and 1771 in annual installments of rupees four lakhs twenty-five thousand in the first four years and four lakhs each in 1770 and 1771. Sawai Madho Singh also agreed to surrender parganas Tonk and Rampura to Holkar. A jagir worth rupees one lakh was bestowed upon Mal Rao, grandson of Malhar Rao Holkar, by Sawai Madho Singh. Holkar left Jaipur after concluding this agreement.[41]

The above agreement saved the Kachhwaha State from being ravaged by the Marathas. Sawai Madho Singh satisfied Holkar by immediately paying up rupees 400,001. However, he was not at all serious about paying the rest of the amount. But the surrender of Tonk and Rampura to the Marathas reduced the territory of Jaipur State which had financial implications for the State as well. It also gave the Marathas a strong base in the middle of Rajasthan to put pressure on the Rajputs and carry on military operations as and when required. By subduing the powerful Kachhwaha State all alone, not only established Holkar's supremacy in Rajasthan, but also provided him financial resources to sort out his internal problems.

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40 *Indore Kharita* No. 85, *Posh Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
41 *Indore Kharita*, No. 87, *Magh Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1821/1764.

In the following year, in 1765, Sawai Madho Singh paid rupees 1,09,670 to Kedarji Shinde. In 1765, Sawai Madho Singh paid the current installment of rupees 5 lakhs to Holkar and promised to issue *hundis* of the *sahukars* for the payment of the balance.[42] Mal Rao Holkar passed away within nine months of the death of Malhar Rao Holkar (1766). Sawai Madho Singh also died in 1768. Both states were now headed by new rulers in 1767-68. After Sawai Madho Singh's death his son, Sawai Prithvi Singh ascended the *gaddi* of Jaipur. Due to successive deaths in Holkar family, Ahilya Bai assumed the charge of the Holkar affairs.[43] Tukoji Holkar, who was now commander of the Holkar army wrote six letters to Sawai Prithvi Singh within a span of eight months. All these were written in 1768 which contained messages of goodwill and also indicated that there was a temporary break in diplomatic ties on both sides and that now the Holkar's look forward to a new beginning of relationship.[44]

The Peshwa, Madhav Rao sent a turban to Sawai Prithvi Singh as a mark of recognition of his legitimate authority and the new ruler of Jaipur. The Peshwa expressed his desire to maintain cordial relations with Jaipur. Sawai Prithvi Singh promptly reciprocated the friendly gestures of the Peshwa. An examination of the letters sent by the Maratha leaders to Sawai Prithvi Singh reveal that now the posture was less hostile and there were hardly any open or veiled threats as was the case in the earlier times. These letters were more in the nature of reminders and protests for non-payment or delayed payment of dues. There were also protests against Jaipur Raja's inaction in curbing disturbances caused by the Rajputs in the parganas held by Holkar in Jaipur territory. In 1767, Tukoji Holkar wrote to Sawai Prithvi Singh that the Holkars disapprove of Jaipur State's control over parganas Tonk and Rampura which were handed over to them by Sawai Madho Singh. He asked Sawai Prithvi Singh to instruct his officials to co-operate and restore these parganas to their local agent Pandit Sadashiv Gopal and be allowed to settle the revenue of the above mentioned parganas.Tukoji Holkar maintained regular communication with Sawai Prithvi Singh

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42 *Yaddashti*, *V.S.* 1822/1765, p. 15.

43 *Indore Kharita,* No. 101, *Chaitra Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1824/1767.

44 *Indore Kharita*, No. 110, *Posh Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1825/1768 ; *Indore Kharita*, No. 111, *Falgun Vadi* 12, *V.S.* 1825/1768 ; *Indore Kharita*, No. 112, *Chaitra Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1826/1769 ; *Indore Kharita*, No. 113, *Vaisakh Vadi* 13, *V.S.* 1826/1769 ; *Indore Kharita*, No. 114, *Jeth Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1826/1769 ; *Indore Kharita*, No. 115, *Sawan Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1826/1769.

to safeguard the territorial possessions of the Holkars in the Jaipur State as he put forward Indore's claim over pargana Tonk and Rampura.[45] Tukoji Holkar's involvement in the external affairs of the house of Holkar continued till 1770. In his letter of 1769 to Sawai Prithvi Singh, Tukoji Holkar wrote that since long time Najib, Jaipur State and the house of Holkar were united. In this letter he endorsed the solidarity shown by Jaipur State with Najib Khan.[46] It appears from Indore *kharitas* that from the beginning of 1770, Ahilya Bai Holkar herself started taking interest in the external affairs of the house of Holkar. She herself entered into negotiation with Prithvi Singh protesting against the behaviour of the Rajput *bhomias* in the villages of Jaipur parganas that were under the control of Holkar's officers. The *kharita* read :

> "In pargana Tonk and Rampura our *kamavisdar* Pandit Rangoji has not been able to settle the affairs of these *parganas* because of the resistance of the *bhomias*. So I write that instruct all the *bhomias* to behave and allow our officers to carry on the work of settlement."[47]

In 1779, the Jaipur ruler Sawai Pratap Singh paid rupees 2 lakhs and promised a further sum of rupees 20 lakhs in installments, out of which only 7.5 lakhs were paid in 1781. In 1784, the Jaipur ruler promised to pay rupees 21 lakhs but paid only rupees 3 lakhs in 1785. In 1786, the outstanding amount of tribute and other dues was calculated at rupees 63 lakhs. Sawai Pratap Singh agreed to pay rupees 11 lakhs immediately, rupees 10 lakhs were to be paid in six months time and rupees 20 lakhs were to be adjusted by transfer of some territory of Jaipur to the Marathas. The remaining 22 lakhs were to be covered by assignments on the revenues of the *thikanas* of the Jaipur chiefs and jagirs. The first installment of rupees 11 lakhs was paid and the Maratha officers were deputed to collect the second installment of rupees 10 lakhs and assigned revenue of rupees 22 lakhs on *thikanas* and jagirs. However, no further payment was made to the Marathas. In 1790, Mahadaji defeated the combined forces of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The Jaipur ruler agreed to pay rupees 17 lakhs but expressed his inability to pay the entire amount. After victory at Patan and Merta over Jaipur and Jodhpur, Mahadaji Shinde halted at several places collecting money from local chieftains

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45 *Indore Kharita*, No. 105, A and B, *Magishri Sudi*, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
46 *Indore Kharita*, No. 121, *Asoj Sudi*, 10, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
47 *Indore Kharita*, No. 130, *Magishri Vadi*, *V.S.* 1827/1770.

and villagers. Several instances of Mahadaji collecting money from local Rajput chiefs are mentioned in the Persian Newsletters. One of the letter on p. 45 reads:

> "In every march of Mahadaji Sindhia, Ambaji and Deshmukh with the *fauj* and guns used to go ahead and collect 2 or 3 lakhs from villages and *garhis* of Shekhawati and bring away grain and cattle and hostages for contributions."[48]

Even as late as 1790's, the Maratha expeditions in Jaipur continued to realize the promised amount. In 1800, Sawai Pratap Singh purchased peace with the Marathas by agreeing to pay rupees. 6 lakhs within one month and rupees 3 lakhs after six months. Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, the Jaipur rulers had to face the Maratha menace and claims for huge monetary payment. The Maratha incursions were not only a strain on the state exchequers, they had a devastating impact on the *raiyat,* jagirdars and the *bhomias* of the Jaipur state as well. In this context, the *chitthis* and Amber records furnish invaluable information. These can be used not only to catalogue the Maratha incursions chronologically but also to bring out the significance in terms of economic hardships they caused to the rural economy of the region.

The *raiyat* of the parganas of Gaji-ka-Thana, Chatsu, Nenwa and many other unspecified parganas belonging to Jaipur territory witnessed reckless plunder by the Maratha army. The Jaipur ruler was constantly informed by the *amils* of the affected parganas that the standing crops were ruined and that the *raiyat* of these areas fled from the villages.[49] In 1751, the *raiyat* of pargana Chatsu helplessly bore the brunt of the Maratha plunder.[50] Similarly in 1753, the *amils* of pargana Sawai Jaipur and Chatsu reported plundering of the villages by the Maratha bands resulting in severe damage to the cultivation. The prospects of revenue collection in the coming season became dim. Economic hardship became more severe when the ruler was informed that the *raiyat* was unable to resume cultivation due to lack of resources.[51]

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48 See Sarkar, *Sindhia As Regent of Delhi*, pp. 45-58.

49 *Chithi* to the *amil Pargana Gaji ka Thana*, *V.S.* 1807/1750; *Amber Records*, letter dated, *Chaitra Vadi* 8, *V.S.* 1807/1750.

50 *Chithi* to the *amil Pargana* Chatsu, *Vaisakh Sudi*, *V.S.* 1808/1751, *Jeth Vadi* 4, *V.S.* 1808/1751.

51 *Chithi* to the *amil pargana* Chatsu *Falgun Vadi*, *V.S.* 1810/1753; *Pargana* Sawai Jaipur, *Magh Sudi* 6, *Chaitra Vadi* 8, *V.S.* 1810/1753.

Every successive year brought more economic hardships to the *raiyat*. In 1754, the Marathas plundered the parganas of Sambhar, Naraina, Fagi, Narnaul, Pragpura, Bairath, Khatu, Malarna and Lalsot. The plunder was brought to the notice of the Jaipur ruler by the concerned *amils*. They expressed inability to collect revenue from the *raiyat*. The *amils* were instructed to enforce surrender of one month's salary by all the jagirdars and the other state officials. Similarly, the *chaudhris* and *qanungos* were asked to pay their customary perquisites for one year so that money could be raised to pay to the Marathas. The state realized *malba* from the *raiyat* of all the *khalisa* villages. Lalsot, one of the best revenue yielding pargana, was the worst affected since the *raiyat* of the pargana had to give up cultivation for lack of material support.[52]

Highly moved by the plight of the *raiyat*, in a letter written in the year 1756 to Malhar Rao Holkar, Sawai Madho Singh expressed his deep anguish and protested against the loot and burning of the villages of parganas Rampura, Malarna, Niwai, Lalsot , Chatsu, Fagi etc. The letter was intended to bring to the notice of Malhar Rao Holkar that the Maratha ravages had incurred a loss of rupees 11 lakhs to the Jaipur state as this was the expected revenue yield from these parganas. The jagir villages were also utterly ruined which caused considerable suffering to the jagirdars.[53] The situation became so alarming that in 1757 it was reported that the *raiyat* of the parganas Chatsu, Niwai, Fagi etc. was indigent and villages were getting depopulated on account of these parganas being ruined by the Marathas.[54]

Constant Maratha ravages and plunder was bound to take it's toll on the productivity of crops and fertility of the agricultural land. By 1758, there prevailed constant famine conditions that diminished the resources of the *raiyat*. Their plight was further aggravated by the state when the *raiyat* was overburdened by the additional taxes which were levied on them to augment the revenue. To escape from all these woes the *raiyat* deserted their villages. Many villages became depopulated due to persistent famine condition and widespread damage to culvitation done by the Maratha army. The *raiyat* migrated to Malwa for survival and to escape plunder by the Marathas. The efforts of the

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52 *Amber records*, Letter *Sawan Sudi*, *V.S.* 1811/1754, *Chithi, Asoj Vadi* 3, *V.S.* 1811/1754; *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Lalsot, *Sawan Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1811/1754.

53 *Kharita* from Madho Singh to Malhar Rao Holkar, *Falgun Vadi* 7, *V.S.* 1813/1756.

54 *Chithi Asoj Sudi*, *V.S.* 1814/1757, *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Chatsu, *Asoj Vadi* 2, *V.S.* 1814/1757.

revenue officials to calm the fears of the *raiyat* and to console them to resettle in the abandoned villages proved futile. The Maratha menace was so great that the *raiyat* refused to return to their villages.[55] The sources inform us that in the year 1759, Maratha inroads devastated the parganas of Chatsu, Tonk, Fagi, Toda Raisinghpur, Pragpura, Lalsot, Niwai, Mauzabad, Naraina and Sawai Jaipur. The devastation ranged from plundering villages, burning and damaging standing crops. Even the cattle and agricultural implements were not spared. The Jaipur administration expressed its anger by strictly prohibiting the purchase of looted property from the Marathas and declared it a punishable offence.[56]

The situation remained grim and deplorable in the successive year also. Almost all the parganas witnessed decline in cultivation. Depopulation of villages was reported from all over the Jaipur territory. Not only agriculture but trade also suffered due to the Maratha menace.[57] From 1762 to 1765, although there was a moderate presence of the Marathas in Jaipur territory, yet it adversely affected the *raiyat* of the parganas of Mauzabad, Dausa, Gijgarh, Bahatri and Chatsu. Plunder and ruination of the villages along with the capturing of the cattle by the Marathas were reported to the authorities of the Jaipur State.[58] The years 1760's and 1770's went down in history registering depopulation of villages and decline in agriculture.[59] In 1777, the Marathas plundered the villages of pargana Niwai and ruined the crops. The harm done to the economy of the pargana can be gauged from the drastic decline in the revenue of the pargana that had fallen from rupees 2.66 lakhs to rupees 19 thousand.[60]The situation remained grim and was more or less same in succeeding decades, details of which are given in

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55 *Chithi* to the *amils* of all the Jaipur parganas, *Asoj Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1815/1758; *Asoj Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1815/1758 *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Mauzabad, *Bhadon Vadi* 6, *V.S.* 1815/1758, *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Lalsot, *Asarh Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1815/1758 and *Magh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1815/1758, *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Narnaul *Posh Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1815/1758.

56 *Chithi, Chaitra Sudi 12, V.S.* 1816/1759, *Chithi*, to the *amil* pargana *Chatsu, Chaitra Sudi 7, V.S.* 1816/1759 and *Jeth Vadi* 5*, V.S.* 1816/1759.

57 *Chithi* to the *amils* of all the Jaipur parganas*, Asarh Vadi, V.S.* 1817/1760; *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Bahatri, *Asarh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1817/1760, *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Mauzabad, *Kati Vadi* 6, *V.S.* 1817/1760.

58 *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Mauzabad, *Sawan Sudi* 9, V.S. 1819/1762; Amber Records, letter *Vaisakh Sudi* 12, V.S. 1819/1762.

59 *Chithi, Sawan Sudi 11,V.S.* 1820/1763; Chithi, to the *amil* pargana Chatsu, *Asarh Vadi, V.S.* 1820/1763 and *Asarh Vadi* 3, *V.S.* 1821/1764, *Chithi* to the *amil* pargana Niwai, *Chaitra Vadi* 7, *V.S.* 1822/1765; *Chithi, Asarh Vadi 3, V.S.* 1826/1769.

60 Amber records, letter dated *Asoj Sudi* 15, *V.S*. 1834/1777.

Sarkar's *History of Jaipur.*[61] In 1791, in many unspecified parganas cultivation suffered as the villagers were plundered by the Maratha army sent by Holkar. Starvation of the *raiyat* was reported to the higher authorities by the local revenue officials.[62]

With the help of a *chitthi* document we get a vivid depiction of the economic impact of the Maratha raids and their cumulative effects on almost all sections of the rural society. In a letter addressed to the *amils* of parganas Sawai Jaipur, Khohri, Gaji ka Thana, Naraina, Niwai, Narnaul, Qasba Sawai Jaipur, Gaori, Chatsu, Tonk, Toda Raisinghpur, Toda Bhim, Dausa, Paonta, Pinayan, Pahari, Pragpur, Fagi, Bairath, Bahatri, Malarna, Mauzabad, Malpura, Ramgarh, Lalsot, Sherpur, Udai and Wazirpur,[63] the *diwan* of the Jaipur State lamented the depopulation of villages belonging to *khalisa* and jagir and miserable condition of the *raiyat*, *bohras* and other inhabitants on account of the Maratha depredations. There was an official acknowledgement of progressive decline in the *jama* as well as the increasing inability of the state to realize revenue. The same document further highlights the miserable condition of the jagirdars who lament their inability to receive any *hasil* and hence their failure to render any kind of service to the state. The state instructed the *amils* to avail of the help of the jagirdars and make efforts to rehabilitate as many jagir villages as possible. The remaining villages were to be rehabilitated with the endeavour of the *raiyat* and the *bohras* and culvitation was to be resumed with the financial support of the *bohras* wherever it could be made available. In such cases, where the *bohras* were not available to make investments in agricultural production, the state extended a helping hand and proposed the advancement of *tagai* (agricultural loan) to the *raiyat*.

The precedent set by Jaipur rulers was followed by the Jodhpur rulers also who invited Maratha help to settle their domestic feud. In 1748, Abhay Singh had to seek Maratha help in checking his brother, Bakht Singh's ambitious designs. Abhay Singh solicited Malhar Rao Holkar's help and offered to pay rupees. 11,000 per day as *fauj*

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61 Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, pp. 270-313.
62 Amber records, letters *Asarh Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
63 *Chithi Asarh Vadi, V.S. 1817/1760.*

kharch.[64] Abhay Singh was succeeded to the Jodhpur throne by his son Ram Singh. However, Ram Singh's succession was challenged by his uncle, Bakht Singh. Under these circumstances Ram Singh deputed his representative Pandit Jagannath to negotiate the price of securing Maratha help either from Holkar or Shinde in 1751. He offered to pay expenses for a contingent of 10 to 12,000 and agreed to pay two months expenses in advance. Bakht Singh made a counter offer of rupees two lakhs to Malhar Rao Holkar in order to neutralize him.

The seeking of frequent Maratha help and their involvement in the internal affairs proved costly to Jodhpur. The Marathas soon imposed the obligation of paying regular tribute and other dues. In 1756, Bakht Singh accepted the Maratha demand for the regular payment of tribute at the rate of rupees 1.50 lakh per annum.[65] Sometime later when Bijay Singh acquired Godwad, he agreed to pay rupees 30,000 per annum as it's tribute. This amount was to be paid only to Shinde.[66] Bijay Singh made every effort not to delay the payment of tribute. The Gwalior *kharita* of 1769 from Mahadaji Shinde to Bijay Singh confirmed the receipt of *mamlat* from Jodhpur up to 1768 and henceforth the same amount, i.e., rupees 1.50 lakhs was to be paid to Shinde as tribute.[67] In 1770, Mahadaji Shinde once again acknowledged the receipt of *mamlat* amount for Jodhpur and Godwad.[68] But sometimes the payment got delayed due to certain reasons. This becomes evident from Pandit Balarao's letter of 1774.[69] Similarly only half the amount of *mamlat* for the period 1772 to 1776 for Jodhpur and 1773 to 1777 for Godwad could be paid. The balance amount was to be paid later on.[70] Here we will discuss the amount paid to Mahadaji Shinde for the period 1778 to 1782 in regular installments. The amount payable for the above mentioned five years was rupees 9 lakhs at the rate of rupees 1.80 lakhs per year. Out of this amount the immediate remission was rupees 2 lakhs.[71] The remaining amount was paid partly in cash and partly in kind, rupees 6 lakhs was paid in cash and rupees 1 lakh in kind. The first installment was divided into two, the

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64 *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. II, p. 483.
65 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Asarh Vadi 14, V.S.* 1813/1756.
66 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Chaitra Vadi, 5, V.S.* 1829/1772.
67 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Jeth Sudi 5, V.S.* 1826/1769.
68 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Chaitra Vadi 5, V.S.* 1827/1770.
69 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Falgun Vadi 5, V.S.* 1831/1774.
70 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Magh Vadi 5, V.S.* 1838/1781.
71 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Vaisakh Sudi 13, V.S.* 1841/1784.

first part was paid in July, 1784, and the second in February, 1785. 197 camels were sent in lieu of rupees 1 lakh. However, the entire payment could be made only by 1786. From the *mamlat* dues for the next three years amounting to rupees 5.40 lakhs, only rupees 1.50 lakhs could be paid.[72] In 1790, the total outstanding amount that included *mamlat, fauj kharch, nazrana, darbar kharch*, etc., stood at rupees 6 lakhs.[73] But the payment remained pending due to persistent famine conditions. Bijay Singh was allowed to make the payment partly in the form of bullocks and camels. These were to be supplied in the Deccan. From this lot, Poona demanded the supply of three hundred best quality camels exclusively for the use of the Peshwa.[74] The payment of the remaining amount due up to 1790 was made in the form of the supply of elephants, oxen and camels. Their supply was arranged by the Jodhpur official Bhandari Manroop.[75]

The Jodhpur ruler had to suffer severe repercussions of the battle of Patan. The monetary obligations imposed upon Bijay Singh by Mahadaji Shinde after the battle were too burdensome. Bijay Singh was coerced into paying rupees 60 lakhs as war expenses. This was in addition to the usual payment of the annual tribute out of which only rupees 11.63 lakhs were remitted to Mahadaji Shinde during 1790-1791 in the forms of cash, *hundis* and kind. Since there were not enough resources to meet the demand, in 1792, Bijay Singh handed over the parganas of Merta, Didwana and Nawa to Mahadaji Shinde to adjust the payment due to him. There was always a discrepancy between the demand claimed by the Marathas and the actual payments made albeit in installments. Even the amount that was actually paid proved to be an unbearable burden on the financial resources of the state.

Due to lack of detailed information, it is difficult to make an estimate of the financial loss caused to the state by way of Maratha plunder, forced collection, devastation of land and destruction of crops and fodder. As there was no escape from meeting the Maratha demands, Bijay Singh levied extra taxes on the *raiyat* and the jagirdars and paved the way for discontentment among both the sections. At times the merchants

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72 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Ashadh Sudi1, V.S.* 1843/1786.
73 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Posh Sudi 1, V.S.* 1847/1790.
74 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Bhadon Sudi 12, V.S.* 1848/1791.
75 Gwalior-Jodhpur *Kharita, Posh Sudi 13, V.S.* 1848/1791.

had to lend money to the State. In return they sought favourable terms and conditions to promote their business interests. But the *sahukars* were vigilant of the risks involved in such collaboration and adopted safeguards to maintain their reputation in the market. A leading merchant house, which issued a *hundi* of two lakhs on Ujjain, to pay the Marathas on behalf of the State took several *hundis* of small amounts from the other local merchants as deposits to back up his own *hundi* in the books.[76] During the period between 1755 and 1759, financial crisis of the Jodhpur state was so acute that it became difficult to arrange money for routine expenditure. The situation was so deplorable that the Maharaja could not afford oil everyday for lighting lamps in the evening for holding his *darbar*. His personal attendant, Narsingh Das Bhandari was instructed to make his appearance before the ruler and salute him thereby indicating that the supply of oil had been arranged and the court could be held. There was a secret understanding between the ruler and his attendant that the latter would not show up in the event of non availability of oil for the lighting. The acuteness of the financial strain can be gauged from the fact that the Maharaja had to leave his fort palace residence and shift to a smaller palace in the valley.[77]

The local people suffered great hardships due to the depredations of the Maratha army. Standing crops were damaged by the invading army. In addition to forceful collection of money, property was plundered in towns and villages. All this was reflective of the Maratha's desperate need for money. Contemporary sources testify to the widespread desolation of the countryside, acute poverty of the *raiyat* due to the Maratha presence and the growing inability of the Rajput rulers to provide relief or arrange resources for agrarian restoration. The unprecedented growth of revenue farming in the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur during the second half of the eighteenth century is also attributed to the growing pressure of the Marathas for the payment of tribute. The undercurrent of resentment against the Marathas is evident from measures adopted by the Rajput states prohibiting the *raiyat* all round to buy any property moveable or unmoveable acquired by the Marathas by way of plunder. The ever growing Maratha demands for tribute and war indemnity caused acute economic

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[76] Madhu Tandon Sethia, *Rajput Polity: Warriors, Peasants and Merchants (1700-1800)*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur and New Delhi, 2003, pp. 272, 273.

[77] *Marwar ri Khyat*, pp. 41 and 48.

hardships to Rajput rulers and they became desperate. This is evident from the anguish and the growing antipathy towards the Marathas among the Rajput elites.

Rajput Perceptions of the Marathas

In the Mughal official records the Marathas have been termed as *Ashqiya*, i.e., 'Robbers'.[78] There was another term used for the Maratha leaders in Mughal official documents. They were called *nasardaran*, i.e., pseudo-chiefs.[79]Bhimsen, while writing his memoirs in 1700 addressed the Marathas as 'malefactors.' However, the Marathas have been perceived differently in the Rajasthani sources. Since the Maratha dominance in Rajasthan was resisted by the Rajput Rajas, one is curious to know about the terms used for them commonly. The question arises whether appropriate references to the Marathas, if viewed in chronological order suggest any change or continuity. The use or non-use of particular words may also be indicative of attitudes. When one wades through different genre of Rajasthani sources, i.e., *Khyats* as well as archival records, the terms used for the Marathas are derived from the place of their origin. They are mentioned as *Dakhanis* or natives of Deccan. No other common terms, not even the term Maratha, which is indicative of their ethnicity has been used.

In late medieval Rajasthani sources, we find similar attitude towards the Muslims who irrespective of their varying ethnic origins are simply addressed as Turks. In the case of the Marathas, even a more detatiled reference to their contextual occurances does not make difference, the sole exception being the use of suffix Pandit in respect of the Maharashtra Brahmans and prefix Sindhia, Holkar, Pawar, Bable, Ingle, Jadhav and so on to differentiate them from the Brahmans, in each and every context, be it the military campaigns, visits to the court of the Rajput Rajas or their interaction with the local society.

In the bordering State of Mewar, the apprehension about the Maratha designs becomes evident from Maharana Jagat Singh's letter to Bihari Das. This letter was written in the context of Peshwa Bajirao's visit to Udaipur. If we look at the content of the letter, it says:

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78 Irfan Habib, *Agraraian System of Mughal Empire*, p. 404.
79 Ibid., p. 401.

> "Bajirao has come and he will derive reputation from having compelled a contribution from me, besides his demand for land. He has commenced with my country and will take twenty times more from me than from other Rajas. Malhar came last year but this was nothing. Bajirao is coming this year, and he is more powerful. But if God hears me, he will have no land,"

and that if a meeting was to take place at all, it was to be arranged beyond Dewalia.[80] Earlier too, a section among the Rajputs had perceived the Marathas as being capable of creating great disturbance and representing the elements of anarchy and ruin of entire land. Though Sawai Jai Singh had friendly relations with the Marathas, even he called them thieves (*chor*)when he came to know about their repeated intrusions into southern Mewar. In a letter written by Kesho Ram, Sawai Jai Singh's agent in Ujjain, the former used the term *ghanims* (plunderer/enemy)for the Maratha army.[81]

In *dastur komwar – dikhni*, the Marathas have been addressed as *ghanims* only once. In 1734, Raja Aayamal was sent from Bundi along with the '*ghanims*' to Ujjain.[82] It comes as a surprise that except for this sole reference, upto 1793, in the Rajasthani sources, the term *ghanim* for the Marathas is not found. Even in periods of acute tension and hostility between the two sides, the Marathas are referred to as *Dikhanis*. This is evident from the *dastur komwar*, *chitthi* records and *Marwar ri Khyat*. Throughout the period of this study, these sources refer to the Marathas as *Dikhanis.* When Mahadaji Shinde arrived at Tunga in 1787 to fight with the Jaipur and Jodhpur rulers, his arrival is announced in a polite language.[83] In the *chitthi* and *arzdasht* documents the arrival of the Marathas has been recorded as, "*Dikhniyan ka ghana vahada chhe*," (There is great uproar and/or fear of the *Dakhanis*). When Maratha Khanu visited Marwar, it created panic for some days, "*so Khanu ko kai din to baido raiyo*."[84] It comes to our notice that in the *chithi* documents of Jaipur, the term *ghanim* is used for the Pindaris of Amir Khan who invaded Jaipur territory while serving under the Marathas.

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80 Letter from Maharana Jagat Singh II to Pancholi Biharidas dated September 22nd, 1734.
81 V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh*, p. 202.
82 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, VOL. X, *Chait Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1793/1736.
83 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, pp. 677-682.
84 *Marwar ri Khyat*, p. 59.

Interestingly, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Mughal perception of the Marathas changed in the context of the then prevailing situation of North India. While Persian accounts of the first half of the eighteenth century contented themselves with straight narration of events pertaining to Maratha inroads, most writers in the second half tried to give their accounts a new perspective and vision. It seems that with the appointment of Mahadaji Sindhia as *wakil-i mutlaq* by Mughal Emperor Shah Alam, the prolonged Mughal-Maratha enemity got mitigated. It also marked the beginning of a new era of reconcialiation and adjustment between two former adversaries, changing the political scenario of the Delhi court. Efforts were made to work out a system based on mutual co-operation to cope with the growing challenge of British hegemony over North India by establishing peace and order in fairly large areas around Delhi. These trends and tendencies were reflected in the literature that developed in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The chroniclers from North India avoided derogatory remarks previously used to explain the Maratha military thrusts and to portray the character of their generals. Now they politely referred to them as Maratha leaders (*sardaran-i Maratha*) or leaders from the Deccan (*sardaran-i Janub*).[85]

It is also interesting to note that despite antagonistic relationship between the Rajputs and the Marathas, the Rajasthani documents offer more or less a dispassionate perception of the Maratha success in Rajasthan, their military superiority over the Rajputs and how they manifested their power vis-à-vis the Rajput rulers. In the context of the 1760s the *Khyat* admits undisputed ascendancy of the Marathas in Rajasthan, "*Dikhniyan ro` moto partap huvo*,"[86]and their growing strength, "*Raj to samvat 1817 su hi jaman mathe aayo pin samvat 1820 su to arudh huvo*"[87] and again in 1788 when the Marathas were again asserting themselves, "*Dikhniyan ro jor ditho.*"[88] There is just one instance during the 1780s when the Rajputs boasted about their success against the Marathas and plight of Shinde in the battle of Tunga. It is recorded as Shinde's

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85 Z.U. Malik, "Persian Historiography of Marathas in the Second half of Eighteenth Century," *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 52nd Session, New Delhi 1991-92.

86 *Marwar ri Khyat*, it reads, p. 56.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., p. 91.

flight from the field and that he was running away.[89]There is hardly any attempt to undermine the exploits of the Marathas, the despair and sadness among the Rajput Rajas over the prospects of loss of face, territory and parting with huge sums of money to buy peace with the Marathas. The inability of the rulers to pay up the promised sum and acceptance on their part of the humiliating condition that made them place leading personalities of the state under custody of the Marathas as some kind of insurance for payment of the outstanding dues – all these are stated as a matter-of-factly developments.

It may be stated here that Mahadaji Sindhia and Malhar Rao Holkar, being directly involved in the political disputes in Rajasthan, were more demanding of money from the rival Rajputs. For money's sake they frequently changed side and backed up any individual who promised to pay more money. They quickly abandoned the contender for the throne supported by them earlier. On the other hand, being remotely concerned with political developments in Rajasthan they followed a policy of splendid caution. The Peshwa demanded money from the Rajput Rajas only in case of dire need and not out of greed. However, one is curious that the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur, despite experiencing economic hardships due to the incessant Maratha demands, never used offensive language for them.In the next chapter we analyze evidence depicting softness in the Maratha-Rajput relations.

[89] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, p. 681; *Rathora ri Khyat*, Vol. III, p. 615, "*Patel naas gayo*."

CHAPTER 4

DIPLOMATIC TIES AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE MARATHAS AND THE RAJPUTS

The Marathas and Rajputs came in close contact during the reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707) when Mirza Raja Jai Singh was sent to campaign against Shivaji. Jai Singh followed an astute plan which isolated Shivaji from Bijapur and Golconda. Jai Singh had taken twenty-three forts of Shivaji leaving only twelve with the Maratha chief. After much negotiations Jai Singh succeeded in persuading Shivaji to visit Agra. In May 1666, Shivaji, his son and a small party of 250 troops set out for Agra. In the Mughal court Shivaji was meted out a cold reception. He was made to stand with low ranking nobles. Moreover, Aurangzeb did not acknowledge his presence. In reaction, Shivaji walked out of the audience hall. There was a clear clash of Shivaji's self-perception and the Emperor's perception of Shivaji. Aurangzeb considered Shivaji merely a successful rebel *zamindar* from Bijapur. But Shivaji perceived himself as a king with lands, forts and a subject population. Anyhow, Shivaji escaped from Agra with the connivance of prince Ram Singh, the son of Mirza Raja Jai Singh.

Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur and his son, Prithvi Singh, paid a heavy price as the father was accused of collaborating with the Maratha king, Shivaji. In consequence of his failure in the Deccan, he was recalled by Aurangzeb, who appointed him as the commander of the force sent to quell the Afghan rebellion in Kabul. Jaswant Singh left Marwar under the regency of his eldest son, Pirthi Singh who died due to a poisonous robe of honour presented to him by Aurangzeb.When the news reached Jaswant Singh at Kabul, he realized that Aurangzeb had made his son bear the brunt of his father's deeds. Unfortunately, his remaining two sons who were with him at Kabul, also died. At the end of a long reign of forty-two years, Jaswant Singh died far away from his home.[1] At the time of Shivaji's coronation ceremony, Pandit Gaga Bhat established the legality of his lineage with the Sisodia house of

[1] Festng, *From the Land of Princes*, pp. 216-218.

Mewar. When Shambhaji was killed along with his close associate poet Kavi Kalash at Aurangzeb's instructions, the poet's family moved to Marwar. The family took shelter at Bilara near Jodhpur. The *hakim* of Merta was instructed by Durgadas Rathore to meet their expences at the rate of rupee one and fifteen annas per day. These events indicate that relations between the Marathas, Kachhwahas, Sisodias and Rathors were acquiring a new dimension.

When the Marathas were trying to gain foothold in Malwa, the Jaipur Raja, Sawai Jai Singh extended clandestine support to the Marathas. The Maratha king Shahu regarded him as his reliable supporter in the royal court and Peshwa Baji Rao considered him as a sincere friend.[2]Jai Singh was appointed as the Mughal governor of the province of Malwa three times. Raghubir Sinh has opined that :

> "Jai Singh was friendly with the Marathas, kept them informed of even the most confidential consultation and talks in the inner circle of the Emperor, ministers and other influential members at the capital."[3]

Sawai Jai Singh's pro-Maratha policy was motivated by his desire to drive away the Mughals from Malwa with the help of the Marathas and then extend his own territories upto Malwa[4]. But Sawai Jai Singh's third *subedari* of Malwa in 1730's proved to be particularly favourable to the Marathas. The successive failure of the Mughal forces against the Marathas provided the much awaited opportunity to Sawai Jai Singh to convince Khan-i-Dauran to make peace with the Peshwa. Sawai Jai Singh convincingly argued that the Maratha occupation of Malwa was now inevitable despite Mughal efforts to stop them. He entered into negotiations with the Peshwa's representatives after the Maratha victory over the Mughals in 1735. This paved the way for the Mughal grant of the right to collect *chauth* from 28 parganas of Malwa to the Marathas. The anti Maratha faction at the Mughal court blamed Sawai Jai Singh for ruining the empire by his secret support to the Marathas.[5] This tradition of friendship between Sawai Jai Singh (*Bade Maharaj*) and the Marathas was invoked in

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2 Harish Chandra Tikkiwal, *Jaipur and the Later Mughals (1707-1803 A.D.)* : A Study in Political Relations, Hema Printers, Jaipur, 1974, p. 51.
3 Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition*, p. 129.
4 Ibid., p. 130.
5 Ibid., p. 234.

the letters to the subsequent rulers of Jaipur from the Peshwa, Shinde and Holkar. Infact Baji Rao addressed Sawai Jai Singh as 'Kaka.'[6]

Sawai Jai Singh's *subedari* of Malwa in 1713-1717 and 1732-1737 brought Rajasthan and Malwa closer. During Sawai Jai Singh's stay in Malwa, trade and commercial relations between Ujjain and Jaipur also began, as Sawai Jai Singh was interested in developing his capital city as a major trading and commercial centre in Rajasthan. He extended invitations to traders and bankers from Ujjain to settle in Jaipur or establish their shops and branches there. Shops, mansions and other belongings of the traders from Malwa in Jaipur are referred to in the *kharitas* of Mahadaji Shinde and Malhar Rao Holkar. In 1764, Malhar Rao Holkar wrote to Sawai Madho Singh to provide protection to *seth* Kewalram, whose father was brought to Jaipur from Ujjain by Sawai Jai Singh.[7] Its seems that migration from Ujjain to Jaipur during the time of Sawai Jai Singh was much wider as reflected in another *kharita* from Malhar Rao Holkar. It deals with the following information:

> "Pandit Harbaji Krishna Brahman is there in Jaipur and performing *Vyarcharya* (priesthood) since the time of Sawai Jai Singh along with many other Brahmans and are facing trouble, the state should take care of them and see to it that they are not suffering."[8]

Security to Maratha Travellers in Rajasthan

As a result of Baji Rao's expansionist policy, Maratha power expanded in the North and their involvement in Rajasthan and adjacent areas grew deeper. There was a phenomenal increase in the movement of the Maratha officials of varying stature and people belonging to diverse social groups from the Maratha ruled areas. Visits of political dignitaries from the house of Peshwa, Holkar, Shinde, their representatives, traders and bankers, physicians and pilgrims from the Deccan and Malwa became frequent. This development gave a new dimension to the interaction between the two sides and particularly prompted the Marathas to look beyond the immediate political

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6 R.V. Oturkar, 'Rajput-Maratha Cultural Relationship', Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 14th Session, Jaipur, 1951, p. 191.

7 *Indore Kharita* No. 85, *Posh Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1821/1764.

8 *Indore Kharita* No. 21, *Bhadon Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1808/1751.

concerns in Rajasthan. The pan regional concerns of the Marathas needed the co-operation of the Rajputs in some way or the other.

The first and foremost was the safety of the Marathas travelling within or through Rajasthan.The *kharitas* exchanged between the Marathas and Rajputs bear testimony to the fact that co-operation of the Rajput rulers was sought more or less on regular basis by their Maratha counterparts. This was necessary to facilitate large number of travellers from Malwa and the Deccan who were visiting Rajasthan or passing through it's territory by ensuring safe passage and protecting their belongings. Requests were also made to make suitable arrangements for their stay at the place of visit. Representatives of the Maratha *sardars* frequently visited Jaipur and Jodhpur to acquire quality horses, camels and sometimes oxen.

In his *kharita* of 1750, Jayaji Shinde informed Sawai Madho Singh of Jaipur about the appointment of Pandit Mahadeo as Shinde's representative at the Jaipur court and requested him to treat his representative well.[9] The next year, in 1751, we find Jankoji Shinde soliciting Sawai Madho Singh's co-operation to depute a suitable contingent of troopers and horsemen as escort for Gopal Rao's security and safe passage to Doab.[10] Sawai Madho Singh's co-operatipon was again sought by Jankoji Shinde for the foolproof security of Ram Singh, the deposed ruler of Jodhpur who had taken shelter at Naraina in Jaipur territory. Jankoji Shinde was an ally of Ram Singh who had sought his support against Bijay Singh, the ruler of Jodhpur .

Such co-operation continued even during the reign of Sawai Prithvi Singh. Peshwa Madhav Rao wrote to Sawai Prithvi Singh to arrange for the security of Munshi Narayan Rao's sister, who was on a pilgrimage to Badrinath. As she was also visiting Pushkar, the Jaipur ruler was requested to arrange for her safe passage from Jaipur to Pushkar and also to properly look after her so long as she was in Jaipur territory.[11] The Peshwa made another request of the similar nature concerning Manaji Bable, the son of Maratha commander Jan Rao Bable who was going back from Jaipur to Ujjain. The Jaipur ruler was requested to provide him with an escort up to Bundi.

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9 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 1, *Falgun Vadi* 5, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
10 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 15, *Bhadon Vadi* 15, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
11 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 62, *Sawan Vadi* 4, *V.S.* 1827/1770.

Mahadaji Shinde requested Sawai Prithvi Singh to ensure security and safe passage to the family of Munshi Sadashiv Shankar who were travelling from Ujjain to Jaipur.[12] Pushkar was frequently visited by pilgrims of all walks from the Maratha ruled territory, including the Maratha dignitaries. Whenever any person of importance from the Maratha territory visited Pushkar, the Jaipur ruler was invariably approached to facilitate the pilgrimage by extending hospitality and safety. When Balaji Mahadev undertook his journey from Ujjain to Pushkar, Mahadaji Shinde informed Sawai Pratap Singh about his travel plan and requested to make suitable arrangement for his journey.[13] Shinde informed Sawai Pratap Singh that two officers, Imam Khan and Miyan Khan were proceeding towards Gwalior via Jaipur and Karauli. The Jaipur Raja's help was requested to arrange for their stay at Jaipur. The Raja was also requested to escort the officers up to Karauli which is situated on the boundary of Gwalior.[14]Mahadaji Shinde asked Sawai Prithvi Singh to extend hospitality to physician (*vaidya*), Pandit Ganga Vishnu who was visiting Jaipur from Ujjain.

Mutual Exchange of Information

Information concerning mutual interests was shared between both the sides on regular basis. Success against the rival power was duly appreciated by highlighting the achievement and expression of happiness. Kedarji Shinde, who was looking after the Maratha interests in Rajasthan, informed Sawai Madho Singh about the resolution of outstanding dispute with Shivpur and the appointment of two Maratha officials, Balaji Patil and Raghav Shankar for the settlement and management of the area. The Jaipur Raja was requested not to render any military help to the chief of Shivpur.[15] The fact that the Maratha *sardars* were keen to seek military support from the Rajput rulers in the campaigns against their rivals is evident from the *kharitas*. In 1752, Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayaji Shinde requested Sawai Madho Singh for military help as desired by the Peshwa in support of the Maratha campaign in the Deccan to install Ghazi-ud-din Khan as the Nizam of Hyderabad. Mahadaji Shinde expressed solidarity with

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12 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 81, *Asarh Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
13 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 135, *Asoj Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1842/1785.
14 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 153, *Jeth Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1843/1786.
15 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 31, *Chaitra Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1820/1763.

Sawai Madho Singh against the Jats of Bharatpur. Sawai Madho Singh favourably responded to Holkar's request for military help against the Jats. In their joint *kharita* to Sawai Madho Singh, Kedarji and Mahadaji Shinde expressed their desire to go to the *Desh* (the Maratha country) but changed their plan on the request of the former. They acknowledged the receipt of information regarding Jaipur's fight with the Jats of Bharatpur and asked for more details of the battle between Sawai Madho Singh and Jawahar Singh Jat. In his response to Sawai Madho Singh's request for help against the Jats, Shinde assured the Jaipur ruler that the latter should be rest assured about Maratha arrival.[16]

The Marathas appealed to both Jaipur and Jodhpur for help against Abdali in the battle of Panipat. But the Rajputs remained neutral. A Rathore contingent under the command of Jeevraj was dispatched by Bijay Singh of Jodhpur to join the Marathas in the battle but it did not participate.[17] Solidarity between Jaipur and the Marathas against the Jats of Bharatpur was again reiterated in a letter addressed to Sawai Prithvi Singh by the Maratha commanders Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna. They informed the Jaipur Raja about the fight between Nawal Singh, the Jat ruler and the Marathas. The success of the Marathas in the battle and the capture of arms and ammunition and other belongings of the Jats in plenty were conveyed through this letter.[18] Mahadaji Shinde kept Sawai Prithvi Singh informed about developments at Delhi and other places in the North. In his *kharitas* of 1771, he informed Sawai Prithvi Singh about the arrival of the Emperor Shah Alam from Farrukhabad to Delhi. He advised the Jaipur ruler to dispatch a prominent noble of Jaipur to wait upon the Emperor.[19] In another *kharita*, Sawai Prithvi Singh was informed that details regarding Shinde's plan to visit Delhi are being sent through Pandit Ramrao Govind and Shyajiram. Shinde requested Sawai Prithvi Singh to act as per the suggestions of the former.[20]

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16 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 42, *Kartik Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1825/1763.
17 *Marwar Ri Khyat*, p. 51.
18 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 58, *Vaisakh Vadi* 4, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
19 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 76, *Bhadon Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
20 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 74, *Sawan Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1827/1770.

The Jaipur ruler's arbitration in resolving the dispute between the chief of Shivpur and Holkar's officials at Tonk was sought by Shinde.[21] Shinde is again seen advising Sawai Pratap Singh of Jaipur not to be a party in the dispute that arose in Kota. He made a specific request to Jaipur not to support Raja Kishordas. Sawai Pratap Singh was urged not to intervene in the dispute allowing both the parties to resolve it through negotiations. Shinde expressed hope that Sawai Pratap Singh would act as per his desire.[22] Shinde sought Sawai Pratap Singh's support for the military action that he was contemplating against Mohammad Beg Hamdani for ditching Shafi Khan. He informed the Jaipur Raja about his resolve to punish Hamdani. He requested Sawai Pratap Singh to extend help to his commander Ambaji Ingle who was fighting Hamdani.[23] Shinde's *kharita* of 1783 acknowledged the receipt of the letter of congratulations dispatched from Jaipur over the conquest of the fort of Gwalior by the former.[24] In the same year Sawai Pratap Singh again wrote to Shinde congratulating him on his success against the Jats of Gohad.[25]

Economic Interaction between the Marathas and the Rajputs

The *kharitas* reveal growing economic interaction between the Rajputs and the Maratha ruled territories. In the second half of the eighteenth century, trade and commercial relations between the two gained momentum**.** Maheshwari *banias* from Rajasthan came to Pune and settled in *Kapadganj* (a *peth* in Pune) as cloth merchants and grocers. They were followed by the *Marwaris* from Jodhpur and Sirohi.[26] Mahadaji Shinde himself took personal interest in promoting trade and commerce between Ujjain and Jaipur. He sought the co-operation of the Raja of Jaipur for the smooth conduct of goods from Jaipur territory to Ujjain and beyond Malwa up to the Deccan. Commercial transactions between the *sahukars* from Ujjain and Jaipur were brisk. Shinde made all efforts to protect the interests of the bankers and traders from Ujjain who were operating in Jaipur and had opened shops there. The trade solely

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21 *Gwalior Kharita* NO. 107, *Asoj Vadi* 15, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
22 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 108, *Asoj Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
23 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 110, *Asoj Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
24 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 111, *Bhadon Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
25 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 116, *Chaitra Vadi* 13, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
26 A. R. Kulkarni, *Medieval Maratha Country*, pp. 232, 233.

conducted to meet the requirements of Shinde's household and his army was sought to be treated as preferred. It was to be given protection by the Jaipur rulers who were requested to help the traders and representatives sent to Jaipur to procure items needed by Shinde and Peshwa. The Jaipur rulers were asked to exempt these items from *rahdari* and other local taxes.

The Peshwa wrote to Sawai Prithvi Singh and requested him to personally intervene and resolve a dispute that arose between Shambhu Dixit, a trader from Poona who was conducting business in Jaipur and Balwant Rao *sahukar*, a Poona based banker. The former had obtained a loan from the latter on the mortgage of his mansion (*haveli*). The borrower was unable to pay back in time and the matter was reported to the Jaipur officials. Balwant Rao's agent Motiram was sent to Jaipur for the recovery of the loan from Shambhu Dixit. The Peshwa complained against the arrest of Motiram and requested for his immediate release from the prison. Sawai Prithvi Singh was requested to use his good office and to sort out this matter.[27] Mahadaji Shinde sought Prithvi Singh's co-operation for the safe passage of Malhar Naik, a textile trader from Ujjain who was carrying textile goods to Jaipur.[28] Mahadaji Shinde sought Sawai Prithvi Singh's intervention in the recovery of rupees 1,600 that were borrowed by the son of Gulabrai from *modi* Premraj of Ujjain. The borrower belonged to *Gumani Chaudhari ganj* (a wholesale market in Ujjain) and had gone to Jaipur. Sawai Prithvi Singh was requested to help Sukhram, the agent of *modi* Premraj who was being sent to recover the amount and ensure that the amount was given to the agent.[29]

Rajasthan became the hunting ground for the purchase of high breed horses and camels needed by the Marathas. Shinde sent Raja Himmat Bahadur to Jaipur for the purchase of horses, camels and other items for his army. Sawai Prithvi Singh was specifically requested to provide security and safe passage to Himmat Bahadur. The Jaipur Raja's favour was also sought to exempt the items bought from the taxes levied

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27 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 67, *Kartik Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
28 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 73, *Asarh Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
29 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 78, *Kartik Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1828/1771.

on trade in the territory of Jaipur.[30] Shinde protected the professional interests of his traders and bankers operating in Jaipur territory with the support of Jaipur rulers. This is evident from his *kharita* witten to Sawai Prithvi Singh in which he requested the latter to extend help in the recovery of loan given by *seth* Kewalram to the people belonging to Jaipur territory. The *seth*, who was apparently a Brahman had received village Hindon in charitable grant (*udik*) from Jaipur. As Shinde had managed this land grant from the Jaipur ruler, the Raja was requested to make this land grant effective.[31] Shinde again approached the Jaipur ruler on behalf of the Peshwa and solicited his help to the officials who were sent to Jaipur for the purchase of horses and camels. The Jaipur ruler was requested to see to it that the Peshwa's officials were not troubled in any way and sought exemption from taxation on their purchases.[32] Similarly when the two traders, Balaji Janardan and Chiman Beg purchased textile goods from Ujjain and were returning to Jaipur, Mahadaji Shinde asked Prithvi Singh not only to provide safety enroute to both the traders but also to exempt their textile goods from taxation.[33]

Besides protecting the interests of the traders, requests were also made for the purchase of horses, camels, exemption from taxation, safe passage of men and goods as well as arbitration and mediation in the settlement of accounts. Shinde requested Sawai Prithvi Singh to facilitate the purchase of best quality horses by his broker Maujdeen, who was stationed at Jaipur. The broker was assigned the task of bringing these horses to Shinde and the Jaipur Raja was asked not to impose *rahdari* on them.[34] When Onkar Shinde was returning from Jaipur to Ujjain, he was robbed of his weapons and other belongings by someone who was arrested in Jaipur. When the news was brought to the notice of Shinde, he wrote to Sawai Pratap Singh to see to it that the stolen things were restored to the person concerned and that suitable arrangements be made for the safe passage of the victim to Ujjain.[35]

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30 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 79, *Magishri Vadi* 4, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
31 *Gwalior Kharita No*. 80, *Jeth Vadi* 7, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
32 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 82, *Bhadon Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
33 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 84, *Magishri Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
34 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 86, *Magh Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
35 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 105, *Sawan Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1839/1782.

In yet another letter Shinde requested Pratap Singh to arrange a safe passage for Shivdas Nayak who was sent to Marwar to buy camels and cows for Shinde. Exemption from taxation on the purchase was very often sought from the Jaipur ruler.[36] Sawai Pratap Singh was informed by Shinde about the visit of *sahukar* Ballabhdas along with his staff to Jaipur. The request concerned the safe escort of the *seth* upto Kota. The *seth* was having monetary transactions in Jaipur and some residents of Jaipur owed money to him. The Jaipur ruler was requested to help the *seth* to recover his loans.[37] The Ujjain traders Jivandas and Govardhandas were running a business establishment in Jaipur which was looked after by their agent Uttamchand. People of Jaipur were taking credit from his establishment. Acting upon the request of the Ujjain trader, Shinde requested Sawai Pratap Singh to settle his account with the clients in Jaipur.[38]

Political intervention was invariably sought to resolve monetary disputes. For instance Shinde sought Sawai Pratap Singh's arbitration in resolving a monetary dispute between Takhtmal, a banker from Gwalior and his accountant Uttamchand, whose family was residing in Jaipur. The banker refused to give any money to the family of his accountant who petitioned to Shinde. At this, Shinde requested Sawai Pratap Singh to persuade the banker to pay reasonable amount to the petitioner's family.[39]When Shinde deputed Pandit Purshottam to visit Jaipur for the purchase of horses, he was cheated by the horse dealers of Jaipur and was supplied horses of inferior breed. At this, Shinde requested Sawai Pratap Singh to ensure that his representative was given good quality horses.[40] Further Shinde also sought the Jaipur ruler's favour in procuring four imported horses of Turkish breed that had been brought to Jaipur for sale. These horses were required by the Peshwa for his personal use. Full payment was also assured for the above purchase.[41] Maratha dependence on Jaipur for procuring horses is evident from Shinde's letter of 1791 addressed to Sawai Pratap Singh in which request was made for the supply of imported horses to meet the

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36 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 113, *Bhadon Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
37 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 117, *Chaitra Vadi* 3, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
38 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 120, *Falgun Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1840/ 1783.
39 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 124, *Asarh Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1841/1784.
40 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 141, *Vaisakh Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1843/1786.
41 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 150, *Chaitra Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1848/1791.

requirement of the Peshwa.[42] Jaipur had emerged as one of the major centers of horse trade.

Shinde also sought Sawai Pratap Singh's co-operation to extend help to the traders who were eager to visit Sambhar to buy salt.[43] Interest was also taken by Shinde in promoting the annual fair organized at Pushkar. Shinde facilitated the larger participation of traders in the fair. Accordingly, he requested Sawai Pratap Singh to encourage and grant necessary permission to the traders residing in Jaipur territory to attend the Pushkar fair of 1791, as per the past practice.[44] The importance of Pushkar lay in the fact that it is situated near Ajmer which was at that time under Maratha possession. Therefore, Shinde sought the co-operation of the Jaipur State in the conduct of trade not only between Rajasthan and Shinde territory but also worked to safeguard the interests of the traders and bankers of Indore who operated in Jaipur. We find him intervening on behalf of *sahukar* Khushalchand Ambadas of Indore who had commercial transaction with Maniram Parbat of Jaipur. The latter was reluctant to return money that he owed to the *sahukar*. Sawai Pratap Singh's help was solicited to recover the amount from the Jaipur trader.[45] Mukund Das Ambadas, a *sahukar* from Indore was going to Jaipur for marriage. Shinde requested the Jaipur Raja that the *sahukar* be taken good care of and also be given due respect.[46]

Co-operation was also sought in apprehending criminals. In this connection Mahadaji Shinde sought Sawai Pratap Singh's co-operation in capturing Lal Mohammad who used a forged letter affixed with English agent Mr Anderson's seal to cheat *seth* Kashmiri Lal of Ujjain. Lal Muhammad successfully obtained rupees 10,000 from the *seth* by producing the forged letter. The cheater was to be handed over to Shinde by the authorities.[47]

From the correspondence it becomes clear that apart from conducting their professional dealings in Rajasthan, the traders and bankers from the Maratha territory

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42 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 172, *Posh Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
43 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 157, *Asarh Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
44 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 164, *Asoj Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
45 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 168, *Maghishri Vadi* 14, *V.S.*1848/1791.
46 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 182, *Vaisakh Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1850/1793.
47 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 109, *Asarh Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1840/1783.

were also involved in religious activities. This is evident from Daulatrao Shinde's letter to Sawai Pratap Singh in which the Jaipur Raja was informed about the visits of *seth* Parasram Modi, an Indore based banker to Maroth, which is a well known trade center on Jaipur-Marwar border. The purpose of the *seth's* visits to Maroth was to construct a temple there. Therefore, Sawai Pratap Singh was requested to make arrangements for his safe journey both ways in Jaipur territory. Besides this, request was also made for suitable accommodation for the *seth's* relatives and agents who were to stay at Maroth to supervise the construction work. The Jaipur Raja was asked to facilitate the tax free passage of whatever goods they had purchased from the trade fair of Maroth.[48]

From the content of the evidence discussed above it appears that the Maratha presence in Rajasthan cannot be viewed merely in terms of persistent antagonism between the Rajputs and the Marathas. Hence, the general perception that their relationship was marked by armed conflicts, plunder and devastation of the countryside needs to be relooked. True the Rajput States faced financial strain by way of Maratha demand for tribute and war expenses. Nonetheless, overt display of hostility and resistance to the Maratha presence in Rajasthan in myriad ways did not hinder the possibility of mutual co-operation. There is ample evidence showing the areas of co-operation between the Marathas and the Rajputs. The social relations were always maintained by way of exchange of greetings at the time of coronation ceremony, invitation for participation and exchange of gifts on the occasion of festivals and whenever marriages were solemnized in the royal houses. Diplomatic relations were always maintained through regular exchange of letters between the Rajput and the Maratha rulers. The *vakils* were present at the courts of each other. Frequent dispatches of special envoys and representatives from both sides for negotiations and clarification over contested issues used to take place in an amicable atmosphere.

Both sides frequently expressed and shared their feelings about each other's actions. On several occasions, the Peshwa, Shinde and Holkar expressed their friendship with

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[48] *Gwalior Kharita* No. 189, *Posh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1851/1794.

Jaipur and resolved to strengthen their ties further. Jankoji Shinde in his *kharita* to Sawai Madho Singh acknowledged the receipt of letter from Jaipur as well as horses and other gift items sent through Mishra Kishan. He requested Sawai Madho Singh to preserve the mutual harmony.[49] In 1766, Kedarji and Mahadaji Shinde conveyed their intention to maintain their friendship with Jaipur and resolved to work for healthy improvement in the relationship.[50] In a letter to Sawai Prithvi Singh, Mahadaji laid stress on the friendship between Jaipur and the Marathas that had been existing for three generations. He reiterated his desire to keep up the tradition of friendship continuing ever since the time of *Bade Maharaj*, i.e., Sawai Jai Singh.[51]Shinde's *kharitas* to Sawai Prithvi Singh confirmed the receipts of letters from Jaipur.[52] In one of his dispatches to Sawai Prithvi Singh, Peshwa Madhav Rao requested him to continue the past practice of sending the messenger to each other's court once in the year.[53] In one of his letters Mahadaji Shinde conveyed his annoyance to Sawai Pratap Singh by writing:

> "I am interested in protecting and preserving the honour of Jaipur house as per the commitment of the Marathas to late Sawai Jai Singh, but you have spoiled the prestige of Jaipur house and it has become a cause of worry to me."[54]

But as per their agreement, both decided not to side with the enemy of each other. Perhaps it was in this context that Mahadaji Shinde strongly disapproved Sawai Pratap Singh's decision to send his forces to Kannauj. Shinde viewed it as an inappropriate act on the part of Sawai Pratap Singh and warned the Jaipur ruler not to repeat such actions in future.[55] Sufficient evidence exists to prove that besides the above mentioned areas, concern about each other's well-being were also expressed. In a *kharita* to Sawai Pratap Singh, Shinde shared his concern about the Jaipur Raja's declining health. He asked Sawai Pratap Singh to send Raja Sanjay Singh for

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49 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 3, *Sawan Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
50 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 36, *Bhadon Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1824/1766.
51 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 45, *Posh Vadi* 2, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
52 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 55, *Magh Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1826/1769; *Gwalior Kharita* No. 56, *Falgun Vadi* 7, *V.S.* 1832/1775.
53 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 68, *Kartik Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
54 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 99, *Sawan Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1837/1780.
55 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 163, *Asoj Vadi* 1, *V.S.* 1848/1791.

discussion over pending matters and expressed the hope that he expects positive response from Jaipur.[56] In 1790, Shinde conveyed his satisfaction over Sawai Pratap Singh's positive attitude towards the Marathas. He conveyed this by writing:

> "I am happy to note that you are serving our government as per our instruction and I request you for continuous adherence to the policy that you are following. I ask you to furnish our forces and artillery whenever required by us. I urge you not to back out from your promise to serve us at any cost."[57]

Sawai Pratap Singh's representatives, Khushaliram and Bakhtawar Singh, who were present at the court of Shinde confirmed that their master's reply had reached Shinde. They even advised Sawai Pratap Singh not to change his attitude and continue to serve Shinde with total dedication.[58] Although the Marathas had dominance over the Rajput states, after the battles of Patan and Merta, they followed a cautious approach while dealing with the Rajputs and avoided complications in their mutual relationships.

Sometimes a particular situation required exchange of letters to assuage the fears and apprehensions of each other. For instance when the Jaipur ruler was required to visit Udaipur for the performance of an engagement ceremony he apprehended disturbances in Udaipur on account of the Maratha presence there. When Shinde came to know about the Raja's dilemma, he wrote a letter of reassurance to him by putting his fears to rest.The letter also requested the Raja to proceed to Udaipur without any reservation. Shinde asked the Raja not only to participate in the ceremony but that he should also go through all the rituals. Shinde further wrote that no disturbance would be created in Udaipur as he had already sent instructions to Lakshman Anant, his commander in Udaipur. Through this gesture, he assuaged the fears of Sawai Pratap Singh.[59]

Efforts were made by the Marathas to involve the Rajput rulers in the administration of the territory ceded to them. The pargana Sambhar was transferred to Mahadaji Shinde after the battle of Patan and Merta. While making arrangements for the

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56 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 137, *Kartik Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1842/1785.
57 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 158, *Asarh Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
58 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 151, *Vaisakh Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
59 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 188, *Magishri Vadi 10*, *V.S.* 1851/1794.

administration of Sambhar, Shinde tried to take Sawai Pratap Singh into confidence and sought his help in handling the affairs of Sambhar. He informed him about the appointment of two officers namely Gangaram and Rajaram as the new *amil* and *faujdar* of Sambhar. They were to proceed from Ujjain to resume their respective offices. Sawai Pratap Singh was askedto help these officers in running the office.[60]Shinde equally avoided unwarranted administrative interference in the territory under the direct jurisdiction of the Rajput rulers. This gets corroborated through the incident of the Jaipur ruler complaining to Shinde about the interference of his officials in the affairs of pargana Ramgarh. To this Shinde quickly responded with the assurance that appropriate instructions had been given to the Maratha officials. He also assured Sawai Pratap Singh that henceforth there will be no interference in any pargana or village belonging to Jaipur ruler.[61]

Despite display of cordiality from the Maratha side, the apprehensions of the Rajputs regarding the real intention of the Marathas is quite apparent from the sources. It is also evident that the Rajputs were not willing to part with the territory claimed by the Marathas, yet they had to yield to their demands due to fear of attack. The Maratha presence in the regions bordering Jaipur was also resented by the Jaipur rulers. These were the regions where Holkar asserted his authority.

Constant Maratha pressure on the Rajput rulers for the payment of tribute, endless disputes over the transfer of territory and the administrative control, reluctance of the Rajputs to concede the Maratha demands and manifestation of hostility between the two sides were paralleled by social and diplomatic ties between the two throughtout the second half of the eighteenth century. The visits of the Maratha *sardars* to the courts of the Rajput rulers, exchange of *kharitas*, frequent visits of the Maratha administrators and *vakils* from the Deccan for negotiations between the Marathas and the Rajput rulers. The *mokasadars*, representing the Maratha authority in various parts of Rajput ruled territory that was given to Holkar and Shinde also visited the courts of Rajput rulers.

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60 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 145, *Magh Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1843/1786.
61 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 154, *Jeth Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1848/1791.

Priests and bankers from the Maratha side frequented the capital towns of Rajput states. The relationship between the Rajputs and the Marathas was sustained with the help of courtesy visits of the Maratha dignitaries to the courts of the Rajput rulers. Detailed account of such visits in a chronological order is preserved in *dastur komwar – dikhni* in respect of Jaipur. These accounts offer valuable information and the nature of treatment meted out to the visitor from the side of the host. A careful analysis of the information contained in *dastur komwar* enables us to get an insight into the nature of diplomatic and social ties between the Jaipur rulers and the Maratha *sardars* as well as their high ranking officers. The process of the exchange of gifts between the two sides continued throughout the period of study. However, the status in the hierarchy were the determining factors in deciding the quantum and value of the gifts offered. The nature of the Maratha domination over the Jaipur ruler is also revealed by the accounts of such visits and the nature of hospitality extended to the visitor are contained in this important source. The following account is entirely based on *dastur komwar – dikhni* which provides a comprehensive account centering around these visits.[62]

Diplomatic ties were maintained by the Maratha King Shahu, Peshwa Balaji Bajirao, Rajaram and Tarabai with the rulers of Jaipur. This was accomplished through the occasional visits of their representatives to the Jaipur court and exchange of gifts. The Mughal emperors received gifts from and also gave to the envoys on their arrival and departure.[63] We find similar etiquette being followed by the Marathas and the Rajputs as well. The gift items covered a wide range from gold jewellery to pearl necklaces, clothes, horses, elephants and cash money.

Raja Shahu's representative, Tatya Gangadhar paid several visits to the Jaipur *darbar*. In 1750, when Tatya Gangadhar performed the *shradh* ceremony of his father, Sawai Madho Singh sent rupees 200 for him[64]and in 1753, rupees 250 for his wife.[65] In 1755, when he again visited the Jaipur court, Sawai Madho Singh honoured him by presenting a horse and several gifts consisting of dress material and jewellery. As

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62 *Dastur Komwar-Dikhini*, Vols. IX, X preserved in the Rajasthan State Archives at Bikaner.
63 Harbans Mukhia, *the Mughals of India*, Blackwell Publishing, New Delhi, 2004, p. 102.
64 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
65 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1810/1753.

hospitality allowance, a sum of rupees 220 was also sanctioned to him. Rupees 200 was given as cash.[66]In 1756, Tatya Gangadhar was sent to Jaipur to participate in the Maratha campaign against the Jats of Bharatpur. The Jaipur Raja felicitated him on this occasion by presenting him one horse and forty six expensive dresses.[67] A few years later, in 1765, when the Jaipur commander Raj Singh Hamirdeka was dispatched to the Deccan, gifts worth rupees 250 were sent for Tatya and his two sons.[68]

Cordial relations between Tarabai, wife of Rajaram of Satara, and Madho Singh is evident from the number of visits undertaken by Tarabai's representatives to the Jaipur court. We get to know that between 1754 and 1761, twenty four representatives from Satara visited Jaipur.[69] They were duly received at the court and properly looked after by the Jaipur ruler. In a similar way Ramraja of Satara, sent his representative to the Jaipur court on regular basis. In 1750, his *vakil* Mansa Ram Kayastha visited Madho Singh's court[70]. This was followed by Rama Pandit's visit in 1753.[71] Rama Pandit remained at the Jaipur court till 1763.[72] Raghu Pandit was the other *vakil* from Satara who came to Jaipur in 1743. He again visited Jaipur in 1748.[73]Dinkar Pandit visited the Jaipur court in 1756[74] and the Jaipur rulers attached a lot of significance to these visits from Satara.

Besides the Maratha kings, the Peshwas also sent their representatives to the Jaipur court. Peshwa Balaji Bajirao sent his officers and messengers to Jaipur right upto 1760. In 1750, he sent his officer Damodar Pandit to Jaipur to attend the coronation ceremony of Sawai Madho Singh. To commemorate the occasion an elephant and other appropriate gifts were presented to the ruler.[75] While reciprocating, Sawai

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66 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
67 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 1 & 2, *V.S.* 1811/1754.
68 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1822/1765.
69 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1811/1754 ; *Maghshri* 11, *V.S.* 1811/1754 ; *Fagan Budi* 6, *V.S.* 1811/1754; *Chait Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1811/1754; *Maghshri Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1812/1755; *Maghshri Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1812/1755; *Chait Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1817/1760; *Asoj Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1818/1761.
70 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
71 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
72 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 5, *V.S.* 1820/1763.
73 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1804/1748.
74 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
75 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1807/1750.

Madho Singh gave him expensive gift items consisting of ornaments and fancy dresses.[76] Rupees five hundred and eighteen besides five hundred rupees and two maunds of sweets were sent to his residence as a token of hospitality. Through him, expensive gifts including elephants, horses, diamonds, jewels, gold ornaments and exclusive dresses were sent for the Peshwa. To mark the occasion, valuable gift items totaling 168 were sent for the other leading Maratha *sardars*.[77]The person, who rode the elephant to Jaipur was also generously rewarded. The giving of gifts as an acknowledgement of status difference seems to have gradually evolved into a norm in the Mughal court. During the Delhi Sultanate and the reign of early Mughals, the giving of presents to the ruler has not been recorded as an obligation, although gifts were changed.[78] In 1751, four messengers carrying letters to be delivered to Sawai Madho Singh were dispatched by the Peshwa from Poona to Jaipur.[79] They revisited Jaipur thrice in 1753 [80]and once in 1754 [81]to deliver *kharitas* from the Peshwa. Again in 1755 and in 1760, three visits were undertaken by the messengers from the Poona court. The Peshwa appears to be more interested in maintaining cordial ties with the Jaipur Rajas.

From the Maratha side, notable visitors to the Jaipur court included Raghunath Rao, the brother of Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, Malhar Rao Holkar, Jayappa Shinde, Jankoji Shinde, Khande Rao Holkar, Mal Rao Holkar and Mahadaji Shinde. The leading commanders of the Peshwa, Shinde and Holkar who visited the Jaipur court included Jaswant Rao Bable, Jan Rao Bable, Santaji Bable, Ambaji Ingle, De Boigne, Bhau Bhaskar, Lakhwa Pandit and Perron. Apart from these important officials, other visitors to the Jaipur court included the relatives of the Maratha *sardars*, *mokasadars* and the other Maratha officials posted in the Maratha held territories in Rajasthan. Bankers, astrologers and a hord of Maratha officials, *halkaras* and *kasidas* also visited Jaipur from time to time. A large number of these visitors came to the Jaipur court in

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76 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
77 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
78 Harbans Mukhia, *the Mughals of India*, p. 100.
79 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 9; *Baisakh Sudi* 8; *Jeth Sudi* 3 & *Aashadh Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
80 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 12; *Posh Sudi* 2 & *Mah Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
81 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1811/1754.

connection with official matters. The other category of Maratha visitors to the Jaipur court were those who had service assignments in North India or were dispatched to other Rajput states. Interestingly, none of the Jaipur rulers, from Sawai Madho Singh to Sawai Jagat Singh ever went to the Deccan to meet the Peshwa, Shinde or Holkar. But representatives of Jaipur rulers including the *diwans* and other high ranking Kachhwaha nobles undertook journey to Poona and the Maratha camps.

In 1753, Raghunath Rao, Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Shinde visited Jaipur. Sawai Madho Singh spent rupees 20,000 on their stay and rupees 500 to meet the expenses incurred on charity disbursed by them.[82]Raghunath Rao and Mal Rao, the grandson of Malhar Rao Holkar and son of Khande Rao Holkar visited Amber. Arrangement for their stay was made at *Badaaran ka Bagh* near Amber Palace. As a mark of courtesy, Sawai Madho Singh went to meet them. In order to assert his superior position, Raghunath Rao met Sawai Madho Singh and made some formal conversation. They were joined by Mal Rao Holkar. From here the distinguished guests were taken to the Amber Palace where they held further discussions.[83] In 1756, the Jaipur ruler presented Raghunath Rao four horses and 73 valuable gifts comprising gold ornaments, exotic dresses, diamonds and pearl necklaces. Mal Rao was gifted two horses and 29 expensive items.[84] Once the formalities were taken care of, Raghunath Rao raised the issue of tribute payment during the course of conversation. Sawai Madho Singh agreed to pay rupees 6 lakhs in the form of *hundis*. These were issued by three bankers namely, *seth* Dhaneshwar, Mansa Ram Kukna and Bhikhari Das.[85] *Dastur komwar* also gives a record of payments that were subsequently made by the Jaipur ruler. In 1757, two *hundis* worth rupees 2.50 lakhs drawn by *seth* Dhaneshwar and Mansa Ram Kukna, one elephant and other gifts were sent to Raghunath Rao's headquarters in Poona.[86] In the same year, another *hundi* of rupees three lakhs was dispatched to him through *diwan* Kanhi Ram of Jaipur.[87] Shyam Singh Hamirdeka visited Poona as an envoy of the Jaipur ruler to discuss the

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82 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
83 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
84 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
85 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 4, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
86 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1814/1757.
87 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1814/1757.

schedule of tribute payment. A pearl necklace was presented to Raghunath Rao by the Jaipur representative.[88] From among the other prominent Maratha *sardars*, Jayaji Shinde visited Jaipur in 1750. He was not only received by Sawai Madho Singh himself at *Moti Dungri*, the Raja even embraced him with affection. Shinde was made to mount on an elephant and was taken to the Palace. On reaching the Palace, Shinde was presented with two elephants, dresses, ornaments and jewels.[89] To meet the local expenses, a sum of rupees 2,000 was sent to him.[90] In 1755, Sawai Madho Singh sent 85 gift items for Shinde. These included fancy dresses, ornaments, one elephant and horses among other things.[91]

Malhar Rao Holkar also received a grand reception when he came to Jaipur to visit Sawai Madho Singh in 1753.[92] After being received by Sawai Madho Singh, expensive gifts and an amount of rupees 2,900 were given to him. Separate allowances were sanctioned for his wife (rupees 500) and daughter-in-law (rupees 200). Besides all this, a sum of rupees 200 was sent to Malhar Rao Holkar for distribution in charity[93]. At the time of his departure from Jaipur, gifts consisting of an elephant, horses, ornaments and several pieces of dress materials were given to him by Sawai Madho Singh. Later the Jaipur ruler expressed his deep concern on hearing the news of Malhar Rao getting wounded. He even dispatched a *hundi* for rupees 2,040 for disbursement as charity and wished for his speedy recovery.[94] In 1755, Holkar was engaged in a fight with the Jats. As a mark of his support, Sawai Madho Singh sent a high breed horse and 26 articles of gift.[95] The year 1757 again saw several gift items being sent to the Deccan for Malhar Rao Holkar and Raghunath Rao. Five maunds of rice were sent from Jaipur for the consumption of Holkar's daughter, Gautam Bai's contingent. Besides this, tobacco for smoking pipe for Shahbaz was also sent.[96] Gifts for Malhar Rao's wife (rupees 1500), mother-in-law

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88 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
89 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 6, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
90 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
91 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
92 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
93 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 15 , *V.S.* 1810/1753.
94 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
95 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1821/1755.
96 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1814/1757.

and daughter-in-law (rupees 271) were also dispatched by Sawai Madho Singh.[97] In the same year, Malhar Rao Holkar visited Jaipur along with his family to settle the pending amount of *peshkash*. Sawai Madho Singh agreed to pay rupees 2 lakhs through a Jaipur banker, Paras Ram Kukana.[98]

In the years 1753, 1754, 1755, 1758 and 1759, several visits were paid by Holkar's messengers.[99] Information suggests that from 1751 to 1757, his *mokasadar* in Toda, Ganesh Pandit made contact with Jaipur. Within this period several gift articles were received by him from the Jaipur ruler.[100] In 1764, Holkar received five *hundis* worth rupees 11 lakhs issued by bankers Kawal Ram Surat Ram, Shah Balkishan and Sanghvi Jeev Raj Mohan Ram. These were delivered by Raja Sadashiv.[101] The following year, in 1765, Jaipur *diwan* Raja Sadashiv and the commander of Jaipur army, Raj Singh Hamir Deka were sent to the Deccan to meet Holkar. They carried 32 gift items for the Holkars[102]. The Jaipur representatives entered into an agreement with Holkar to resolve the payment of tribute amounting to rupees 1.5 lakhs. The realization of this amount was adjusted against some parganas of Jaipur which were assigned to Holkar[103].

In 1772, Mahadaji Shinde along with Jaswant Rao Bable visited Jaipur. The arrangement for their stay was made at the *Ghasi Ram Natani Ka Bagh*. They were escorted to the palace of Sawai Prithvi Singh by Ramchandra Natani and Rao Vikramaditya Rajawat. As no details are given, it appears to be a courtesy visit.[104] In 1758, Raghunath Rao's brother-in-law, Gopal Rao Pandit proceeded towards Jaipur

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97 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 3, *V.S.* 1814/1757.

98 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1814/1757.

99 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 12 & 13, *Posh Sudi* 5, *Fagan Budi* 10 & 12, *V.S.* 1810/1753; *Posh Budi* 11, *Mah Sudi* 12, *Chait Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1811/1754; *Fagan Sudi* 2 & 6, *Jeth Budi* 9, *Aashadh Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1812/1755; *Maghshri Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1815/1758; *Aasoj Budi* 1, *Posh Budi* 8 & *Posh Sudi* 4, *Fagan Budi* 11, *Fagan Sudi* 5 &14, *Baisakh Budi* 7 & *Baisakh Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1816/1759.

100 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 15, *Maghshri Budi* 11, *Mah Sudi* 15, *Chait Sudi* 1, *Jeth Budi* 9, *V.S.* 1808/1751; *Mah Sudi* 7, *Aashadh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1809/1752; *Baisakh Budi* 1 & *Baisakh Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1810/1753; *Chait Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1811/1754; *Bhadwa Sudi* 2 & *Posh Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1812/1755/; *Maghshri Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1813/1756; *Mah Budi* 5, *V.S.* 1814/1757.

101 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1821/1764.

102 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1822/1765.

103 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1822/1765.

104 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1829/1772.

from where he was to undertake onward journey to Kashi. He first paid homage at the Govind Devji temple and thereafter called on Sawai Madho Singh. The Raja received him in *Chandra Mahal* and offered him a seat facing his own. At the time of his departure from the palace, he and members of his entourage were given valuable gifts.[105]

In 1792, at the instructions of Mahadaji Shinde, De Boigne and Bhau Bhaskar accompanied by Machheri Rao Raja Pratap Singh's son, Bakhtawar Singh visited Jaipur. Two senior ministers, namely, Khushali Ram Bohra and Daulat Ram Haldia along with two leading Jaipur nobles, Raja Ratan Singh and Shiv Das Rajawat were deputed to wait upon Shinde's commanders.[106] Shyam Singh Champawat escorted them to the Jaipur palace. The Jaipur ruler, Sawai Pratap Singh got up from the throne to receive them and even embraced De Boigne. Bhau Bhaskar presented a coconut and *janeu* to the Raja.The guests were then taken to the *Chandra Mahal* where they offered 5 gold coins and rupees. 50 to the Jaipur ruler as a customary mark of respect. rupees. 1,000 and 10 maunds of sweets were sent to the camp of the visitors to take care of their hospitality.[107] These were delivered by *daroga* Santokh Ram. De Boigne set up his camp in Jaipur and named it after Mahadaji Shinde. The following day Sawai Pratap Singh along with his son, Jagat Singh went to the Maratha camp. The Raja was received with due respect. The Raja and his son were honoured with various gifts in the form of dresses, ornaments, jewels, one horse, an elephant, two guns, two pistols, betel leaf, turban and imported dry fruits. The gesture was reciprocated and De Boigne and his companions were given gifts worth rupees 20,000 by the Jaipur Raja.[108]

In 1794, the Maratha commanders, Gopal Bhau and De Boigne were encamping at Shahpura, 40 miles from Jaipur City. When Sawai Pratap Singh received the news of their arrival, he dispatched high ranking officers, namely Rai Ratan Lal, Ranjeet Singh Nathawat, Rao Raja Bhim Singh of Uniara, Rao Shambhu Singh and *hakim* Sabil Darsheel, to Shahpura to bring De Boigne to Jaipur where he was

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105 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 6, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
106 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1849/1792.
107 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 13, *V.S.* 1849/1792.
108 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1849/1792.

accommodated at *Kanth Ki Bagichi* at Bhojpura.[109] Raja Ajit Singh Chudawat and Shiv Das were sent to Bhojpura to escort him to Jaipur court. First De Boigne was reluctant to visit the Jaipur court but on getting assurance from *mahant* Jugraj of the Jain temple (*Nasia*) and Ranjit Singh Nathawat, a Kachhwaha noble that no harm would be done to him, De Boigne visited the court along with 200 of his followers and was offered the seat close to the throne of the Jaipur ruler. De Boigne and his men offered *nazar* to Sawai Pratap Singh. Thereafter he was taken to *Chandra Mahal* for conversation. The next day, Sawai Pratap Singh visited his camp at Bhojpura where gifts were exchanged by both sides. The attendants of De Boigne were also given gifts and rewards.[110] This incident shows that suspicion was lurking in the minds of some of the Maratha leaders about the Rajput ruler's intentions.

In 1791, Tukoji Holkar along with Bapuji Naik set up his camp at Nayla near Jaipur city. Santokh Ram *daroga* delivered rupees for the sake of hospitality and a maund of sweets. Rao Chaturbhuj and the son of Shri Krishan Tiwari, together went to receive Holkar and Bapuji. They came upto the court premises along with their 500 followers from where they were taken to the palace of Sawai Pratap Singh. Bapuji greeted the Jaipur ruler and the latter also reciprocated. Both sat on the carpet and held discussion. The guest was offered betel leaf and perfume. In the form of gifts, he was given an elephant, horses, dresses and ornaments by Sawai Pratap Singh. The next day Bapuji Nayak along with Bahadur Singh Rajawat of Jhilai, a Jaipur *thikana*, revisited the court. Sawai Pratap Singh held a private meeting with him. He was taken back to Tukoji Holkar's camp by Bahadur Singh Rajawat.[111] When Bapuji visited Jaipur, for the sake of hospitality, Sawai Pratap Singh sent rupees 2,000 and 20 maunds of sweets which were placed at his disposal. Santokh Ram and Hiralal delivered these items to Bapuji[112]. His third visit to the Jaipur court took place after one week. Bapu Shambhu Singh and *khawas* Roda Ram received Bapuji and his brother Mahipat Rai in the lawns of Govind devji temple. They were then taken to *Sukh Niwas* palace for conversation. Reception at the *Sukh Niwas* was accorded to

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109 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
110 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
111 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
112 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1849/1792.

persons of high rank and confidence.To deliver gifts to Bapuji Holkar, *khawas* Roda Ram and *munshi* Meetha Lal were sent to the Holkar camp.[113]

In 1799, the French commander of Shinde, Parron also visited Jaipur. On the way to his camp in Jaipur, Parron was received by high ranking officials of the Jaipur court. They were Rao Shambhu Singh, Gyan Singh Churawat, *bohra* Dina Ram, Rai Ratan Lal and *munshi* Meetha Lal. He was treated as the *tazimi* guest, honoured by the ruler who got up to receive him.[114] Sawai Pratap Singh offered him not only a seat close to himself but he also sprinkled perfume on Perron's dress. After the welcome, he was taken to Pritam palace for conversation. Parron made an offering of five gold coins and rupees. 35 to the Jaipur ruler.[115] The next day, Sawai Pratap Singh paid a visit to Parron's camp and gave him gifts comprising 35 pieces of dress, ornaments, an elephant, a horse and one telescope. Parron also reciprocated by offering valuable gift items to the visiting dignitary. Finally at the time of his departure from Jaipur, Parron received many gift items from the host.[116] Sometime later, on the occasion of the marriage of his son Jagat Singh, Sawai Pratap Singh dispatched high quality dress material to Parron.[117]The Maratha commander Jaswant Rao Bable, who was placed under the command of Mughlal emperor Shah Alam in Delhi, visited Jaipur court in 1772. He was received by a Jaipur noble Dalel Singh Khangarot. Jaswant Rao came to the court to call on the Jaipur ruler, Sawai Prithvi Singh. The Raja himself offered him betel leaf and gave a seat four feet away from his own. Jaswant Rao was honoured by presenting him a turban along with a sum of rupees 400. Besides all this, 4 maunds of sweets were sent to his camp as hospitality.[118]In the same year, Jaswant Rao Bable's son visited the Jaipur court and was given 55 expensive gifts and 3 dresses.[119]

High ranking Maratha civil officers also visited the Jaipur court as special emissaries of the Maratha leaders. Prominent among them were Antaji Mankeshwar, Pandit

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113 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1849/1792.
114 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1856/1799.
115 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1856/1799.
116 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 9, *V.S.* 1856/1799.
117 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 8, *V.S. 1856*/1799.
118 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
119 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 2 & *Jeth Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1829/1772.

Anand Rao, Naro Shankar, Aapaji Pandit, Dattaji Pandurang, Mahipat Rai Holkar, Vithal Sahdev, Kalyan Rao Pandit and Manaji Shinde. In 1755, Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao's representative Antaji Mankeshwar, posted at Jhansi was instructed to visit Marwar. Antaji Mankeshwar along with his son and Tatya Pandit reached Jodhpur. Sawai Madho Singh honoured him by sending a turban which was delivered in the territory of Marwar.[120]Late, in April 1755, Antaji visited Jaipur also. He was accommodated at *Lunkaran Ka Bagh*. At the court, Sawai Madho Singh himself received Antaji and his son. Antaji's son, Bhagwant Rai was given several gifts by the Jaipur Raja.[121] The importance of this particular visit can be gauged from the fact that Antaji was given a seat on the right side of Sawai Madho Singh which was a rare honour. By providing spatial proximity to the king or the throne, Sawai Madho Singh wanted to convey through symbolic gesture that he held the Peshwa in great regard. The Karauli chief was also present and was given a seat on the left side of Sawai Madho Singh. After the initial formalities, the Peshwa's representative held conversation with both the rulers. From the court, Antaji was taken to the temple of Gobind devji. While leaving for his camp, Antaji was gifted one horse, one pearl necklace along with 5 dresses from Sawai Madho Singh. As hospitality expenses, a sum of rupees 1050.75 was sent to the camp.[122]Later, the Jaipur ruler along with the Karauli chief went to *Lunkaran Ka Bagh* to meet the Maratha representative. During his stay in Jaipur, Antaji paid five visits to the Jaipur court and each time he was given expensive gift items. When Antaji was departing from Jaipur, one horse and 21 gift items were offered to him. [123]This was followed by one superior breed horse, 20 pieces of dress and ornaments which were sent by Sawai Madho Singh for Antaji through Anirudh Singh Khangarot who was instructed to personally deliver these to his camp in Gwalior.[124]Once again Sawai Madho Singh sent one horse and 30 other gift items to Antaji through *diwan* Kanhi Ram.

Probably it was on account of these honours bestowed on him that in 1756, during his stay at Jaipur, Antaji obliged Sawai Madho Singh by offering personal surity on

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120 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 4 & *Kati Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1812/1755,
121 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
122 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1822/1755.
123 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
124 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 2 & *Bhadwa Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1812/1755.

behalf of the latter to Jankoji Shinde for the payment of rupees one lakh.[125] The Jaipur Raja was immensely pressurized to make this payment immediately. Having been given a breather, Sawai Madho Singh soon arranged for the payment of this due demand through *hundi* issued by banker Fateh Ram Baj in the name of Antaji, payable in Ujjain. In recognition of the timely help offered by Antaji, Sawai Madho Singh sent gifts comprising one superior breed horse, dresses and ornaments.[126]

In the year 1757, Sawai Madho Singh invited Antaji to attend the court. The invitation was extended through *diwan* Kanhi Ram and Bhat Sadashiv. Antaji attended the court along with Ganesh Pandit and Triyambak Pandit. After the court proceedings, they held negotiations with *diwan* Kanhi Ram and Nand Lal of Jaipur. For further consultations, Antaji was taken to Sawai Madho Singh's private chamber in Chandra Mahal.[127]The next day, Sawai Madho Singh reciprocated the visit and went to meet Antaji at his camp. Antaji received the Jaipur Raja with due honour and offered *nazrana*. Before departing from Jaipur, Antaji visited the temple of Govind devji to pay his obeisance. Sawai Madho Singh presented him gifts worth rupees 14,000 and to his assistant Triyambak Pandit dresses and ornaments worth rupees 2,000.[128]

In 1753, Malhar Rao Holkar's *diwan*, Vithal Rao accompanied by Aapaji Pandit came to Jaipur. They were received by the Jaipur *diwan*, Raja Hargovind at *Moti Dungari*. They were then taken to the court where Sawai Madho Singh stood up to receive them. After the meeting they proceeded to pay their obeisance at the Govind devji temple. Both the visitors were given suitable gifts that included six horses and two elephants. A sum of rupees 1,500 and ten maunds of sweets were sent for their hospitality.[129]In 1755, the representatives of Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar, Naroshankar and Anand Rao Pandit were sent to the Jaipur court. The two were offered rupees 2,000 each as hospility allowance and a sum of rupees 110 in lieu of sweets. A sum of rupees 34,000 was also handed over to them as partial payment of tribute. Naroji Shankar was also the *subedar* of Jhansi and was accompanied by Aapa

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125 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
126 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
127 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
128 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
129 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1810/1753.

Tatya. In Jaipur, the arrangement for his stay was made at *Kirajila Bagh*. He was called on by the Jaipur *diwan* Kanhi Ram and Har Sahay. The two offered him perfume and betel leaf. The Jaipur *diwan* escorted him to the court where he was received *tazim* from Sawai Madho Singh. Naroji Shankar was offered a seat on the right side of the Jaipur Raja. From the court he was taken to Chandra Mahal along with Aapa Tatya Pandit and Anand Rao, who were representing Malhar Rao Holkar. *Diwan* Kanhi Ram and Har Sahay also participated in the negotiations with the Maratha representatives. They were honoured by the Jaipur ruler, who sprinkled perfume on their persons and he himself offered betel leaves and various gift items.[130]

Sawai Madho Singh again met Naro Shankar in his camp set up near the Jaipur palace. His arrival was already awaited by the Maratha representatives. Sawai Madho Singh was presented an elephant, horse, ornaments and dresses from the Maratha side. The Raja also reciprocated by giving valuable gifts to Naro Shankar. After holding discussion with Naro Shankar, the Raja left for his palace. Naro Shankar saw him off to the palace. When Naroji Shankar departed from Jaipur, he was given one horse and 32 pieces of gifts. Again in 1757, one horse and 16 gift items were sent to the Deccan for Naroji Shankar. In 1758, when Shyam Singh Hamirdeka was deputed by Sawai Madho Singh to visit Deccan to hold negotiations with the Marathas, he was instructed to take gifts for Naroji Shankar.[131]

An official of the Peshwa, Sethiaji Kherada visited Jaipur in 1750. When he called on the ruler, six dresses were presented to him. Rupees 100 were sent for Santaji Babla.[132]He visited Jaipur for the second time in 1753. The full court meeting was held to welcome him. Sawai Madho Singh received him and gave him due honour by offering him a seat on the right side of his own seat. The Jaipur *diwan* invited him to have a meal with him at his residence and also offered him 20 pieces of gifts. Sethiaji Kherada again visited the court to greet Sawai Madho Singh. This time he received 26 gift items from the Raja including dresses, ornaments and jewels. His retinue was

130 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Budi* 13, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
131 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
132 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1807/1750.

also suitably rewarded by the Raja.[133] In 1753, Vithal Sahdev was dispatched to Jaipur by Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar. He was sent to resolve the issue of tribute payment. An amount of rupees 1,500 was sanctioned to take care of his local expenses.[134] In 1757, Udai Ram Nayak was sent to Jaipur by Malhar Rao Holkar. A *hundi* worth rupees 4,060 issued by Paras Ram and a sum of rupees 100 was given for his local hospitality.[135] Besides this, Bhat Sadashiv delivered rupees 300 for Dudha Nayak and Purushottam Pandit. Similarly, Raghunath Rao sent his representative, Purushottam Pandit who visited Jaipur in 1750 and again in 1757.[136] On both the occasions he received gifts and rupees 300 to meet the cost of local hospitality. In 1761, he passed through Jaipur while he was on his way to Mathura. Sawai Madho Singh generously offered him rupees 500 so that he could meet his travel expenses upto Mathura.[137]

Malhar Rao Holkar sent Sadashiv Khande Rao and Gobind Rao Pandit to Jaipur in 1764. They stayed at Jaipur for a duration of 21 days. They received rupees 2,100 to meet their local hospitality charges. When they departed from Jaipur they were given two horses in gift and rupees 500. Again in the same year, Sadashiv Pandit and Babu Rao Pandit visited Jaipur. Sadashiv Pandit received rupees 200 as hospitality allowance and two maunds of sweets. As instructed by Holkar, he was paid rupees 15,000 through *seth* Kewal Ram to meet the salary claims of some Maratha officials stationed at Jaipur. Babu Rao Pandit was also given gifts and hospitality charges by the Jaipur Raja.[138] Ram Kishan Mishr was another representative sent by Holkar to Jaipur.[139] The next year, in 1764, Holkar sent Pandit Khande Rao to the Jaipur court where he received two gift items, a robe of honour and rupees 100 as hospitality expenses from the Raja.[140]

From among the representatives of Mahadaji Shinde who visited the Jaipur court to call on the Raja included Purushottam Pandit who visited in 1785. The Raja met him

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133 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
134 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1810/1853.
135 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1814/1757.
136 *Dastur Komwar DIkhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashad Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1814/1757.
137 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1818/1761.
138 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 3, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
139 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
140 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 3, *V.S.*1821/1764.

at Chandra Mahal. Purushottam Pandit presented a coconut and *janeu* and the Raja reciprocated by giving him a shawl and rupees 200.[141] Parbat Rai and Banoji Pandit met the ruler in 1790. Banoji Pandit was given audience in *Chandra Mahal*. Mehta Maluk Chand delivered rupees 100 and one maund of sweets as hospitality. Several other gifts were also given.[142] In 1790, Tukoji Holkar sent Dattaji Pandurang to Jaipur.He was to hold negotiations regarding the issue of control over parganas given in Jaipur territory to the Holkars. He was received with due regard by Sawai Pratap Singh at Pritam palace and was given a seat facing the Raja. Sawai Pratap Singh was presented a gold coin and a coconut by Dattaji and his son. In turn they were sanctioned rupees 800 and 8 maunds of sweets for hospitality.[143] One of the commanders of Mahadaji Shinde, Lakhwa Pandit, visited Jaipur from Sambhar in 1793. He was staying at Sambhar along with Jiwa Dada. Sawai Pratap Singh, the Jaipur ruler deputed *bohra* Khushali Ram and Sukh Lal to bring Lakhwa Pandit to the court for a meeting. Lakhwa was given the reception as *tazimi*. As per the protocol, Sawai Pratap Singh also visited the Maratha commander's camp. Over there he and his two sons received an elephant, horses, pearls, ornaments and dresses as presents from the commander. While departing from Jaipur, Lakhwa Dada received as gifts an elephant worth rupees 10,000 and various items numbering 343. As long as he was at Sambhar, Lakhwa continued to receive gifts from Jaipur Raja.[144]

Visits of the Maratha *Subedars* and *Mokasadars* to Rajasthan

Besides the high ranking officials of the Marathas, the other category of Maratha persons who visited Jaipur were the Maratha *subedar* and *mokasadar* posted in the territories under Maratha possession in Rajasthan. They came to Jaipur either to call on the Raja or to meet the higher authorities of Jaipur State to transact official work. The work was related to revenue collection, realization of tribute and administrative control over the areas transferred to the Marathas. Sometimes these visits were merely courtesy calls to create goodwill and harmony.

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141 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vl. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1842/1785.
142 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1847/1790.
143 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1847/1790.
144 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1850/1793.

The Peshwa appointed Gobind Rao Pandit as the *subedar* of Ajmer.[145] His son, Kishnaji Rao held the office of *mokasadar* in Udaipur. In 1764, Kishnaji Rao visited Jaipur and was given rupees 200 as expenses for local hospitality.[146] Sadashiv Gopal held the *mokasa* charge of Marwar and Nainwa. In 1762, he was sent to Jaipur for the collection of *mamlat* (tribute). Sawai Madho Singh received him in the court and embraced him. He was offered a seat near the Raja. The latter honoured him by presenting a robe, one horse and five other gift items. rupees 200 and one maund sweets were given for his hospitality. On his departure, he was paid rupees 2,000.[147] Keshav Pandit, *the mokasadar* of Tonk was given in gift three dresses when he came to the court.[148] The Maratha *subedar* of Ajmer, Gobind Rao Pandit was offered gifts and rupees 2,000 as reward money in 1769 when he visited the Jaipur court. He was also handed over rupees 10,000, the *ijara* amount of Borada and other villages of Ajmer for two years.[149] The Jaipur Raja obtained these villages on *ijara* with the help of Gobind Rao Pandit. His subordinate, Nanaji *Dikhni* visited Jaipur court several times to hold negotiations on behalf of his superior. There is a record of his visits undertaken in the years 1751, 1753, 1754, 1759, 1760 and 1763. On each visit he received gifts from Jaipur.[150]

Pargana Tonk had been transferred to the Holkars. In 1756, Naroji Pandit, the *mokasadar* of Tonk was sent to Jaipur by Raghunath Rao. Rupees 34,000 was fixed as the *mamlat* for Tonk. He was given rupees 1000 to meet his expences.[151] The Maratha *amil* of pargana Tonk, Bhagwant Rao dispatched his subordinate Kewal Pandit to Jaipur in 1784, to negotiate the amount of *mamlat*[152]. The *mamlat* of Tonk was again negotiated with Jaipur through his *mokasadar* Bhikhaji Bhau Pandit and Nonand Ram Soni *mahajan*, a local person. Both of them together visited Jaipur and each of them received in gift three pieces of dress material. In 1784 as the *mamlat* of

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145 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
146 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 6 & 7, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
147 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1819/1762.
148 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
149 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
150 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 7, *V.S.*1808/1751; *Mah Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1810/1753; *Mah Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1811/1754; *Baisakh Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1816/1759; *Maghshri Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1817/1760.
151 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Budi* 13, *V.S.* 1813 /1756.
152 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1841/1784.

Tonk was settled, a *shawl* was sent to the *amil* Bhagwant Rao through his *mokasadars*.[153] Kewal Pandit and other officials who accompanied him to Jaipur were presented *shawls*.[154] Bhagwant Rao was reappointed as the *amil o*f Tonk in 1797.[155] In 1791, the new *amil* of Tonk, Kripal Singh Sikh called on Sawai Pratap Singh. As a mark of respect he offered one gold coin to the Jaipur Raja. In return he received eight gift items from the Raja.[156] In 1794, he sent his *mokasadars*, Bhola Nath and Jivaji Pandit to Jaipur to fix the *mamlat*. They were duely taken care of and also suitably rewarded.[157] For Kripal Singh gift items worth rupees 200 were sent through Jwala Nath Khatri, the *vakil* from Tonk.[158]

In 1784, Shinde sent his own *amil* to pargana Sambhar to take charge of the revenue collection. He received robes of honour from the Jaipur ruler at Sambhar.[159] In 1750 [160]and 1751[161] Bapuji Pandit, the *mokasadar* of pargana Toda visited Jaipur. Balaji Pandit, the *mokasadar* of Malpura came to Jaipur in the years 1750,[162] 1751 and 1752. The Jaipur ruler gave robes of honour to both of them. Later, when Bapuji Pandit was succeeded by Yakoji Pandit as the *mokasadar* of Toda, the latter called on the Jaipur ruler and received six pieces of gifts. But his tenure proved to be quite short. In 1751, Ganesh Pandit was appointed as the mokasadar of Toda. At the time of his customary visit, the Jaipur Raja presented him a shawl and 28 gifts.[163] In 1753, Sadashiv Pandit held the charge of the pargana as the new *mokasadar*. He also made the customary visit to the Jaipur court. In 1751, Malhar Rao Holkar appointed Mahadev Pandit as the *mokasadar* of Toda. He met the Jaipur ruler after resuming the office. When he departed from Jaipur, he was given two dresses as farewell gifts.[164]In 1755, Vinayak Ganesh Pandit was made the new *mokasadar* of Toda. Like his predecessors, he also paid the official visit to the Jaipur court. He was given the

153 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1841/1784.
154 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1841/1784.
155 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1854/1797.
156 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
157 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 3, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
158 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 4, *V.S.* 1853/1796.
159 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1841/1784.
160 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1807/1750;
161 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
162 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
163 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
164 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1808/1751.

customary robe of honour and other gifts by the Raja.[165] Bishaji Pandit was the other *mokasadar* of pargana Toda and visited the Jaipur court in 1757. He was given a horse and nine gift items consisting of dresses and ornaments. At the time of his departure from Jaipur, he was suitably rewarded.[166] In 1762, Kedarji Shinde sent Bisaji Pandit to Jaipur to settle the *mamlat* amount. Bisaji was paid rupees 400 as salary and rupees 100 as inam. Rupees 300 were paid to meet his expences.[167] *Mokasadars* of Tonk[168] and Rampura[169]also visited the Jaipur court from time to time. These parganas of Jaipur were handed over to the Marathas by Sawai Madho Singh.

Ram Rao Pandit, the then *subedar* of Ujjain, was a notable Maratha administrator who paid courtesy visit to Jaipur in 1755.[170] In 1763, the Maratha *amil* of pargana Shahpura, Raghu Shankar Pandit visited the Jaipur court. Similarly the Martha *amil* of pargana Hindon in Jaipur territory, Dharam Rao *Dikhni*, called on Sawai Pratap Singh. In 1783, he was honoured with rupees 200 for his timely help against Pratap Singh Naruka.[171] In 1786, he revisited Jaipur at the invitation of the Raja[172]. Other Maratha officers included Abhoji *Dikhni* [173]and Sarbat Rai Pandit [174]who were jointly holding the office of *amil* in pargana Sambhar, paid visits to Jaipur in 1795 and 1796. They were given local hospitality as well as farewell gifts at the time of departing from Jaipur. Pargana Sambhar was under the control of Shinde.

Maratha-Jaipur Alliance against Bharatpur

The Jaipur ruler gave special honour and reward to those Marathas who visited Jaipur for participating in the battle against the Jats of Bharatpur.[175]For instance, Malhar Rao Holkar's *diwan*, Ragho Aapa came to Jaipur in 1755 to join the Maratha army sent against the Jats. He was felicitated by Sawai Madho Singh by presenting one horse

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165 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
166 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
167 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1819/1762.
168 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
169 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
170 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 2 & *Aashadh Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
171 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
172 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1843/1786.
173 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1852/1795.
174 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 4, *V.S.* 1853/1796.
175 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol.IX, *Jeth Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1812/1755, p. 664.

and many gift items.[176]Another person in Holkar's army namely Mandu Patel was sent to fight the Jats. He received one horse and various gift items from Jaipur.[177] In 1767, when the Jaipur army fought against Jawahar Singh, the Jat ruler of Bharatpur, Sawai Madho Singh requisitioned the services of Anayaji *Dikhni*. He was paid rupees 151,450 and rewarded with an elephant, a gold chain and a variety of dresses.[178] His representative, Balaji Pandit visited the Jaipur court in 1768 and got cash rewards and other gifts.[179] In 1767, Jaswant Rao Bable was given rupees 68,225 to meet the expences.[180] In 1769, Santaji Bable, Jan Rao Bable and Jaswant Rao Bable were campaigning against the Jats. When the Jaipur ruler, Sawai Prithvi Singh came to know about their presence in Jaipur territory, he sent rupees 400 and 4 maunds of sweets to the Maratha commanders as hospitality from Jaipur side. At the time of their departure, they were given rupees 1625.[181] Whenever the Marathas helped the Jaipur rulers against the Jats, special bonding emerged between the Marathas and the Rajputs. Similarly, in 1768, Anayaji *Dikhni*, Jaswant Rao Bable and Daula Mian were given rupees one lakh Daula Mian as *fauj kharch* for participating against the Jats.[182] In 1768, Dewaji Pandit was deputed by the Peshwa to join Mahadaji Shinde who was campaigning against the Jats of Bharatpur. He was received by the Jaipur officials and treated as state guest.[183]

In 1770, Sawai Prithvi Singh assigned jagir *w*orth rupees 5,000 in Phagi and Niwai *parganas* of Jaipur to Man Rao Bable, the son of Jan Rao Bable.[184]At the time of his departure from Jaipur, he was given 12 gift items. In 1770, the *vakils* of Santaji and Jaswant Rao Bable, visited the Jaipur court and were given rupees 700. For Jan Rao's son and *vakils* rupees 500 were given.[185]Tatya Gangadhar, who was under the service of Chhatrapati Shahu was honoured by Sawai Madho Singh by giving a horse and 23

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176 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1812/1755, P.P. 773,774.
177 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1812/1755, P. 664.
178 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
179 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
180 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1824/1767, p. 196.
181 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1827/1769.
182 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
183 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
184 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1827/1770, p. 200.
185 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1827/1770.

gift items. The Tatya was rewarded as he was joining the Maratha troops that were engaged in a fight against the Jats.[186]In 1772 and 1784, rupees 150 were sent for him. Ramaji *Dikhni* who was campaigning against the Jats was also given two horses and 46 gift items. The giving and sometimes exchange of gifts implicated several kinds of relationships, with status hierarchy being at the very core.[187]

Maratha Representatives at Jaipur Court for Tribute

The Peshwa, Shinde and Holkar dispatched their representatives to Jaipur court on almost regular basis to seek explanation of the Jaipur ruler about the issues yet to be resolved and the issues raised by them in the *kharitas* addressed to the Jaipur rulers. The issues pertained to the complexity involved in the settlement of tribute amount and it's timely payment. The other complicated issue was the transfer of control over territories which were given to the Marathas. This also created tensions between the two sides.

In 1751, Nago Pandit was sent to Jaipur to demand rupees five lakhs due to be paid to Malhar Rao Holkar. He received rupees 1,300 for his expenses.[188]In 1768, Shyam Rao Pandit was deputed to visit Jaipur to find out about the Jaipur ruler's take over the dispute regarding the control over Borada and other villages in Ajmer. He was sent to Jaipur by Jankoji Shinde to collect tribute from Sawai Madho Singh. They received rupees 2,000 to meet the local expenses.[189] Similarly, the Maratha *vakils*, Prithuji Pandit,[190]Jujhar Singh Brahman[191] (was given rupees 372 as hospitality) and Anand Roop Brahman[192](was given rupees 500 at the time of departure) were sent to Jaipur in 1751, 1764 and 1765 respectively. In 1770, *seth* Bapu was sent to claim *mamlat* amount of rupees 7,500.[193]

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186 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. X, *Bhadwa Sudi* 1&2, *V.S.* 1811/1754.
187 Harbans Mukhia, *the Mughals of India*, p.101.
188 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1808/1751, P. no. torn.
189 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1808/1751, P. 129.
190 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
191 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 3 & *Posh Sudi* 15, *Fagan Budi* 11, *Fagan Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
192 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Budi* 3, *V.S.* 1822/1765.
193 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1827/1770.

The Jaipur court was visited by the house of Shinde also. In 1758, Jankoji Shinde sent Antaji Nayak and Ganga Ram *khawas* to Jaipur. Sawai Madho Singh paid them rupees 300 and rupees 200 respectively, for local hospitality. In the same year, as Jankoji Shinde's representative, Naroji Kashi Pandit was dispatched to the Jaipur court.[194]The concerned document mentions the details of the amount sanctioned for his local expenses and gifts made to him in 1758 and 1759. In 1759, Udayji Bhosle sent his representative, Anand Rao Pandit to the Jaipur court. To meet his travel expenses he was given three dresses and rupees 150.[195]Mahadaji Shinde's messengers visited Jaipur in 1759, 1763, 1764, 1766, 1767, 1771 and 1772 to deliver Shinde's letters to the Jaipur rulers, Sawai Madho Singh and Sawai Prithvi Singh. They were suitably rewarded by the Jaipur rulers. Quite often Mahadaji Shinde sent his senior officers to the Jaipur court. Venkat Rao Pandit was the *mokasadar* of Tonk in 1751.[196] Later, he went back to the Deccan. Mahadaji Shinde sent him to the Jaipur court in 1768. Venkat Rao Pandit was sanctioned rupees 1000 for his expenses. To the spies and attendents who accompanied him, rupees 100 were given. As charitable grant, an additional amount of rupees 400 was paid to Venkat Rao Pandit.[197] In 1770, another officer, Lakshman Rao Pandit was sent to the Jaipur court. He was given rupees 535 and three maunds of sweets as hospitality.[198]In 1771, Mahadaji Shinde dispatched two more officers to the Jaipur court, Ragho Rao Pandit and Keshav Pandit. They received rupees 208 and 216, respectively, along with a maund of sweets from the Jaipur Raja.[199] In 1771, Aapa Pandit visited Jaipur to collect rupees 50,000 from the Raja, Sawai Prithvi Singh, to meet the expenses of Shinde's troops in Rajasthan placed under the charge of Vithaji.[200]

In 1774, Ratan Lal also went to Jaipur on Shinde's instructions to convey his master's reminder to Sawai Pratap Singh for the clearance of outstanding dues. In 1786, Sahiboji Narayan Pandit was deputed by Shinde to visit Jaipur and seek explanation

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194 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
195 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 5, *V.S.* 1816/1759.
196 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
197 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 6, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
198 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
199 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
200 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1828/1771.

from the Jaipur ruler over his inaction with regard to the issues raised by Shinde. Sawai Pratap Singh gave an audience to him in the chamber of his Palace *Pritam Niwas*. Mahadaji Shinde had deputed Shah Nizam-ud-din Fakir to manage the affairs of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam at Delhi. His son Mohammad Mir Khan was proceeding to the Deccan to get married. On Mahadaji's request, he was treated as the guest of the Jaipur state and also granted audience by Sawai Pratap Singh. The Jaipur Raja embraced him and also engaged him in formal conversation. The guest was given gift items worth rupees 1850.[201] Ganpat Rao Pandit was perhaps the last representative of Mahadaji Shinde to the Jaipur court. This last visit was in 1790, when the tribute amount which was long outstanding was demanded.[202]

After Mahadaji Shinde, his successor and grand nephew, Daulat Rao Shinde's representatives kept visiting the Jaipur court. In 1781, De Boigne sent Daya Shankar Nagar to the Jaipur court for a meeting with the Raja. He not only had to enquire from Sawai Pratap Singh about the delay in payment but also had to seek his explanation. The Jaipur Raja gave him suitable gifts.[203] In 1792, he again visited the Jaipur Raja and offered him coconut and *janeu* (sacred thread). The Jaipur Raja gave him rupees 100 for local hospitality, ornaments worth rupees 5,000, dresses and a palanquin.[204] In 1793, Daulat Rao's commanders De Boigne and Gopal Bhau deputed Ram Chandra Chhabra to visit Jaipur.[205] In the years 1793,[206] 1794,[207] 1796, 1799 and 1801,[208] Harsukh Lal *vakil* paid visits to the Jaipur court to demand the pending amount of tribute. In each of these years, he was sent to Jaipur four times to impress upon the ruler that the payment was urgently required.

In 1797,Gangadhar Balwant *Dikhni* was commissioned by Lakhwa *Dikhni* to visit the Jaipur court. After meeting the Raja, he presented a coconut and a *janeu*. The Raja also rewarded him appropriately by giving him rupees 400 as cash along with several

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201 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni,* Vol. IX, p. 831.
202 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 10, *V. S.* 1847/1790.
203 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Duti*, *V.S.* 1848/1781.
204 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 12&13, *V.S.* 1849/1792.
205 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh* 15, *V.S.* 1850/ 1793.
206 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1850/1793.
207 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
208 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Budi* 13, *V.S.* 1858/1801.

other gifts.[209]In 1794, Nago Rao Pandit was sent to Jaipur for the settlement of *mamlat*. He remained in Jaipur till 1795.[210]Nago Rao Pandit again visited Jaipur in 1797. He held a meeting with the Raja in his Palace *Chandra Mahal* and made an offering of cash, coconut and a *janeu.*[211] He took his leave from Jaipur in 1799. His last two visits to Jaipur were on behalf of the French commander of Shinde, Parron.

The Holkar house also did not lag behind in sending its representatives to the Jaipur court. In 1764, Malhar Rao Holkar dispatched maximum number of representatives to Jaipur.[212] The *dastur komwar* records of this particular year informs about the visits of Jagan Nath Pandit, Jethmal Pancholi, Triyambak Rao Pandit, Babu Rao Pandit, Paras Ram Mahadev Pandit, Sadashiv Pandit, Khande Rao Pandit and Govind Rao Pandit. With the exception of Jagan Nath Pandit, who stayed for one year in Jaipur, the other representatives visited for a short duration of time. These representatives were sent to Jaipur to remind the Raja about remitting the *peshkash* amount expeditiously.

In 1768, Rajaram Pandit was sent to Jaipur by Tukoji Holkar to demand for the pending amount of *mamlat*.[213] Mukund Rao, Holkar's representative visited Jaipur in 1772 to collect the *mamlat* amount. The Jaipur Raja paid him rupees 5,000 to meet his travel expenses back home.[214]In 1769, Tukoji Holkar dispatched Sadashiv Pandit to Jaipur with the same objective.[215]In 1791, Tukoji Holkar sent Ram Rao, Abhoji and Khanduji Pant to Jaipur to convey his message to Sawai Pratap Singh. They made offerings of gold coin and coconut to the Jaipur ruler.[216]While reciprocating the honour, the Raja gave one horse, a pearl necklace, a robe of honour and gold ornaments at the time of his departure.[217]

Visits of Maratha Notables to North India via Jaipur

With the expansion of Maratha power in North India, there was an increasing movement of the Maratha armies and representatives of the Maratha *sardars* to

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209 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1854/1797.
210 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 4, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
211 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
212 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, pp. 642, 643, 644, 645.
213 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi 2 & Chait Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
214 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
215 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 9, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
216 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
217 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1848/1791.

various places in Rajasthan and Delhi-Agra region. The sources make it evident that many of the Marathas travelling from the Deccan to Delhi-Agra region passed through the Jaipur territory. In fact some of them even halted at the Jaipur city. On such occasions, these Maratha officials often visited the Jaipur court where robes of honour and suitable presents were given by the Raja.

Dastur komwar – dikhni mentions the visits of all the notable Marathas who passed through Jaipur. When Aapaji *Dikhni* went to Marwar via the Jaipur territory he was given a sum of rupees 600 by the Jaipur Raja to meet his personal expenses within the Jaipur territory. Another Maratha official, Jagan Nath Rao *Dikhni* visited the Jaipur court and was given three robes of honour by the Jaipur Raja. In 1765,Manik Rao Pandit and Madho Rao Pandit visited the Jaipur court.[218] Similarly when a number of Marathas stationed at Fagi visited Jaipur, the Raja gave them robes of honour and gifts according to their status. Rane Khan, Man Singh Pandit, Manaji Shinde, Biraj Pandit, Madho Rao Pandit,Gopal Rao Pandit, Bahaji Tukoji Shinde, Vanuji Raghunath Pandit, Bapu Munshi, Bisoji Pandit, all of them came to visit Jaipur from Fagi in 1765.[219] In 1765,Tukoji Nayak met the Jaipur Raja. A gift item was delivered to him through Raj Singh Hamirdeka.[220] When Babu Rao Pandit, brought a *farman* of the Mughal emperor to confirm the appointment of Sawai Madho Singh as the *naib subedar* (deputy governor) of *suba* Agra, reached Jaipur, he was offered hospitality at Jaipur. He was given rupees 100 and five maunds of sweets as hospitality.[221] In 1751, he attended the Jaipur court and received rupees 200 for local hospitality.[222]He also received cash award at the time of departure from Jaipur. Later on he maintained his contacts with Jaipur till 1766. This becomes evident when the documents inform us that the Jaipur ruler sent eight gift items for him to Delhi in 1764.[223] His next visit to Jaipur is recorded in 1766.

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218 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 3 & *Chait Budi* 5, *V.S.* 1822/1765.

219 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1822/1765; Rane Khan, pp. 873; Man Singh Pandit, p. 659; Manaji Shinde, p. 837; Madho Rao Pandit, p. 659; Bahaji Tukoji Shinde, p. 350; Vanuji Raghunath Pandit, pp. 935, 936; Bapu Munshi, pp. 583, 584; Bisoji Pandit, p, 587.

220 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1822/1765.

221 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1807/1750.

222 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1808/1751.

223 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1821/1764.

When Tukoji Holkar asked his officials to join him at Bundi, they had to pass through Jaipur territory. These included Devaji Lavatia, Sriniwas Rao, Babuji Malhar, Vanji Medhkar, Sadashiv Pandit, Chimnaji Aapa and Himmat Singh *munshi*. The Raja treated them as the guests of the Jaipur state. They also received gifts and rupees 600 for local expenses.[224]Bhauji Pandit while on his way to Delhi called on Sawai Madho Singh. He received hospitality and gift items from Sawai Madho Singh.[225]

Jaipur became a convenient halting point for the Maratha officials from Deccan. They kept visiting North India to execute various tasks. It was in this connection that Shinde deputed Nawab Naqi Ali Khan in 1769 to go to the North to disburse the salary in his force encamping somewhere in Delhi-Agra region. He passed through Jaipur and received local hospitality.[226] In 1778, Aapa Pandit was deputed by Shinde to go to Jaipur to disburse salary among his forces stationed near Jaipur territory.[227]In 1788, Triyambak Rao Pandit and Man Singh Rajput were dispatched to Jodhpur by Shinde to hold negotiations with Bijay Singh. On their way back to Shinde's camp they visited Jaipur to meet Sawai Pratap Singh.[228]Another official of Shinde, Kalyan Rao Pandit, accompanied the Jaipur officials, Pahar Singh Khangarot and Radha Ram *khawas* to Jaipur. he was granted audience by Pratap Singh in *Pritam Niwas*. When he left for Rewari, he was given farewell gifts.[229]

Officials were sent not only by the Maratha *sardars* but also by their commanders. Vishnu Pandit, on his way to Udaipur came to Jaipur in 1755. The Jaipur ruler gave him rupees 164 as guest allowance along with other gifts.[230] In 1765, Raghunath Rao dispatched Gobind Pandit to Udaipur to offer the *tika* (coronation mark) to the Maharana.[231]From Udaipur he came to Jaipur to meet Sawai Madho Singh, who was related to the Maharana. He was given rupees 25 and one gift item as hospitality.[232] Similarly, in 1791, Nanhe Khan, a troop commander in Tukoji Holkar's army that was

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224 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
225 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1814/1757.
226 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 2 & *Chait Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
227 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
228 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 4, *V.S.* 1845/1788.
229 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1847/1790.
230 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
231 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 6&7, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
232 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 9, *V.S.* 1822/1765.

encamping at Jhilai in Jaipur territory visited Jaipur. He was given several dresses and ornaments as gifts.[233]In 1794, the Shinde commander Lakhwa Dada sent Gobind Ram Pandit, Mahipat Rao Holkar and Sada Bhau *Dikhni* to Jodhpur. They were accompanied by Sawai Singh Champawat, a Jodhpur noble. They were received by Megh Singh Rajawat and Hiralal *munshi*.[234]The Jaipur Raja, Sawai Pratap Singh invited the Maratha diginitories to his Palace, *Chandra Mahal*. Once there, they made an offering of coconut, gold coin and *janeu* to the Jaipur ruler. Sada Bhau, the nephew of Lakhwa Dada, was to negotiate with Bijay Singh the issue of tribute payment from Marwar.[235]When Mahadaji Shinde died in1794, Gorishankar *jyotishi*, (astrologer) who remained with Mahadji Shinde at his Mathura camp, visited Jaipur. When Sawai Pratap Singh received the news of his arrival in Jaipur, he deputed his officials to receive him. His visit to the Gobind devji temple was arranged. A sum of rupees 100 and one maund of sweets were sent for the guest. At the time of his departure from Jaipur, gifts worth rupees 500 were given to him.[236]

The bankers played a very significant part in arranging the finances for the Marathas. The *dastur komwar* document provides valuable information about the bankers associated with the Maratha *sardars* in the Deccan. They were also dispatched to Jaipur. Sada Shankar Mehta, a *sahukar* from the Deccan, visited Jaipur thrice in 1759,[237] 1760[238] and 1761.[239]On each visit he received hospitality, cash reward (rupees 3998) and gift from the Jaipur Raja. In 1759 and1760, Holkar sent from the Deccan, *sahukar*, Surat Ram Mehta to Jaipur. He was also given gifts and rewards by the Jaipur ruler.[240]In 1790, Khushal Chand *seth* from the Deccan visited Jaipur on the occasion of the festival of *Gangor*. The festival is celebrated with great fanfare at Jaipur. In keeping with the spirit of the festival, the Jaipur Raja gave him several

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233 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
234 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 13, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
235 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 5, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
236 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1851/1794.
237 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 2, *Aashadj Budi* 5 & 7, *Sawan Sudi* 4 & 10, *Bhadwa Budi* 3, *Fagan Sudi* 14, *Bhadwa Budi* 13, *V.S.* 1816/1759.
238 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 4, *Bhadwa Sudi* 6, *Aasoj Sudi* 5, *Maghshri Budi* 13, *Posh Budi* 9 & 11, *Posh Sudi* 12 & 13, *Fagan Sudi* 6, *Jeth Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1817/1760..
239 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1818/1761.
240 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1816/1759.

gifts.[241] When the father of Khushal Chand passed away in 1791, as a mark of *matami* (bereavement) the Jaipur Raja sent three dresses.[242]In 1798, the agent of the *seth*, Khushal *Parikh*, came to Jaipur to transact business.He visited the court and offered *nazrana* to the ruler and received gifts in reciprocation.[243]In 1791, Tukoji Holkar visited Jaipur along with his minister Khandoji Pant and the banker Tikamdas Oswal. Holkar's minister was given one horse, a robe of honour, gold ornaments and five dresses.[244]Tikamdas Oswal, the banker made an offering of five gold coins and rupees 10 to the Jaipur ruler. The Raja presented him a robe of honour and three gift items.[245]

Maratha Participation in the Rituals of the Rajputs (Coronation, Marriage and Mournings)

Political ties between the Marathas and the Rajputs were strengthened by fulfilling social obligations. Senior officers were dispatched by the Peshwa, Shinde and Holkar to Jaipur to represent them in the coronation ceremony, on occasions of marriage in the royal family of Jaipur. To mourn the death of Jaipur ruler or any members of his family important persons were sent. There were certain norms that they were required to fulfill. At such times, the concerned officials carried all the things required according to the occasion and the particular ritual. In 1750, the Jaipur Raja Sawai Madho Singh's coronation ceremony was to take place. Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao sent several gifts through his representative Damodar Mahadev Pandit along with felicitations and best wishes. These were delivered to Sawai Madho Singh at the time of the coronation ceremony. The Jaipur Raja reciprocated the gesture. The Peshwa's representative was given rupees 500 as hospitality allowance and two maunds of sweets. At the time of his departure, he was given various gifts numbering 50. These gifts also included elephants , horses, pearls,diamonds and dresses for the Peshwa. Besides these, about 168 gifts were sent for the leading Maratha *sardars*.[246] Malhar Rao Holkar also sent the customary *tika* to Sawai Madho Singh to felicitate him on

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241 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1847/1790.
242 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
243 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, pp. 693, 694.
244 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
245 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1848/1791.
246 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1807/1750.

the occasion. On his behalf, expensive dresses, ornaments, one elephant and two horses were presented to Sawai Madho Singh. The Raja also generously reciprocated and sent numerous gifts which were 279 in number. Besides these 10 horses were also sent for Holkar. The Jaipur *diwan* Kanhi Ram was deputed to deliver these gifts personally to Holkar in the Deccan.[247] The Peshwa's brother, Raghunath Rao also sent the customary tika for Sawai Madho Singh.[248] Baji Pandit also brought gifts for Sawai Madho Singh on this occasion.

In 1755, the Peshwa sent dresses for the crown prince of Jaipur through Raghunath Pandit.[249] When Sawai Madho Singh died, Shinde sent his representatives to Jaipur to participate in the *pagbandi* (tying of the turban) ceremony. In this ceremony, the ritual of tying a turban (*pagbandi*) takes place, in which after the death of the father a turban is tied on the head of the son, thereby indicating the succession from father to son.The representatives of Peshwa were received at Sanganer by Surat Ram Shivbrahmpota, Manorath Ram and Khoob Ali Pirzada. Apart from them, Bhatt Shankar Dutt, *diwan* Ratan Lal and Ajit Singh Churawat went to Sanganer to call on the Maratha representatives and escort them to the capital. After reaching the court, the guests met the ruler. They were given hospitality allowance of rupees 1000, five maunds of sweets and rupees 2000 to meet their other expenses. The Maratha representatives carried with them several gift items bestowed on them by the Jaipur court. Aapa Pandit stayed back at Jaipur till 1771.

In 1769, on behalf of the Peshwa, Vithal Rao Pandit brought all customary gifts for Sawai Madho Singh's successor Sawai Prithvi Singh. He was sent to attend his coronation ceremony. Vithal Rao Pandit received rupees 300 and three maunds of sweets as hospitality and rupees 200 as *inam*.[250]Besides all these he was given 38 gift items when he departed from Jaipur.[251]Mahadaji Shinde also sent his representative, Neelkanth Rao Pandit from the Deccan to attend the coronation ceremony of Sawai Prithvi Singh. He received rupees 400 and two maunds of sweets as hospitality.

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247 *Dastur Kowmar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
248 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 6, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
249 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 5, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
250 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
251 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1826/1769.

Customary presents were given on behalf of Shinde. In accordance with the custom, Shinde's representative placed *tika* on the forehead of Sawai Prithvi Singh. The Raja was presented the *tika* in the presence of the entire court. Shinde had also sent an elephant, several dresses and studded ornaments to the new ruler. These were delivered by Govind Rao Pandit.[252] Three days after the coronation ceremony, Shinde's representative from the Deccan, Ghudaji Pandit came to Jaipur to present a turban to Sawai Prithvi Singh and expressed Shinde's solidarity and friendship with Jaipur. Arrangements for his stay were made in a mansion. Ghudaji was escorted to the court by the *daroga* of the court. The Raja came to the court to meet the Maratha representative. To entertain the guest, dance and music were performed in the court. Thereafter he was taken to the private chamber where Sawai Prithvi Singh accepted the decorated turban and gifts sent by Shinde. These consisted of an elephant, two horses, ornaments and 25 dresses. Shinde also sent presents for the younger brother of the Raja and his mother Shri Chudawatji.[253]

In 1771, Shinde expressed his friendship and solidarity with the Jaipur Raja and sent customary gifts of forty one dresses and four pearl necklaces for Sawai Prithvi Singh. These were sent through his representataive Keshav Rao Pandit. The Raja also graciously sent return gifts and rupees 10,000 for Shinde's daughter and son-in-law.[254]Once again In 1772, the Jaipur Raja sent several gifts for Mahadaji Sindhia as courtesy.[255]It was remarkable that even at the time of acute hostility and tension between the two sides, both Shinde and the Jaipur ruler remained courteous and respectful to each other. This will become clear from the fact that when tensions were soaring high and Mahadaji Shinde came to Tunga to give a fight to the Jaipur and Jodhpur rulers, the expressions used in the official language for his arrival at Tunga are very polite and full of respect.[256]

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252 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
253 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
254 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
255 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
256 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1843/1786, Throughout the battle, Mahadaji Sindhia was addressed as 'Sindhia Patel', 'Sindhia', or 'Patel.'

Like Mahadaji Shinde, Tukoji Holkar also sent his representative, Vithal Rao Pandit to Jaipur to attend the coronation ceremony of Sawai Prithvi Singh in 1769. In the presence of the high ranking civil officials and nobles, he presented the gifts sent by Holkar for the Jaipur Raja.[257] In 1770, another representative of Tukoji Holkar, Ghanshyam Pandit visited Jaipur to attend the marriage ceremony of Sawai Prithvi Singh. On this occasion, Holkar had sent gifts for the marriage.[258] In the same year, a messenger of Tukoji Holkar brought a *kharita* from Jaipur to inform about the news of the Holkar house being blessed with the birth of a son.[259]Vasdeo Pandit, Holkar's *vakil* was sent to Jaipur to deliver the customary gift to Sawai Pratap Singh in 1788.[260]In the year 1790, on behalf of Tukoji Holkar, Malhar Pandit visited Jaipur to participate in the coronation ceremony of Sawai Pratap Singh. Suitable gifts were sent by Holkar to observe the occasion. The Jaipur official, Malook Chand Khiduka received the Maratha official at the *Ghat* gate. He was accommodated at the mansion of Bala Rao *Dikhni*. Malhar Pandit made his personal offering of a coconut, two pieces of sacred thread and rupees 510 to Sawai Pratap Singh in full view of the Jaipur court. The gift items sent by Tukoji Holkar included an elephant, horses, jewels, a necklace made of forty pearls, diamonds and a sapphire. Apart from the gifts for the Raja, other members of the royal household were also taken into consideration. Holkar sent separate gifts for the crown prince and wards of the royal household. These consisted of dress materials which were manufactured in the Deccan. Besides these, ornaments were also sent. The Raja also sent several return gifts for Holkar and his family.[261]

Besides reciprocating on the occasions of marriages and coronation ceremony, the Rajputs and the Marathas also empathized with each other when the cruel hands of death struck them. When the Jaipur Raja received the information regarding the death of Mahadaji Sindhia, he ordered that as a mark of mourning, the *naubat* was not to be sounded.[262]

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257 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
258 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
259 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
260 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1845/1788.
261 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1847/1790.
262 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, pp. 689, 690.

Jaipur Ruler's Adherence to Protocol

Just as the Marathas were particular in fulfilling the social and political obligations, the Jaipur rulers also fully adhered to all protocols and etiquettes in their treatment of the Maratha dignitaries on occasions of birth, marriage and death in their respective families. In 1765, three dresses were sent to Vanket Rao Pandit on the occasion of his marriage in 1765.[263]When Bhau *Dikhni* was blessed with a son in 1772, dresses and other gifts were sent from Jaipur.[264]The Maratha commander, Jaswant Rao Bable raided pargana Toda Rai Singh in Jaipur territory and occupied it. However, he was overpowered by the Jaipur *diwan* cum commander, Daulat Ram Haldia. The latter captured him and brought him to Jaipur where he was imprisoned in Jaigarh fort and he died as a captive. Though Jaswant Rao Bable was in captivity, yet, the Jaipur Raja visited the residence of his son, Abha Rao Bable in order to mourn the death of his father. The Raja offered him a special robe of honour, drum, palanquin, a horse and also made a very generous assignment of jagir worth rupees one lakh. Apart from these honorariums, the title of Rao was also bestowed on him.[265]

In 1753, Malhar Rao Holkar's son, Khande Rao, lost his life while fighting with the Jats of Bharatpur. When Sawai Madho Singh received the fateful news, he sent a robe of honour, an elephant, a horse and two ornaments to the Holkar household as a mark of mourning. These were delivered by *diwan* Kanhiram.[266]Sawai Madho Singh also mourned the death of Jayaji Shinde in 1755 and sent a condolence message to Jayaji's successor, Jankoji Shinde. For the performance of the death ritual, two horses, dresses and ornaments were sent.[267] Even Ganesh Pandit was consoled by the Jaipur ruler when his father Shankarji Pandit passed away in 1752. Rupees 40, a robe of honour and three gifts were sent as condolence.[268] When Gobind Rao Pandit, a senior officer of Holkar, who also held the office of the *subedar* of Ajmer died in 1755, a robe of

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263 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1822/1765.
264 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
265 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1838/1781.
266 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
267 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi 2 & Bhadwa Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
268 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Baisakh Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1810/1753.

honour and 55 gifts were sent for his son Balaji Pandit as a mark of mourning.[269] In 1759, Sawai Madho Singh sent rupees 100 on the occasion of the *janeu* ceremony of Pandit Bala Rao's brother. [270] In 1769, when Khande Rao's father lost his life in a battle, as a mark of mourning, the Jaipur Raja sent a robe of honour along with three other items to his son Khandoji.[271] A commander of Shinde's army, Jan Rao Bable was residing in the mansion of Jadu Das Chhabra in Jaipur. When he returned from the campaign against the Jats, he visited Jaipur. He was provided hospitality and was given rupees 400 along with 4 maunds of sweets.[272]When he expired in 1770, the Jaipur ruler went to the residence of his son Man Rao Bable to mourn the death.[273] However, Man Rao Bable had to rush to Jaipur from the Deccan. He was given a robe of honour and rupees 150.[274]In 1790, Lakshman Rao Pandit *Dikhni* was asked to accompany Roda Ram *khawas* to visit Indore for the settlement of *mamlat* with Tukoji Holkar in 1790. Unfortunately, Lakshman Rao expired at Indore. To condole his death, Sawai Pratap Singh sent three dresses for his son, Madhav Rao Pandit.[275]

At times close personal relations were developed by the Maratha officials during their stay at the courts with the Rajput ruler, his senior ministers and sometimes even with the nobles. Continued dispatches of gifts indicated recognition of the favours received in the past. It was also an indication topreserve goodwill that had been developed overtime. This can be strengthened with the examples of Antaji Mankeshwar and Naroji Shankar. When Sawai Madho Singh was under immense pressure from Jankoji Shinde to remit the amount of pending tribute, it was on account of Antaji Mankeshwar's efforts that Sawai Madho Singh got reprieved. Antaji bailed him out by giving his personal surety for payment of rupees one lakh. This amount was later paid by Sawai Madho Singh at the earliest. Naroji Shankar was also sympathetic to the cause of Jaipur. Both, Naro Shankar and his son Shankarji Pandit continued to receive gifts from Jaipur in the Deccan as well as at the place of their posting.

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[269] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
[270] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1816/1759.
[271] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
[272] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 14, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
[273] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
[274] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 11, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
[275] *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 6, *V.S.* 1847/1790.

Another Maratha official who helped Sawai Madho Singh was Gobind Rao Pandit, the Maratha *subedar* of Ajmer. He helped Sawai Madho Singh in obtaining the villages of *taalluqa* Borada on *ijara*. It is significant to note here that the Jaipur ruler had for long resisted the Maratha demand for the transfer of administrative control over *taalluqa* Borada to the Marathas. The Maratha commander Ambaji Ingle placed Jaipur under gratitude when he thwarted the attempts of the Machheri ruler, Pratap Singh Naruka to capture and annex Patan from Jaipur. Krishnaji Pandit, the Peshwa's *vakil* at the Jodhpur court was regarded as a great sympathizer of Bijay Singh. Therefore, the Jodhpur ruler wanted Krishnaji to be a party when Jodhpur officials were to hold negotiations with Shinde for the settlement of the terms of treaty between the two, after the battle of Merta.

In the light of the above discussion it can be concluded that the Rajputs tried to create a pro-Rajput faction among the Marathas. The latter could use their influence to accommodate the interests of the Rajputs and help them in seeking less harsh terms for the settlement of the Maratha demands. It also becomes clear that gift giving was used as a device to win over the Marathas of substance. Whether this diplomacy of the Rajputs was successful becomes clear from the correspondence exchanged between Pandit Naro Shankar and Sawai Madho Singh. In a letter written by Naro Shankar and addressed to Sawai Madho Singh, it is clearly mentioned that Naro Shankar acted in the interests of the Jaipur ruler and that he is committed to obey the orders of the Jaipur ruler.

Interestingly, the gifts given to the Marartha *subedars*, *kamavisdars* and *mokasadars*, operating in the parganas handed over to the Marathas were also motivated. The objective was to desist the Marathas from having a firm hold over these pockets of territory. If the Marathas were given a free hand, it could have seriously undermined the Rajput authority in these areas. A large number of reports support the difficulty faced by the Maratha officials in the settlement of revenue, despite the presence of Maratha military posts. On the basis of the available information it can be concluded that some Maratha officials colluded with the Rajputs and devolutions of the Maratha control to some extent was sought with their collaboration. Thus, the gift giving

signified not only adherence to diplomacy, royal protocol and etiquettes but also a means to create a strong support base among a section of the Marathas that could be instrumental in diluting the burden of demands imposed upon the Rajputs by the far more powerful Maratha adversaries. In 1751, Nago Rao Pandit had visited Jaipur four times to negotiate the terms of the payment of *mamlat*[276]to Shinde. In 1799, the Jaipur Raja, Sawai Pratap Singh sent the invitation for the marriage of prince Jagat Singh to Daulat Rao Sindhia. Along with it he received dresses and rupees 800 in cash , besides an elephant, a horse and 101 gold *mohars*.[277] These gifts were delivered in the Deccan. Marriage gifts were also sent for Parron through Bhawani Das Khatri.[278]

Continous Process of Exchange of Gifts

There was a continous process of exchange of gifts between the Jaipur rulers and the Maratha dignitaries. In 1742, jewels and dresses worth rupees 1872.75 were presented to Uma Bai, the wife of Khande Rao Holkar. Har Prasad Khatri delivered these gifts to her.[279]She also maintained contact with the Jaipur ruler through her messengers. They constantly visited Jaipur. The Jaipur ruler sent gifts to the Peshwa and his leading *sardars*. Keshav Das Khatri was deputed to visit the Deccan in 1748 and 1751 to deliver gifts comprising, dresses, ornaments, diamonds etc. Altogether they valued rupees 15,000.[280]In 1750, the Jaipur representatives in the Deccan, paid the Marathas rupees 42,53,000.[281]The following year, in 1751, the Jaipur *diwan* Kanhi Ram went to the Deccan to meet Malhar Rao Holkar. He carried with him a robe of honour and 134 gifts for Holkar.[282] Again in 1752, gifts worth rupees 16,000 and 10 horses were sent twice for Holkar.[283]Horses and gift items were sent for Mal Rao Holkar, the son of Khande Rao Holkar in 1753[284]and 1757.[285]In the year 1756, the Jaipur representative

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276 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 10; *Mah Budi* 10; *Fagan Sudi* 2; *Chait Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
277 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1856/1799.
278 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1856/1799.
279 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1799/1742.
280 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
281 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
282 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
283 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Mah Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1808/1752.
284 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aashadh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
285 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Jeth Budi* 7, *V.S.* 1812/1757.

was deputed to deliver gifts for Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar. Once again Raghunath Rao received several gifts including one elephant and horses. These were sent to him in the Deccan.[286] Shyam Singh Hamirdeka was sent from Jaipur in 1771 to the Deccan to deliver a necklace to Raghunath Rao. In 1756, Raghunath Rao's *diwan*, Chimaji Pandit had received a robe of honour from the Jaipur ruler.[287] In 1771, along with his master, the *diwan* also received gifts through Shyam Singh Hamirdeka. The Peshwa's *diwan*, Anand Rao Pandit had also received several gifts from the Jaipur ruler.

Jaipur Raja's Efforts to keep the Holkar and Shinde Household in Good Humour

Attempts were made by the Jaipur rulers to keep the Holkars also in good humour. This was accompolished by delivering them gifts from time to time. In 1756, two horses and 89 gifts were sent for Malhar Rao Holkar.[288]The next year, in 1757, one horse and 14 gift items were sent for Holkar. Along with this, five maunds of rice for his daughter, Gautam Bai's contingent and tobacco to be used in the smoking pipe for Shahbaz.[289] The Jaipur Raja sent Raja Sadashiv and Raj Singh Hamirdeka to the Deccan, in 1765, where they presented several gifts to Malhar Rao Holkar and Mal Rao Holkar.[290]In 1767, the Jaipur representative, Shyam Singh Hamirdeka, carried gifts for the *Dakhanis*.[291]The next year, in 1768, the Jaipur ruler sent an elephant worth rupees 8,000 along with weapons made in Jaipur as gifts. Raja Sadashiv delivered them.[292]These gifts were sent soon after the coronation of Sawai Prithvi Singh.

Sometimes requests were made to the Jaipur Raja to send certain specific items which were either not locally available in the Deccan or were of superior quality. Therefore, when Holkar requisitioned for 10 *sers* of raw silk, five diamonds and two gold rings

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286 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
287 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1822/1765.
288 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 1, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
289 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Budi* 10, *V.S.* 1814/1757.
290 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1822/1765.
291 Dastur Komwar Dikhni, Vol. IX, Chait Budi 2, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
292 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Fagan Sudi* 6, *V.S.* 1825/1768.

from Jaipur, the Raja sent them as gifts.[293] Similarly, in 1771, Tukoji asked the ruler to send saffron, medicinal herbs and spices for the use of Holkar household. The Raja promptly met the request.[294]Tukoji Holkar continuously sent his representatives to Jaipur to meet the specific requirements of Holkar household for services and goods. Jaipur has always been famous for its dying and calico printing industry. In 1768, Holkar sent 26 bales of cloth to Jaipur for a particular type of dying. The services of two dyers, Chiman and Madari were requisitioned to undertake the work. They received rupees 269 as service charges.[295]

In 1787, the Jaipur Raja sent 43 gift items to Indore for Tukoji and six gifts for his daughter-in-law, through Raja Ram Godha.[296] In 1788, the Jaipur representative delivered to Holkar rupees 2,000, 34 gift items, medicine weighing two *sers*, seven smoking pipes and tobacco. Similarly gifts were sent for his daughter-in-law. In 1772, Sita Ram Pandit from Jaipur delivered to her an unspecified amount of cash and dresses for her.[297] Once again Raja Ram Godha delivered two horses and 26 dresses in 1783 [298]and again in 1787, many expensive dresses for her were sent from Jaipur. [299]Her employee, Kamlakar Pandit stayed at a village in the Jaipur State. When he decided to depart from Jaipur and join her employer's service, the Jaipur ruler sent gifts for her.[300]

Like the Holkar household, even the Shinde's received gifts from the Jaipur Raja at regular intervals. Contacts were maintained with them in almost equal measure. In 1751, rupees 1,000 were sent for Jayaji Shinde for his personal expenses. At the time of Jayaji Shinde's death, the rituals pertaining to the mourning were performed on behalf of the Jaipur Raja. His successor, Jankoji Shinde received two horses and many other gift items consisting of dresses and ornaments. Later, in 1755, when Jankoji was formally declared as the successor of Jayaji Shinde, 42 gifts at the time of this

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293 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi 2 & Chait Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
294 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Aasoj Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
295 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni* , Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
296 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni* , Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1844/ 1787, PP. 398, 399.
297 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni* , Vol. IX, *Maghshri Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1829/1772.
298 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni* , Vol. IX, *Baisakh Sudi* 15 & *Sawan Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1842/1785.
299 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni* , Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1844/1787, pp. 372, 373.
300 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni* , Vol. IX, *Sawan Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1844/1787.

ceremony, were sent on behalf of the Jaipur ruler.[301]In the following years, in 1756, 1757 and 1758, Jankoji Shinde continued to receive gifts from the Jaipur State that varied from swords, horses to ornaments and clothes. Dresses and ornaments were also sent for his wife.[302]

With the tragic death of Jankoji in 1761, ritualistic offerings of bereavement were sent to his sons Kedarji and Mahadaji Shinde. Gifts were also received from Jaipur at the time of their *tika* ceremony. At the time of their coronation ceremony, four horses and 84 gift items were presented. As the occasion demanded, clothes and ornaments were sent through Dalel Singh Rajawat, to mourn the death of Jankoji Shinde.[303]In 1762, the Jaipur representative, *diwan* Kanhi Ram and Sada Shiv Pandit were deputed to deliver unspecified gifts for Kedarji Shinde.[304] He also carried gifts for a member of the Shinde family, Dattuji Patel that included a horse and 26 dresses for him and two dresses and ornaments for his wife. *Diwan* Kanhi Ram delivered rupees 51,000 to Mahadaji Shinde.[305]Again in 1767, Sawai Madho Singh dispatched Shyam Singh Hamirdeka to give gifts to Mahadaji Shinde.[306] In 1768, Rs, 2,000 were sent to Mahadaji Shinde to meet his requirement.[307]The *diwan* of Kedar Shinde, Triyambak Rao also received gifts from Jaipur.[308]

Besides the Maratha commanders, their civil officers of standing also received gifts from the Jaipur representatives on behalf of the Raja. Whenever they visited the Deccan to hold negotiations with the Marathas, they also carried gifts with them. In 1755, the Kachhwaha noble, Anirudh Singh Khangarot went to the Deccan and presented three robes of honour to Galwaji *Dikhni*.[309]During Shyam Singh Hamirdeka's visit to the Deccan in 1767, he offered gifts to Abhaji Mahadeo, an influential Maratha administrator. Anand Rao Pandit was another Maratha civil officer who received gifts from

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301 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
302 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Posh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
303 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Sawan Budi* 12, *V.S.* 1818/1761.
304 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Magh Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1819/1762.
305 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1822/1765.
306 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Chait Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
307 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1825/1768.
308 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, Vol. IX, *Kati Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1820/1763.
309 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni, Vol. IX, Sawan Budi* 2, *V.S.* 1821/1755.

the Jaipur Raja. In 1758, he received one horse and sixteen dresses. In 1759, Shyam Singh Hamirdeka visited the Deccan and delivered eleven dresses to him. The same officer visited the Deccan again in 1767 and gave eight items to Anand Rao Pandit on behalf of the Raja.

Similarly, Tatya Gangadhar served under Raja Shahu. Tatya and his two sons were delivered gift items by Raj Singh Hamirdeka in 1764. Ram Krishna Mishr, a subordinate of Malhar Rao Holkar was given twenty two gift items in 1765.[310] These were sent to him in the Deccan. Mahadaji Shinde's commander, Ambaji Ingle also received gifts in cash as well as kind from the Jaipur ruler in 1777, 1788 and 1799. In 1799, gifts worth rupees 673 were sent to Ambaji's two sons also. The other two Maratha dignitories, who received gifts were Ali Bahadur and Bapuji Holkar. The gifts were carried on behalf of the Jaipur Raja by Raja Ram Godha, who delivered them to the Deccan in 1787 by Mehta Gunaji.[311] For De Boigne's son, Illahi Baksh, six dresses were sent from Jaipur in 1795.[312]In 1795, Mehta Maluk Chand delivered gifts to the Maratha dignitaries that included Lakhwa Dada, Jagu, Aabaji, Bapu Fadnis, Ambaji Ingle and his two sons, Bhikhaji, Budh Singh, Kushal Rai, Hiralal Munshi.[313]

It may be concluded from the above mentioned discussion that the relations between the Marathas and Rajputs were not totally adversial but were also marked by attempts to further mutual co-operation. Through mutual exchange of letters both sides tried to negotiate the quantum of tribute payable to the Marathas. Despite occasional bonhomie, the Rajputs did not desist from resisting Maratha occupation of Rajasthan. The next chapter gives a detailed account of Rajput resistance against the Marathas.

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310 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni, Vol. IX, Kati Budi* 8, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
311 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni, Vol. IX, Sawan Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1844/1787.
312 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni, Vol. IX, Kati Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1852/1795.
313 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni, Vol. IX, Posh Budi* 4, *V.S.* 1852/1795.

CHAPTER 5

MARATHA OCCUPATION OF RAJASTHAN AND RAJPUT RESISTANCE

The succession disputes in Jaipur and Jodhpur paved the way for the formal arrival of the Marathas in Rajasthan. It offered them an opportunity to expand their influence in Rajasthan much beyond the right to collect the tribute. The rival princes indulged in bribing the Maratha commanders, namely, Holkar and Sindhia, to support their cause.[1] When Raja Sawai Ishwari Singh Kachhwaha cound not pay the promised amount to the Marathas, he committed suicide. His younger brother, Madho Singh ascended the Jaipur throne after promising a heavy price to the Marathas. The new ruler, his nobles and the people of Jaipur bitterly resented Jayappa Shinde's demand of one third or at least one fourth of the Jaipur territory to be handed over to the Marathas. The simmering anger of the people of Jaipur for the Mararthas found expression in the killing of thousands of Marathas in the Jaipur city.[2] However, this act of the people further increased the financial strain on the State treasury. The massacre was followed by negotiations with the Marathas that again swelled the Maratha demand for payments. The Jaipur ruler had to agree to compensate the Marathas for the loss of men, horses and property.[3]

The Jaipur succession dispute had involved the Marathas for six years. Somehow this span badly damaged the good old ties that existed between Sawai Jai Singh and the Marathas.[4] But the twin issues of tribute payment and transfer of territory as demanded by the Marathas were not fully resolved. This left a lot of scope for disputes, claims and counter claims in future. Throughout the later half of the eighteenth century, these unresolved issues gave the Marathas the pretext to intervene in the affairs of Jaipur whenever they so desired.

As per the terms of the negotiations with the Marathas, the parganas of Tonk, Toda, Raisinghpur, Malpura, Fagi and *tappa* Barwada in pargana Niwai were to be

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1 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 174-189.
2 G.S. Sardesi, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, Bombay, 1958, p. 251.
3 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 170, 171.
4 G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, p. 251.

transferred under the control of Malhar Rao Holkar. Sawai Madho Singh also promised to pay a *nazar* of rupees 10 lakhs to the Maratha king Shahu. A written undertaking was given by Malhar Rao Holkar to the Maratha king Shahu. The amount was payable in four installments over a period of next two years, i.e., 1749-50. Within this period the Maratha general was allowed to occupy the above mentioned parganas till the payment was complete.[5] With the completion of the negotiations, Holkar started demanding the possession of the parganas that were promised. In a letter of 1749, Holkar asked Sawai Madho Singh for the payment of promised amount and control over pargana Tonk in return for the Maratha support extended against Sawai Ishwari Singh in 1748, in the battle of Bagru.[6] Earlier Sawai Madho Singh had given to Holkar the control over Rampura an area that actually belonged to Mewar and was gifted to Madho Singh, who was the nephew of the Maharana of Udaipur.

We get valuabe information from the *kharitas* about Holkar's attempts to gain steady control over areas promised by Sawai Madho Singh. The nature and degree of the Maratha control as well as the response of the Jaipur ruler and the local Rajput *bhomias* to the presence of the Marathas in Jaipur territory are also recorded. As soon as Sawai Madho Singh occupied the Jaipur throne, Malhar Rao Holkar and his son Khande Rao Holkar tried to settle the areas claimed by them within Jaipur territory. In order to make their presence felt in the region, the first step was to appoint their representatives in the Jaipur court. This was done for regular communication to sort out the dealings between the two sides. Holkar sent Bhaiya Tulsi Ram as his *vakil* at the Jaipur court.[7] To superwise the work of tribute payment, two more officials, Pandit Shankarji and Pandit Ganeshji were also deputed to Sawai Madho Singh's court.[8] *Diwan* Kanhi Ram was sent by Sawai Madho Singh to Holkar as the Jaipur representative.[9]

Apart from appointing officials to the Jaipur court, Holkar thought it prudent to establish his *thanas* or outposts in the parganas which he claimed from Jaipur.

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5 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 145.
6 *Indore Kharita* No. 1, *Kartik Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1806/1749.
7 *Indore Kharita* No. 5, *Falgun Vadi* 6, *V. S.* 1807/1750.
8 *Indore Kharita* No. 9, *Falgun Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1807/1750; *Indore Kharita* No. 38, *Kartik Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
9 *Indore Kharita* No. 35, *Bhadon Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1809/1752.

Accordingly, he appointed officials to take over the charge of these *thanas*. Therefore, in 1750, Malhar Rao Holkar he wrote to Sawai Madho Singh to transfer the control of parganas Rampura and Hinglajgarh to Pandit Govind. The official was to act as Holkar's representative in these parganas. Sawai Madho Singh was asked to issue necessary instructions to his officials, *qiledars, taalluqadars*, etc. about the transfer of these areas to Holkar. This was to be done to avoid any confrontation between the Maratha officials and the local officials of Jaipur.[10]

Thanas were established by Holkar in pargana Nenwa. He also appointed *kamavisdars* (Maratha local administrator overseeing several parganas) in Sherpur, Alanpur, Panchmahal and Malpura. But it appears that the Maratha control in these areas was weak. This becomes clear from a *kharita* of 1752, which was jointly written by Shinde and Holkar. In this *kharita* an appeal was made to Sawai Madho Singh not to encourage or extend any support to the elements opposing the Maratha revenue settlement in Sherpur and Alanpur.[11] Malhar Rao Holkar asked Sawai Madho Singh to hand over the parganas of Tonk, Toda, Malpura, Chhota Rampura and Sherpura to his *kamavisdar* Balaji Shyam Rao. He also wrote to him in stern language to stop disturbances in these parganas else he would face the Maratha army.[12] In 1752, Sawai Madho Singh was also informed about the undesirable behavior of the Jaipur official, Lachhiram Natani.[13]

While making arrangements for the administration of territory gained by Holkar in Rajasthan, he confronted the problem of dual control. Holkar himself wanted to set up his own administrative machinery. But the hereditary local elements who were manning the pargana revenue administrative machinery owed allegiance to the Jaipur state. In pargana Toda, Raisinghpur which was under the control of Holkar, Sawai Madho Singh replaced the existing *chaudhary* and *qanungo* without asking the Marathas. This was not liked by Holkar and he sent a letter of protest to Sawai Madho Singh asking him to revoke his order by issuing a fresh *parwana* to this effect.[14]

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10 *Indore Kharita* No. 5, *Falgun Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1807/1750.
11 *Indore Kharita* No. 26, *Jeth Vadi* 7, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
12 *Indore Kharita* No. 36, *Asoj Vadi* 12, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
13 *Indore Kharita* No. 36, *Asoj Vadi* 12, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
14 *Indore Kharita* No. 25, *Vaisakh Vadi* 12, *V.S.* 1809/1752.

The Jaipur ruler was frequently apprised of the problems faced by the Maratha *kamavisdars* in the areas assigned to Holkar. This gets verified from the Jaipur *diwan,* Hargobind Natani, who admitted that the *amaldar* of pargana Malpura was not paying the full amount of money to the Maratha *kamavisdar.* Holkar asked Sawai Madho Singh to instruct the concerned *mamlatdar* (collecter) not to interfere in the collection of revenue.[15] For supervision Khande Rao Holkar personally visited all the areas in Jaipur that were handed over to Holkar in order to sort out the problems concerning revenue collection.[16] From the above description it becomes clear that the Jaipur officials were still functioning in these areas. The Maratha *kamavisdars* were sent to these areas just for receiving the amount collected byJaipur revenue officials. It was due to this lack of effective control over the revenue collection process that created problems for the Marathas in getting the desired revenue. In Sambhar, the local Maratha revenue collecter was to receive rupees 1,000 as his salary out of the revenue collection from Sambhar. On the basis of the letter written by Holkar to Sawai Madho Singh in 1754, it becomes clear that he had not been paid for the last two years despite the instructions of *diwan* Hargobind to the local officials.[17]These instances reveal that the local Jaipur officials were unwilling to co-operate with the Maratha *kamavisdars.* It may be noted here that it is not clear whether they themselves were opposed to the Maratha control or they received instructions from their superiors to harass the Maratha officials. Thus, till the third battle of Panipat in January 1761, the hold of Holkar on the areas assigned to him in the parganas of Jaipur State was nominal and the Maratha officials present in these areas did not have requisite administrative authority. Moreover, resentment of local people which was dormant earlier became more vociferous.

The defeat of the Marathas at Panipat provided a much needed opportunity to the Rajputs in Rajasthan to reassert their authority in the areas that were handed over to the Marathas. For instance, Rampura was taken back by the Chandrawat Rajputs which had been under the contol of Holkar. Similarly, a commander of the Kota ruler

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15 *Indore Kharita* No. 44, *Sawan Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
16 *Indore Kharita* No. 46, *Bhadon Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
17 *Indore Kharita* No. 60, *Kartik Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1811/1754.

seized the fort of Gagron and ousted the Maratha *kamavisdar* from there.[18] Both, Rampura and Gagron, were the two important Maratha outposts on the bordering areas of Malwa and Rajasthan. In November 1761, Sawai Madho Singh also made efforts to take advantage of the situation and tried to capture Niwai and Keshorai Patan. But Holkar could not afford to loose these areas. Hence he quickly recaptured them by defeating Sawai Madho Singh in the battle of Mangrol.

The successor of Malhar Rao Holkar, Ahilyabai Holkar, also experienced difficulty in exercising control over the Maratha territory in Jaipur. This becomes clear from the letter that Ahilyabai wrote to Sawai Prithvi Singh of Jaipur:

> "In parganas Tonk and Rampura, Pandit Raghoji has been appointed as the *kamavisdar* but the Rajput *bhomias* are resisting our attempt to settle these areas efficiently, so send instructions to all Rajput *zamindars* and allow the settlement of these parganas by our officials."[19]

In 1771, Tukoji Holkar also repeatedly wrote to Prithvi Singh about the unrest created by the Rajputs in parganas Tonk and Malpura. Holkar was informed about this by his *kamavisdar*, Sadashiv Bhatt. He immediately asked the Jaipur ruler to warn the insubordinate elements.[20] In the same year, Tukoji again wrote to him about the ongoing disputes between his official, Sadashiv Bhatt and the Rajput *bhomias* of village Parana in pargana Tonk.[21]

The local Jaipur officials also disputed the right of Holkar to make land grants from the parganas transferred to him. One such incident was reported by him in 1777 to Sawai Prithvi Singh. This involved the village Thikariaya in pargana Toda. Tukoji granted this village in *inam* to Pandit Gobindrao *munshi*. Tukoji wrote:

> "Recently we have come to know that the *amil* of Toda has deprived the Pandit of the ownership right of the village." Holkar requested for the restoration of the village given in grant

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18 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 361.
19 *Indore Kharita* No. 130, *Maghishri Vadi* 1, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
20 *Indore Kharita* No. 132, *Posh Vadi* 1, *V.S.* 1827/1770; *Indore Kharita* No. 137, *Chaitra Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
21 *Indore Kharita* No. 144, *V.S.* 1828/1771.

to the said Pandit.[22] In 1779, the *kamavisdars* of parganas Tonk and Rampura reported to Holkar about the disturbances created by the local elements. Tukoji Holkar asked the Jaipur ruler to stop these disturbances.[23] The following year (in 1780) Tukoji repeated the same complaint in his letter and reprimanded Sawai Pratap Singh for his inaction.[24]It appears that the Jaipur rulers were surreptitiously inciting the Rajput chiefs and *bhomias* to harass the Maratha officials. It is also possible that for the local Rajput gentry, the Maratha dispensation was an unwelcome development. The Rajput rulers instead of curbing these disturbances chose to abet them.

When Mahadaji Sindhia got to know about the failure of the Holkars to tighten their grip over the Maratha possessions in Jaipur territory, he decided to intervene on their behalf. In a firm language, he told the Jaipur ruler to give up control over the areas that were given to the Holkars. Shinde declared that the interference of Jaipur in these parganas was uncalled for. He asked the Jaipur ruler to transfer the overall authority to the officials of Holkar for the sake of healthy relationship else the Raja would face trouble.[25] Once again, Shinde reminded Sawai Pratap Singh to remove his forces from these parganas otherwise the Maratha forces would be sent to settle the issue.[26]

The above description makes it amply clear that the position of the Holkars in the territory gained in Jaipur was never strong. In pargana Tonk and Malpura disturbances and sporadic attacks on the Maratha outposts continued. Tukoji asked Sawai Pratap Singh to take action against the turbulent elements and restore the authority to his *mokasadar*, Govind Rao.[27] Throughout the 1780's and 1790's, incidences of defiance and insubordination to the Maratha officials were frequent. But the Holkars did not go beyond complaining and at times reprimanding the Jaipur ruler. It seems that the Holkars were not in a position to initiate any military action against Jaipur as they were not sure about receiving Sindhia's support in such ventures.

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22 *Indore Kharita* No. 179, *Posh Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1834/1777.
23 *Indore Kharita* No. 183, *Kartik Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1836/1779.
24 *Indore Kharita* No. 185, *Asarh Vadi* 5, *V.S.* 1837/1780.
25 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 75, *Sawan Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1836/1779.
26 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 76, *Sawan Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1836/1779.
27 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 189, *Asoj Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1837/1780.

In pargana Tonk, there were disturbances against the Marathas. In 1796, Laxman Anant and Jagannath Ram Bahadur, the representatives of Holkar, wrote to Sawai Pratap Singh about these disturbances. They informed him about the trouble created by the *zamindars* and revenue officials in pargana Tonk and asked him to stop their activities.[28] To stabilize the situation in Tonk, Tukoji removed the Maratha *mamlatdar* and instead appointed Kripal Singh Sikh to handle the pargana administration.[29]Holkar also wrote to Sawai Pratap Singh that his officials had lost control of the village Churu and other adjacent villages.[30]

Mahadaji Sindhia was another notable Maratha *sardar* who acquired territory in Rajasthan. In 1751, Jayappa Shinde reprimanded Sawai Madho Singh for making encroachment in Bundi and Nenwa claiming them to be Shinde's territory.[31] In 1755, Jankoji Shinde asked Sawai Madho Singh to hand over Ajmer and twelve villages of *taalluqa* Borada to Shinde's representative Gobind Rao.[32] Resistance to the presence of Maratha *kamavisdars* in outlying areas as tax collectors despite authorization from the Jaipur ruler, was reported from several places. The local Rajputs opposed the *thanadars* of Shinde who were trying to gain foothold in Jaipur territory. For instance, Shinde's officials were ousted from their outpost of Chhain by the local revenue officials. In fact, Sawai Madho Singh was sternly told by Jankoji Shinde to restore the outposts to his officials, Ragho Shankar and Bhagwantari Shankar, or face the visitation of the Maratha forces.[33]Jankoji was also interested in establishing his control over the strategically important Ranthambhor fort. In 1758, he reprimanded Sawai Madho Singh for his 'unauthorized' possession of the fort.[34] Gradually, Shinde started asserting his claim over some of the pockets of the Jaipur territory that were promised to him earlier. Obviously Sawai Madho Singh never fulfilled these promises. The Maratha presence was always resented by the local Rajputs. Hence Shinde's officials faced difficulty in maintaining control over the *thanas* and collecting revenue from the areas they claimed as theirs.Even as late as 1769,

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28 *Indore Kharita* No. 298, *Sawan Vadi* 2, *V.S.* 1853/1796.
29 *Indore Kharita* No.299, *Bhadon Sudi* 12, *V.S.* 1853/1796.
30 *Indore Kharita* No. 293, *Vaisakh Vadi* 13, *V.S.* 1852/1795.
31 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 155, *Jeth Sudi* 7, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
32 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 162, *Falgun Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
33 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 173, *Falgun Sudi* 17, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
34 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 166, *Posh Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1815/1758.

Shinde's demand for the transfer of 12 villages of *taalluqa* Borada had not been met by the Jaipur ruler. Mahadaji Shinde felt constrained to warn Sawai Prithvi Singh that these villages be vacated and handed over to his agent, Pandit Gobind Rao.[35] Disputes between Shinde and the Jaipur State persisted even in the 1780's. For example, Shinde's representative, Pandit Balrao Govind was given two villages Chakwara and Dhimana in Jaipur territory, in lieu of his salary. Although these villages had been in Maratha possession since long, the local Rajputs managed to oust the Pandit and seized these villages. Mahadaji had to warn Sawai Pratap Singh, the Jaipur ruler :

> "Both villages should be vacated and handed over to Pandit Shankarji Jagannath on behalf of Balarao as he is present there and in future you should take care that such problems do not reoccur."[36]

In 1781, Shinde gave the *mamlat* authority of Ajmer to his representative *Mirza* Rahim Beg and instructed Sawai Pratap Singh to give the amount of *peshkash* of *taalluqa* Borada to Rahim Beg.[37] Mahadaji Shinde had to interfere in the transfer of office from one officer to the other. This becomes clear from a *kharita* written by Shinde from Gwalior in 1783 to Sawai Pratap Singh about his official Pandit Shankar Rao Jagannath who had been doing official work at an unspecified place. When he died, his son Trimbak Shankar was appointed to perform the same task. At this time Shinde had to intervene to ask Sawai Pratap Singh to transfer villages assigned to the deceased Pandit Shankar Rao Jagannath to the new appointee.[38] Shinde also faced problems with regard to his control over pargana Sambhar. In 1784, he tried to settle this matter with Jaipur. In a letter written to Sawai Pratap Singh, Shinde clearly stated:

> "Your State had given us Sambhar but till today the *amil* of Sambhar has not vacated the local *thanas* and bothers our men posted there. I have also written to you earlier and raised this matter, but no action has been taken from your side. So now ask your *amil* to handover the charge to our officials who will co-ordinate with your court and manage the pargana accordingly."[39]

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35 *Gwalior Kharita No*. 3, *Posh Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1826/1769.
36 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 80, *Kartik Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1837/1780.
37 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 77, *Magh Vadi* 1, *V.S.* 1838/1781.
38 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 92, *Bhadon Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1840/1783.
39 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 99, *Falgun Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1841/1784.

Mahadaji also asked Sawai Pratap Singh to stop the excesses committed by his officials while collecting taxes from the traders. Once again, prior to the Lalsot campaign, Mahadaji complained to Sawai Pratap Singh and expressed his unhappiness over the discrimination being made with the Maratha officials in Sambhar.[40]The position of the Marathas in Rajasthan was substantially weakened when Mahadaji Shinde was defeated in the battle of Tunga. The interference of the local *amil* in Sambhar was so great that it irked Shinde to the extent that he conveyed to Raja Sawai Pratap Singh that he no longer wanted the Jaipur official's presence in Sambhar. In 1786, he appointed his own officials in Sambhar and informed the Jaipur ruler: "We are sending *seth* Gangaram and Rajaram from here for taking charge of the offices of *amil* and *faujdar* of Sambhar, so do consult them for official work."[41]

In 1791, Sawai Pratap Singh again received a letter of complaint from Mahadaji asking him to do something to stop the trouble created by the Rajput *bhomias* who were harassing the traders on account of *rahdari* collection. The following year, in 1792, Mahadaji reminded the ruler that: "Borada *thana* in Ajmer has not been vacated so far, so now handover the *thana* to Jaguji and Lakshman Rao. Otherwise I will ask them to capture the *thana.*" [42]

At least one conclusion can be drawn from the above instances that the Maratha officials appointed in Jaipur territory had to encounter the non co-operation of local Jaipur officials as well as the hostility of Rajput *bhomias*. Without the backing of the Maratha military, the Maratha revenue officials, *kamavisdars* and their subordinate staff could not manage the fiscal affairs. The local officials and *zamindars* defied them. Although the presence of Maratha *thanadars,* the *kamavisdars* and other officials were not allowed to function effectively. They constantly complained to the Maratha *sardars* about this helpless state of affairs. This gets verified from the *kharitas* of Shinde and Holkar, both of whom constantly raised the matter and asked the Jaipur rulers to instruct the local *bhomias* and *amils* not to create disturbances and that they should let the Maratha officials settle the areas. As there was persistent

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40 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 118, *Vaisakh Vadi* 1, *V.s.* 1843/1786.
41 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 119, *Magh Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1843/1786.
42 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 80, *Kartik Sudi* 14, *V.S.* 1837/1780.

hostility to the presence of the Maratha *kamavisdars*, they could not collect full revenue from the areas placed under their charge in the Jaipur territory. The salaries of the Maratha officials working in these parganas as well as of the troopers posted at the Maratha *thanas* had to be paid out of the revenue of the areas under Maratha possession in Jaipur territory. But insufficient collection of revenue created the problem of giving their salaries. In order to improve the collection of revenue and to cope with the situation, the Marathas resorted to the practice of *ijara* or revenue farming in some of the areas. This change in policy will become more clear from the following description. Shinde granted the *ijara* of Sambhar to the local traders because of the unabated hostility of the local Jaipur officials and *zamindars.*[43] But the problem could not be solved even with the help of the *ijaradars* who themselves had local roots. They also found it difficult to bring the situation under control and reported loss due to poor collection.[44]

It is necessary to briefly discuss the Maratha administrative system in Malwa and then compare it with the administrative arrangement in the Jaipur parganas transferred to the Marathas. The Marathas had been claiming the *chauth* of Malwa since 1717, which were repeated in 1719 and again in 1724. The Peshwa's *vakil* at the Mughal court persistently made demands for the *chauth* as well as *sardeshmukhi* in Malwa.The 1730's witnessed the Marathas establishing contact with the *zamindars* of Malwa. By the mid 1730's, the *zamindars* especially of southern and western Malwa had paid a tribute to the Marathas for five years.[45] The Maratha desire for securing Malwa became a reality when the Mughal Emperor gave the *sanad* (grant) in July, 1741, ceding Malwa to the Marathas.

Stewart Gordon differentiates the earlier Maratha military forays in Malwa and calls the administrative arrangements made by the Peshwa (after the official grant of the *sanad*) as stabilized *khandani*. In the early forays, valuable things like horses, cloth, rugs, silver trays, were simply taken away from villages. Soon these were converted into rupees by a local money lender whereas in stabilized *khandani* specified payment

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43 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 103, *Jeth Vadi* 13, *V.S.* 1842/1785.
44 *Gwalior Kharita* No.104, *Sawan Sudi* 6, *V.S. 1843*/1786.
45 Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders,* pp. 36, 37.

was made on certain dates and in standard rupees. In the early accounts, single villages were the predominant entries while in the stabilized *khandani* accounts, the contract was with an individual, usually a big *zamindar*. For instance, in the early forays, the collecter was a *rakhwalla* (a military leader), who was paid *rakhwalli*, literally meaning money paid for not devastating an area. In the stabilized *khandani* contracts, we notice a change in the terminology. The collecter was now designated as *kamavisdar*, who were civilians and not the military leaders. Another important feature was that the *kamavisdars* did not have to maintain a body of troops out of the revenues of the district and therefore, they were not *saranjamdars*.[46] They maintained a small staff to do their work.

The *kamavisdar* did not administer the area. He did not assess the land, collected no taxes, heard no cases, imposed no fines, put down no rebellions and did not administer the area. He did not deal with village headmen, traders or others within the *zamindar's* jurisdiction. His function was just to ask the signatory of the contract for the stipulated amount in each season. Though stabilized *khandani* was an advance over the *rakhwala* system, due to various reasons, it proved to be unsatisfactory. Firstly, the big *zamindars* did not control all the areas of Malwa. Secondly, the Marathas were bound by a fixed, long-term contract with the big *zamindars*. Thirdly, troops were required to enforce tribute collection. To deal with these problems, the first step was to place small garrisons in some of the *zamindaris*. This was followed by more severe settlement on the *zamindar*. Once the villages covered by the contract were specified, they were liable for direct collection in case the amount was not paid. This was followed by practically carrying out the threat and finally the *kamavisdar*, with the help of troops collected revenue in the name of the *zamindar*. When the arrears accumulated for several years, the Marathas demanded full administrative control of the areas specified in the contract.

Once the Marathas had full administrative control, the Peshwa appointed a bureaucracy with specialized functions. The important among these appointees were the *faujdar* (rural police) and the *kotwal (*urban police). The new *faujdars* and *kotwals* dealt with cases concerning every aspect of life.

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[46] Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders,* pp. 38, 39.

The *kamavisdar* was the revenue collecter, appointed over parganas ranging from one to five and was assisted in his work by a body of clerks. The revenue administration worked on an annual cycle. A contract was signed between the Peshwa and the *kamavisdar*. The amount of the initial contract was based on the best available area statistics. Once the first installment was paid, the *kamavisdar* left for the field. He was to maintain a garrison but could not indiscriminately recruit troops. His contract specified the size of each garrison, with a salary for each type of soldier. The amount of the salary of the troops, officers and even servants was specified and fixed in the contract. Sometimes a *mujumdar*, or an auditor visited the area to examine the *kamavisdar's* books, troops and stocks of garrisons and sent the report direct to the Peshwa. To supervise the work, the *kamavisdar* personally undertook tours through his parganas, as indicated by *bhojan kharch* (dinner expenses) levied as a minor tax on many villages.[47]

Needless to emphasize that the Marathas were successful in laying out an efficient administrative set up in Malwa. However, the Marathas failed to make a similar administrative arrangement in the territories that were transferred to them by the Jaipur rulers. The parganas of Tonk, Toda, Malpura, Fagi, Rampura, Nenwa, Sherpur, Alanpur, Panchmahal, Keshorai Patan and Barwada in pargana Niwai, were the areas which were transferred to the Marathas. To begin with, the Marathas appointed their *vakil* at the Jaipur court so that there could be a regular communication between the two sides. The second step was to establish *thanas* or outposts in the parganas. Accordingly, officials were appointed to take charge of these *thanas*. Thirdly, *kamavisdars* were appointed to collect revenue from these areas. As these areas had dual control, that of the Jaipur officials as well as the Marathas they always had difficulty in performing their task . Unlike Malwa, there was no effective Maratha control over these areas. The presence of Maratha *kamavisdars* and their subordinate staff appointed to collect the revenue in lieu of tribute payment is recorded. Somehow, right from the beginning the Maratha control over administration remained nominal and superficial. Even for the collection of revenue they were dependent upon the local revenue officials of Jaipur. Besides this, the Maratha officials were resisted

[47] Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders,* p. 46.

by the local elements. Perhaps the Marathas were also not keen to replace the existing administrative network by their own system. However, they desired to control the local administrative machinery. It is amply clear that the Marathas who had completely replaced the Mughal administration in Malwa were unable to accomplish the same task in Rajasthan.

In Marwar, the Marathas never put up a stake for claiming territory as it was agriculturally poor as compared to Jaipur, Kota and Bundi. Their sole interest was to gain control of Ajmer from Jodhpur ruler, as it was strategically located. Their presence in Jodhpur was by and large confined to the collection of tribute regularly. The sole exception was the demand for the surrender of Ajmer to the Marathas. After the battle of Merta (September 1790) the treaty of Merta was concluded between Bijay Singh and Mahadaji Shinde. As per the terms of the treaty, Bijay Singh had to surrender Sambhar, Khairwa, Masuda and 29 villages of pargana Bhinai to Mahadaji. Bijay Singh was made to promise that his men would not interfere in the management of the above areas or create difficulties for the Maratha tax collectors. Besides these territories, there are also instances of the assignments of villages in Marwar territory to the Maratha officials. Shinde demanded from Bijay Singh the assignment of village Bharonda to his commander Jadhavrao in 1775. In 1782, he demanded village Ganga, in pargana Parbatsar to Krishanrao Gangadhar. In both the cases the common instruction given by Mahadji Shinde to Bijay Singh was to ensure that his appointees were not to be troubled by Jodhpur officials.[48] This specific instruction to Bijay Singh indicates that Mahadaji was anticipating hostility from the Jodhpur officials. But the unhelpful attitude of the Jodhpur ruler and his local officers did not change towards the Marathas even upto the 1790's.

In 1791, Mahadaji Shinde sent a *kharita* to Bijay Singh in which he instructed the latter to stop the interference of the *amaldar* and jagirdar of Nawan in village Kakrauli of pargana Sambhar. He also mentioned that Sargoth and Kuchaman be handed over to the Maratha officials.[49] The battle of Merta had established almost

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[48] *Gwalior-Jodhpur Kharita, Magh Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1832/1775; *Gwalior-Jodhpur Kharita, Vaisakh Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1840/1783.

[49] *Gwalior-Jodhpur Kharita, Asoj Sudi* 14*, V.S.* 1848/1791.

complete domination of Mahadaji Shinde over Jodhpur, yet there was hardly any change in the situation. The local officials and the *bhomias* were unwilling to surrender to the Marathas and hence their resistance also persisted. The hostility of the *bhomias* was evident even as late as 1806. Daulat Rao Shinde, the successor of Mahadaji Shinde, informed Bhim Singh, the new ruler of Jodhpur that the Marathas had lost control over Makrana five years ago. He asked Bhim Singh to persuade the *bhomias* to transfer the control of the area to the Marathas.[50]

Forms of Resistance to the Marathas

In the later half of the eighteenth century, the Maratha activities were largely confined to South-eastern and South-western (less arid parts of Marwar) Rajasthan. Maratha actions in these areas of Rajasthan were guided by the fact that most of the better revenue yielding pockets were concentrated in this part. Such areas included Jaipur, Bharatpur, Alwar (Machheri), Karauli, Ajmer, Shahpura, Malpura, Rampura, Tonk, Toda Raisinghpur, Sambhar, Kota, Bundi, Mewar etc. The areas where Maratha-Rajput conflict was more pronounced were, Jaipur, Bharatpur, Jodhpur.These areas attracted the attention of the Marathas till the end of the eighteenth century. The additional importance of these areas was their strategic location.The frontiers of the three major Rajput States of Marwar, Mewar and Jaipur converged here. Perhaps this explains the long term involvement of the Marathas in these parts of Rajasthan despite stiff resistance at several places. The Maratha presence in Rajasthan was largely motivated by their desire to extract regular tribute from the Rajput rulers. Secondly, they were also interested in occupying and controlling fertile and strategically important centres like Kota, Ajmer, Tonk, Rampura and Malpura. Sambhar was much sought after because of the commercial value of its salt trade.

After the collapse of the Mughal empire, both Jaipur and Jodhpur had emerged as bigger and powerful States in Rajasthan. Though the Marathas had established themselves as real successor of the declining empire in large parts of India, they faced stiff opposition to their presence in Rajasthan. The Marathas experienced great

[50] *Gwalior-Jodhpur Kharita, Posh Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1853/1796.

difficulty in controlling and administering the several pockets gained in the Rajput States. The powerful Rajput *thikanedars* and *bhomias* who dominated the villages spearheaded unabated resistance against the Marathas. Moreover, the Rajput States of Rajasthan as compared to the smaller Rajput principalities of Malwa and Bundelkhand were far more resourceful and strategically positioned to face the Maratha aggression. Moreover, the Rajput rulers of Rajasthan had greater experience in running the local administration as compared to the *zamindars* of Malwa. The Rajput States of Jaipur and Jodhpur were in the forefront of the struggle against Maratha occupation in Rajasthan.

The premier status enjoyed by the Sisodia house of Mewar had gone into near oblivion with the death of Rana Raj Singh in 1680. From the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards, the struggle for political primacy among the Rajputs was largely between the Kachhwahas of Amber/Jaipur and the Rathors of Jodhpur. A considerable expansion of the territories and economic resources of Amber/Jaipur took place during the reign of Sawai Jai Singh (1700-1743).[51] The pre-eminent position enjoyed by the Rathors in the Mughal court was on the decline after the death of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. However, successive Rathor rulers of Jodhpur managed to keep their political power intact even after the death of Maharaja Ajit Singh. Therefore, the eighteenth century witnessed an acute rivalry between the Kachhwahas and the Rathors punctuated with occasional bonhomie.

The Rajasthani sources vividly depict the forms of resistance adopted by the Rajputs against the Mararthas. The *kharitas* written by the Shindes and Holkars to the Rajput rulers also provide an insight into the manner in which the Rajputs addressed the Maratha menace. The varied ways through which the Rajputs resisted the Marathas ranged from diplomacy to passive as well as armed struggle. For a clear understanding of the Rajput resistance to the Marathas, we would discuss the forms of struggle under three heads. First there was popular resistance initiated by the local people on their own and occasionally instigated by their rulers. Active resistance sponsored by the State in the form of military action constituted the second form of resistance. The third form was

[51] Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 130.

passive or subtle resistance by the State in the form of non-payment, short-payment, delayed payment and haggling over payment and transfer of territory. The State also offered passive resistance in the form of *yajna*, donation etc. and by use of diplomacy and forging of connections with Maratha officials.

Popular Resistance

The first instance of popular resistance to the Marathas was reported from the Rajput State of Marwar. In 1742, the people of Marwar resisted the Maratha attempt to realize tribute. The Peshwa then dispatched Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Shinde to Marwar. He instructed them to collect the tribute amount due from the Jodhpur ruler, Abhay Singh right from the end of the battle fought at Merta in 1736. Despite this, the Marathas found it difficult to realize tribute from Abhay Singh. Having failed to collect direct from the ruler, they tried to realize tribute from the people of the parganas of Sojat, Raipur and Jaitaran. In protest,the people deserted their villages to avoid payment to the Marathas. They were able to collect a measely amount of rupees 100-200 per day. Abhay Singh was ultimately successful in evading the payment from the treasury.[52]

The Jaipur rulers also resisted the Maratha demand of tribute and military expenses which kept accumulating. From the pockets of territories in the Jaipur State, though notionally transferred to the Marathas, demand for revenue was resented not only by the Jaipur ruler but also by the local Rajputs. The latter continued to create disturbances and give trouble to the Maratha officials present in their locality. Sometimes efforts were made by the Raja to secretly encourage the people to murder the Marathas. The murder of large number of Marathas in the Jaipur city during the reign of Sawai Madho Singh is a notable example in this regard.

After Sawai Iswari Singh's death on 14 December, 1750, Madho Singh was invited to come quickly and occupy the vacant throne. The Jaipur ministers, Hargovind and Vidyadhar visited Malhar Rao Holkar and entreated him hard to spare the State. It was only after four days of discussion that they agreed to pay a heavy ransom for the

[52] G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 57.

kingdom and capital that Malhar Rao Holkar recalled his soldiers posted at various places and set himself to realize the money. Later, Malhar Rao himself conducted Sawai Madho Singh to the palace. When Jayappa Sindhia arrived on 6th January, 1751, he put up new demands:

> "The question of ransom (*khandani*) had been settled before, but now a new demand was made that one-third or at least one-fourth of the territory of Jaipur should be made over to the Marathas by a written deed. This demand alienated the Raja and the Rajputs."[53]

Sawai Madho Singh felt enraged by these new demands. Besides this, he became emboldened to resist the Marathas as he got the support of his chiefs especially the Shekhawats who had gathered round the new king. In a changed policy he tried to extricate himself from the Marathas. Sawai Madho Singh made many attempts to poison the Maratha *sardars* and their soldiers. However, the Marathas did not fall pray to Madho Singh's deadly plans. Due to Jayappa and Umed Singh Hada's efforts the plan to kill Marathas could not be executed. The noxious food was then buried in the ground. Sawai Madho Singh did not give up his efforts. Next he planned to physically annihilate important Maratha leaders.[54]

Sawai Madho Singh ultimately succeeded in his plans on the 10th January, 1751. On that day approximately four thousand Marathas had entered the city of Jaipur. Suddenly, at noon, a riot broke out and the inhabitants of Jaipur attacked the unsuspecting Marathas. Nearly fifteen hundred Marathas were slain and a thousand wounded inside Jaipur. Only a few managed to save themselves from carnage.[55] The news of Maratha slaughter spread outside the capital. The Rajputs rose in the villages and killed the couriers of the Marathas wherever they could catch them, so that the roads were closed.[56] Disturbances in the territories of Nenwa and Bundi were also reported. At these places they joined hands with a local *zamindar*, Kishen Singh Hada. Holkar threatened the Jaipur ruler of serious conquences if the local Rajputs

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53 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 168, 169.
54 Ibid., p. 169.
55 *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. XXVII, *Balajirao Peshwa and Events in the North (1741-61),* Supplementary, Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1932, Nos. 64, 65.
56 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. I, pp. 170.

were not prevented from opposing the Maratha presence in their area.[57] The situation was quite grave as Holkar's officials were facing resistance from the local Rajputs all around in their possession within Jaipur. Holkar asked Sawai Madho Singh to intervene and stop all acts of disturbances and opposition to the Marathas in Tonk, Toda, Malpura, Chhota Rampura and Sherpur.[58]This is indicative of the growing anti-Maratha sentiments that provoked turbulences in various localities.

Mina Opposition to Marathas

In the discussion it has been noted that the Marathas were able to gain support from certain sections of the elites and other functionaries in Rajasthan. But they cound not avoid being troubled and harassed at the hands of certain local communities, particularly the Minas who often looted the convoys carrying supplies to the Maratha camp. The Minas are a sturdy group of people found mostly in North-east and South-east Rajasthan. They are found in large numbers mainly in Jaipur, Alwar, Bharatpur, Sawai Madhopur, Tonk, Kota and the Bundi districts.[59] The plundering activities of the Minas during the Tunga campaign always rankled in the minds of the Marathas. On 7th July 1787, it was reported from Mahadaji's camp that the Minas carried off camels and ponies that were on the way to the Maratha camp. Near Toda, the Minas looted fruits being sent to the Maratha camp. From another location, it was reported that the Minas had plundered several carts of grain belonging to the Marathas. In one such raid, the Minas successfully carried off 150 oxen loaded with grain from the rear of the caravan heading for Shinde's camp.

Rajput Rulers Defensive Alliances

The Marathas entered Rajasthan for the first time in 1734, on the invitation of Pratap Singh Hada of Bundi.This was the first Maratha interference in the internal matters of any Rajput State. Soon the Rajput rulers realized the need of a well defined policy if the Maratha advance in Rajasthan was to be checked.Consequently, Sawai Jai Singh

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57 *Indore Kharita* No. 14, *Jeth Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
58 *Indore Kharita* No. 36, *Asoj Vadi* 12, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
59 M.L. Sharma, *Rajasthan*, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1971, p.15.

convened a conference of the Rajput rulers at Hurda in July, 1734. It was presided over by Maharana Jagat Singh of Mewar and was attended by the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota, Bikaner, Bundi, Karauli and Kishangarh. They all agreed to form a united front against the Marathas under the leadership of Maharana Jagat Singh. But the unity exhibited at Hurda could not be executed on account of the conflicting interests of different Rajput rulers. Though the Hurda conference was a failure, it succeeded in at least making the Rajput rulers realize the seriousness of the Maratha threat. It also brought home the lesson that the Maratha menace ought to be tackled collectively and not in isolation. The idea of collective resistance to the Marathas in Rajasthan was experimented with varying degree of success during the second half of the eighteenth century.

Armed Opposition to Marathas

Once the Marathas had made a formal entry in Rajasthan, they became involved in the succession disputes between the competitors for the throne of Jaipur and Jodhpur. This divided the Rajputs into pro and anti-Maratha camps. Bakht Singh, who was fighting his nephew Ram Singh to secure the *gaddi* of Jodhpur, took the initiative to form another front of the Rajput rulers to drive the Marathas out of Rajasthan.[60] Jaipur and Shahpura responded favourably. Bikaner was already supporting the cause of Bakht Singh and therefore, readily agreed to join the front. In 1751, Gaj Singh of Bikaner sent a *kharita* to Sawai Madho Singh informing him about his preparations to join Bakht Singh soon. He further wrote that in case the Marathas do not withdraw they should militarily drive them out of Rajasthan.[61] When the news of Malhar Rao Holkar's march towards North India reached Gaj Singh, he wrote to Bakht Singh to devise a plan to prevent Holkar from proceeding further.[62] Bakht Singh also proposed to Sawai Madho Singh to divide Malwa between the two after driving the Marathas beyond the river Narbada.[63]Unfortunately the plan could not materialize due to the death of Bakht Singh in September, 1752. The Marathas interpreted Bakht Singh's

60 *Hingane Daftar*, Vol. I, p. 59.
61 *Bikaner-Jaipur Kharita, Asarh Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
62 *Bikaner-Jaipur Kharita, Asarh Vadi 4, V.S.* 1809/1752.
63 *Marwar Khyat*, Vol. II, p. 521.

plan to forge a united front of the Rathors, the Kachhwahas, the Jats of Bharatpur and the Mughal *wazir*, as the combined move of Jaipur and Jodhpur to finish the Maratha domination in North India.[64]

Bijay Singh, the successor of Bakht Singh, carried forward his father's anti-Maratha policy. Throughtout the late half of the eighteenth century, he continuously resisted the Maratha domination. Several attempts were made by him to form a coalition against the Marathas. He sent his representative to Delhi and through him offered rupees five lakhs to the Emperor and requested him to join the Rajput army. Jaipur and Bikaner had already decided to make a common cause with Jodhpur.[65] Bijay Singh did not hesitate to seek Ahmad Shah Abdali's help if the Marathas could be thrown out of Marwar.[66]

In the meanwhile, the Peshwa received the report that Bijay Singh was hobnobbing with Abdali.[67] In November 1759, Govind Rao Ballal informed the Maratha commander, Sadashiv Rao Bhau that Bijay Singh intends to join Abdali with a view to overthrow the Maratha domination in North India.[68]In a letter dated, 29th December 1759, Abdali wrote to Sawai Madho Singh acknowledging his '*Ariza*' wherein the Raja had written to the Afghan king that the latter's letters to Raja Bijay Singh had been duly forwarded to him. Abdali wrote that he had sent another letter to Bijay Singh asking him to unite with Sawai Madho Singh.[69]Another letter mentions about Abdali trying to effect a union with the Rohilla forces. He had also invited other potentates – the Jats, the Rajputs under Sawai Madho Singh and Shuja, to fight under his flag against the Marathas. It also mentions that though the Rajputs were afraid to open hostilities with the Marathas, they could not ignore the powerful Abdali and opened negotiations with him.[70] To avert such an unfolding situation, the

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64 *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. XXI, *Balaji Bajirao : Uttarhind (1741-61)*, Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1932, No. 50.
65 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXVII, No. 119.
66 G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 86.
67 *S.P.D.*, Vol.21, No. 101.
68 Ibid., Vol. 21, No. 126.
69 Syed Hasan Askari, Durrani-Rajput Negotiations, 1759-61, *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 9th Session, 1945, p. 264.
70 *S.P.D.*, Vol. XXI, No. 187.

Marathas contacted Bijay Singh for help.[71] Bijay Singh promised to help both but he remained neutral in the third battle of Panipat. In a letter dated, 10th March, 1760, Raja Keshav Rao reports to the Peshwa about these developments in North India.

The hatred towards the Marathas had accumulated so much so that in the wake of Abdali's expected attack, Sawai Madho Singh attempted to poison the Maratha *vakil*, Govindrao Tamaji, a Brahmin by caste. This has been highlighted in a letter dated 29th September 1755 written by Bapuji Mahadev Hingane and Damodar Mahadev Gosavi.[72] The Rajputs were in constant touch with Abdali even after the third battle of Panipat. *Dastur komwar – dikhni* also mentions about the visit of Gulraj Khatri, an agent of Abdali, to Jaipur. He came from Lahore in 1762, with a *farman* for Sawai Madho Singh. Unfortunately the contents of the *farman* are not available. Sawai Madho Singh gave him rupees 2,700 to cover the cost of travel and hospitality.[73] Abdali was keen to use the Rajputs against the Marathas. It gets reflected from Gaj Singh's *kharita* to Sawai Madho Singh in which he acknowledged receiving monetary help sent through Yakub Ali Khan, by Shah Abdali and Nawab Ali Khan, the *wazir* of Qandhar.[74]It becomes evident yet again that there was continous interaction between the Afghan ruler and Rajputs through a letter written by Gaj Singh in 1773 to Sawai Madho Singh. In this letter he mentions about the visit of the agent of Taimur Shah and requested Sawai Madho Singh to arrange for his safe passage up to Delhi.[75]

Many Rajput rulers wanted the Marathas to help them in their succession disputes. However, the Marathas were ready to help on suitable payment. When the Marathas put pressure for excessive payments, the Rajputs tended to resist them unitedly.This time the initiative was taken by the Hadas of Kota who contemplated to form a united front for Jaipur, Jodhpur and Mewar against the Marathas. Guman Singh, the ruler of Kota arranged a meeting of Rana Ari Singh and Bijay Singh at Nathdwara.[76]

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71 Letter from Bijay Singh to Anand Rao, *Asarh Sudi* 9, V.S. 1816/ Jan. 1760, *Arzi Bahi* No. 4, Jodhpur Records.
72 *Hingane Daftar*, No. 169.
73 *Dastur Komwar Dikhni*, VOL. IX, *Bhadwa Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1819/1762.
74 *Bikaner-Jaipur Kharita, Asoj Vadi* 8, *V.S.* 1823/1766.
75 *Bikaner-Jaipur Kharita*, *Falgun Vadi* 13, *V.S.* 1830/1773.
76 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 51.

The meeting between these three rulers took place in November 1766, but nothing came out of this meeting as the Jaipur Raja abstained and the Mewar Rana also showed relunctance to join the front. Maharao Guman Singh was now left with no other choice except to profess allegiance to the Marathas.

The Rajputs were quite anxious about the recent developments in the politics of North India. They were particularly concerned about the return of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam with the help of Mahadaji Shinde. This is evident from the Bikaner ruler Gaj Singh's letter to Sawai Pratap Singh of Jaipur in 1785. We also get to know through the letter about the eagerness of the Rajput rulers to work out a common strategy in consultation with their leading Rajput *Thakurs*. He requested that all the Rajputs should be consulted and requested to assemble to consider proposals to eliminate Maratha domination from North India.[77] The years 1788 and 1790 saw great efforts made by Bijay Singh to oust Shinde not only from Rajasthan but also from North India. He entered into negotiations with all possible allies. His first move was to write to the Peshwa through Tukoji Holkar, to remove Mahadaji Shinde from the charge of the Maratha affairs in North India.[78] Prior to the battle of Merta in September, 1790 Bijay Singh even ventured to entice Shinde's commander, De Boigne for defection to the Rajput side but he was unsuccessful.[79] The greatest setback to the Maratha interests particularly in Rajasthan and generally in North India was the death of the prominent Maratha leaders. Mahadaji Sindhia's death in 1794 was an irretrievable loss. The death of Ahilyabai Holkar was another setback for the Marathas.

The Jaipur and Jodhpur rulers resorted to non-payment of tribute, short-payment and delayed payment as a form of resistance against the Marathas. Sometimes it led to further enhancement of the amount to be paid. For instance Sawai Madho Singh troubled the Marathas in a discreet way without overtly defying their authority. He removed the *chaudhary* and the *qanungo* from pargana Toda which was under

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77 *Bikaner-Jaipur Kharita*, *Chaitra Vadi* 8**,** *V .S.* 1842/1785.

78 Letter from Bijay Singh to Tukoji Holkar, *Posh Vadi* 14, V.S. 1844/ Jan. 1788, *Arzi Bahi* No. 4, Jodhpur Records.

79 Herbert Compton, *A Particular Account of the Military Adventures of Hindustan*, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1892, p. 55.

Holkar's control. In this way, he brought the work of the revenue administration to a standstill.[80] Perhaps at the instructions of Sawai Madho Singh, the *amil* of pargana Malpura was not paying the entire amount of revenue collection to Holkar's *kamavisdars.*[81] Resistance to the Maratha authority in the areas handed over to Holkars was unabated in the subsequent years. Despite pressure from Holkar throughout the years 1756 and 1757, there was no positive response from Sawai Madho Singh. Besides this, the rivalry between Shinde and Holkar also turned advantageous to the Jaipur Raja. Raghunath Rao, the Peshwa's brother told Sawai Madho Singh that he could rule over Jaipur in alliance with *subedarji* (Malhar Rao Holkar) and *Patil Sahib* (Mahadaji Shinde).[82]

The debacle at Panipat emboldened the Rajputs to oppose the Maratha presence at various places in Jaipur territory. In one of his letters to Sawai Madho Singh, Kedarji Shinde specifically instructed the Jaipur Raja not to send any troops to Shahpura. The chief of Shahpura was troubling the Maratha revenue collectors with Sawai Madho Singh's consent. Maratha collecter in Shahpura, Jayaji Bohite informed Sawai Madho Singh about the mischief of the Shahpura ruler.[83]Shinde's *vakil* at Jaipur *darbar* persuaded Sawai Madho Singh to withdraw support to Shahpura enabling Jayaji Mohite to regain his position in Shahpura as the Maratha *mamlatdar.*[84]

Despite repeated Maratha warnings, the resistance from the Jaipur ruler as well as the local elements continued in one form or the other. All this frustrated the Marathas, as their repeated attempts to consolidate their hold on the territory within the Rajput States did not yield the desired results. It was on account of this continued defiance and resistance to the presence of the Marathas that Mahadaji Shinde decided to take up the issue with the Jaipur ruler, Sawai Pratap Singh, in 1782. Shinde registered his protest against the hostile posture of local *zamindars*.[85] Once again Shinde wrote to Sawai Pratap Singh in 1784, asking him to control the people of Jaipur. They troubled

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80 *Indore Kharita* No. 25, *Vaisakh Vadi* 12, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
81 *Indore Kharita* No. 44, *Sawan Vadi* 1, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
82 *Indore Kharita* No. 53, *Jeth Vadi* 11, *V.S.* 1811/1754.
83 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 179, *Chaitra Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1820/1763.
84 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 180, Undated.
85 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 79, *Sawan Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1839/1782.

his representative, Balarao, who was staying in the Jaipur city. Pargana Sambhar was given to Shinde by the Jaipur ruler. When his officials tried to establish their own administrative set up in Sambhar, they faced resistance from the local Jaipur officials and *zamindars*.[86] His officers continued to face resistance from the *bhomias* which is evident from Shinde's *kharita* to Sawai Pratap Singh.[87] Thus, the Maratha attempts to undermine the authority and control of Jaipur in the matter of tax collection were only partially successful.

The **payment of tribute and war expenses** to the Marathas was another issue on which the Maratha attempts were contested by the Rajputs. It cannot be denied that the Marathas participated in the succession disputes of Jaipur and Jodhpur for fiscal considerations. But when the Rajputs were unable to pay the promised amount, they were pressurized by the Marathas. The Peshwa asked his *vakil*, to demand the promised amount from Sawai Ishwari Singh of Jaipur. But Sawai Ishwari Singh could not arrange the demanded money. When the Peshwa deputed both Shinde and Holkar to collect the promised amount from the Jaipur ruler, he committed suicide because he could not meet the Maratha demands. After Sawai Ishwari Singh, it was Sawai Madho Singh's turn to meet the Maratha demands. The issue of tribute payment remained inconclusive partly due to the feeling among the Rajputs that the demand was unreasonable and beyond their means. Though, the issue of tribute payment was sorted out several times by both the sides, the Rajputs did not keep their promises. All this provided an excuse for continued Maratha intervention in the affairs of the Rajput States. With the help of the *kharitas* addressed by Shinde and Holkar, we get an insight into the complicated nature of the issues and means adopted by the Jaipur ruler to **evade the payment** of ever growing Maratha demands for money.

Both Shinde and Holkar needed a continuous supply of finances for their military advances in the North. Therefore, soon after the accession of Sawai Madho Singh to the *gaddi* of Jaipur, they started demanding tribute on a regular basis. As per the terms of the agreement between Sawai Madho Singh and the Marathas, the Jaipur ruler was committed to pay a *nazar* of rupees 10 lakhs to the Maratha king. It was agreed that the payment would be made in four installments in a span of six years, from 1744 to

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86 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 99, *Falgun Vadi* 11, *V.S.* 1841/1784.
87 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 42, *Posh Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1848/1791.

1750. When the people of Jaipur attacked the Marathas in 1751, Sawai Madho Singh agreed to pay compensation for the loss of men and materials.[88] Despite all these promises, Holkar did not get any payment. Sawai Madho Singh was reminded by Khande Rao Holkar about the non-payment due in mid-1752.[89] Malhar Rao Holkar also wrote to the Jaipur ruler about the non-payment of promised amount. As the Peshwa was in dire need of cash, Sawai Madho Singh had to arrange for the money.[90] In 1753, Sawai Madho Singh was immensely pressurized by Holkar to make the due payment.[91] The language of the *kharitas* make it very clear that Holkar was very desperate to receive the payment. He also openly expressed his displeasure about Sawai Madho Singh's indifferent attitude.[92]

Sawai Madho Singh avoided the Maratha demands by following **covert methods of resistance**. These included non payment, delayed payment and underpayment of tribute to the Marathas. One such instance is when Jaipur *diwan* Hargobind instead of sending rupees 50,000 dispatched only rupees 40,000. Khande Rao Holkar protested to Sawai Madho Singh against these tactics of Jaipur.[93] To avoid payment and buy time, the other method adopted by Jaipur was by issuing invalid *hundis* which could not be honoured. This will be clear from the following account. In 1753, a *hundi* was sent by Jaipur to be exchanged with cash at Aurangabad. But it was not honoured by the local *sahukar*. In a similar way, *hundis* dispatched for the Peshwa could not be encashed. A *hundi* issued in the name of an Aurangabad based *sahukar* for payment of rupees three lakhs was not entertained by the *sahukar* as the amout had not reached him.[94] Khande Rao Holkar warned the Jaipur *diwan* Hargobind to issue valid *hundis* in future[95].

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88 *Indore Kharita* No. 3, *V.S.* 1809/ 1749.
89 *Indore Kharita* No. 32, *Asarh Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
90 *Indore Kharita* No. 38, *Kartik Sudi*, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
91 *Indore Kharita* No. 38, *Vaisakh Sudi 2, V.S.* 1810/1753.
Indore Kharita No. 43, Sawan Vadi 12*, V.S.* 1810/1753.
Indore Kharita No. 49, *Posh Vadi* 5, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
92 *Indore Kharita* No. 43, *Sawan Vadi* 12, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
93 *Indore Kharita* No. 47, *Bhadon Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
94 *Indore Kharita* No. 46, *Bhadon Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1810/1753.
95 *Indore Kharita* No. 48, *Sawan Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1810/1753.

The Marathas did not hide their annoyance over the casualness of Jaipur regarding payment. They kept on pressurizing Sawai Madho Singh for the payment of tribute. In 1754, Holkar asked Sawai Madho Singh to send the money fast.[96]He also reported the failure of the Jaipur officials to pay the salary to the Maratha officials in Jaipur territory as per the agreement.[97] But Sawai Madho Singh knew how to gain time by entering into prolonged negotiations albeit paying only a paltry sum of the promised amount. Reacting to these tactics of Jaipur, the Peshwa's *vakil* commented in 1765:

> "At Malhar's instance we are treating the Jaipur Raja with every tenderness and consideration, but Mahadaji Sindhia has been dunning [pressurizing] him for arrears….This court moves very slowly and protracts business."[98]

But no payment was made even in the years 1756 and 1757 despite constant pressure from Holkar. The evasive attitude of the Jaipur Raja compelled the Marathas to act tough. In fact, in 1756, they reminded Sawai Madho Singh that he owed the throne of Jaipur to the Maratha support. He was reprimanded for the delayed payment. In 1757, Raghunath Rao wrote to Sawai Madho Singh from Shahjahanabad about his failure to pay the installment money for the month of *Kartik*, as per the promise.[99]Throughout the 1750's the Jaipur ruler evaded payment of tribute and the Marathas could do no more than sending reminders and stern warnings.

In fact, Malhar Rao Holkar, in his letter of 1764 mentioned the details of the pending dues since 1761.[100] Rupees 35 lakhs were to be paid in seven annual installments, out of which rupees 10 lakhs were to be paid immediately. Four lakh rupees were demanded in cash by Holkar and the rest in three equal installments, in the coming three months. The entire amount was to be paid between 1765 and 1771.[101] Tukoji also reported to Sawai Prithvi Singh about the harassment caused to his

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96 *Indore Kharita* No. 53, *Jeth Vadi* 11, *V.S.* 1811/1754.
97 *Indore Kharita* No. 60, *Kartik Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1811/1754.
98 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 305.
99 *Indore Kharita* No.72, *Kartik Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1814/1757.
100 *Indore Kharita* No. 87, *Magh Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1821/1764.
101 *Indore Kharita* No. 87, *Magh Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1821/1764.

representative, Pandit Gobind Rao Munshi in village Thikariya of *pargana* Toda. The said village was given to the Pandit in *inam*. Tukoji wrote:

> "Recently we have come to know that the *amil* of Toda has taken over the ownership of the said village from Pandit Gobind Rao."

Sawai Prithvi Singh was requested to restore the village to the *inam* holder.[102] Holkar's *kamavisdars* in pargana Tonk and Rampura continued to report disturbances. Tukoji was compelled to write again and again to Jaipur ruler to take appropriate action.[103] It appears that Holkar's officials were not able to effectively control their possessions in Jaipur territory on their own. Instances of growing confrontation and resistance to their presence became more frequent with the passage of time. Tukoji Holkar wrote repeatedly to the Jaipur Raja to curb disturbances caused by local Rajputs. In 1780, Tukoji Holkar reprimanded Sawai Pratap Singh, the new ruler of Jaipur for his inaction to control disturbances in pargana Tonk.[104] The weakening position of Holkars in Jaipur led to Mahadaji Shinde's intervention on their behalf. He advised the Jaipur ruler to give up hope to regain control over the areas claimed by Holkar. Mahadaji even used veiled threats in his letter to Jaipur ruler if he did not respond positively. He asked the Jaipur Raja to vacate Tonk and Rampura in order to restore cordial relationship failing which he should be ready to face severe consequences.[105]

However, Holkar's officials in pargana Tonk, Rampura, Toda and Malpura continued to face the hostility of local Rajputs. Even Mahadaji's threats could not produce the desired results. Tukoji kept on reminding Sawai Pratap Singh to take action against his Rajputs and restore control to his revenue official Gobind Rao.[106] Repeated instances of resistance and defiance to Holkar's officials in 1780s indicate that his authority in Jaipur was becoming lax. The Holkars in their *kharitas* to Sawai Pratap Singh continued to reprimand him but did not go beyond that. They did not resort to military action against the Jaipur ruler. In the 1790s, Holkar's position in Rajasthan

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102 *Indore Kharita* No. 179, *Posh Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1834/1777.
103 *Indore Kharita* No. 183, *Kartik Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1836/1779.
104 *Indore Kharita* No. 185, *Asarh Vadi* 5, *V.S.* 1837/1780.
105 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 75, *Sawan Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1836/1779.
106 *Indore Kharita* No. 186, *Asoj Sudi* 3, *V.S.* 1837/1780.

was further undermined due to widespread resistance against the Maratha presence in the territories of the Rajput rulers. Thus, from the reign of Sawai Madho Singh to that of Sawai Pratap Singh there was a regular confrontation between the Jaipur rulers and Holkar regarding the issue of tribute. But Holkar could not realize much on account of the Jaipur rulers evasive tactics.

From 1751 onwards, Shinde also followed the issue of tribute payment with Jaipur. Jayappa Shinde's attitude towards Sawai Madho Singh was comparatively soft than Holkar. Although there was a large scale massacre of the Marathas in Jaipur and Shinde's troops suffered immensely, he remained soft to Sawai Madho Singh as the ruler had agreed to pay the tribute as per schedule and the compensation amount also for the damages caused to the Maratha men and money.[107] Even Shinde could not extract more than unfulfilled promises of getting *hundis* for the payment of tribute and other dues from Sawai Madho Singh.[108]After Jayappa's death, his son and successor, Jankoji Shinde turned his attention towards Jaipur after concluding negotiations with Marwar, in 1755. Sawai Madho Singh was asked to make an immediate payment of tribute.[109] At this time the Marathas were facing a cash crunch. Therefore, the Peshwa exerted immense pressure on all his *sardars* for arranging the finances. This forced Jankoji in 1758 to adopt a tough stand towards Jaipur. He wote to Sawai Madho Singh about his pressing need for money. Sawai Madho Singh was asked to pay three lakh rupees out of the tribute amount immediately.[110] To collect this amount, he sent his troops in order to pressurize Sawai Madho Singh to raise this amount from the *sahukars.*[111] Shinde told Sawai Madho Singh to hand over the amount to the Maratha *vakil*, Naro Kashi present in Jaipur. Naro Kashi would then send *hundis* prepared by the *sahukars* and deliver them to Shinde's camp.[112] In 1759 he gave similar

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107 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 156, *Kartik Sudi* 13, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
Gwalior Kharita No. 157, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
108 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 157, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
109 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 160, *Sawan Sudi* 2, *V.S.* 1812/1755; *Gwalior Kharita* No. 163, *Vaisakh Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1813/1756.
110 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 169, *Posh Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
111 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 172, *Posh Vadi* 10, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
112 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 171, *Magh Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1815/1758.

instructions to Sadashiv Bhat, who was present in Jaipur at that time.[113] But Sawai Madho Singh ignored all these demands of payments.

The Maratha defeat in the battle of Panipat was coupled with their financial difficulties.The tribute from Jaipur was also due for a long time. It was against this background that Kedarji and Mahadaji Shinde asked Sawai Madho Singh to release twelve lakh rupees of the tribute. This amount was to be handed over to their representatives *seth* Dhaneshwar and Parshuram. The Marathas did not have money even to meet their day to day needs.[114]Between 1761 to 1763 many letters were sent to Sawai Madho Singh from Shinde demanding money. Sawai Madho Singh probably sent some amount around this time, promising to pay the rest later. This is confirmed from Shinde's *kharita* sent to Sawai Madho Singh in which the former acknowledged the receipt of only one installment.[115] Kedarji also required money at Ujjain, hence he asked the Jaipur ruler for an immediate payment of the current installment of tribute.[116] But Sawai Madho Singh did not give up his delaying tactics.In mid 1763, he reprimanded Sawai Madho Singh for not sending the due installment of the tribute in time. In 1767, Mahadaji dispatched a Maratha contingent under Jaswant Rao Bable to collect arears of tribute amount. He wrote to Sawai Madho Singh: "deposit the arrears with the above mentioned officer. I will also be reaching that side soon."Mahadaji Shinde's resolve to put pressure on Sawai Madho Singh who often defaulted in making timely payment is evident from his *kharita.*[117]Shinde was continuously bothered by the subtle resistance of the Jaipur ruler to the Maratha demand for payment that continued over the years. Sawai Madho Singh's successor, Sawai Prithvi Singh also followed the tactics of his father. Promises made to Shinde were seldom honoured. Shinde's strong letters were sometimes also followed by his representatives visiting the Jaipur court to collect money. The Jaipur ruler had promised to hand over rupees four lakhs to Pandit Gobind Rao but did not honour his words. Therefore, in 1773, Shinde sent Jodhraj and Amarchand Devdas to collect this amount. Sawai Prithvi Singh's successor, Sawai Pratap Singh also followed delaying

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113 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 174, *Chaitra Sudi* 11, *V.S.* 1816/1759.
114 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 242, *Jeth Vadi* 14, *V.S.* 1819/1762.
115 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 179, *Chaitra Sudi* 8, *V.S.* 1820/1763.
116 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 183, *Jeth Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1820/1763.
117 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 190, *Magh Vadi* 9, *V.S.* 1824/1767.

tactics in matters of payments to the Marathas.The anguish of Mahadaji Shinde eventually culminated in the Tunga campaign. Shinde decided to punish the ruler for his repeated failure to pay the arrears of tribute despite repeated reminders and warnings. In 1793, Shinde again reminded Sawai Pratap Singh about the payments to be made. He wrote:

> "Pay to Ganpatrao the amount due for the month of *Jeth* and pay as per schedule agreed upon in future."[118]

The *kharitas* are an ample proof that the Maratha claims were resisted overtly or covertly by all the successive Jaipur rulers from Sawai Madho Singh to Sawai Pratap Singh. From the Maratha side polite requests for sending the agreed amount were followed by stern warnings and open threats. But the Jaipur ruler's response was always lukewarm. The Marathas even appointed their own officials at the Jaipur court for the specific purpose of collecting the dues. That policy also failed miserably. The occasional visits of the Maratha representatives to force the Jaipur ruler to pay did not produce the desired results. The *kharitas* clearly depict the frustration of the Marathas over non payment of money. In 1751, Malhar Rao Holkar wrote to Sawai Madho Singh:

> "Your State had agreed to pay *khandani* dues, now ask your officials to send *hundi* for the amount."[119]

In 1753, he wrote to Sawai Madho Singh: "my representatives, Ganesh Pandit and Shankar Pandit have informed that you have not made payment of tribute which is not good." He warned Sawai Madho Singh to arrange for the payment for the sake of good relations.[120]

In 1757, Raghunath Rao wrote to Sawai Madho Singh:

> "Installment for the month of *Kartik* has not reached, this is not correct, send money fast……..that will be better for you."[121]

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118 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 58, *Asarh Vadi* 13, *V.S.* 1850/1793.
119 *Indore Kharita* No. 20, *Bhadon Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1808/1751.
120 *Indore Kharita* No. 37, *Kartik Sudi* 1, *V.S.* 1809/1752.
121 *Indore Kharita* No. 72, *Kartik Sudi* 10, *V.S.* 1814/1757.

As Sawai Pratap Singh owed sixty three lakh rupees to the Peshwa, a threatening letter was written to him. He was warned not to delay in this matter. The Marathas threatened to ruin Jaipur territories in case the Rajput Raja failed to meet the tribute demand.[122]

Shinde also shared the same experience as Holkar regarding the non payment of dues from Jaipur. This is evident from Shinde's *kharitas* sent from 1752 onwards. For instance, he wrote to Sawai Madho Singh in 1762 about the pending dues amounting to rupees 45 lakhs. In the following year again there was a complaint from Shinde that he did not receive the current installment. Two months later a reminder was sent to clear all pending dues.[123] In 1766, two *kharitas* were written by Mahadaji Shinde raising the issue of non payment of arrears. Moreover, he sent his forces to recover the same.[124] Similarly, in 1770, Peshwa Madhav Rao sent Aapaji Narayan to collect one lakh nine thousand rupees. He also warned Jaipur of dire consequences in case of delay.[125] Incidently, the Peshwa's person was taken a hostage by the Jaipur ruler. In 1771, Mahadaji again asked for the remittance of all dues without any delay.[126] Similar reminders were dispatched in 1775 and 1776. After a long interval Mahadaji again raised the issue of payment in 1784 and asked for immediate payment to his representative, Ratanlal.[127]It becomes evident that the Maratha authority and administration in the territory that they obtained from the Jaipur State was neither systematic nor effective. This was quite unlike their efficient revenue administration in Malwa.

Resistance from Marwar was more overt than covert as Bijay Singh tried hard to offer organized and armed resistance to the Marathas. Marwar also offered a passive form of resistance to the Marathas. The source from which it emanated was not Bijay Singh, the ruler of Jodhpur, but from his officials and nobles. They used the services of *Charans* and *Bhats* for this purpose. According to *Marwar ri Khyat,* they were asked to visit the Marwar villages and articulate in their anti-Maratha songs the

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122 *Indore Kharita* No. 99, *Aghan Vadi* 8, *V.S.* 1815/1758.
123 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 161, *Jeth Sudi* 5, *V.S.* 1812/1755.
124 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 190, *Magh Vadi* 6, *V.S.* 1824/1767.
125 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 139, *Jeth Sudi* 4, *V.S.* 1827/1770.
126 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 136, *Bhadon Vadi* 2, *V.S.* 1828/1771.
127 *Gwalior Kharita* No. 101, *Magh Sudi* 9, *V.S.* 1841/1784.

sufferings and humiliation of the people of Marwar caused due to the Maratha inroads. The thought that lay behind this was to create popular resentment and unrest against the Marathas.[128] In the battle of Merta when the Jodhpur forces were defeated by the Marathas, the high ranking officers of Bijay Singh even had recourse to divine intervention to halt further Maratha advancement and success against Jodhpur. These officers were Sawai Singh Champawat, Khichi Gordhan and Singhvi Gyanmal. They asked Someshwar Ojha to suggest some device which could lead upto some divine intervention to help Marwar to get rid of the Maratha menace and effectively stop the Maratha progress:

> *"Champawat Sawai Singhji, Khichi Gordhanji, Singhvi Gyanmalji, Ojha Someshwarji nai puchhiyo koi iso upaya jap jaap karo tin su Dikhni agha nai vadhe. Tad Somesarji kaiyo Shri hajur su dara nai to Sat Chandi kara to agha nai vadhai."*

Someshwar Ojha recommended the performance of the ritual of *Satchandi Yagya* (sacrifice) to invoke Goddess Durga. But he was unwilling to undertake it due to Bijay Singh's fear. The Ojha felt that it would be the most effective weapon against the Marathas. He said that if this *yagya* was performed they would be able to stop the Marathas from advancing further. But as the nobles and officers had made up their mind to perform the *yagya*, they decided not to inform Bijay Singh as they were apprehensive that he would dissuade them from performing the *yagya.* But they were careful to take his favourite, Gulab Rai *Paswan* into confidence, as a safeguard to handle the situation. Under the direction of Someshwar Ojha, the *Satchandi yagya* was performed in 1790 as per the procedure. The *yagya* lasted for full one month. When it got concluded, Brahmins were invited for feast. They were given lavish presentations that consisted of clothes, utensils, cash and one gold coin each was offered to all the four Brahmin participants.[129] Interestingly, after the battle of Merta, Bijay Singh did not offer any resistance to the Maratha domination. Nor did he join any anti-Maratha venture initiated by Jaipur. A close scrutiny of the *kharitas* shows that Marwar did not trouble the Marathas with regard to it's obligation of tribute

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128 *Marwar Ri Khyat*, p.42.
129 Ibid., p.99.

payment after 1790. The Marathas did not experience much problem as the payment was more or less regular. Bijay Singh, at times was unable to pay in cash, therefore, he paid in the form of valuable articles such as jewellery, camels, elephants, oxen etc.The flow of payment got disrupted only in exceptional circumstances, particularly in times of severe famine conditions. The Marathas, understood the problem of Marwar arising out of such a situation. They also expressed their concern and made necessary adjustment in the payable amount and the time frame within which the revised amount of *peshkash* was to be paid.[130]

In conclusion it can be stated that the Marathas were unable to establish even a modicum of administration in the parganas and villages ceded to them by different rulers of Rajasthan. Even the official machinery created by the Marathas in occupied territories to collect revenue directly was not effective. In other words, the process of slow conquest did not take place in Rajasthan unlike in Malwa. The Rajput rulers, chiefs (*thikanedars*), *zamindars* and people continued to resist the Marathas in various ways. It seems the Marathas were unable to comprehend the complexities involved in the social, local politics of Rajasthan. Hence, their failure to repeat their performance in Rajasthan, what they had achieved in Malwa. As the Marathas did not have the legal authority to administer the occupied territories in Rajasthan, they had to face dispersed resistance in the localities. This reality had dawned on different Maratha *sardars*. That is why they concentrated on extorting tribute money from a centralized source, namely, the Rajput kings. Needless to reiterate that the threatening postures of the Marathas were matched by the evasive tactics adopted by successive rulers of Jaipur.

[130] *Indore-Jodhpur Kharita* No. 44, *Vaisakh Sudi* 15, *V.S.* 1841/1784.

CONCLUSION

The present work tries to clear some of the mist surrounding the Maratha-Rajput relations in the eighteenth century. The two most dominant themes in the major historical writings on eighteenth century India are the disintegration of the Mughal Empire and the rise of the Maratha power. As has been discussed, it was under the leadership of Shivaji that the Marathas gained prominence. He organized them into a force to reckon with. Due to Shivaji's able leadership, the Marathas successfully challenged the mighty Mughal Empire. With the persistent decline in the Mughal power, a number of successor States came into being. From among these, the Marathas emerged as the most successful and spread their power far and wide. Under the Peshwas, by late 1730's, the Maratha power had expanded beyond the Narmada. With their power firmly established in Khandesh, Malwa and Bundelkhand, they made central India as their base. From here they could easily venture into the neighbouring States of Rajasthan and the tracts North of the Chambal and the Yamuna rivers extending from Mathura, Agra belt to Allahabad.

The expansion of the Maratha power in North India in the eighteenth century naturally received wide attention from the Mughal court historians. The foremost among them namely, Khafi Khan, projected only a negative image of the Marathas. He describes in detail the hardships suffered by the Imperial camp. He also mentions the impact of the Maratha raids on the socio-economic life of the townsmen and the villagers in the affected areas.

But in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Mughal perception of the Marathas changed in the context of the historical situation of North India. While Persian accounts of the first half of the eighteenth century contented themselves with straight narration of events pertaining to Maratha inroads, most writers in the second half tried to give their accounts a new historical perspective and vision. It seems that with the appointment of Mahadaji Sindhia as *wakil-i mutlaq* by the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam, the prolonged Mughal-Maratha hostility was moderated. It also marked the beginning of a new era of reconcialiation and adjustment between the two former

adversaries, changing the political scenario of the Delhi court. Efforts were made to work out a system based on mutual co-operation to cope with the growing challenge of British hegemony over North India by establishing peace and order in fairly large areas around Delhi. These trends and tendencies were reflected in the historical literature that developed in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The historians from North India avoided derogatory remarks previously used to explain the Maratha military thrusts and to portray the character of their generals. Now they politely referred to them as Maratha leaders (*sardaran-i Maratha*) or leaders from the Deccan (*sardaran-i Janub*).

The Mughal emperors followed a definite policy towards the Rajputs. The relations of the Mughal emperors and the Rajput rulers were not on a parity. The Rajput rulers were employed by the Mughal emperors, in the Imperial service which was indicated by their holding *mansabs*. As Mughal *mansabdars*, they served as the civil and military officers in the outlying *subas*. In lieu of salary they received jagirs. The Rajput Raja's own territories were regarded as their *watan* jagirs. This implied that they could avail of the full revenues of their dominions and were under no obligation to pay tribute.

But the Emperor expected a *peshkash* especially at the time of a ruler's accession or at the time of being allotted a jagir. The Rajput Rajas were the sword arms of the Mughal Empire and rendered great military service in consolidating the empire politically. In return for their services, they were rewarded with lucrative jagirs. Therefore, joining the Imperial service proved to be very beneficial for the Rajas. Another important feature of the Mughal policy towards the Rajput Rajas was to allow them to rule with minimum Imperial interference and control. At the same time, the Rajas were assured that in case of any external threat, the onus of protecting them would lie with the Emperor. Therefore, there was a feeling of mutual trust and respect.

While examining the Maratha-Rajput relations in the eighteenth century, we have considered the historical context in which they came into contact with each other. In the coronation ceremony of Shivaji, his lineage was linked with the Sisodias of Mewar, who enjoyed a premier status among the Rajput Rajas of Rajasthan.This

struck an amiable cord between the Marathas and the Rajputs. Shivaji's son, Shahu also maintained the respect and dignity of the Mewar Maharana. The relations of the Marathas and the Rajputs should be studied first in the context of Mughal-Maratha relations. It was during this phase that the Rajputs first came in contact with the Marathas. Both, Mirza Raja Jai Singh of Amber and Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Marwar had served as the lieutenants of the Mughal emperors in the Deccan. The declining Mughal power fanned the aspirations of the Rajas of Amber and Marwar. In the period under study, Sawai Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were made the governors of Malwa and Gujarat respectively. Sawai Jai Singh had suggested a policy of judicious compromise while Ajit Singh was bent upon resisting the Marathas. Thus, both followed divergent policies towards the Marathas. However, under the able guidance of the Peshwas, the Maratha *sardars* were pursueing a policy of Northward expansion more carefully yet perseverently.

With Aurangzeb's death, the Mughal Empire witnessed a quick succession of weak Emperors. Mughal weakness gave most opportune time when the Peshwa's policy of Northward expansion could be materialized. It proved fruitful in many ways. Not only did it fulfill the Peshwa Baji Rao's grand Northward scheme, it also helped the Peshwa economically as he could shake off the accumulating burden of debt. Besides this, it became imperative for the Peshwa, to check the fissiperous tendencies and ambitions of the enterprising Maratha *sardars*. This was done by properly channelizing their energy in the campaigns in North India. Under the able supervision of the Peshwas, the Marathas established their control over Malwa and Gujarat. As both Malwa and Gujarat shared their borders with Rajasthan, Rajasthan inevitably had to become their hunting ground in future. It foreboded evil for Rajasthan in general and border States like Kota, Bundi and Mewar in particular.

It was the geographical proximity of Rajasthan to the Maratha dominions that they made their early forays in the Rajput States. Malwa served as a convenient starting point for raids into Rajasthan. They followed the route from the Mukandara Pass and across the Chambal from Malwa via Harauti. From Gujarat they followed the route via Idar and Jalore. The Marathas initially made sporadic raids. But in the wake of the

declining Mughal authority, they were soon formally invited by the Rajput Rajas of Bundi, Jaipur, Marwar and later Mewar to intervene in their succession disputes. In order of chronology, the Rajput State of Bundi was the first to invite Maratha assistance in domestic feuds. The dispossessed Raja of Bundi, Bakht Singh's queen, the sister of Bijay Singh, sent Sawai Pratap Singh to seek Maratha help against Dalel Singh who had been enthroned by Jai Singh. This set an ominous precendent which was followed by the States of Jaipur, Jodhpur and later even Mewar. Succession disputes between Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh of Jaipur and Ram Singh and his uncle Bakht Singh of Jodhpur invited the Marathas to help them achieve their goal of crowning themselves. In return for this support, they promised to pay huge sums of money. At times when they could not pay the due installments, certain territories were transferred to them. Thus, the Marathas entered Rajasthan to settle the domestic feuds, for which they were hired, later they became the masters who levied tribute and ravaged the land whenever they desired.

Everything seemed to work well for the Marathas. As Kota lay on the North of Malwa, the Marathas made it their tributary State. From there they could easily move in the various States of Rajasthan and finally to Delhi and Agra. Ajmer was another strategic location that was coveted by the Marathas. They brought it under their control in 1756. As Ajmer is centrally located in Rajasthan, from here they could keep an eye on all the Rajput States, especially Jaipur, Jodhpur and Mewar. Due to Ranthambhor's strategic location it was also coveted by the Marathas. Besides this, it had a reputation for its strength, solidity and impregnability. The surrender of Tonk and Rampura by Jaipur to the Marathas provided the latter a strong base in the middle of Rajasthan to put pressure on the Rajputs and to carry on military operations as and when required. This study has shown that the political conflict between the Marathas and Rajputs ranged between piecemeal intrusion of Marathas into Rajasthan and headlong military confrontation.

But the relations of the Rajputs with the Marathas were not stable. At the same time their relations were not uniform with all the Rajput States. Jhala Zalim Singh, the regent of Kota was friendly to the Marathas. Though Shivaji claimed his descent from

the Sisodias of Mewar, it did not deter the Marathas to exact tribute from Mewar. Malhar Rao Holkar had exchanged the turban with Abhay Singh and also promised to take care of the interests of his son Ram Singh. But the latters insolent behavior alienated him from Holkar. Despite this, Holkar never supported his rival Bakht Singh. The Bundi Raja's wife had made Malhar Rao Holkar her *rakhi* brother and in that capacity he rendered military help to her husband. Despite maintaining cordial relations the Marathas never let their economic motive loose sight. In the case of Jaipur, the basis of their rendering help to Madho Singh was monetary benefit. Both Madho Singh and Malhar Rao Holkar had exchanged turbans to strengthen their relations, but when the objective was achieved, their relations deteriorated. Clearly, the relations between the Marathas and Rajputs alternated between heightened activity and diminishing interests.

It is also interesting to note that besides providing military assistance in settling the matters of disputed throne, the smaller States like Machheri, Kishangarh and Salumbar looked upon the Marathas as a superior power to settle their inter-state disputes over various issues. Even the States of Kota and Bundi also reached out for Maratha assistance. The Marathas were more than keen to assist them as both these States lay on their route to Northern India and the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. Later, due to the movement of their regular and irregular troops they had to suffer damage. But as good relations prevailed between Zalim Singh and the Maratha leaders, the latter tried not to deliberately cause any damage to their territory. In the long run, these States served as useful allies to the Marathas. Besides providing military help, they also rendered local intelligence. They benefitted the Marathas by availing supply of provision and also served as safe base for their army. The Marathas reciprocated their allies by helping them rise in their social status. A classic example of this was the Rao Raja of Machheri, Pratap Singh Naruka. Belonging to the Naruka sub-clan, Pratap Singh was a non-entity and held a jagir worth two and a half villages. In due course of time, he befriended Mahadaji Sindhia and carved out an independent principality of Alwar. While Jaipur and Jodhpur were resisting the Marathas, the Naruka chief helped Sindhia against them. He wanted to reap the harvest of his friendship with Mahadaji Sindhia by enlarging the territory of his own State, Alwar.

The Rathore State of Kishangarh also served as a useful ally of the Marathas. Their dispute with Jodhpur over territory and with Jaipur over succession to the throne, prompted them to seek Maratha help. The Marathas in turn benefitted with their friendship with Kishangarh as it served a convenient base in their fight against Jodhpur for regaining Ajmer. In this fight, the Marathas were supported by the ruler of Kishangarh. Similarly, Rawat Bhim Singh, the chief of Salumbar and Jhala Zalim Singh, the regent of Kota were also the allies of Mahadaji Sindhia.

The Marathas also created a powerful group of influential supporters in the courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur, in order to augment their prospects. Among these, the name that can be listed first is that of Khushaliram Bohra, the *diwan* of Jaipur. He stood for friendly relations with the Marathas whereas his adversary, Daulat Ram Haldia pursued an open anti-Maratha policy. After differences arose between him and the Jaipur Raja, he was considered to be pro-Marathas. After his fall from grace, he along with his partisans had to flee to the camp of Mahadaji Sindhia, in order to save their lives. This embittered him so much that he provided valuable services to Mahadaji Sindhia by supplying military information related to Jodhpur, their terms for settlement with the Marathas and other such relevant information.

In the case of Jodhpur, Singhvi Fateh Chand, Pradhan Devi Singh and Sawai Singh Champawat were against coming at logger-heads with the Marathas. At times they negotiated terms of settlement with the Marathas. The augmentation of power in the career of Bhawani Ram Bhandari was exclusively due to the support of Mahadaji Sindhia. For his services, he was made the *diwan* of Jodhpur and in this capacity he successfully brought many *sardars* to his side. Gulabrai *Paswan* along with Bhawani Ram Bhandari and *Pradhan* Sawai Singh Champawat were at the helm of political affairs. She not only sent some of the *mutasaddis* as guaranters to Mahadaji Sindhia but imprisoned her opponents at Jodhpur. Along with the *diwan*, Bhawani Ram Bhandari, the *Paswan* shouldered the responsibility of paying the *mamlat* to Mahadaji Sindhia. In return for this financial gain, Mahadaji ignored the rightful claimant, Zalim Singh and sent *tika* for Sher Singh, *Paswan's* favourite. The ex-*diwan*, Govardhan Khichi was faithful to the Jodhpur Raja, Bijay Singh and followed a

strong anti-Maratha policy. Clearly, the Marathas gained and fanned factions in the courts of Rajput kingdoms.

The nature of Maratha intervention in Rajasthan was a bit different from the Mughals. The Marathas tried to impose themselves on the Rajputs and demanded *nazrana*. Like the Mughals they also sent *tika* signifying their paramountcy. When Ram Singh ascended the Marwar throne after the death of Abhay Singh, he was sent a *tika* by Malhar Rao Holkar. When the Jaipur Raja, Sawai Madho Singh died, they demanded *tika nazar* from the new ruler, Sawai Prithvi Singh. In 1756, when the Kota Maharao Durjansal died, his cousin Ajit Singh could succeed to the throne only after promising to pay a sum of rupees forty thousand as succession fee. A few years later when Maharao Ajit Singh died, his son Shatrusal could succeed to the throne after paying a sum of rupees two lakhs. The message was loud and clear that earlier this right was exercised by the Mughals but now the Marathas were the paramount power. In relation to the Rajput States of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur, the term *mamlat* was used for all the Maratha claims. They were also expected to pay their contribution more regularly and without much resistance. The Rajput States could avail of Maratha help only if they paid a sizable amout to them. This considerably increased the financial burden on the Rajput States that ultimately made them detest the Marathas.

But the Mughal objective in Rajputana was seldom economical, in fact, the Rajput Rajas became more prosperous by aligning themselves with the Mughals.. Whereas, in relation to the Marathas, the Rajputs felt as if they were being economically fleeced. The Rajputs served as the military power for the Mughals. Unlike the Mughals, the Marathas failed to make the Rajputs as their swordsmen. The growing needs of the Maratha State demanded more resources and they could secure it only through aggrandizement.If the Mughals had a political motive, the Marathas had a purely economic motive. Under the Mughal care, the Rajas experienced a sense of security and they had also become more prosperous. But the incessant Maratha demands had made them loathful to the Rajas. Besides being a constant strain on the State treasury, there was a stress of being subjected to Maratha depradations, if they did not pay the requisite amount. The Marathas were not interested in annexing them.

Rather they just wanted the Rajputs to recognize them as a paramount power. They were mostly interested in financially benefitting themselves from the Rajput States as much as possible. Even the areas that were transferred to the Marathas mostly lay in the eastern and south-eastern region, which has a more diversified character. It consists of very fertile land and was also rich in the mineral resources. Due to this it enjoyed a brisk agrarian commerce. These areas included Toda, Tonk, Malpura, Fagi, Barwada, Rampura, Chhota Rampura, Sherpura, Gagron, Newai, Sambhar, Khairwa, Masuda and 29 villages of pargana Bhinai etc. Ajmer was blessed with mineral wealth, copper and iron mines. Marble was also quarried in the area adjoining Ajmer. Sambhar was famous for its salt production and trade.

With Maratha help the claimants to the thrones of the Jaipur and Jodhpur States achieved their goals. They tried to pay the promised amount for the help extended but the increasingly exhorbitant demands was a great burden on the State treasuries. For this they had to sometimes transfer certain parganas to the Marathas. But the Maratha officials found it difficult to collect the revenue due to resistance at the local level, which was possible with the support of the Rajas and their officials. The Maratha defeat in the third battle of Panipat accelerated the efforts of the Rajputs to unite against them. They tried to avail of this opportunity to extricate themselves from the Maratha clutches. It also proved to be their last great effort to drive the Marathas out of Rajasthan.

The Maratha-Rajput relations in the pre-Panipat phase were marked by confrontation and conciliation. The pendulum always swung back from cordiality to resistance. There is definitely a change in the Maratha-Rajput relations in the post Panipat phase. The Maratha defeat in the third battle of Panipat had clearly demonstrated to the Rajputs that the Marathas were not as invincible as felt by the Rajputs.The Rajputs tried to unite themselves to oust the Marathas from Rajasthan. The bitterness had become too deep seated. When Mahadaji Sindhia became the regent of the Mughal emperor, the Rajas were asked to pay the arrears that had accumulated over the years. Their success in the battle of Lalsot further emboldened the Rajput Rajas. But Mahadaji did not reconcile with this repulsion. He soon reorganized his forces with

added vigour. It is significant to note that in the battles of Patan and Merta the Rao Raja of Machheri, the Rajas of Karauli and Kishangarh rendered help to the Marathas. It also provides the information about the presence of pro-Maratha faction at the courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur that facilitated the Maratha prospects. Mahadaji's confusion was confounded due to the unco-operative stance of Tukoji Holkar.

In the later half of the eighteenth century, the Maratha activities were largely confined to South-eastern parts of Rajasthan. The reason was that most of the better revenue yielding pockets were located in this part. The areas included were Ajmer, Shahpura, Malpura, Rampura, Tonk, Toda, Sambhar, Kota and Bundi. These areas attracted the interest of the Marathas till the end of the eighteenth century. The importance of these areas also lay in the fact that these were located where frontiers of the three major Rajput States of Marwar, Mewar and Jaipur converged. Perhaps this explains the long term involvement of the Marathas in these parts of Rajasthan despite stiff resistance at several places.

The economic impact of the presence of the Marathas in the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur can be gauged from the economic hardships it brought on the State exchequers of the respective States. It remains an undisputed fact that the Marathas were invited by the contenders to the thrones of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The Marathas readily agreed to extend their support as they could forsee a steady supply of money from these two States. In comparison to Jodhpur, Jaipur had more fertile and revenue yielding territory and hence when the payment could not be made in cash it was commuted in territory. As the Maratha *sardars* themselves were not very vigilant when collection had to be made forcefully, the Maratha army committed atrocities. Due to this not only the crops were damaged but even the property of the people in the towns and villages was plundered. The *amils* of the affected parganas informed that due to the reckless plunder, the *raiyat* of those areas fled from the villages. Not only the countryside was devastated and the *raiyat* ruined, it also led to the decline of agricultural production that further diminished revenue collection. The 1760's and 1770's have gone down in history as the years full of hardships that witnessed the depopulation of villages and decline in agriculture. The Rajput rulers found

themselves in dire straits and had to rely on the bankers for loans. The *chitthis* and the *kharitas* testify to the helplessness and anguish of the Rajput rulers.

The Rajput rulers tried to take advantage of the prevailing unstable political situation and the rift between the Maratha *sardars*. They evaded payment by adopting delaying tactics. Sometimes the payment was not only short but was also marked by irregularity. When the Marathas could not mobilize liquid money they asked the Jaipur Raja to meet the daily requirements of the Maratha officials posted in Jaipur. In the case of Jodhpur, Raja Bijay Singh had to levy extra taxes on the *raiyat* and the jagirdars that paved the way for discontentment among both the sections. The situation was quite grim for the Jodhpur ruler even to perform his courtly affairs.

However, despite the existing hostility between the Rajputs and the Marathas, there was a continuous flow of diplomatic exchange and gifts between the two sides. Unfortunately this aspect of their relations has not been given its due credit in existing historiography. It has been generally perceived that the Rajputs had only bitter memories associated with the Maratha incursions, plunder, devastation and armed conflict. But the present study reveals that they not only maintained the protocol and diplomatic relations but also fulfilled social obligations. The Rajasthani documents throw immense light on the interaction of the Marathas with the societies outside Maharashtra. There was a continuous process of exchange of greetings at the time of coronation, various festivals and performance of marriages. Envoys and representatives from both sides were frequently sent for negotiations and also to clear certain contested issues. Cordiality in the past was frequently invoked and emphasis was laid on further strengthening it. With the expansion of the Maratha power in the North, there was a continuous movement of Maratha officials, dignitaries as well as people from diverse social groups such as traders, bankers, physicians and pilgrims.

The Peshwa and Maratha *sardars* frequently made requests to ensure safety of the Maratha travellers by ensuring them a safe passage through Rajput territory. Jaipur and Jodhpur were often visited by the representatives of the Maratha *sardars* to procure good quality horses, camels and at times even oxen. At times, requests were also made for arbitration and mediation for the settlement of accounts. The Maratha

sardars showed personal interest in promoting trade in the Rajput States. Both the sides co-operated with each other in briefing about the contemporary political developments. Besides this, co-operation was also sought by both in apprehending criminals. The Rajput States were also frequented by Maratha priests and bankers. In order to sustain their relationship, Maratha dignitaries visited the courts of the Rajput rulers and were accorded hospitality as per their status. The sources offer invaluable information regarding the treatment meted out to them and the arrangements made for their stay. Gift items were frequently exchanged between the two sides. However, care was taken to maintain the hierarchy of status on both the sides. Unfortunately, similar information in respect of Jodhpur is not available. Hence it is not possible to examine the nature of gift giving between the Jodhpur rulers and the Marathas. However, it can be safely assumed that the exchange of visits and gifts between the two sides must have been a regular feature of Maratha-Jodhpur relations.

Though the Marathas in general and Shinde in particular expressed their unhappiness and resentment over delaying tactics adopted by the Jaipur rulers with regard to the obligation of tribute payment and transfer of the territory promised to the Marathas, but Shinde was particular not to use harsh words and offensive language in any of the letters of reminders because he did not want to hurt the pride of the Jaipur ruler. This was because in the first place they had not employed the Rajputs. Secondly, their relations were more on an equal footing.Sometimes despite sending numerous letters as reminders when no response was forthcoming, the Maratha *sardars* resorted to mild warnings and wield threats. It was only in situation of extreme provocation that the letters from the Maratha side contained stern warning and threat of military action. The Rajput rulers were reprimanded by the Marathas when the former repeatedly defied and altogether ignored the pleas for a positive response. But all the matters raised in these letters concerned the Maratha affairs in Rajasthan and within the framework of the agreements arrived between the two sides. A survey of these *kharitas* shows that whenever the Maratha *sardars* became uncomfortable with the Rajput Rajas lukewarm response, Raja managed to make a modicum payment of tribute.

The Marathas needed the co-operation of the Rajputs in their pan-regional concerns.On the basis of the present study, it can be concluded that as compared to the Mughal-Rajput relations, the Maratha-Rajput relations were very different. The Marathas had all along tried to rope in the Rajputs in their expansionist policy in the North as well as in the Deccan. But the Marathas never pressurized the Rajputs to become a party in their rivalry with the other powers in the North and the Deccan. This proves that the Marathas did not treat the Rajputs as their subordinates who were under the obligation of rendering military service as and when demanded. The demand for military help of the Rajputs came as a request rather than as a dictate from the Maratha side. Similarly, the Marathas never tried to regulate the dealings of Rajput rulers with powers outside Rajasthan.

In order to avail of Maratha help in fulfilling their aims and objectives, the Rajput Rajas had promised substantial amount to them. At times when this money could not be paid in cash, they transferred their territories to the Marathas under duress, who appointed their officials to collect the revenue of these areas. From the above discussion it is clear that the Marathas never had a well planned policy of establishing their direct administration in the territories transferred to them by the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur. There is absolutely no similarity beween their highly organized, systematic and efficient administrative system of Malwa and their nominal control over administration in the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. In Malwa, they had a well developed bureaucracy that performed specific functions. Though they had appointed their *vakils* and other revenue collecting officials and had also established *thanas*, facts reveal that there was only nominal Maratha authority. While collecting revenue, the Maratha officials faced the problem of dual control. Especially in the case of Jaipur, constant reminders had to be sent to the Raja by both Sindhia and Holkar that his officials be instructed not to create disturbance in the collection of revenue. All this however, implies that there was only fragile Maratha control over the administration of these areas. In fact the Maratha officials were resisted by both the States in myriad ways ranging from diplomacy to armed struggle as well as passive form of resistance.

Before leaving for the Deccan, Mahadaji had settled the affairs of North India. In order to collect the Maratha dues from the Jaipur State, Mahadaji had given the responsibility to two armies there – one under Jiva Dada Bakshi, which was helped by De Boigne's third brigade (commanded by Perron) and the second under Apa Khande Rao. The second army was charged with keeping order in Mewat and also for collecting dues from the Shekhawati chiefs of the Jaipur kingdom. For nine years, from 1792-99, though Jaipur heaved a sigh of relief from the external dangers but internally it was disturbed due to the painful history of Khandela, Khetri and Sikar which was marred by political intrigues and instability. This was also the time when some of the experienced, mature and far-sighted rulers/administrators disappeared from the political scene.Within two years, i.e., from 1793-95 many of the eminent political heads of States died in quick succession one after the other. Raja Bijay Singh of Jodhpur was the first to breathe his last on 7th July, 1793. Mahadaji Sindhia, who had dominated the political sphere of Northern India after the third battle of Panipat, died on 12th February and his son-in-law, Ladoji Deshmukh on 15th April, both in the same year, 1794. Ahalyabai Bai Holkar, who earned the reputation of being one of the most sober and capable administrator, passed away on 13th August, 1795. On 27th October, 1795, Peshwa Madhav Rao II also died. After almost one year, Baji Rao II, occupied the vacant throne and the Marathas headed for their impending disaster. After Mahadaji's death, De Boigne left from Sindhia's service in February, 1796 and his well trained army was to be commanded by Perron, who was much less competent than him.

Sensing internal dissensions among the Maratha leaders that erupted into a civil war between Sindhia and Holkar at Poona, and the breakdown of Daulat Rao's administration, the Rajput Rajas tried to take advantage of the situation. But the misfortunes of Mewar coupled with Lakhwa Dada's victory over the coalition of Jaipur and Jodhpur in the battle of Malpura on 16th April, 1800, destroyed the hope of any future resistance on the part of the Rajputs.

Militarily the Rajput States could not stand the might of the trained battalions of the Marathas. Though their States were devastated, they were not annihilated. They

realized that they could be delivered from their problems only by the rising British power. Hence, from 1803 to 1823, all the Rajput States including Alwar, Karauli, Kota, Jodhpur, Mewar, Bundi, Bikaner, Kishangarh, Jaipur, Banswara, Pratapgarh, Dungarpur, Jaisalmer and Sirohi concluded subsidiary treaties with the British Government.

At the end it may be concluded that the Maratha-Rajput relation is a field of study which despite being impregnated with daunting difficulties needs to be understood on the basis of contemporary documentation and not modern prejudices. In this work we have been able to explore, basing ourselves on a variety of sources, the nuanced and complex facets in the Maratha-Rajput relations during the eighteenth century.

GLOSSARY

1.	*aasamiyan*	–	Contingent of a *jagirdar*.
2.	*ahadnamah*	–	Letter of agreement.
3.	*akhbarat*	–	Newsletter.
4.	*amaldar* (*amalguzar*)	–	Revenue collecter.
5.	*amil*	–	Revenue Collecter of a *pargana*.
6.	*angarakhi*	–	An upper garment, a jacket, vestment.
7.	*aswar*	–	Cavalryman.
8.	*asur*	–	Demon.
9.	*baab*	–	(Persian *abwab*) Tax, cess.
10.	*bakshi*	–	Military pay-master.
11.	*bakshi-ul-mumalik*	–	Commander-in-Chief.
12.	*bania*	–	A merchant, trader, shopkeeper.
13.	*banjara*	–	A gypsey or nomad.
14.	*bhai-bant*	–	Brotherhood, brethren.
15.	*bhanbhi*	–	Leather workers.
16.	*bhat*	–	A Brahmin.
17.	*bigha*	–	Unit of measurement.
18.	*bharna*	–	Miscellaneous articles like jewels, clothes, cattle and valuables.
19.	*bhomia*	–	Holder of *bhom* (*zamindar*).
20.	*bohra*	–	A banker or money lender.

21. *chhadi fauj* – Advanced army.

22. *chamvar* – Fan made of the hair of Yak's tail generally used to fan the idols of Gods, Goddesses and kings.

23. *charan* – A bard.

24. *chaubdar* – Sceptre-holder.

25. *chaudhary* – Hereditary *pargana* semi official.

26. *chauth* – The claim to one-quarter of the government's share of the revenue made by the Marathas.

27. *dakhinis* – Marathas in Persian historiography.

28. *dam* – A copper coin. In the days of Akbar a rupee could be divided into 40 *dams*. During the period of Aurangzeb, the theoretical value of *dam* was put at 1/60 of a rupee. However, the market rate of the *dam* was the basis for the payments in the market by the treasury officials.

29. *darbar-kharch* – Tax levied for the maintenance of court.

30. *daroga* – Superintendent.

31. *desh* – The Maratha country, the plateau area of Maharastra which is located east of the Ghats.

32. *diwan* – Finance and civil administrator; the head of the king's administration, usually the highest civilian office in the kingdom.

33. *diwan-i khas* – Hall of private audience.

34. *dyodhidar* – A person guarding the entrance.

35. *dikhni* – Term used for the Marathas in Rajasthani sources.

36. *farman* – Written order issued by the Emperor, properly attested by his personal seal.

37. *faujdar* – In the Mughal administration, a *sarkar*-level military commander. In Maratha usage, a rural police official.

38. *fauj-kharch* – Money for the maintenance of army.

39. *fitna* – Overthrowing allegiance, rebellion, sedition.

40. *ghanim* – Plunderer, enemy, foe, adversary.

41. *ghas-charai* – Tax levied to keep away the Maratha light horse. The rate was four annas per *bigha*, from peasants and rupee one per family from others.

42. *hakim* – A commander, a governor, in-charge of the *pargana* who looked after the civil and military administration of the area under his control.

43. *harkara* – Messenger.

44. *hasil* – Collected tax on the basis of measurement of land/crops.

45. *hasil mamur* – Less revenue realization.

46. *harem* – Seraglio.

47. *haveli* – Mansion.

48. *hundi* – Bill of exchange.

49. *inam* – Hereditary tax exempted grant for special services or merit.

50. *ijara* – Revenue farming.

51. *jama* – Estimated revenue, a formal assessment of the revenue of an area.

52. *jakhira* – Fodder tax.

53. *garh* – Fort.

54. *kamdar* – Agent or representative.

55. *kamavisdar* – Maratha local administrator and revenue collecters. His jurisdiction was usually several parganas.

56. *khandani* – Tribute, paid without assessment of land or revenue.

57. *khalisa* – Crown domain, not assigned in *jagir*.

58. *khansama* – A butler.

59. *kharif* – Autumn crop.

60. *kharita* – A letter addressed from one Raja to the other.

61. *khasgi* (land) – Private land.

62. *khasa-sawari* – Reserved conveyance.

63. *khawas paswan* – Personal attendants.

64. *khillat* – Robe of honour.

65. *mahajan* – Trader cum moneylender.

66. *malba* – Common expenses of the village.

67. *mamlat* – Dues.

68. *mamlatdar* – Official, collecter.

69. *mutasaddi* – A class of officers and ministers.

70. *muzumdar* – General term for records-keeper, often an auditor.

71. *malzamini* – Surety.

72. *mansab* – Rank conferred by the Mughal Emperor.

73. *mansabdar* – Holder of a rank.

74. *modi* – A grain dealer.

75. *mohar* – Gold coin.

76. *mokasadar* – Holder of an assignment of land or land-revenue ; also the designation of the 3/4th fraction of the Maratha levies; an official deputed to collect an assigned portion of the government's share of the revenue.

77. *moondkati* – Compensation for being behead.

78. *mukhtiyar* – An agent, an attorney.

79. *mukkadam* – Village headman.

80. *munshi* – Generally a clerk of high rank.

81. *musayab* (*musahab*) – A companion, a wealthy man, a bodyguard.

82. *mutalik* – Deputy minister.

83. *naib subedar* – A Mughal term for deputy governor.

84. *nazar* – Formal gift to a superior, often in return for the grant of rights to revenue. Broadly, a gift. More specifically, the gift paid to government upon taking up an office.

85. *nazrana* – Gift, usually from inferior to superior, also forced contribution.

86. *nazir* – Inspector.

87. *nisar* – Propitiatory gift.

88. *ol* – Surety.

89. *paagbandi* – Tying of turban.

90. *paga* – Foot soldiers.

91. *pala* – Infantry.

92. *palki* – A sedan-chair, for travelling.

93. *paltan* – A brigade, battalion, regiment.

94. *pan-charai* – Expenses accruing from the giving of betel leaf, on the occasion of honourable reception.

95. *panch-mahajans* – Panchayat of traders.

96. *panihar* – One who brings waterpots on his head.

97. *pargana* – The lowest administrative unit at which the Mughal revenue machinery operated.

98. *parwana* – Order, licence.

99. *pataka* – Banner.

100. *patil* – Village headman.

101. *patta* – Document given by collecter of revenue to the revenue payer stating terms on which the land is held and the amount payable.

102. *pattayat* – Holder of the *Patta*.

103. *patel Sahib* – Term used for Mahadaji Sindhia

104. *peskabaj* – A dagger worn in front.

105. *peshkash* – Tributary or honorary payment.

106. *peth* – A sector or district of a city usually centered on a market.

107. *Pradhan* – Ministers

108. *qanungo*	–	*Pargana*-level records-keeper.
109. *qalandar*	–	Sufi monk, carefree person.
110. *qazi*	–	Muslim judge, whose decisions were based on Sharia law.
111. *qiledar*	–	Military officer in charge of the fort.
112. *rahdar*	–	Toll collecter.
113. *rahdari*	–	A levy on the goods passing from one political jurisdiction to another. It was essentially a sovereign tax. No *thikanedar* or *pattadar* could enjoy *rahdari* rights unless such rights have been conferred on him by the state.
114. *raiyat*	–	Cultivator, peasant.
115. *raiyati*	–	Peasant held land.
116. *rekh bab*	–	Tax on income.
117. *riyayati*	–	A favoured or privileged person, one to whom remission or concession is granted.
118. *sadr sarkar*	–	Headquarters district.
119. *sahukar*	–	Term used for businessman, money lender, indigenous banker.
120. *sanad*	–	Official document or decree; a contract, specifying rights and responsibilities.
121. *saranjam*	–	Non-hereditary grant for maintenance of troops.
122. *saranjamdar*	–	Holder of an assignment of land or land-revenue.
123. *sardar*	–	Broad term used for noble or noble family.
124. *sardaran-i janub*	–	Leaders from the Deccan.

125. *sardarn-i maratha* – Maratha leaders.

126. *sardeshmukhi* – The claim to one-tenth of the government's share of the revenue, based on a position as *sar-deshmukh* or head of the *deshmukhs*, generally a royal right.

127. *sarkar* – A Mughal administrative division, smaller than a *suba*, and usually composed of several *parganas*.

128. *sar-o- pao* – From head to foot

129. *sawar* – Cavalry.

130. *ser* – Unit of weight, about 930 grams.

131. *shatchandi yagya* – Sacrifice to invoke Goddess Durga.

132. *sirpech* – Bejewelled headgear, given by Emperor as a special favour.

133. *suba* – Province.

134. *subedar* – The administrative and military head of a province.

135. *subedarji* – Term used for Malhar Rao Holkar

136. *taalluqa* – A revenue unit (*talukka*), generally consisting of a number of villages.

137. *taalluqdar* – One who contracted to collect and pay the revenue of a revenue unit.

138. *tabinan* – Contingents.

139. *tagai* – Agricultural loan.

140. *tankhwah jagir* – Revenue assignment salary.

141. *tazimi* – Ceremonial and respectful treatment/status.

142. *thakur* – Rajput chief, holder of a *thikana*.

143. *thana* – Chowki, military post.

144. *thanadar* – Officer in-charge of a military post.

145. *thikana* – Landed estate of a Rajput chief or *thakur*.

146. *thori* – Name of a caste.

147. *tika* – Coronation.

148. *tika nazar* – Succession fee.

149. *udik* – Charitable endowment.

150. *vahada* – Fear/uproar.

151. *vakil* – Ambassador, representative for example, the agent of one state at another king's court.

152. *wakil-i-mutalaq* – Regent Plenipotentiary (Chief executive head).

153. *watan jagir* – Hereditary dominions of Rajput kings.

154. *wazir* – Prime Minister.

155. *wizarat* – Office of the Wazir.

156. *zamindar* – A broad Mughal term covering a variety of hereditary superior elements standing above the peasantry and usually leaders of their caste.

157. *zamindari* – An estate, landed property.

158. *zat* – A personal numerical rank of a Mughal mansabdar denoting his status.

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